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ALINE BURNI PEREIRA GOMES

GOVERNMENT AGENDA UNDER ELECTORAL PRESSURE:
THE IMPACT OF RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES ON IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN
WESTERN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES (1980-2010)

Belo Horizonte
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WESTERN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES (1980-2010)

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Supervisor: Dr. Magna M. Inácio
Co-supervisor: Dr. Felipe Nunes dos Santos

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ATA DA DEFESA DE TESE DA ALUNA
ALINE BURNI PEREIRA GOMES

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( ) Reprovada

Finalizados os trabalhos, lavrei a presente ata que, lida e aprovada, vai assinada por mim e pelos membros da Comissão.

Belo Horizonte, 10 de junho de 2019.

Profa. Magna Maria Inacio _____
Orientadora (DCP/UFMG)

Prof. Felipe Nunes dos Santos _____
Co-orientador (DCP/UFMG)

Profa. Maria de Fatima Junho Anastasia _____
(PUC Minas)

Prof. Pedro Feliú Ribeiro _____
(USP)

Prof. Jorge Alexandre Barbosa Neves _____
(DSO/UFMG)

Prof. Carlos Ranulfo Felix de Melo _____
(DCP/UFMG)

I dedicate this work to all migrants and refugees who bravely (and many times forcedly) leave their countries of origin to (re)start their lives in a different and occasionally hostile place. Not an easy task, but often (hopefully) worthwhile. Their successful journeys are particularly important for host societies, who benefit from migrants' cultural and economic invaluable contributions.

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Minor parties that succeeded in passing the threshold of representation, even though they are electorally weak, function in various ways. . . They challenge either the ideological and symbolic aspects of the system or its rules of the game . . . Because of the ways they bypass obstacles, they are also initiators of new patterns of political competition. As such, they are relevant to the political system and to its understanding. (Herzog 1987: 326)

ABSTRACT

From a comparative perspective, this dissertation studies the impact of Radical Right Parties (RRPs) on the restriction level of immigration policies in the area of controls, in Western Europe. It develops a model of drivers of the level of restriction of immigration control policies guided by four dimensions: electoral competition, characteristics of governments, institutions, and contextual factors. Considering that the emergence and electoral persistence of Radical Right Parties in Western Europe have raised the salience of the immigration issue in the broader political agenda, pushing established parties to respond in the electoral competition, to what extent do national governments enact more restrictive immigration policies in reaction to RRPs' electoral performance? By increasing their electoral support, can RRPs influence immigration policies towards a more restrictive direction, or only when they enter governing coalitions and have the potential to exert a more direct impact? The central argument states that electoral competition is key to understand recent changes in the restrictiveness level of immigration policies. The main hypothesis is that parties in government will adopt more restrictive immigration control policies when RRPs get relevant support in elections, but this effect is conditioned to institutional factors, in particular the type of electoral system. Moreover, RRPs are also expected to directly push for more restrictive controls over immigration when they become formal or informal partners in a governing coalition. The main findings point that Radical Right Parties are able to exert influence on immigration control policies towards more restrictive directions, although this influence is low. Their electoral performance has a small positive effect on the restriction level of immigration control policies, being higher in majority and mixed electoral systems, contrary to initial expectations. This suggests that the contagious effect of RRPs on established parties is higher in more disproportional systems. In these systems, established parties feel more pressured to adapt their policies in government in order not to lose electoral support and, therefore, lose power. RRPs also push for more restrictive immigration control policies when they support the government, being able to advance their anti-immigration preferences to some extent, even controlling for the type of electoral system. The empirical analysis is based on linear models with random effects and focuses on immigration policies of national governments in 17 Western European countries within the period from 1980 to 2010.

Keywords: Radical Right, Immigration policy, Political Parties, Government Agenda, Western Europe

RESUMO

A partir de uma perspectiva comparativa, esta tese estuda o impacto dos Partidos de Direita Radical (PDRs) no nível de restrição das políticas de controle de imigração, na Europa Ocidental. São elaborados modelos de fatores explicativos do nível de restrição das políticas de controle imigratório, orientados por quatro dimensões: competição eleitoral, características dos governos, instituições e fatores contextuais. Considerando-se que o surgimento e a persistência eleitoral dos Partidos de Direita Radical na Europa Ocidental aumentaram a saliência da questão da imigração na agenda política de forma mais ampla, pressionando os partidos estabelecidos a responder durante a competição eleitoral, em que medida os governos nacionais adotam políticas mais restritivas de imigração em reação ao desempenho eleitoral dos PDRs? Ao incrementar seu apoio eleitoral, os PDRs conseguem influenciar as políticas de imigração em direção a uma tendência mais restritiva, ou apenas quando entram em coalizões governamentais e têm o potencial de exercer impacto mais direto? O argumento central afirma que a competição eleitoral é fundamental para entender as recentes mudanças no nível de restrição das políticas de imigração. A hipótese principal é de que os partidos no governo adotam políticas de controle de imigração mais restritivas quando os PDRs conquistam apoio relevante nas eleições, mas este efeito está condicionado a fatores institucionais, particularmente ao tipo de sistema eleitoral. Além disso, os PDRs também devem pressionar diretamente por controles mais restritivos sobre a imigração quando se tornam membros formais ou informais da coalizão governista. As principais conclusões apontam que os Partidos de Direita Radical são capazes de exercer influência nas políticas de controle de imigração em direções mais restritivas, apesar desta influência ser baixa. O desempenho eleitoral desses partidos possui um efeito positivo pequeno no nível de restrição das políticas de controle imigratório, sendo mais expressivo em sistemas eleitorais majoritários e mistos, contrariamente a expectativas iniciais. Isso sugere que o efeito de contágio dos PDRs nos partidos estabelecidos é maior em sistemas mais desproporcionais. São nesses sistemas em que os partidos estabelecidos se sentem mais pressionados a adaptar suas políticas no governo, com o intuito de não perder apoio eleitoral e, consequentemente, perder poder. PDRs também pressionam por políticas de controle imigratório mais restritivas quando apoiam o governo, sendo capazes de avançar, em certa medida, suas preferencias anti-imigração, mesmo controlando-se pelo tipo de sistema eleitoral. A análise empírica baseia-se em modelos lineares com efeitos aleatórios e concentra-se nas políticas de imigração dos governos de 17 países da Europa Ocidental no período de 1980 a 2010.

Palavras-chave: Direita Radical, Políticas de Imigração, Partidos Políticos, Agenda Governamental, Europa Ocidental

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"The response of the mainstream parties to the resurgence of extreme right parties has often been the incorporation of part of the far right's agenda into their own programs. Over the past decade, many parties – on the left as well on the center-right – have proposed more restrictive policies on immigration, naturalization, and asylum rights. They have urged more repressive police measures to combat rising crime rates and the decline in the sense of domestic security. Mainstream parties have sought to regain lost terrain by promising stricter enforcement of drug laws and cleaning up of low-cost, crime-ridden public housing. They are more aggressive in finding and prosecuting corruption in their own ranks.". (Wilson 1998: 257)

In different countries, radical and challenging political parties, from the left as well as from the right, have become viable electoral alternatives in their party systems. Radical Right Parties (RRPs) have been particularly successful in Western European advanced democracies. These party organizations, characterized by identitarian politics, authoritarian values and populist style, have generally emerged around the 1970s and 1980s, and considerably increased their electoral support since the 1990s. At this point, RRPs have formally or informally participated into governing coalitions at the national and sub-national levels in countries like Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, among others. By gaining progressive shares of the vote, RRPs have introduced their core topics into the broader political agenda, affecting positions and the behavior of established parties, particularly on the issue of immigration (Abou-Chadi and Krause 2018; Akkerman 2015a; Schain 2006).

Several studies about the Radical Right have assessed the reasons behind their emergence and provided explanations for their electoral performance variation, both across and within countries (Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Mudde 2007; Stockemer 2017). These studies have shown that the anti-immigrant stance of the Radical Right is the clearest driver of their support (Ivarsflaten 2005). Immigration is also among the most contagious policy issues affecting mainstream parties. According to Jackman and Volpert (1996: 503): "in responding to the positions adopted by parties of the extreme right, other parties move closer to those policy locations. In the process, extreme-right positions obtain a place in the mainstream political agenda, and thus accrue a degree of legitimacy".

One research area that still deserves more studies concerns the effects of the emergence and persistent political success obtained by Radical Right Parties. In particular, scholars have been

interested in questions about whether and to which extent RRPs affect their party systems, public opinion, the democratic regime and policy-making (Bale 2003; Minkenberg 2001; Mudde 2016; Williams 2006). From existing research in this field, RRPs seem to affect their party systems and electoral competitions, but it remains unclear whether their influence on policy-making is significant, marginal or inexistent.

The present work is particularly interested in the influence of Radical Right Parties on their core issue: immigration policy. The aim is to assess the extent to which their electoral strength is an important driver of more restrictive immigration control policies in Western European democracies, and under which conditions RRPs are able to affect these policies. The analysis takes into account that immigration policy is a multidimensional concept, composed of a different areas and tools of regulations. Therefore, to assess the impact of Radical Right Parties it is important to consider the different logics driving areas of immigration policy and ponder that such parties are expected to affect specific aspects of measures regulating the entry and stay of foreigners, instead of all areas of immigration policy.

The main argument is that Radical Right Parties can have indirect and direct influence on immigration policy outcomes, because parties in government tend to react to their political strength. RRPs can indirectly affect policy-making by electorally threatening established parties, who tend to co-opt the Radical Right's core issues and positions. The contagion of established parties by the Radical Right is likely to be felt in terms of policy outputs, because of the activity that co-opting parties develop in government after adapting their positions and strategic choices during elections. The expectation is that this effect is mediated by institutional arrangements. Additionally, RRPs can directly affect policy-making when they participate as formal or informal governing coalition partners, given that, in this position, they can negotiate political support in exchange of policies and directly shape policy-making to a certain extent.

Nevertheless, political parties in general and RRPs in particular are not the only actors driving immigration policies. Based on the specialized literature, this work highlights four dimensions of potential explaining factors to account for variations of immigration policies over time and across countries. These are the electoral competition, characteristics of governments, institutions and contextual factors. The electoral competition refers to disputes between political parties during elections, in which the threat represented by Radical Right Parties and their contagious effect on mainstream parties are taken as drivers of more restrictive immigration policies being

adopted. Ideological features and the type of government –majority/minority and coalition/single-party – are important traits to understand trends on immigration policies as well, since the literature emphasizes that right-wing cabinets tend to implement more restrictive measures to regulate immigration, while left-wing parties tend to liberalize them. In addition, the presence of RRPs in governments provide them with higher potential to directly affect policy-making. Therefore, it is expected that governments with support or participation of RRPs will enact more restrictive immigration policies.

In addition to domestic political factors, national and international institutions are pointed out in the literature as able to either block restrictive changes or induce the expansion of immigrants' rights. Particularly important in this discussion is the role of the European Union, expected to be a liberalizing force, and the existence of a mechanism of judicial review, which tends to act as counter-majoritarian force regarding anti-immigration pressures. Finally, the context in which governments operate can also affect decisions to restrict or liberalize immigration policies. As a matter of fact, the literature points out that when economic conditions deteriorate – indicated here by the level of unemployment in the country – governments tend to limit the entrance of foreigners, because of reduced job offer and rising dissatisfaction of the host society. Furthermore, when inflows of asylum seekers are higher, decision-makers could also be pressured to implement stricter controls of their borders, in attempt to reduce the volume of newcomers.

The electoral competition, overall characterized by the rising support for Radical Right Parties in Western Europe, is considered a central dimension to explain the observed trend towards more restrictive controls over immigration in the region since the 1980s. It is argued that parties in government are likely to react to RRPs' electoral strength by adopting more restrictive controls over immigration. National governments still have a considerable room of maneuver over immigration controls. In addition to that, RRPs clearly advocate for border closure, and immigration control is explicitly linked to other concerns also raised in their electoral appeal, notably crime, terrorism, national sovereignty and welfare-abuse. In sharp contrast with the liberalization of immigration policies within the European Union and the freedom of movement that benefits EU-citizens, controls over immigration have clearly followed a stricter trend over the last years. This area specially affects foreigners of non-European decent, who are the main target of anti-immigrant parties.

To fulfil the aim of this dissertation, which is to assess if and the extent to which the restriction level of immigration control policies increases in response to the strength of Radical Right Parties, this work has the following specific objectives:

- To explain the direct and indirect theoretical mechanisms and the logics behind the influence of Radical Right on immigration policies of control;
- To clarify that there are multiple areas within immigration policies and that not all of them are subject to the influence of RRPs;
- To define Radical Right Parties based on a set of policy preferences, which focuses on cultural issues and are more radical than mainstream parties' policy positions;
- To estimate, in a comparative perspective, the impact of RRPs on immigration control policies accounting for rival explanations behind policy outputs in this area.

To test the central argument, I built a dataset from secondary sources, covering 17 Western European countries over the period 1980-2010. With this data, I developed linear models with random effects to estimate the effect of Radical Right Parties on the restrictiveness level of immigration control policies. This is one of the first and still scarce large-N longitudinal studies interested in the effect of Radical Right Parties on immigration policies up to this point. This quantitative approach has the advantage of providing external validity, and to control for rival hypothesis simultaneously included in the analysis.

Another contribution of this work is that it considers a very specific area of immigration policy, in which RRPs have a clearly defined position: controls over immigration. The choice to focus on a particular area within the field of immigration policy is an advantage because it captures the nuances within this policy issue in a disaggregated manner. This strategy is not limited to distinguishing immigration policies from integration and citizenship policies, as done by other studies (Akkerman 2015a; Lutz 2019), but it focuses on an aspect of immigration that is central for the appeal of the Radical Right. Besides, most works assessing this specific question are restricted in terms of timeframe and number of cases, which limits their ability to generalize or even quantify the size of RRPs effect. Because of the underlying qualitative nature of most existing studies, it is often hard to precise the magnitude of RRPs' influence on policy-making.

The main findings of this analysis show that RRPs' electoral strength is only a moderate driver of the government agenda on immigration, and their effect is conditioned to institutional factors, particularly the electoral system. Interestingly, the analysis finds that RRPs' contagious effect

tends to be lower in proportional electoral systems, rather than in majority or mixed systems. Radical Right Parties also have influence on the restriction level of immigration control policies when they participate in governing coalitions, controlling for the electoral system.

The first chapter of this dissertation theoretically discusses the connection between immigration policy, electoral competition and Radical Right Parties. It defines and explains the general research design of this work, by contextualizing the investigation question and presenting the theoretical framework. The chapter further explores the mechanism behind the influence of RRPs on immigration policies, as well as the dimensions of analyses and hypotheses underlying the empirical study.

The second chapter is devoted to immigration policies, further exploring its drivers and trends in Western Europe over the last decades. Based on the comparative immigration policies literature, the chapter argues that immigration policy is a multidimensional concept, and diverse categories of immigrants have predominated in European receiving countries over distinctive periods. It also identifies the drivers of immigration policies as discussed by the specialized literature, and explores one the most prominent questions within this set of works: are national-states still capable to decide on their immigration policies in a globalized world? The argument for different logics and forces affecting areas of immigration is followed by a discussion on the concept of policy agenda and sources of measurement of immigration policies in a comparative perspective. This chapter also explores the evolution of trends of different areas of immigration policies. By the end, it links the immigration issue more clearly to Radical Right Parties, considered to have implemented an issue-entrepreneurship strategy by mobilizing on immigration. The argument in the second chapter emphasizes the relevance of national-level political actors in framing the immigration issue, and the particular expectation of Radical Right's influence in certain areas more than others. However, it also calls attention to constraints that national governments may face to implement regulations that are more restrictive.

The third chapter is concerned with the concept of Radical Right Parties. Is there a Radical Right Party family? If so, how is it defined? The advanced argument states that Radical Right Parties are better defined based on three features: identitarian politics, authoritarian values and a populist style. Based on data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), it is showed that RRPs tend to attribute significantly more importance to cultural issues than traditional ones, and that they often hold more radical positions than mainstream parties. Although there is a level of heterogeneity

within this party family – less so than among Liberals and Christian-Democrats – they are clearly united around very negative, salient and radical positions on issues of immigration and multiculturalism. The chapter also briefly discusses explanations behind the rise and electoral success of Radical Right Parties, since these factors can be closely linked to their ability to influence the broader political agenda and immigration policy-making in particular.

The fourth chapter presents the data and research design, specifying the empirical strategies implemented in this work. The fifth chapter develops the multivariate analysis and discusses the findings in light of the analytical model and the literature. At the end of this dissertation, the concluding section highlights its main contributions, implications and limitations.

CHAPTER 1

Immigration Policies, Electoral Competition and Radical Right Parties

Introduction

To what extent do Radical Right Parties (RRPs) drive more restrictive immigration policies in Western Europe? Under which circumstances do parties in government react to the electoral performance of RRPs regarding their anti-immigration agenda? This chapter presents and contextualizes the research question under investigation, the theoretical framework, as well as the hypotheses guiding this work. The chapter starts by announcing the topic and research questions under investigation, in this introduction. After that, it briefly revisits two sets of specialized literatures that are the building blocks of this work: on comparative immigration policies and on Radical Right Parties. Following that, the chapter explains the general argument, which emphasizes that electoral dynamics in which RRPs become relevant challengers to mainstream parties are key to understand variation of policy outputs in the area of immigration. Then, it discusses the theoretical mechanism behind the expected impact of Radical Right Parties on immigration policies. The final section presents the dimensions of analysis and hypotheses guiding the empirical study.

The main aim of this dissertation is to understand the extent to which Radical Right Parties influence the increasingly restrictive level of immigration control policies in Western Europe over the period from 1980 to 2010. Two possible mechanisms of influence are plausible. The first way that RRPs' could affect the immigration agenda is indirectly, by receiving relevant shares of the vote and pressuring other political parties to co-opt their anti-immigration agenda. The second one relates to a more direct impact, in which the effect of RRPs' informal or formal presence in government coalitions is considered as an explaining factor to the adoption of more restrictive immigration policies.

Topic under study and research question

Immigration to developed countries, particularly in Western Europe, has taken place for decades. However, there is growing political attention towards this specific issue over the last years. Since the late 1980s, immigration has been highly politicized, taking a central place in elections, party platforms, voters' priorities, and government attention. The Brexit referendum was highly driven by immigration concerns, as well as recent elections in France, Italy, Austria, and the Netherlands. In Austria, for instance, the centrality of immigration during the 2017 electoral competition favored the formation of an unusual governing alliance between the parties of the center-right and the radical right. In France, President Emmanuel Macron, elected in 2017, implemented an immigration reform in the early months of his term, after winning the second round against the radical right candidate, Marine Le Pen. By different mechanisms, immigration seems to enter governments' agendas, of various ideological orientations.

This policy issue has been particularly salient during the 2015 refugee crisis in Europe, but such attention remains high even after decreasing numbers of asylum seekers from 2016 onwards. Additionally, political attention to immigration has not been straightforwardly connected to the presence of immigrants or the volume of refugees arriving in Europe. It started to enter the political debate long before the asylum crisis, and it gained political attention in countries with very different immigration experiences.

While issues related to the immigration phenomenon can be framed in many ways, a major factor responsible for its politicization, or framing as a central political concern, are Radical Right Parties (RRPs). RRPs frame immigration mainly through cultural and security lenses. In their perception, high inflows of foreigners represent a threat to national identity, and traditional ways of live are considered endangered by the presence of visibly different customs, beliefs and values within the national territory. Such presence also represents a security threat in the view of these anti-immigrant political groups, since the intense border crossing can allow the entrance of potential terrorists. Furthermore, specific foreign origins are frequently associated, by common sense, to criminal and unlawful attitudes, and the overseas background of some perpetrators of past terrorist attacks feeds further suspicion towards different cultures and ethnicities. On the other side, there are countries in which the immigration issue is not traditionally very important in politics and, in general, public opinion and governments have been open and committed to the integration of foreigners, like in Spain (Arango 2013).

Immigration is among the top concerns of the public in most advanced democracies, and RRPs constantly mobilize on anti-immigration attitudes (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Ivarsflaten 2005). In this context, decision-makers have been confronted with urgent needs of response to growing inflows. They cannot simply ignore immigration as a political issue. In the setting of intense globalization and the consolidation of the European Union, movements of people across national borders acquire significant importance and intensity, being one of the most prominent phenomena of the present era. Governments also face the challenge of multiple policy areas affected by the arrival and settlement of immigrants, such as housing, health services, employment, and integration. In short, immigration is a complex issue affecting post-industrial societies and governments.

This dissertation seeks to understand the extent to which the electoral pressure of Radical Right Parties is an important driver, among others, of cross-national and longitudinal variation of governments' immigration policy agenda in Western European countries. Given that immigration is a core issue for RRPs, and previous studies have suggested restrictive patterns characterizing immigration politics and policies across Western European countries in recent years, - but not without important disparity - the main questions to be investigated in this work are the following: 1) to what extent is the increasing restriction level of immigration control policies explained as a reaction to the electoral performance of RRPs? 2) By increasing their electoral support, can RRPs influence immigration policies towards a more restrictive direction, or only when they enter governing coalitions and have the potential to exert a more direct impact?

The expectation that Radical Right Parties affect immigration policy outputs is grounded on the Downsian spatial theory of party competition that expects parties to implement public policies which are closer to the median voter, so they can get reelected in the future (Downs 1957). Inspired on the idea of party political agenda, found in Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008), which refers to the agenda of key political decision-makers and consists on the issues that political parties focus upon in their competition for voters, the government political agenda, as defined in this work, refers to the issues and approaches that parties in the national government focus during their period in office. This conception of political agenda is different from the classic policy agenda setting and from the media agenda setting approaches, as they are usually defined. The government political agenda refers to the topics under major attention of political parties that control the national government, as well as their approach of such issues. Though

preferences placed at the center of the government agenda may or may not result in approved laws, the political agenda of governments is of crucial importance in determining which issues are perceived as politically relevant by parties in charge of the government, and as such, will be put on the table for further consideration in the policy-making process.

The political agenda highlights central concerns of parties responsible for the national government. Therefore, it points out to the policy areas and directions towards which governing parties are willing to engage their major efforts as the ruling executive body. This is a key element of representative democracies, with consequences that go beyond specific government decisions, but can have medium- and long-term repercussions on public policy and party competition. This locus of attention allocation by governments establishes which issues are likely to be further discussed inside the legislative and executive branches, how they will be framed, and how important they are to the elites holding power. Under different institutional arrangements, the path through which a policy issue in processed also indicates its level of importance to parties in government, as well as its level of consensus or division as a policy issue.

Periodical elections are one of the defining features of representative democracies, and parties are central actors in the process of connecting public demands to state laws and government actions. Therefore, parties tend to also bring their most relevant issues to public debate during elections. Additionally, incumbent parties are expected to be accountable to the public. They wish to be recognized for their achievements in government, and to gain credibility for efficiently managing priority policy issues. In this sense, agendas go through cycles, and they can be reinforced or contested in different arenas of politics. Political parties are major actors for determining which issues are important in politics, how they are framed, and how they effectively turn into policies and laws, because they act as intermediators between interests of the public and policy outcomes.

The discussion throughout this dissertation considers that RRPs have benefited from immigration issue-entrepreneurship strategies[1] (Hobolt and de Vries 2015), and political issues at the core of their appeal gained salience among the public and the party system agenda (Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2017) over the last years. The general argument states that RRP's electoral performance is

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[1] "Issue entrepreneurship refers to a strategy by which parties mobilize issues that have been largely ignored in party competition and adopt a policy position on the issue that is substantially different from the mainstream status quo." (Hobolt and de Vries 2015: 3)

an important factor to account for recent changes on immigration policies towards a more restrictive direction, particularly in the area of controls over immigration. However, because national-level political dynamics and institutional factors do matter to understand policy outputs in the area of immigration, the direct or indirect influence of Radical Right Parties could happen with different intensities and by different means depending on the setting. For example, their influence can be different in proportional and non-proportional electoral systems. The initial expectation is that RRPs should be able to influence immigration policies towards a more restrictive direction when they represent a threat to mainstream parties. In theory, the perceived threat by established parties is projected to be higher when RRPs are inserted in a system that favors the entrance of challengers. Nevertheless, the increasing popularity of Radical Right parties is not considered to be the *only* driver of more restrictive immigration policies, neither their pressure to be able to promote policy changes under any setting. Rather, the aim is to bring this additional element of the Radical Right's electoral strength into the discussion of policy outputs, arguing that these radical competitors can be key drivers of more restrictive immigration policies under certain circumstances.

1.1 Immigration as a political issue

The following parts of this chapter revisit two sets of literatures that are important to study the impact of Radical Right parties on immigration policies, but that, usually, are not connected to each other. The first one regards immigration and comparative immigration policies. The advanced discussion states that immigration has been mobilized as a political issue. Additionally, policies in this area remain largely contested and driven by political factors at the national level, although important institutional, judicial and normative constraints do operate. The second set of literature focuses on the phenomenon of the Radical Right itself and is concerned with the effects of the emergence and growing popularity of Radical Right Parties on liberal democracies more generally, among which their influence on immigration policies.

These two broader literatures should be linked in this study because Radical Right parties have been major actors in politicizing the immigration issue. At the same time, immigration policies are multidimensional and subject to diverse structural and contextual factors, the pressure of political parties being only one of them. In some areas, immigration policies acquired a more restrictive character over the last decades, and some authors believe that there is a causal link

between these restrictive trends and the rise of Radical Right Parties (Willians, 2006; Zaslove, 2004; Schain, 2006).

With the intensification of globalization, the immigration phenomenon arises as a central concern in post-industrial societies. Some authors (Sassen 1996; Soysal 1994) argue that this policy issue has suffered major influence of globalizing trends affecting the sovereignty of nation-states, while others (Geddes and Scholten 2016; Joppke 1999; Messina 2007; Schain 2009) bring evidence that nation-states remain dominant to control non-nationals' entrance and settlement. In particular, if immigration policies remain largely controlled by domestic politics in certain areas, as I believe they are, the political pressure of anti-immigrant parties should be taken into account to understand the level of restrictiveness of immigration policies in recent decades.

1.1.1   *Globalizing and national-level pressures over immigration policies*

Immigration is currently one of the most contentious issues across contemporary democracies, though this has not always been the case (Dancygier and Margalit 2018). In an era of intense globalization, the international movement of people from different places and backgrounds emerges as a central challenge for nation-states and liberal democracies, to the point of reshaping public perceptions of their national political systems and the elites in power (Mclaren 2015). For instance, the development of the European Union characterizes a new era of influx of foreigners across the territories of member-states, the free movement of people being one of the pillars of the European integration. Immigration not only introduces significant changes in traditionally homogeneous cultural communities, and sometimes stresses material limitations of welfare states, but also challenges key dimensions of the nation-state and liberal democracy.

One of the key dimensions of the nation-state challenged by immigration is sovereignty. Joppke (1999) explains that sovereignty refers to the "stateness" of modern nation-states, meaning final control over bounded territory and populace. Immigration policy is precisely devoted to control over access to and stay in territory. States decide over who is a citizen - and therefore has rights of entry and stay -, and foreigners - who can be denied such rights. For this reason, political conflict concerning control over immigrants and their rights can expose ambivalences between core principles of nation-states and liberal democracies, such as the protection of human rights and popular sovereignty.

While nation-states have the prerogative to bound the rights of certain categories of citizens, the principles of liberal democracies and global human rights demand and pressure for equal fundamental rights, non-discrimination, protection of the individual human being, freedom of expression, and so on. In the context of democratic, open, and plural European societies, the way immigration is framed can be very controversial, or even taboo for liberal states, for instance when it nurtures a vision that certain immigrant categories are unwanted (Hampshire 2013). Sometimes these basic principles of the major structures organizing Western European societies can be pushed into different and contradicting directions. Indeed, this has been the case of issues related to immigration and border-control in the European Union. While citizens of the member-states have freedom of movement and stay within the block, member states have coordinated their actions to discourage the settlement of non-EU immigrants, treated as a different category of citizens. Consistent with this notion, Messina's (2007) argument states that the most important and universal thread running throughout all of the major intergovernmental policy initiatives on immigration since 1985 in Europe is a transparent bias in favor of restricting the flow of third-country migrants.

There are two general theoretical approaches about immigration policies in the globalized world. The first one emphasizes that globalizing forces are predominant in shaping immigration policies because globalization affects the sovereignty of nation states (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000a). Here, the so-called "declining sovereignty thesis" considers that the development of globalization has diminished the capacity of states to take autonomous decisions and to control their policy in immigration, as well as in other areas. This is so, because exogenous factors, found at the supranational or international dimension of politics, are taken as the dominant drivers of immigration policies. Accordingly, the global human rights regime would be influential enough to generate converging trends on immigration policies, which would guarantee the free movement of peoples and their fundamental rights overseas.

In contrast, the second approach considers that claims about the erosion of the capacity of nation states to regulate migration have been overestimated. Many political scientists oppose the vision that the national-state or domestic actors would have virtually lost their capacity to control immigration policies (Geddes and Scholten 2016; Joppke 1999; Messina 2007; Schain 2009). Scholars in line with this argument suggest that, although there is a certain level of intergovernmental coordination among European states (for example towards asylum policy), the immigration policy field remains largely under the control and political interest of nation states.

If states coordinate actions to deal with specific issues in the broad topic of immigration, without delegating powers to an international or supranational institution, it is because they remain sovereign to decide so, and they do it under punctual circumstances and areas. Therefore, in spite of intense globalization, domestic factors remain dominant to understand immigration policy outputs.

The present work is anchored in this latter tradition, and considers that immigration policies are driven by interests. They can be politically contested at the domestic level. In fact, they are still largely decided on the domain of national governments, although in some areas much more than others. This is not to say that international factors do not matter. However, national-states have not lost their capacity to choose their regulations regarding entry and stay of aliens. In other words, domestic political factors can largely affect the various immigration regimes across Western European countries, in spite of their similar exposure to converging international pressures. Nevertheless, since immigration has become a salient topic and is now a matter of polarizing positions engaging multiple actors and interests, governments' decision-making in this topic has also been exposed to stronger constraints than in the past. This means that changes in regulations are expected to involve complex bargains and negotiations, as well as be constrained by institutional and normative mechanisms in place. So, although national governments might be pressured by public opinion and radical political organizations to adopt stricter controls over immigration, for example, their decisions are also constrained by aspects such as path dependence (Messina 2007), judicial institutions (Joppke 1998) and embedded liberalism (Hollifield 1992).

1.1.2 *Immigration flows, perceptions and policy trends*

The literature on international migration considers that advanced democracies in Western Europe have experienced three waves of immigration. From the end of World War II to the mid-1970s, there was a movement of labor migrants, in which immigrant-receiving countries recruited labor force from Mediterranean territories, Eastern Europe, and former colonies to help rebuild their own economies after the conflict. In reaction to the effects of the 1970s oil shocks, governments decided to close their doors for such workers, and foreigners started to massively enter through another access, as family migrants. This type of immigration still remains one of the most important in the present, it hasn't been stopped. Instead, family reunification has been overlapped by a significant flow of asylum seekers and refugees, considered to be the third wave

of immigration to Western European countries. This third wave intensified at the end of the 1980s, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, and recently had its peak in 2015, linked to violent conflicts around the world, in particular the Syrian war.

During the first wave, immigration was largely seen as a positive phenomenon, since it brought visible benefits for receiving countries regarding their economy and reconstruction. At that time, immigration policy was almost exclusively treated as an administrative matter (Schain 2008), being kept insulated from political or public debates. It only started to become relevant for public opinion and overtly discussed by politicians from the 1980s onwards. The development of the European integration has also played an important role on shifts of public and political awareness towards immigration. First, it opened up more developed countries to receive labor immigration from less developed countries within Europe. Second, it also allowed free movement from legally established third-country immigrants within the European Union. Third, the EU introduced an unpreceded discussion about post-national identity, in many ways fostering an opposition of European values to those of the non-Western world. These new configurations exposed national communities that were once very homogeneous to rapid changes in the composition of newcomers, sometimes reviving sentiments of intolerance and racism. Over time, a rhetoric favoring stricter controls of national borders, and the association of multiple social, economic and security threats to the presence of immigrants in the national territory has gained encouragement into the political debate. In fact, a "closing door" approach and the securitization of immigration have entered the mainstream perception of immigration in Europe.

As immigration issues became relevant in elections and politics, opinions defending or opposing related topics, like multiculturalism and integration, have become intense and, sometimes, polarizing. But even though there are political actors that explicitly defend the rights of immigrants and asylum seekers, such as human rights associations and most Green-libertarian parties, it is reasonable to say that a restrictive approach towards newcomers has become the dominant vision, at least in the plan of rhetoric and policy positions (Rayp, Ruyssen, and Standaert 2017).

As the immigration topic gained political attention, reshaping important aspects of electoral competition, the specialized literature has explored relevant aspects related to this phenomenon, particularly anti-immigration attitudes among the public (Wright 2011), how this issue frames party-competition over time and across-countries (Akkerman 2015b; Dancygier and Margalit

2018; Schain 2006), as well as the drivers for liberalization or restrictiveness of immigration and citizenship policies in liberal democracies (Abou-Chadi 2016; Howard 2010).

Immigration policies become more liberalized or expansive when they favor and facilitate the entry, rights and integration of non-native settlers. In this sense, when states adopt more flexible regulations and permissive controls towards immigrants, their policy framework is considered to be, or to become, more liberalized, or expansive. On the contrary, immigration policies are, or become more restrictive when states limit, or raise the barriers to the entry, rights and integration of newcomers. This can concern, for example, the introduction of measures such as the need to prove language skills or to pay significant fees when applying for a visa. Reducing quotas for specific immigrant categories is another example of measure applying a restrictive approach. In other words, when governments adopt stricter measures of controls and regulations towards immigrants, in an effort to close their doors and protect their borders, their policies become more restrictive.

Comparative studies about immigration policies show general patterns of liberalization over the long run, basically since the end of World War II until the years 2010s, period for which it is possible to find comprehensive comparative data to date. However, two points are particularly relevant when one looks to these long-term trends, and they should be highlighted. The first one is that, since the end of the 1980s, more restrictive policy measures have been adopted, compared to previous decades, making the balance between more restrictive and more liberalizing policies more equal. From the 1990s, the general rhythm of liberalization has slowed down, although the broad liberalizing trend has not been reverted (de Haas, Natter, and Vezzoli 2015). The second point is that, also from the 1990s, there is an increase in the volume of immigration policy measures being adopted, compared to previous times (de Haas and Natter 2015). These two trends suggest that the activity of ruling bodies concerning immigration-related measures has accelerated over the last decades. Furthermore, it also shows that decision-makers are increasingly concerned with immigration issues, and, in spite of overarching international and normative pressures for immigration policy expansion, restrictive approaches have managed to penetrate the political-institutional agenda. Political pressures for restricting immigration policies gains importance and legitimacy and liberalizing movements should not be taken for granted.

Immigration policy is a multidimensional, not a straightforward concept. This means that states regulate and control immigration by using several tools and by targeting different types of

immigrants, whose motivations to live in a new country can be for economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian reasons. As it will be better explored in the second chapter of this dissertation, immigration policies concern different groups of immigrants and areas of policy measures, which do not always go towards the same direction, but can sometimes follow diverging trends (Hampshire 2013). As an example, according to the objectives of the nation-state, labor immigration policy can be more liberal, while family reunification can be very strict. Due to these nuances, different factors can drive changes in each area of immigration policy, such as socio-economic conditions, preferences of central actors like political parties and interest groups, institutions, international policy diffusion, and norms.

One of the areas of immigration that has gained most attention in politics is control over the entrance and stay of third-country citizens, since the European Union promoted free movement of member-states' nationals and opened its internal borders but implemented tougher external border controls. For this reason, the pressure of anti-immigration parties is expected to particularly to affect the area of control over immigrants. Radical Right Parties hold more clear positions regarding the entrance of immigrants and border control. Their other claims frequently connected to immigration, such as security, national identity and use of welfare services is directly linked to the capacity of states to allow higher numbers of immigrants and to control their borders. Moreover, in party competition, the issue of control over immigration has become particularly important in the recent context of the refugee crisis and threat of terrorist attacks.

1.1.3 Restrictive immigration measures and the influence of Radical Right Parties

It has been argued that immigration gained importance and evolved towards a more restrictive trend over the past years, particularly in the area of controls. One possible driver of such changes, as studied in this dissertation, is the influence of Radical Right Parties. Most studies on the Radical Right focus on explanations for their electoral performance and cross-national variation of their success. Analyses about the impact of RRPs within their political systems are still considered to be scarce and limited in terms of understanding of this political process (Mudde, 2007).

While there are different terminologies and definitions in the literature, this work considers the Radical Right party family to be defined based on three core features shared by parties within the group: identitarian politics, authoritarian values, and populist style. These characteristics derive RRPs' central policy positions, among which their anti-immigration appeal is their main driver

of electoral support. Two main reasons motivate the interest to better understand the impact of RRPs on immigration policies. First, topics related to immigration have become prominent in consolidated European democracies, specifically among the public and on the level of party-competition. In recent decades, political parties have attributed more salience to issues placed on the cultural dimension, especially those related to multiculturalism, when competing for office (Kitschelt and McGann 1997). Hostile positions towards immigration are also significantly high among the public (Howard 2010). Second, there is a broad trend of increasing popularity of Radical Right Parties, and these organizations undoubtedly mobilize on immigration issues. This is a central concern on their platforms, and a topic that differentiates RRPs from other mainstream parties. By its turn, immigration is not a traditional concern for mainstream parties, and they are perceived as insufficiently addressing them (Dancygier and Margalit 2018). RRPs' rise is inserted in a context of distrust towards traditional political elites and established political parties, in which the success of RRPs largely happens at the expense of mainstream left- and right-wing parties, which are losing considerable support and might feel pushed to adapt their strategies in a new scenario of competition. The potential impact of RRPs on immigration politics and policy appear to be a central question for different research fields of political science, such as voting behavior, party-competition, public policy and agenda setting.

While Radical Right Parties are clearly associated with anti-immigration claims, and their electoral success can be highly explained by their mobilization on immigration (Ivarsflaten 2005), their effective impact on immigration policies remains unclear and findings of the few existing studies are inconclusive to this point, sometimes showing conflicting evidence (Lutz 2019). Some researchers highlight that RRPs' electoral success does influence policy positions of other parties in electoral competition (Van Der Brug and Van Spanje 2009; Schain 2006). However, regarding policy outputs, scholars consider that RRPs have limited capacity to impact immigration policies (Bale 2003; Dancygier and Margalit 2018; Minkenberg 2001). In some works, RRPs are considered capable to influence public opinion, party-competition, immigration and citizenship policies, but only under specific circumstances (Abou-Chadi 2016; Carvalho 2013; Williams 2006). Furthermore, systematic comparative analyses are still scarce (Carvalho 2013). So, one of the contributions of this work is to help fill this research gap and to amplify the comparative and time scope of investigations on the topic.

At this time, only one large-N study about the effect of RRPs on immigration and integration policies was found: the one developed by Lutz (2019), in which he analyses variation in policy

success of the Radical Right in 17 Western European countries from 1990 to 2014. He argues that there are different political logics driving immigration and integration policies, and shows that there is variation in Radical Right Parties' policy success in these areas. His hypothesis is that, while immigration policies have become more liberal despite the electoral success of RRPs, they can enact more restrictive integration policies when in government office. Therefore, his findings do not provide clear evidence of an indirect effect of PRRPs on policy outputs, via the electoral competition, but their direct effect via government participation seems to be more relevant, particularly in the area of in integration.

Three main differences distinguish this work from Lutz's (2019). First, the author uses measures of immigration policy change from the Determinants of Immigration Policies Dataset (DEMIG) (de Haas, Natter, and Vezzoli 2015) to build his dependent variables, while my analysis is based on an indicator from the Immigration Policies in Comparison Dataset (Bjerre et al. 2016; Helbling et al. 2017). Strictly speaking, the DEMIG is not an adequate dataset to conduct cross-country comparisons because it traces immigration policy changes within countries over time. As such, the level of restrictiveness or liberalization of policy changes are not comparable across countries, but they refer to the previous legislation in place. The second difference regards his approach of immigration policies. Although Lutz (2019) adequately considers that there are different logics driving immigration and integration policies, areas within immigration policies remain clustered together in his analysis. In contrast, this work selects a particular area within the broader field of immigration policy, the one of controls over the entry and stay of foreigners. Among the reasons behind this choice are the attention that control over immigration receives by politicians, and its clear presence in the nationalist discourse of RRPs. Finally, the third difference is that while Lutz (2019) studies RRPs success to advance their own immigration and integration policies, this works aims at assessing the effect of RRPs' electoral performance on cross-national and longitudinal variations of the level of restrictiveness of immigration control policies. It is not the objective here to test if precise pledges or the program of Radical Right Parties have or not been successfully adopted by governments.

As a matter of fact, other works about the influence of RRPs on immigration policy also analyze their impact in terms of their direct ability to pass their preferred policies. As such, these studies concentrate on the few cases in which RRPs have taken part in governing coalitions, especially in Italy and Austria. For instance, Zaslove (2004) investigates the extent to which policy demands claimed by the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) and the Northern League (LN) in Italy

have been met. He considers that, during their period in governing coalitions, the FPO and the LN have been instrumental in passing more restrictive immigration policies because some of their demands have been fulfilled. Therefore, some of RRPs' specific actions in power have pushed for tougher laws. But neither party has implemented the full extent of their platforms, one of the main reasons being the limitation imposed by international treaties.

Akkerman (2012) develops a comparative analysis of the direct influence of RRPs on immigration and integration policies using a larger scope. The author creates a Nationalism Immigration and Integration Policy Index and compares policy outputs of 27 cabinets in nine countries between 1996 and 2010. Her findings point that cabinets including RRPs are mostly similar to center-right cabinets, while they both differ more substantively from left-wing governments, whose policies tend to be more liberal. Her analysis shows that changes in immigration and integration policies cannot be explained without taking into account the interaction between RRPs and other established parties, particularly center-right ones, inside and outside governments. The crucial relevance of accounting for interactions of RRPs with mainstream parties in order to study their impact has also been emphasized by Carvalho (2013). In his study of the UK, France and Italy in the 2000s, he shows that the reaction of the center-right in these party systems has been a key factor to account for different levels of ability of RRPs to influence public opinion, party systems and policy development.

Overall, existing works tend to find limited or only indirect effect by Radical Right Parties on immigration policies (Lutz 2019), for different reasons. From a study of the FPO/BZO in the Austrian government between 2000 and 2006, Duncan (2010) expected that Radical Right Parties would have a problematic adjustment to public office, because of their anti-system character, lack of experience and too centralized and ideological structure. He argues that, although immigration policies during the analyzed cabinets had a restrictive character, the influence of the FPO/BZO was limited by the role of intra-coalition dynamics and the moderating effect of the policy process. When the preferences of the Radical Right diverged from the position of the OVP, its influence was hemmed in by the coalition partner and by judicial interventions, as well as intra-party struggle to adjust to office-holding.

The literature on the impact of RRPs on immigration policies could benefit from contributions in three aspects: by expanding the scope beyond cases in which RRPs have been in government, by applying a large-N research design, and by accounting for potentially different effects under

types of electoral systems. Most studies focus on the few cases in which RRPs have taken part in government, usually from a case study or another qualitative approach. This limits the generalizability of findings and a more objective estimation of the size of the effect. Such research designs also limit the ability to simultaneously test the explaining potential of competing hypotheses. Moreover, works tend to either ignore that different types of electoral systems can condition the influence of RRPs, or they tend to only analyze countries with similar types of electoral systems, without contrasting proportional representation to mixed or plurality systems. This is a relevant factor to be taken into account because different systems can provide diverse structure of opportunity for RRPs to influence policy-making, as well as limitations and incentives for the behavior of established parties towards RRPs.

1.2 Radical Right Parties and liberal democracies

1.2.1 Contextualizing the rise and threat of Radical Right Parties

Several authors argue that, since the 1970s, there is a two-dimensional structure of party competition operating in advanced democracies (Bornschier 2010; Kitschelt and McGann 1997). This bi-dimensional space comprises an authoritarian-libertarian axis, which concerns socio-cultural positions related to issues like abortion, minorities' rights, environmentalism, and national identity, and a socialist-capitalist axis, comprising positions on traditional economic issues, like the extent to which the state should intervene in the economy.

Such reorganization of the political competition has provided room for the emergence of new political challengers, like Green libertarian and Radical Right parties, both party families that mainly mobilize on non-traditional issues. The literature shows that the drivers of RRPs' success vary according to different factors, such as electoral rules (Carter 2002; Jackman and Volpert 1996), attitudes and values of the public (Norris 2005), contextual factors, like the presence of immigrants, economic crisis (Kriesi and Pappas 2015), and unemployment (Arzheimer 2009), inter-party competition (Kitschelt and McGann 1997), or organizational characteristics of RRPs (Art 2005, 2011). This suggests that RRPs' impact on policy-making should also be conditioned to such structural and political factors, because they are related to RRPs' electoral appeal and bargaining power.

Since the mid-1980s, new political parties located on the right pole of the political spectrum have emerged in many European countries, and scholars have extensively analyzed the causes for their

rise and fortunes. Their appeal is based on an anti-immigration, identitarian, and anti-establishment discourse. The definition and classification of Radical Right parties will be developed in detail in the third chapter of this dissertation. In short, Radical Right Parties are defined based on common policy preferences, particularly on the cultural dimension of the political competition. They share three core characteristics, according to my definition: identitarian politics, authoritarian values and a populist style.

The terminologies and definitions of RRPs have evolved in the literature. Whereas at the beginning they were mostly defined as single-issue parties, uniquely driven by their anti-immigration appeal, or seen as organizations representing the rebirth of neo-Nazi tendencies, the concept is now understood as more complex. The Radical Right is a party family that carries distinguishable policy positions. Parties belonging to this group are fundamentally different from Nazi or Fascist movements, one of the reasons being their fitting to the modern era and acceptance of the democratic regime. They explore contemporary issues, such as globalization, multiculturalism, and immigration, and aim at giving responses to such problems through a cultural framing, not a classic racist conception of difference (Hans-Georg Betz 2002).

RRPs are considered to be compatible with the procedures of democracy, and they stand as actors that play by the rules of the game, even if they criticize traditional political elites and the "establishment". As political parties, they are best understood as a "pathological normalcy" than as a "normal pathology" of democracies (S. De Lange 2008). They hold more radical policy positions than mainstream parties, particularly on the authoritarian-libertarian axis, but classic partisan theory should also apply to these party organizations. As other parties, RRPs are vote-, policy-, and office-seeking organizations. One of their motivations is to introduce their salient issues into the political agenda and influence policy outcomes. When they emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, RRPs used to be marginalized from party systems, and experts interpreted their first significant results as waves of temporary protest. But rapidly, they became non-negligible players in the electoral competition, conquering increasing vote shares from one election to another. Their core issues, especially concerned with culture and identity, have also gained centrality on the electoral competition over the past decades (Kitschelt and McGann 1997; Kriesi 2007).

RRPs are considered to hold a specific ideology, that leads to certain preferences over policies. Some of these positions are unique, because they tend to focus on cultural issues more than

classic economic ones, exploring issues traditionally absent from the electoral competition. They usually emphasize identity politics and seek to gain votes based on the defense of national identity. But their motivations to oppose immigration are not exclusively based on cultural arguments. On the contrary, they are also often related to materialist concerns, such as crime and insecurity, as well as supposed welfare abuse by foreigners and scarcity of jobs and housing. It is common to find examples of RRPs' campaign rhetoric linking lack of jobs and the presence of immigrants (Jackman and Volpert 1996), in which they promise to solve unemployment by expelling foreigners or limiting their entrance. There is variation among RRPs in terms of strategies they implement, their organizational structure, and positions. However, overall, they hold more radical stances on socio-cultural issues than mainstream parties, such as a drastic opposition to refugees and non-Western immigration, and a tough stance on law and order.

In several recent elections in Europe, RRPs have achieved an average share of votes around 20 percent, being constantly placed among at least the three most important parties in their national party systems. While RRPs display general progressive results across Europe, the way they affect political systems is not expected to be the same, because their ability to impact the policy agenda should consider their interactions with mainstream parties (Akkerman and Rooduijn 2015; S. L. De Lange 2012) and institutional characteristics of the systems in which they operate. The extent to which they can influence the political agenda of governments and policy-making depends on certain institutional features and political dynamics, factors that can create opportunity structures for RRPs to challenge mainstream parties and, as a consequence, to affect the strategies of the latter in response to perceived electoral threat[2]. Initially, the theoretical

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[2] For example, in 2017 Marine Le Pen, the presidential candidate for the National Front (FN) in the French elections, obtained 21% in the first round, and 33.9% in the second round. Although very far from the required absolute majority to win this race, it was the largest result ever achieved by the FN at the national level. On the first round of the legislative elections of the same year, the FN got 13.2% of the vote at the national level, with their candidates arriving first in 20 constituencies, and they elected a small, but record number of 8 deputies to the National Assembly. In the mid-1980s, the FN's breakthrough at the local level created first an electoral realignment in France, and then introduced the immigration issue into the agenda, no longer framed no as a market problem, but as a concern of national identity. The dynamics starting at the local level gained national magnitude as the main parties of the center-right, UDF and RPR, engaged into local governing alliances with FN officials, and co-opted those two issues in attempt to control them (Schain 2006). But the FN's agenda hasn't been promoted only among the center-right, it has also affected the main parties of the left, as the immigration issue was particularly salient during the governments of the Socialist president Francois Mitterrand, for example.

In Austria, another country where the extreme right is traditionally strong, the Freedom Party (FPO) was placed third in the 2017 legislative elections, with 26% of the votes. This result turned the FPO into a coalition partner in the government formed by the center-right Austrian People's Party (OVP). In 2015, the Swiss People's Party, also known as the Democratic Union of the Centre (SVP/UDC), was the largest party in Switzerland, gaining 32.5% of the votes. Even in Germany, where the populist radical right has long been marginalized and has faced difficulties to

expectation is that Radical Right Parties would find a higher potential to influence immigration policy outputs when they operate within structures of competition that tend to be more open to challenging parties, and in which smaller parties can get at least some institutional representation. RRPs' potential to affect policies may also depend on party characteristics and structures, such as their own organizational features, leadership, professionalization, and access to resources. However, this dissertation cannot cover all these issues, which doesn't mean to say that party variables are not important factors linked to the party capacity to exert influence on its political system. In this work, party characteristics are understood to be reflected in their electoral performance, since better electoral results are usually a function of party structure and access to resources, particularly when they persist over elections.

To a considerable extent, RRPs' electoral fortunes have been favored because of the declining trust and weakening of voters' identification with traditional parties. In part, their wins are also related to the connection between voters and RRPs' political platforms, while voters perceive them as addressing urgent matters long ignored by established parties. RRPs' electoral progress has mainly occurred at the expense of mainstream parties' votes, at first from the traditional right, and latter also from the mainstream left. Therefore, established parties are expected to react to the progress of the radical right in attempt to recover their voters, or at least to reduce further damage, particularly when elections are very competitive, and parties cannot ignore highly politicized issues (Abou-Chadi 2016).

One way in which mainstream parties can react to the rising Radical Right is by adopting some issues and/or positions "owned" by the latter in their programs and/or during their parliamentary activity (Carvalho 2013). So, to what extent anti-immigration positions that are co-opted by established political parties are also present on immigration policy outputs? To which degree the electoral pressure exerted by RRPs pushes parties in government to enact more restrictive immigration measures? In some cases, mainstream parties, mostly right-wing, have also chosen to work together with their radical right counterparts in governing coalitions[3]. In this sense, do governments supported by a Radical Right Party enact more restrictive immigration policies?

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surpass the 5% threshold to enter parliament (Norris 2005), the newly formed Alternative for Germany (AfD) got 13% for the Bundestag and obtained legislative representation for the first time in the post-war era. In many other countries, radical right parties collected successful results on the ballots in 2017, such as the Progress Party (FrP), with 15.2% in Norway, and the Party for Freedom, with 13% in the Netherlands, both on national legislative elections. This list goes on.

[3] This has happened in Italy during the participation of the Northern League (LN) and the National Alliance (AN) in the governments of Berlusconi (1994, 2001, 2005, 2008). Also, in Austria, during two coalitions between the center-

The dynamics of inter-party competition is considered central to understand the emergence and the level of strength of individual political parties in their systems, particularly concerning smaller and challenging players. The literature on party competition focusing on policy positions (Benoit and Laver 2006; Laver and Hunt 1992) is oriented by theories of spatial competition. In this approach, party competition is driven by policy positions adopted by political parties, which have different preferences so to appear distinguishable in the eyes of voters. Voters are rational individuals who have previously established preferences over policies, and they choose their favorite party according to the proximity of a political party's policy to their ideal policies (Downs 1957). In the electoral process, parties compete over policies, trying to influence which issues will be at stake in the competition. They also want to influence how the structure of party competition looks like. They pay attention to other parties' behavior, as well and the distribution of voters. If the distribution of voters' preferences changes drastically, for example, political parties are likely to alter their policy positions, to become closer to the median voter's preferences.

As challenging forces, Radical Right parties traditionally come from outside the established party system. They make the effort to introduce alternative issues into the party competition, so to have some advantage over other established and larger competitors. From this, it is reasonable to expect that their primary focus would be on votes and policies, instead of office, because they tend to be anti-system parties, which still need to conquer or stabilize a relevant position in their respective party systems, before acquiring relevant bargaining power to negotiate positions in the national government.

In other words, Radical Right parties should attempt, first, to maximize their votes, so they can have a chance to change the relative power of other parties and to access representative institutions, potentially participating into governing coalitions[4]. It is of major importance for RRPs to introduce their policy preferences into the political agenda, and advance solutions to their major concerns, because they wish to influence the public opinion, and to promote major societal changes, being recognized for enacting such transformations. Setting the agenda is

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left SPO and the populist radical right FPO in 1983; later in the center-right Schuessel's governments from 2000 to 2005, and more recently in Kurz's government, starting in 2017. In the Netherlands, the Pim Fortuyn List was part of two coalitions in 2002, which were leaded by the Christian-democratic party. Additionally, the Swiss People's Party (SVP) has gained stronger presence in government since the 1980s, and in Denmark the Danish People's Party offered legislative support to the Liberal-Conservative government between 2001 and 2011, in exchange of advancing its immigration policy agenda.

[4] Participation of RRPs in coalitions governing the national executive level has happened in some cases since the 1990's and, although still reduced in numbers, it has been more frequent over the last years (S. De Lange 2008).

consequential for policies (Romer and Rosenthal 1978), so it is expected that RRPs will try to influence the agenda primarily via elections. The more votes they obtain, the more likely they will be to push the broader agenda towards their preferred direction, either by penetrating representative institutions at the national level, or by pushing mainstream parties to adapt their policy positions and strategies.

1.2.2   Radical Right challengers and implications for liberal democracies

Democracies are expected to respond to citizens' demands and to be accountable to the public. But they are also framed by procedural rules, and fundamental constitutional safeguards, which should be respected regardless of the ideological orientations of the government in charge. Political parties are key institutions in the process of linking and translating public demands into state action (Mair 2012).

Scholars have identified structural transformations in advanced democracies since the 1970s, culminating in changes on political systems. One of the most prominent emerging phenomena is precisely the rise of Radical Right Parties, that systematically conquer higher support over elections, in several post-industrial democracies. Although RRPs remain unable to form governments on their own, some of these parties have participated as junior partners in governing coalitions in countries like Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Finland, and Denmark[5]. Even if RRPs are not part of the government, previous works argue that they have been able to affect the party system (Harmel, Svåsand, and Svasand 1997; Schain 2002, 2006), and the public (Williams 2006). For instance, Schain (2002) has shown that the issue priority of voters in France changed considerably with the breakthrough of the National Front (FN) in the mid-1980s and, by attracting supporters from mainstream parties, the Radical Right impacted the party system by inducing electoral realignments.

RRPs address new and quite sensitive issues within the scope of liberal democracies (Hampshire 2013). As challenging parties, still lacking dominance in office, policies can be central motivations for them. In electoral competitions, RRPs focus on immigration issues and radically oppose more immigration as a way to distinguish themselves from other parties and to enact a new dimension of competition in which they could have advantage over traditional parties (Hobolt and de Vries 2015). When they are able to get legislative representation, RRPs tend to

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[5] In the case of Denmark, the RRP has not taken cabinet positions, but has exchanged legislative support for certain restrictive immigration policies.

propose and want to get credit for eventually approved stricter immigration laws. And, when in government, they search to hold cabinets related to immigration, in order to have agency in policy outputs and claim credit for their actions.

It is important to understand if the influence of RRPs on the political agenda is confined to the electoral level, by putting the immigration issue into the party agenda, or if it also translates into government and legislative action. After all, political parties usually have much more room of maneuver to promote drastic changes, and to adopt innovative strategies during elections. The governing task, however, requires compromise and pragmatism, especially in multiparty and parliamentary democracies, common in Western Europe (W. C. Muller and Strom 2003).

The topic under study speaks to the capacity of democratic systems to process new public demands, promote party responsiveness, and the entrance of challengers into the system, particularly when they represent radical alternatives to established political forces during periods of political instability. It is a timing concern, because such political challengers explore new cultural issues across societies which go through deep identity crisis. For decades since World War II, party-systems used to be relatively stable in most West European democracies, but since the late 1970s those nations have gone through major political and social changes (Mair 2012), resulting in the emergence of challenging political alternatives and anti-system manifestations. Established political forces have been confronted with electoral realignments produced by issue-entrepreneurs and niche parties (Abou-Chadi 2016), which have been able to introduce new dimensions of competition into the party system (Hans-Georg Betz 1993; Kitschelt and McGann 1997; Kriesi 2007).

In this context of changes in political competition, repeated electoral successes of RRPs has largely happened at the expense of established parties' support, both belonging to right- and left-wing traditions. On the one hand, right-wing voters may feel attracted to the conservative and nationalist discourse of this party family. On the other hand, former left-wing voters may feel attracted for their economically and culturally protectionist appeal that blames immigrants for degrading social-economic conditions and creating unemployment. While they lose voters and, as a consequence, their dominant position in their respective systems, established parties are expected to react in order to regain or stop losing their supporters. Such strategies can be constrained by their ideological traditions, reputation, institutional context, and also the behavior of other parties. This range of factors nurtures the expectation that different parties could adopt

dissimilar strategies, that are likely to vary depending on the dynamics of competition and institutions in each country. Key to this movement of established parties is the extent to which they feel threatened by RRPs in the first place, which is more likely to happen under proportional representation than in more disproportional systems.

Studies about the impact of RRPs are still recent and generally inconclusive. They are less numerous than works concerning the causes of emergence and performance of RRPs. For this reason, there is a limited knowledge about the actual effects of RRPs' rise (Carvalho 2013; Mudde 2016). Most existing investigations develop single-case studies (Albertazzi and Mcdonnell 2008), and the conclusions of the few comparative studies do not necessarily converge. For instance, Minkenberg (2001) found an irrelevant policy-making impact by RRPs, confined uniquely to the cultural level. But Williams (2006) argues that their impact has been salient on agenda-setting, institution-shaping, and policy-making. By its turn, Han (2015) finds different effects of RRPs on mainstream right- and left-wing parties' positions on multiculturalism, depending on the opinion of party supporters about foreigners. Works developed by Abou-Chadi demonstrate that RRPs are significant drivers of mainstream parties' policy position shifts on multiculturalism and immigration, an effect that is confirmed to be independent from public opinion (Abou-Chadi 2016; Abou-Chadi and Krause 2018).

It seems plausible, thus, that institutional and inter-party dynamic variables do operate to create or limit RRPs' structures of opportunity to advance their policy agendas and influence potential shifts in the broader political agenda. The cartel party thesis provides important insights to this reasoning. According to Richard S. Katz and Mair's (1995) argument, parties have become increasingly dependent and embedded in the state, being absorbed by it. Access to state resources becomes crucial to the survival of party organizations, whereas divergences in terms of program becomes a less important for the question of winning or losing. Parties not necessarily need to implement their own policies to survive, but if they can implement a policy at a time, all organizations could survive together. This provides room for the formation of a cartel of governing parties, in which parties share resources so all can survive. Such inter-party cooperation and accommodation can become a mechanism of institutionalization of a structure of support, that sustains insiders while excluding outsiders. In this sense, there is an important variation across countries, with a number of democracies being deeply susceptible to RRPs' pressures, while in others their influence could be limited or indirect, for example due to mechanisms of outsiders' exclusion resulting from cooperation among insiders. At the same

time, the electoral rise of RRPs and the salience of identitarian issues affects Europe as a whole. In the context of the European Union, this means that what happens in a neighbor country can affect the dynamics of competition and the responses that governments provide in another country.

There are some reasons why RRPs are expected to have an impact on European democracies. First, their rise corresponds to the emergence and persistence of new (and relevant) actors in the political competition, so they represent a rebalance of the forces struggling for power and searching to influence policy-making. Second, RRPs mobilize on non-traditional issues, focusing on cultural, rather than classic economic divides. This means that they are central to the changing political agenda taking place in advanced democracies over the last decades, in which emerging concerns and cleavages are increasingly related to cultural, non-traditional issues (Bornschier 2010), while established political parties are generally perceived as unable to convincingly address such concerns. Third, RRPs can have a relevant impact on the content and functioning of democracy itself. Their exclusionary approach towards foreigners, some proposals that can be considered illiberal, coupled with populist rhetoric, can represent a threat to fundamental values of democracy, notably to the rights of minorities, consensual decision-making, respect to the constitution, and institutional checks-and-balances (Mudde 2013).

Moreover, as their radical claims spread and gain support by the public opinion, for example regarding anti-immigration sentiments, to a certain extent intolerance towards culturally different backgrounds becomes "normalized" and "justifiable" as it gains support of "the majority". As pointed out by Rydgren (2003:60), "the presence of a xenophobic RRP [Radical Right Populist] party may cause an increase in racism and xenophobia because (1) it has an influence on people's frame of thought; and (2) because it has an influence on other political actors".

Among some studies developed on the topic of impact of Radical Right parties, it is considered that they can have direct and/or indirect effects on party systems (Schain 2006) and on policy-making (Minkenberg 2001). Direct impact happens, for example, when they assume the status of a major player, which puts them in a position of control in the political system. When it comes to policies, RRPs can directly influence them when they actually have policy-making capacities. This happens when the party controls the national government or is a coalition partner. However, party influence can also be felt indirectly, when other parties in the system or the government attempt to reduce the importance of the Radical Right challenger by adjusting their own strategy

and issue agenda. In other words, RRPs are able to have indirect impact on policies and politics while still remaining of second order. One way that Schain (2006) and Abou-Chadi (2016) emphasize that RRPs can be significantly relevant for policy outcomes is by constraining policy development or by exerting veto on liberalizing immigration reforms.

1.3 Theoretical mechanism

This section of the chapter presents the general theoretical mechanism behind the argument, which considers that the growing electoral performance of RRPs is an important driver of restrictive immigration policies adopted by governments in Western Europe.

The electoral outcomes of Radical Right parties are expected to affect the broader political system beyond the electoral arena, because RRPs have an important role in introducing a new set of issues and a new dimension of political competition, that pushes mainstream political parties to raise awareness to subjects previously ignored. When politicians feel they are threatened on electoral grounds, they tend to adapt their strategies, and one way of doing so is by co-opting the issues raised by their challengers and/or change their approach of such issues.

Even though mainstream parties have, overall, reduced their support over the last decades, they remain dominant actors in government formation, so they tend to bring those new issues or approaches adopted during elections into the government agenda as well. Ruling parties want to gain credibility for managing salient policy issues, and to limit the sphere of influence of their Radical Right challengers. As electoral outcomes subsequently inform legislative and government outcomes, changes of party positions and issue salience in the electoral arena tend to be reflected on the institutional arena as well. So, the persistent electoral success of RRPs has helped them to introduce their restrictive immigration policy agenda into the broader political system and it has a contagion effect in mainstream parties. The other mechanism through which RRPs are expected to influence more restrictive immigration policies is directly, when they participate in governing coalitions or support governments in place. When RRPs take cabinets as coalition partners, they can propose and shape policies from within the government. When they provide legislative support to minority governments, they demand their preferred policies in exchange of it.

1.3.1 Connecting the electoral and government agendas

In theory and in practice, the electoral arena and the legislative arena are not dissociated from one another, but the effort to connect the research agendas on elections and on legislative studies is still scarce, due to a division of labor in political science (Sulkin 2005). The link between these two arenas is fundamentally important in this analysis, because the motivations and behavior of political parties in one level are believed to be informed by their lessons learned, and future motivations regarding the other. Through different paths, electoral outcomes can affect policy outcomes.

The theory of issue-uptake links the electoral and the legislative arenas, providing a behavioral mechanism by which elections can influence legislative politics and policy making. Issue-uptake is the phenomenon in which "winning legislators regularly take up their challenger's priority issues from the last campaign and act on them in office" (Sulkin 2005:2). Therefore, when issue-uptake happens, incumbents update their agenda's priorities and legislative activity while in office, based on their previous experience in elections. They try to cover topics that their electoral competitor pointed as missing or weak, as a way to close any gaps for criticism that could potentially benefit their competitor in the next campaign.

According to this theory, the behavior of individual legislators is influenced not only by prospective expectations of reelection, but also by their past campaign experiences. Sulkin (2005:2) explains that legislators are motivated to engage in issue-uptake "because challengers focus their campaigns on the incumbent's weaknesses, their choices of campaign themes provide signals to winning legislators about important issues that they may have previously neglected. To the extent that legislators act on these signals, taking up salient issues and making them a part of their agendas, they can remedy any weaknesses, straightening their records before their next campaign and inoculating themselves against possible attacks".

The theory of issue-uptake was developed in the context of legislative politics, to explain the behavior of individual legislators. However, the logics behind it could reasonably be extended to political parties, that are collective entities also in search of maximizing votes, policy, and office. Political parties compete in elections because they wish to access power, so they can implement their preferred policies. Once in government, they also wish to remain in office, thus one central motivation of governing parties is reelection. Parties wish to implement their preferred policies, as a means to be accountable to voters, to preserve their reputation, and to maximize their gains

in future elections, by getting closer to their constituency's preferences. Therefore, established parties that hold office should also try to remedy their electoral losses in future elections by learning from past electoral experiences and addressing their challengers' issues while in office.

In this investigation, Radical Right Parties are identified as challengers that address new concerns and propose more radical solutions than mainstream parties to the salient issue of immigration. Consequently, based on the theory of issue uptake, the rising popularity of RRPs in elections, whose central appeal is opposition to immigration and multiculturalism, should push other parties that traditionally hold office, to pay more attention to immigration issues, and to adapt their own policy positions towards a more restrictive approach. Such party moves are expected to happen in attempt to be accountable to the demands of the public, in response to RRPs' rise, do that dominant parties can politically survive.

1.3.2 *Explaining the impact of Radical Right Parties on governments' immigration policy agenda*

The performance of Radical Right parties is considered to be a key factor to understand changes in governments' immigration policy agenda over the last decades. This is not to say that it is the only driver of immigration policies, but RRPs represent a significant force, if not to always directly push governments to implement more restrictive measures, to also limit liberal reforms. Their rising popularity in the electoral arena is expected to have broader consequences for other parties' policy positions and for their decisions in office. Still, the extent to which and the way RRPs can influence the immigration policy agenda can happen under certain circumstances, depending on the openness of the political system and the reaction of mainstream parties. Party behavior and preferences are inserted in an institutional setting and can be constrained by these arrangements (Breunig and Luedtke 2008).

Politics matter to understand policy outcomes (Schmidt 1996). As such, the party composition of governments is important to account for the outcomes of democracies, particularly in the case of West European parliamentary democracies, in which political parties are key actors on government formation and policy-making (R. S. Katz 1987). In this sense, political decisions are not only taken in reaction to external events, or to solve "given" problems. They also depend on the framing of a subject into a political issue, and its centrality in the agenda, which is a matter of struggle between competing political actors. This dispute primarily takes place on electoral grounds, and parties are fundamental pieces of this framing process. They not only compete for

office and seats, but equally search to influence policies and to advance their ideological preferences. In party competition, different parties can hold advantages in certain issues over others, so they try to increase the salience of these issues in order to have more gains in the competition (Benoit and Laver 2006; Laver and Hunt 1992).

In the case of Radical Right Parties, they mobilize on anti-immigration sentiments and focus their appeal on the defense of national identity. Elements of their discourse have gained prominence in the broader political debate, particularly as they increase their electoral results and conquer participation in legislative and executive institutions (Abou-Chadi 2016). Facing a context of electoral uncertainty and perceived threat of other strong competitor, established parties are pushed to adapt their strategies and issue positions in order to keep their dominant status in their respective political systems and try to limit the gains of other parties.

Yet, although RRPs generally become more popular all over Europe, they still don't play a central role in advanced democracies and their electoral performance varies considerably across countries and over time. They emerged as anti-establishment, "outsider" parties and have, so far, been junior partners when entering government coalitions[6]. As such, they should get more opportunities to influence the policy agenda in proportional systems, in which established parties should feel more threatened to their rise, compared to majority systems, in which the entrance of new competitors faces more limitations.

Established political parties do not only respond to the demands of public opinion, which become overall hostile to immigration. In fact, Abou-Chadi and Krause (2018) have demonstrated that RRPs' electoral success itself has an effect on other mainstream parties' policy positions on immigration and multiculturalism, an effect that is independent of the moods of public opinion. While the signal of public opinion can be an incentive for mainstream parties to change their level of attention and positions towards immigration issues, the electoral performance of RRPs is in itself a motivation for mainstream parties to adapt their strategies in the electoral competition. Political parties not only react to the public, but also to the behavior of other parties.

This analysis considers that the emergence and persistence of Radical Right Parties in the political system has consequences for the government's policy agenda and is not only limited to

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[6] An exception is the recent populist government formed in 2017 between the Radical Right Party League and the Five Start Movement, in which the League takes protagonist role.

elections. However, the extent to which policy pressures felt in elections can also penetrate the policy-making process also depends on political and institutional factors, which condition the structure of opportunity encountered by RRPs to influence policy outputs.

The process by which RRPs could affect the governments' policy agendas, because of their performance in elections, works like a cycle, in which one stage informs the others. As RRPs obtain more votes, they get stronger potential to impact the party-system, and to introduce their issues into the broader political agenda. In more proportional systems, new competitors are more likely to get representation in parliament than in majoritarian systems. When they acquire a more robust presence in parliament as a result of their rising electoral support, RRPs can expand their bargaining power, they can be seen as potential coalition partners by mainstream parties or act as powerful opposition forces against pro-immigration governments. When RRPs get seats or the advantage to get cabinet positions, they also develop into more robust party organizations, with improved capacity to competitively run elections, mobilize supporters, staff, and resources (Schain, Zolberg, and Hossay 2002). Over time, if they are persistently successful in elections, their power to affect the policy agenda increases, both because of their own organizational capacities, and because of their influence over voters and the behavior of other parties.

The electoral performance of RRPs can impact the policy agenda in two main ways. The first one is by directly conditioning the legislative and executive composition of national political institutions. Under different electoral systems, the winning party (or parties) gain legislative seats and form a government informed by the results of elections. By this channel, RRPs could have strong parliamentary representation and/or enter a governing coalition if they get significant vote shares and bargaining power, particularly in more proportional systems. Their entrance in governing coalitions is, of course, also conditioned to other factors, such as strategic considerations of the main party emerging from the elections, and the relevance of other potential partners. Nevertheless, the most important point is that the presence of RRPs in representative institutions is particularly potentialized when political systems are more proportional. If RRPs can enter the legislative and/or the executive areas with an important weight, they can directly affect the immigration policy agenda, either by participating in governing coalitions, or by opposing pro-immigration measures taken by the government.

Another way in which RRPs' electoral performance could have an indirect effect on the government's policy agenda is by contagion of established parties' policy positions on this

policy field. In some systems, particularly in majority, RRPs can face important constrains to get representation in parliament, or to participate in government. In majority systems it is harder for third-parties to win, while dominant parties are more protected from their challengers. But, if RRPs represent an electoral threat to established parties, they could affect mainstream parties' strategies and policy orientations. In proportional systems they are more clearly perceived as a threat to established parties, which would be pressured to respond by adapting their strategies and positions. Such shifts of mainstream actors can, by its turn, affect the terms of negotiation and subsequent composition of governments. When ruling parties become more attentive to immigration-related issues for strategic considerations during elections, they could also be inclined to adopt more restrictive positions while in office. For this reason, it is expected that policy changes taking place in the electoral arena, and affecting the party system as a whole, would also reflect on policy decisions taken by governments.

1.4 Dimensions of analysis and hypotheses

The general argument of this dissertation states that the electoral performance of Radical Right competitors has been able to push mainstream parties to adapt their strategies to existing or expected electoral losses and this reflects in policy outputs of governments. By increasingly gaining votes and by advancing their anti-immigration agenda as an issue-priority, RRPs are likely to affect the broader agenda on immigration, mainstreaming more restrictive measures towards foreigners, particularly concerning the entrance and stay of immigrants of non-Western origin. When RRPs get significant vote shares, their restrictive approach is likely to be adopted by parties in governments and turn into policy outputs. However, restrictive changes on the immigration policy agenda is expected to happen by different ways, since the political and institutional configurations of West European democracies show important variation. The influence of Radical Right parties is linked to the electoral threat perceived by mainstream parties and the structures of opportunities encountered by Radical Right competitors to affect the political agenda towards their desired direction, notably the openness of the political system to the entrance of new challengers. This is more likely to be the case in systems operating under proportional representation, which tend to give more opportunity for various parties of different sizes to gain some level of representation.

There are two mechanisms by which RRPs are likely to affect immigration policies from their electoral strength. Indirectly, RRPs can push mainstream parties to co-opt their issues and positions in reaction to their electoral performance. Mainstream parties who adapt their platforms tend to implement more restrictive measures towards immigration when in government, so to deliver their promises and try to get credibility for managing priority issues, with the hope to limit support for RRPs. Direct influence of RRPs on immigration policies can happen when they get enough votes to become coalition alternatives to mainstream right-wing parties, within the perspective to enlarge the right-wing block (Bale 2003). By gaining office positions as coalition partners, RRPs have the potential to implement their anti-immigration agenda and affect policy-making.

While the pressure of electorally relevant RRPs is considered an important factor behind changes on immigration policies, because these parties are able to mobilize anti-immigrant sentiments and affect the behavior of other parties in the system, this is not the only factor driving policy outcomes in this area. Also, the electoral performance of Radical Right Parties is expected to influence immigration policies when they represent a threat to mainstream parties and in more proportional, rather than disproportional political systems.

Therefore, political and institutional factors provide different structures of opportunities encountered by Radical Right Parties to influence policy-making. Based on the literature of comparative immigration policies and Radical Right Parties, this analysis highlights four dimensions of explanations about the drivers of immigration policies: 1) electoral competition, 2) characteristics of governments, 3) institutions, and 4) contextual factors. Although not all elements in these dimensions are part of the proposed argument, alternative accounts should also be included in the analysis in order to assess the relevance of Radical Right Parties as drivers of immigration policy outputs in light of other explaining factors.

1.4.1 Electoral competition

The electoral competition is key to understand policy outputs, because electoral dynamics and outcomes tend to display persistent effects on the legislative and executive arenas, for instance in terms of agenda setting and government formation. Political parties are inserted in a system of interactions with their peers, so their behavior and choices are expected to be calculated taking into consideration what other parties do, as well as their performance. For this reason, the electoral dynamic is very important to assess how a challenging political party will ultimately

influence in the political system and policy outputs. On one side, the literature on the Radical Right shows that their success depends, among other factors, on the strategies taken by mainstream parties (Bale 2003; Carvalho 2013; Kitschelt and McGann 1997; Mudde 2007; Schain 2006; Williams 2006). On the other hand, mainstream parties' strategies can also change to the extent that they feel threatened by Radical Right competitors. In this case, possible strategies taken by established parties could be co-optation of RRPs issues, isolation through a "*cordon sanitaire*", or cooperation, through alliances (Carvalho 2013; S. De Lange 2008; Schain 2002).

If established parties are likely to respond to the rising popularity of RRPs when they feel threatened by their electoral results (Harmel, Svåsand, and Svasand 1997), the adoption of more restrictive immigration policies by parties in government tend to happen when Radical Right Parties obtain significant vote shares in previous elections. For this reason, the first hypothesis of this work is the following:

- *Hypothesis 1: The restriction level of immigration control policies increases as Radical Right Parties increase their electoral support*

For comparative purposes, the analysis focuses on elections for the lower house of the national parliament and all electoral indicators refer to this level of competition. The electoral performance of the Radical Right, measured by the aggregate valid vote percentage obtained by parties classified as such (discussed in chapter three), indicates the electoral strength of this group of parties in their respective systems.

1.4.2 *Characteristics of governments*

In coalition governments in parliamentary systems, political parties tend to build governing alliances based on formal or informal policy agreements as a condition to engage in government, so they can control other coalition parties and limit policy discretion (Bräuninger and Debus 2009; Strom and Muller 1999). Most times, because of the proportional nature of electoral rules and the interest to be individually accountable to voters and maximize their support, parties engage in such agreements after electoral outcomes (Strom and Muller, 1999). So, it is likely that their coalition agreements, either formal or informal, will take into consideration policy preferences of parties that negotiate the coalition. In this process, depending on their weight in parliament, they will have different degrees of power to push for their own preferences to be adopted into the government agenda.

Radical Right Parties have gained coalition potential and become junior partners in a number of governments in Western Europe from the 1990s onwards, although they are currently not dominant parties. When they participate into governing coalitions, they are expected to be much more likely to pressure for their own policy agenda to be implemented by governments, and to be successful in advancing their preferred policies. This should happen at least for some of their policies, even though by agreeing to hold office and to work under an institutional agreement, RRPs could arguably moderate their preferences as an effect of government participation (Minkenberg 2001). However, when in the coalition, at least some of their policies will be more likely to be incorporated into the agenda, rather than if they remained in the opposition. In other words, by taking office, RRPs acquire higher potential to directly affect policy-making. They amplify their capacity of pushing policies towards their desired direction when they are inserted in the executive branch or support the government. This means they can either hold office to initiate policy, or bargain for specific measures in exchange for their support to the government in place. This leads to the second hypothesis:

- *Hypothesis 2: The restriction level of immigration control policies increases when Radical Right Parties provide internal or external support to the government*

Internal and external support of RRPs to governments is measured as a dummy variable for years in which RRPs have participated in governing coalitions, either formally (holding cabinets), or informally (through legislative support provided to minority governments).

In addition to the direct participation of Radical Right Parties, ideological characteristics and the type of governments (majority/minority; coalition/single-party) should be taken into account to understand immigration policy outputs, because these features can favor more restrictive or liberal approaches towards immigrants. The literature on immigration policies highlights that right-wing and left-wing parties tend to have different positions concerning immigration issues (Rayp, Ruyssen, and Standaert 2017), so the ideological orientation of governments can affect the nature of immigration policies. Left-wing governments are more inclined to adopt liberal policies and expand immigrants' rights, because pro-immigrant positions are more in line with the universalist and pro-inclusion preferences of left-wing constituencies (Abou-Chadi 2016). On the contrary, right-wing governments tend to prefer more restrictive frameworks regulating the entrance and stay of immigrants, because of their conservative and often nationally-centered orientations.

On the issue of immigration, right-wing parties are also likely to be more affected by the electoral performance of Radical Right Parties, because of their closer ideological proximity compared to left-wing parties. As such, established right-wing parties are expected to feel more pressured to adapt their agendas and government action in response to RRPs. While right-wing parties can be feel more threatened than left-wing parties, when the former are in government, they might also face less ideological constraints to co-opt RRPs' pledges than left-wing parties, resulting in more restrictive immigration control policies under right-wing governments. The party affiliation and ideological orientation of the f*ormateur* or Prime Minister should be especially taken into account, because this central figure is prominent in terms of agenda setting and establishing the issue priority of the government. For this reason, I work with the ideology of the Prime Minister's party as the indicator of government ideology, expecting that when the orientation is right-leaning, there will be more room for more restrictive immigration control policies to be enacted.

- *Hypothesis 3: The restriction level of immigration control policies increases under right-wing governments*

In addition to the ideological orientation of the head of government, some types of governments could encounter more favorable conditions to pass legislation. There are four types of government: single party majority, single party minority, majority coalitions, and minority coalitions (S. De Lange 2008). On the one hand, there is a conception that single-party and majority governments would favor legislative success. For instance, Schmidt (1996) considers that it is harder for governments to promote policy change under consensual democracies, because of the need to negotiate with multiple actors and because of reduced clarity of responsibility, compared to majoritarian systems. While in parliamentary systems the government has considerable control over legislative policy making (Tsebelis and Brocker 2001), majority governments could be seen as in a better position to set the policy agenda and pass their proposed bills more successfully, without being vetoed by opposition parties. When a government holds the majority in parliament, it is likely that it will not need to make significant concessions to other actors. Negotiating with the legislative branch in order to pass its bills is not always necessary, being easier to set the agenda and implement its policies. On the other hand, part of the literature argues that minority governments are not necessarily less successful legislatively, when compared to majority coalitions, and the coalition status of the government has no impact on the survival of democracy (Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh 2004).

Regarding immigration policies in particular and the effect of Radical Right Parties, it is not primarily clear which type of government would favor their agenda. This also depends on the status of RRPs relative to the government in place. For instance, because of the current minority status of RRPs, coalition governments (with right-wing parties) could favor their chances to affect policy-making. Nevertheless, if RRPs have a contagious effect on the larger mainstream right-wing party, this party can become majoritarian and implement its restrictive immigration agenda. Therefore, in this case, RRPs would have an indirect effect even under single-party majority governments. For this reason, this analysis takes the type of government as a control variable. Two dummy variables indicate the following characteristics of the government in place: 1) whether the government is a majority or minority one, and 2) whether it is single party or a coalition.

1.4.3   Institutions

Institutional features are taken as conditioning factors for policy-making. For instance, the extent to which RRPs' electoral results translate into more or less ability to influence the broader agenda also depends on the level of openness of the electoral system to smaller or third parties. The electoral system is important for the strength of a political party, since electoral rules translate votes into seats and indirectly shape the bargaining power of political parties, by determining their size in representative institutions. These rules are important not only because of their mechanic and psychological effects over voters and parties (Duverger 1959), but also because electoral rules play a key function on strategic coordination among the political elites (Cox 1997), which impacts the electoral offers presented to voters in the first place, as well as pre-electoral coordination among party elites.

As challenger parties, Radical Right competitors should encounter lower constraints to exert policy influence under more proportional electoral systems. Indeed, previous research has shown that proportionality favors the electoral performance of RRPs, particularly in multi-party systems (Jackman and Volpert 1996). Under proportional rules RRPs can more successfully translate their electoral support into institutional representation. But even among proportional representation systems display different levels of barriers to the entrance of smaller parties. For example, the district magnitude can affect the level of disproportionality among proportional systems, as illustrated with the information collected in table 1.1 below. Another factor

potentially affecting the performance and entrance of smaller parties is the effective threshold, which is an implicit threshold percentage of votes needed to get parliamentary representation.

When smaller parties enter representative institutions, their potential to affect the agenda increases for various reasons. For example, they can acquire more resources to survive, they can use those resources to obtain political support, and professionalize their machines (Schain 2006). Therefore, RRPs' bargaining power tends to be higher if they obtain relative electoral results in more proportional systems. On the contrary, challengers face a more restrictive structure to obtain seats and have a direct influence on policy making in majoritarian systems, because they will be virtually excluded from the legislative arena in virtue of the need to get the plurality of the votes to enter institutions. This leads to the fourth hypothesis:

- *Hypothesis 4: The effect of Radical Right Parties on the level of restrictiveness of immigration control policies is higher in proportional electoral systems*

Although most West European democracies adopt a proportional representation (PR) system, some countries operate under plurality and mixed rules. More specifically, the UK has a first-past-the-post system, France has a two-round majority rule, Germany, Italy (since 1993) and Greece have mixed systems. Therefore, the number of cases that do not operate under PR is not negligible, and a variable of electoral system should be included into the analysis. The variable measuring the electoral system is a categorical variable with three categories: majority, mixed, and proportional.

Lijphart (2012) argues that the variation of institutional arrangements is linked to different democratic principles and the functioning of democracy. He explains that the majoritarian conception is based on the principle of power concentration and manifestation of the will of the majority. On the contrary, the consensus principle tends to disperse decision-making powers and take into consideration the rights of the minorities. It relies on consensus making and negotiation. Institutional features also condition limitations and incentives to form legislative majorities, for example by forming governing coalitions. The table 1.1 below synthetizes the institutional features and characteristics of the party system of the 17 Western European democracies included in this study, according to information collected from Lijphart (2012).

Table 1.1: Institutional and party system features of 17 Western European democracies

Country	Form of government	Degree of federalism and decentralization	Electoral formula	Cameral structure of legislatures	Strength of judicial review	Average electoral disproportionality (%)	Average effective number of electoral parties
Austria	Semi-presidential	Federal and centralized	List proportional representation	Weak bicameralism: asymmetrical and congruent chambers	Medium-strength judicial review	2.51	4.84
Belgium	Parliamentary system	Semi federal (before 1993); Federal and decentralized (after 1993)	List proportional representation	Medium-strength bicameralism: symmetrical and congruent chambers (before 1995); Weak bicameralism: asymmetrical and congruent chambers (after 1995)	Medium-strength judicial review (after 1984)	3.35	10.07
Denmark	Parliamentary system	Unitary and decentralized	List proportional representation	Unicameralism	Weak judicial review	1.71	5.40
Finland	Semi-presidential	Unitary and decentralized	List proportional representation	Unicameralism	No judicial review	2.96	5.87
France	Semi-presidential	Unitary and centralized	Majority-plurality (except 1986)	Medium-strength bicameralism: asymmetrical and incongruent chambers	Medium-strength judicial review	20.88	4.09
Germany	Parliamentary system	Federal and decentralized	Mixed member proportional formula	Strong bicameralism: symmetrical and incongruent chambers	Strong judicial review	2.67	5.59
Greece	Parliamentary system	Unitary and centralized	List proportional representation	Unicameralism	Weak judicial review	7.88	3.16
Ireland	Semi-presidential	Unitary and centralized	Single transferable vote	Weak bicameralism: asymmetrical and congruent chambers	Weak judicial review	3.93	3.77
Italy	Parliamentary system	Unitary and centralized	List proportional representation (1942-1992); Mixed member proportional formula (1994-)	Medium-strength bicameralism: symmetrical and congruent chambers	Weak judicial review	3.61	3.80
Luxembourg	Parliamentary system	Unitary and centralized	List proportional representation	Unicameralism	No judicial review	3.43	4.26
Netherlands	Parliamentary system	Semi federal	List proportional representation	Medium-strength bicameralism: symmetrical and congruent chambers	No judicial review	1.21	6.99

Norway	Parliamentary system	Unitary and decentralized	List proportional representation	One-and-a-half chambers (before 2009); Unicameralism (after 2009)	Weak judicial review	4.53	4.55
Portugal	Semi-presidential	Unitary and centralized	List proportional representation	Unicameralism	Weak judicial review	4.43	3.84
Spain	Hybrid system	Semi federal	List proportional representation	Medium-strength bicameralism: asymmetrical and incongruent chambers	Medium-strength judicial review	7.28	2.82
Sweden	Parliamentary system	Unitary and decentralized	List proportional representation	Weak bicameralism: asymmetrical and congruent chambers	No judicial review	2.04	4.78
Switzerland	Hybrid system	Federal and decentralized	List proportional representation	Strong bicameralism: symmetrical and incongruent chambers	No judicial review	2.55	5.64
United Kingdom	Parliamentary system	Unitary and centralized (before 1998); Unitary and decentralized (after 1998)	Plurality-formula	Between medium-strength and weak bicameralism	No	11.70	3.73

Source: Lijphart (2012)

Note: The indicators refer to Lijphart's (2012) period of analysis.

In addition to the expected effect of the electoral system, this analysis also controls for the existence of judicial review mechanism, that could potentially affect policy outputs and the room of maneuver of political parties in immigration policy-making. According to the immigration policy literature, national judicial bodies have been guided by human rights and liberal principles, blocking laws that hurt these normative guidelines and constitutional provisions (Joppke 1998). This illustrates why institutional mechanisms framing different models of democracies are so important. They can represent different degrees of power sharing and checks and balances affecting policy-making and conditioning decision-making. The previous table shows that there is important variation among countries under scrutiny and different combinations of features favoring majoritarian or consensus modes of democracy.

The literature on immigration policy emphasizes not only the role of domestic institutions in governments' decisions, but also international governance. As argued by Hampshire (2013), international factors should not be ignored in the task of explaining immigration policies, even though policy measures in this field remain highly concentrated in the hands of national states, because of their interest to protect their national sovereignty. A phenomenon with major

consequences for the dynamics of national political systems has been the development of the European Union integration (Kriesi et al. 2008). The EU has changed the policy control of national governments in some domains, transferring certain policy competencies to the supranational level of governance. It also becomes a political issue by itself, nurturing a new division of the electorate in terms of opposition or support to a closer union, to the functioning of supranational institutions, and the level of sovereignty transfer. One of the central and fundamental principles of the EU is precisely the free movement of people within the block. This has had important implications for controls of national borders, protection of external borders, and the coordination of member-states regarding common policies. Until this moment, the immigration policy field remains largely under national ownership. Due to national interests and different conceptions of national identity, EU member-states have hesitated to establish a common immigration policy and to transfer decision-making power in this area to EU institutions. They are not ready to give up on their national sovereignty regarding decisions of who can enter their territories, which rights immigrants should have, or joint procedures for integration and citizenship decisions. What has been adopted in the immigration policy field was a Common European Asylum System, which establishes shared values and procedures regarding the protection of asylum seekers and refugees' rights. Yet, substantial disagreement among member-states continues in place, and the EU lacks mechanisms of compliance of such common rules, while many agreements are not binding, but only recommendations.

Compared to other policy areas, like trade and finances, the international regime of migration remains very weak and fragmented. In despite of that, the European Union is one of the most relevant multilateral spheres for the development of common immigration policies, although an incomplete one. In some sub-areas, notably asylum, the EU has established basic norms for its member-states. The EU is driven by values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, so it is expected that it will act as a force of liberalization of immigration policies over its member states, possibly counterbalancing stricter immigration measures taken by national governments, at least in some areas of immigration policy. In some arenas, the EU remains largely driven by states' interests, and immigration remains one of them. Member-states can cooperate for more restrictive measures at the EU level, but this requires common interests and coordination. As the EU stands for liberal values and human rights, it is expected that it will act as a counterweight to the anti-immigration and nationalist pressures coming from Radical Right Parties. As such, the EU could limit or prevent more restrictive immigration policies from being enacted by national

governments. Countries included in this analysis became member-states in different moments in time. Therefore, I add a dummy variable indicating if a given country is member of the European Union in a given year. From this discussion, the hypothesis to be tested is the following:

- *Hypothesis 5: The absence of supranational institutional constraints of the European Union allows national governments to adopt more restrictive immigration policies*

1.4.4   Contextual factors

As control variables, derived from the literature on immigration policy and on the Radical Right, the analysis also includes two contextual variables that could, in theory, affect both the vote for Radical Right Parties and immigration policy outputs. The dominant approach in studies about Radical Right Parties emphasizes the "demand-side" to explain their emergence and electoral performance. In this sense, the literature considers that economic conditions, the presence of immigrants or preferences of the public could account for RRPs success. Nevertheless, these developments have affected Western European societies as a whole to a similar extent, so they are limited to explain the significantly different performance and presence of RRPs.

These variables are the unemployment rate (an indicator of economic performance), and the influx of asylum seekers (an indicator of immigration demand). The literature points out to the relevance of the socio-economic context to explain changes in immigration policies and support for Radical Right Parties. For instance, governments could take more stricter immigration measures when the economic conditions of the country are not well in an attempt to reduce the entrance of foreigners. Additionally, Jones and Baumgartner (2008) have argued that external events are central drivers of issue-attention shifts and, consequently they provide conditions for policy changes to take place. In their view, when political actors learn new information, they can update their preferences, and adapt their activity in government in response to new circumstances. In this case, factors influencing agenda shifts would be exogenous from party preferences and interparty competition, driven by elements that are out of the control of political parties. As such, contextual factors represent an alternative approach to explain changes in the immigration policy agenda, which would be seen as a reaction to socio-economic conditions. These two indicators are added in the analysis as controls. The next chapter discusses immigration policies, their determinants and evolution in Western Europe.

CHAPTER 2
Immigration Policies: Liberalizing and Restricting Trends

Introduction

The topic of immigration gained attention in politics over the last decades, in particular since the 1990s. It is a core issue of Radical Right Parties (RRPs), taken as important actors in the process of politicizing immigration. This means that these parties played a relevant role in shaping immigration as a political concern and in introducing it into the political debate. RRPs raise awareness to the immigration issue, and frame it as a potential driver of social, economic, security, and/or cultural instabilities in host societies. They strongly mobilize electoral support on anti-immigration appeals, particularly opposing non-Western immigration. But RRPs are not the only anti-immigration forces pushing for more restrictive measures. Public opinion, for instance, has also become considerably reluctant towards immigrants over the last years, representing an additional pressure over governments to adapt their regulations. At the same time, there are organized interest groups who benefit from, or defend the rights of certain categories of settlers. They tend to demand more permissive measures of entry and stay. In this context, governments are simultaneously exposed to pressures in favor and against immigration. They are also constrained by institutional and normative arrangements, internally and externally. How do governments deal with such diverging pressures? Which different factors can influence policy decisions on immigration issues?

This chapter discusses immigration policies in Western Europe, with the aim to explain the concept, to discuss their potential drivers, and understand the evolution of immigration measures according to data obtained from the Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) project. Immigration policies can be subject to liberalizing or restricting tendencies. Liberalizing tendencies favor and facilitate the entrance, settlement, integration and rights of immigrants, signaling that states are open to receive more foreigners, from diverse backgrounds. On the other hand, restricting tendencies tend to limit or constraint the entrance, settlement, integration and rights of newcomers, indicating hostility of countries to receive more immigrants from different backgrounds.

As it will be explained, immigration policies are a complex set of regulations and controls and, as such, they can be pushed towards different, sometimes diverging directions. Policies in the field of immigration can be influenced by several drivers and interests. While nation-states have been reshaped by globalization and liberalism in a broader level, political dynamics in the national sphere remain significantly important in accounting for the nature of immigration policies, if they become more liberal or more restrictive in specific areas. National governments remain important decision-makers on immigration policies.

The chapter starts by explaining the multidimensional nature of immigration policies. Then, the second section briefly describes the waves of immigration to Western Europe, showing that different categories of foreigners predominate in certain moments of history. Following that, the third section focuses on potential drivers of immigration policies and the extent to which national states can shape them, as discussed in the literature. The fourth part of the chapter connects the immigration issue to the concept of political agenda, a central element in the discussion about the growing importance of immigration matters in politics, and the high level of attention attributed to it by national governments. After that, the use of immigration policy measures as a proxy for the agenda on immigration is clarified, as well as information about the comparative datasets which are source for this analysis. The fifth section analyses patterns and trends of immigration policies in Western Europe over the period 1980-2010 using comparative empirical measures. It shows that there is evidence that different fields of immigration are not influenced by the same factors, some areas become more liberalized, whiles others more restrictive over time. The last part of the chapter emphasizes that the immigration issue has been politicized over the last decades and that Radical Right Parties (RRPs) played an important role in this process. Finally, because national governments do not have the same discretionary power over all fields of immigration, it is expected that the pressure of RRPs could be more influential in certain fields, but not in all of them. At the end, the concluding section sums up the central elements brought to this discussion.

2.1 The multidimensional nature of immigration policy

Immigration policy is not a unidimensional concept. Policy measures regulating the entrance and settlement of non-nationals are plural, because they concern different immigrant categories, operation systems and tools. As explained by de Haas and Natter (2015), immigration policies

are not homogeneous, but typically consist of a "mixed bag" of policies targeting different migrant groups and policy categories in various ways. For this reason, it can be simplistic to refer to *a single* immigration policy of a nation-state, being more suitable to speak of immigration *policies*.

At a broader level, some authors distinguish among immigration, integration, and citizenship policies, each of them comprising subcategories. While immigration policies concern mostly the (legal) entrance and stay of non-nationals in the territory, integration policies deal with assimilation and adaptation, whereas citizenship policies relate to access to nationality, or full-membership (Helbling et al. 2013). It is often hard to fully separate individual measures in each broader category, because in reality they can coexist and compose a common pathway through which new settlers are required to go. To a certain level, immigration, integration and citizenship policies overlap. For analytical reasons, however, their operationalization and division into subcategories can be developed in multiple ways.

This analysis focuses only on immigration policies, rather than on integration or citizenship policies. As such, this research is primarily concerned with policy measures regulating and controlling the entrance and stay of immigrants. More precisely, immigration policies are defined as "government's statements of what it intends to do or not do (including laws, regulations, decisions or orders) in regards to the selection, admission, settlement and deportation of foreign citizens residing in the country" (Helbling et al. 2017: 4).

Grounded on the conception elaborated by Helbling et al. (2013), immigrant population is primarily made up of four groups, which reflect the main reasons why states may accept immigrants: economic (labor migration), social (family reunification), humanitarian (asylum and refugees) and cultural/historical (co-ethnics)[7]. In addition to that, immigration policy measures are grouped according to their location in a two-dimensional scheme composed of a "modus operandi" (how laws operate) and a "locus operandi" (where states regulate: internally or externally). Furthermore, immigration policies are divided into regulations (binding legal provisions) and controls (mechanisms to monitor regulations). Within the controls category it is possible to find measures that deal with irregular immigration, which is regarded as a different

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[7] For the purposes of this analysis, the field of ethno-cultural policies is not taken into account, because this category of immigrants matters, in particular, for countries with a colonizing past, which is not the case of all countries included in this analysis, for example Switzerland and Denmark.

field from the previous four groups, because this is a category of immigrants that spans across all other four categories (Helbling et al. 2017).

Having explained that immigration policies concern different fields and types of measures, it is relevant to highlight that each of them can be exposed to different pressures and interests. For instance, asylum and refugees' policies are often shaped by international norms grounded on human rights and moral humanitarian obligations. For this reason, it is possible that one field of immigration becomes more restrictive at the same time that another one liberalizes. In a similar way, countries can eventually grant more rights to immigrants that are allowed to enter their territory but apply more selective and restrictive measures regulating previous steps to entering the country, such as eligibility of foreigners to get visas. Immigration is a dynamic phenomenon and immigration policies can sometimes be adapted in response to changing contexts. However, in general, immigration policies do not change at the same pace as immigration movements happen. They normally go through incremental and small changes over time. As will be seen in the next section, specific categories of immigration flows were predominant in different moments in the history of Western Europe, which has experienced a significant stream of immigrants since the end of the Second World War. At first, immigration policies were largely decided at the administrative level, without further discussions on the political or public arenas. However, over the last decades, immigration entered into the public debate and is exposed to much more pressure from political and social actors.

2.2 Waves of immigration to Western Europe

Contrary to countries like the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, European nations are not founded on immigration, they are not considered immigrant countries. Massive arrivals of foreigners to Western Europe started with the end of World War II, and despite efforts of states to limit further entrance, this influx has not stopped since then. Scholars in this field of research usually describe three waves of immigration towards the region (Hampshire 2013; Messina 2007; Zimmermann, Bauer, and Lofstrom 2000). It is possible to identify an ending date for the first wave, but not for the two following, ones, which continue to take place.

The first wave of immigration was characterized by labor immigration. It ranged from 1945 to the mid-1970s. The second wave of immigration was mostly characterized by family reunification, starting in the mid-1970s and continuing today. Since the end of the 1980s, with

the fall of communist regimes, a third inflow of immigrants begun, mainly composed of asylum seekers, refugees and illegal settlers. This third wave has been first motivated by the collapse of communist regimes, and later on by escalating violent conflicts around the world. The entrance of migrants as refugees or illegals has also been triggered by governments' efforts to close previous legal entry routes (Messina 2007).

These three waves of immigration are identified as such based on general characteristic of the most substantial influx of foreigners, but they can overlap and build upon the previous ones. These waves can also date differently depending on the country. More recently, the Arab spring[8] triggered important inflows of refugees and illegal immigrants to Europe, particularly of people arriving by the Mediterranean Sea, but it has not accelerated overall immigration to Europe (Fargues and Fandrich 2012). While these events helped increasing awareness of the public to the topic of immigration, it is usually not common to refer to immigration triggered by the Arab spring as a fourth wave. There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, immigration from Arab countries had already been taking place in several European countries for a long time. Secondly, although there were prominent peaks in the number of entrants, particularly in the year 2015, the general trend in the volume of immigrants has not drastically changed in the longer run. Similar numbers were reached before the so-called immigration crisis. Thirdly, European member-states continued to approach immigration from a very similar framework that they used to do before the crisis. European states did not drastically change their immigration policies in response to most recent waves coming from Arab countries (Fargues and Fandrich 2012). Different groups of immigrants - labor, family reunification, asylum, illegal, co-ethnics - are not defined as such because of characteristics that moving people display. Instead, this definition is a process of political decision, related to governments' motivations to receive newcomers. Governments are the entities establishing regulations of entrance and settlement according to such categories.

Having explained that, the first wave of immigration, characterized by labor, was strongly motivated by the economic growth and workforce shortages in the 1950s, which made West European states recruit workers from less developed countries of the Mediterranean, like Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Also, from parts of Eastern Europe, like East Germany and Poland, and, in later stages, from selected areas of the so-called Third World, for instance Algeria, India, Morocco, Pakistan and Francophone West Africa, many of them colonial

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[8] Popular revolutions and anti-government uprisings that happened in the late 2010s in Middle East countries, among which Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Lebanon.

or ex-colonial territories. At first, such immigrants were seen as temporary, and their settlement or impact on the host societies was not foreseen by governments and decision-makers.

When social tensions arise in some countries, like the UK and Switzerland, as well as economic recessions after the first oil price shock in the early 1970s, states took drastic measures to stop upcoming foreign labor force, which made the numbers of foreign workers considerably reduce. Until the late 1970s, decisions related to immigration policy were very insulated, not politicized, and kept away from the public debate. Regulations were mostly decided on an administrative level (Schain 2008), without public involvement. By doing so, decision makers kept the immigration policy-making process relatively well insulated from the party-political process (Messina 2007).

The second influx built on the first labor wave. When governments drastically closed the work route in the 1970s, family members of previously recruited workers (who did not go back to their home countries as expected by host states) massively entered West European countries. Progressively, primary labor migration was replaced by a secondary family reunion flow, and have not stopped since then, albeit efforts by host governments to hinder and limit such entrance. Family reunification remains the most robust immigration flow to Western Europe. For instance, 60 percent of immigration to France is for reasons of family reunification (Schain 2002).

The third wave of immigration, labeled by (Messina 2007) as "irregular and forced migration" was also triggered by efforts to close the doors of other ways to settle in West European countries, notably labor and family reunification. It was first composed flows coming from the East, due to the collapse of communist regimes, and then by asylum seekers and refugees coming from further regions of the globe, like North-Africa and the Middle East. Often times, illegal settlement follows the denied applications for asylum, and it is somehow sustained because some sectors of the economy benefit from cheap and flexible labor force. Around the year 1992, some European countries turned more restrictive the immigration of asylum seekers and refugees, for example by incorporating the concept of "safe countries", which allows the possibility to return applicants back to a country previously reached by them that is considered to be safe.

The first wave of immigration to Western Europe brought evident economic contributions for host countries. However, with the rising number of permanent settlers, and changing economic circumstances, overall economic returns have progressively diminished, while political and social costs related to immigration have significantly increased (Messina 2007). In addition to

immigration being seen as a problem rather than a positive phenomenon, since the 1980s it has been increasingly framed from a security approach (Levy 2005). This security framing of immigration has been particularly emphasized with the terrorist attacks in 2001 in the United States and following the incidents in Madrid and London.

Western European societies experience a generalized growing hostility towards immigrants, which are considered to drive undesired changes in the lifestyle of host societies, causing political and social tensions. These societies have also experienced the widespread emergence of anti-immigrant movements and parties, particularly against Islam and Muslims, who are framed as being incompatible with Western values. Nevertheless, Western European post-industrial societies also go through a rapid aging process. Certain job sectors meet the immigrant supply, and immigrants can represent a crucial active work force contributing to the sustainability of welfare services, including pensions and healthcare for a rapidly aging (native) population. In a globalized world, economies become intrinsically connected and dependent on each other. Additionally, facilitated flows of information and easier transport foster movements of people from very different backgrounds, coming from distant locations. For these reasons, some authors argue that national-states cannot control immigration or determine their immigration policies anymore. However, although there are international pressures affecting immigration policies, the idea that there is a loss of national authority over such policies seem to be exaggerated. Have states lost control over immigration and immigration policies? To which extent do they remain central actors to regulate and manage immigration policies?

2.3 Potential drivers of immigration policies and control by nation-states

The literature on immigration policies develops several approaches to understand their determinants and explain common trends among different nations. It also looks at significant variation between similar states. Some approaches attribute stronger importance to international factors, such as international norms and economic dynamics, to explain converging and liberalizing immigration policies. Others consider that nation-states have not lost their capacity to control immigration in a globalized world. In this view, domestic aspects, institutions and interests remain central to explain decisions in this policy area. In both perspectives, variables such as actors' interests, institutions, normative rules, socio-economic factors, or political dynamics are introduced as potential drivers or conditions for changes in immigration measures

promoted by immigrant-receiving states. One of the main questions that the literature on immigration and immigration policies asks is the following: in a globalized world, are nation-states still sovereign to choose their immigration policies and control immigration, or have they lost decision-making capacity in this domain? This is a relevant point in this discussion, because of the room of maneuver that political parties in government still have to decide on immigration policy. If immigration policy-making was exclusively determined by international or contextual factors, for instance, and disconnected from national politics, then the question about the extent to which parties in government feel pressured to adapt their responses to the rise of RRPs would not be important.

Messina (2007) considers that there are five broad approaches to answer this immigration puzzle. Three of them – *the liberal state model, the embedded realist thesis, and the globalization thesis* – consider that nation-states have lost, to a large extent, control over immigration and immigration policies. This happens either because of internal or external constraints of their discretionary power. The *path-dependent thesis* also considers that there is a certain loss of state control, but this is not necessarily permanent or irreversible. On the contrary, the *political institutional thesis* argues that immigration policies are primarily driven by national governments. They are influence by domestic factors such as political parties and traditional political institutions. Below, I briefly explain the general idea stated by each approach.

The *liberal state model* considers that contemporary states are committed to an open international economy and liberal political rights. The diffusion and hegemony of liberal norms in Western European societies and in the international order constraint states to strictly regulate immigrants and/or treat them in a discriminatory manner. Authors like Hollifield (1992) argue that citizens have rights, and that the rights of non-nationals have become very close to those of native residents. Therefore, states are constrained by constitutional norms and procedures if they want to adopt more restrictive policies. This characterizes at least a partial erosion of sovereignty and national notions of citizenship. Howard (2010) also points out to the fact that there are external pressures for liberalization of immigration policies, such as economic globalization and trends toward "post-national" human rights. This is linked to the strengthening of judicial decision-making throughout Europe.

The *embedded realist thesis* shares some similarities with the previous one. It also considers that national states have lost an important part of their autonomy to make decisions about

immigration. However, this thesis emphasizes the legal moral obligations of states towards particular groups of immigrants, in a logic of client politics, and not to all immigrants. In addition, the role of courts and legal processes are taken as the main sources of policy liberalization, rather than external factors. In the course of the last decades, domestic courts have ruled on the rights of foreigners to remain and to access family reunification, for example. In this sense, domestic factors related to legal processes are highlighted explains the continuous permissions conceded to immigrants to stay and live in post-industrial societies (Joppke 1998) in spite of restrictive pressures from public opinion and some political actors. According to this perspective, to a certain extent, state sovereignty remains resilient in the globalized world, but limits to more restrictive policies are mostly self-imposed by states (Messina 2007).

Contrary to previous conceptions, the *globalization theory* believes that state power and authority have drastically decreased in the context of globalization. As a consequence of this phenomenon, national borders become porous and states lose their autonomy to decide on different policy fields, because of the transnational and international pressure of human rights conventions and laws. For globalists, migration represents a case in which nation-states lose control (Sassen 1996), and the capacity of states to control unwanted migration is declining. This is so because of the emergence of an international human rights regime, which protects the rights of "post-national" individuals and replaces national rights (Soysal 1994).

The fourth approach is identified by Messina (2007) as the *path-dependent thesis*. It considers that states have not ceded control of all dimensions of immigration, but they are constrained by long-established policies with immigrant-sending countries, regarding decisions taken long before 1945. This explanation speaks in particular to the close ties between the former colonial powers and their respective former colonies, but is not restricted to them (Messina 2007). It is hard for receiving-countries to change the course of long-established decisions in the context of close historical relationships with specific immigrant-sending countries, with whom they used to maintain differentiated open access for reasons of cultural connections.

Finally, the *political institutional thesis* concentrates primarily on internal (or domestic) factors to explain the drivers of immigration policies. In particular, the inefficacy or ambiguity of contemporary immigration policies is due to features not directly related to immigration, but that are exacerbated by it. Notably, policy-makers are affected in their capacity to control immigration policies because of the representative crisis suffered by traditional political parties

and institutions (Messina, 2007). This opens space for the emergence of anti-immigration parties and movements, which push for more restrictive measures. In this line, several works show the relevance of internal political dynamics, demands and interests of political or economic actors driving governments' decisions in the area of immigration (Abou-Chadi 2016; Akkerman 2015b; Givens and Luedtke 2005; Hampshire 2013; Messina 2007).

By placing attention within the nation-state, it is possible to focus on distinct roles played by bureaucracies, political parties, electoral arrangements, executive-legislative relations. Political parties are considered to be key institutions in the process by which immigration policy is formulated. The essence of this political-institutional perspective, however, is that determinants of policy are complex, and not reducible to preferences of individual actors or group-levels demands (Freeman 2011).

Explanations with a domestic focus do not ignore the role of international norms, institutions and values. Nevertheless, they raise awareness to the fact that international normative constraints on migration control should not be overstated. According to Guiraudon and Lahav (2000), national governments have devised a number of ways to circumvent international normative constraints, particularly in the fields of immigration controls and unwanted immigrants. For instance, national governments have shifted the level at which policy is elaborated and implemented, adapting they apparatus in charge of migration control. By managing it through a principal-agent logic, national governments have delegated their authority to different agents (i.e., mayors, private companies, international actors) more capable and likely to meet restrictive policy goals. As such, states have not lost control over immigration. They have rather relied on multiple levels and actors to turn immigration stricter for non-EU nationals.

Furthermore, international pressures can be strongly countered by public opinion against liberalization, weak interest group mobilization, and the strength of Radical Right political parties. As explained by Schain (2012: 488): "for better or worse, countries in Europe have been willing, perhaps surprisingly, to take measures that violate their own values of embedded liberalism, that deviate from path-dependent practices, and that resist the pressures of globalization in order to maintain control over their frontiers. Thus, contrary to what is usually assumed, the impact of immigration has been to strengthen state authority, as well as state institutions that deal with immigration control". In sum, the capacity of states to control

immigration in a globalized world is considered to be increasing, rather than decreasing over time (Joppke 1999).

Adding to this discussion about state sovereignty on immigration policy-making, it is reasonable to think that international or national factors can potentially affect each field of immigration policy differently. For example, because of the existence of an international regime of asylum, this field could be more influenced by transnational norms and institutions, instead of national governments' interests. On the other side, in areas in which international regimes do not exist, for example family reunification and illegal migration, states still seem to have a large discretionary power to define their own policies and control mechanisms. As such, different forces and institutions seem to operate concerning the fields of immigration (labor, asylum and refugees, family reunification, illegal immigration, co-ethnics), as well as other policy fields of integration and citizenship (Akkerman 2015b; Hampshire 2013).

2.4 Political agenda and the issue of immigration

Before turning to some empirical trends of immigration policies in Western Europe over the period focused in this work (1980-2010), this section introduces the concept of political agenda. This concept is relevant for the purposes of this analysis because the political agenda refers to the prioritization of issues by political actors, and I want to understand the factors behind their increasing attention to the immigration issue. As will be seen later on, one of the main reasons why governments pay more attention to the immigration issue is the fact that this policy area became important in the political competition, particularly because of the mobilization of Radical Right Parties.

2.4.1 The meaning of government political agenda

The literature on political agendas explains that politicians and political parties need to prioritize some issues over others because attention, resources and time are limited (Baumgartner 2016; Baumgartner, Green-Pedersen, and Jones 2006; Jones and Baumgartner 2008). During their period in office, parties cannot make decisions on everything, so they tend to be more attentive to a number of policies over others. In order to prioritize, parties are guided by their ideological preferences and by flows of information. They are also constrained by the institutional setting, in which all these factors operate. Besides, there are other aspects that may influence how parties approach public policy in a democratic system, such as electoral competition for the medium

voter, responsiveness to public opinion, influence of interest groups, and media pressure (Green-Pedersen and Walgrave 2014). Therefore, although parties are grounded on ideological orientations that can make them attribute more attention to certain issues than others, their activity in government is also influenced by political responsibility and external factors, some of which may be under their control, while others do not.

Political agendas can be seen as lists of issues to which political actors devote their attention (Green-Pedersen and Walgrave 2014). Different amounts of attention can be attributed to diverse issues, such as crime, the environment, immigration, taxes or health. In a political system, there are several types of agendas and political actors. For instance, there is a party system agenda, which refers to the hierarchy of issues that all political parties find important to different degrees (Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2017). It can thus be understood as a structure that constraints parties in electoral competitions and is also influenced by them. There is also an executive agenda, a legislative agenda, the media agenda, and the government's agenda, for example. The process of agenda setting refers to how political institutions and the political elites that inhabit those institutions turn societal conditions into political problems (Green-Pedersen and Walgrave 2014), which is a crucial process in political systems, since it defines which issues will be addressed through public policies.

Political agendas are an integral part of political systems. Political decisions and policy outputs cannot be fully understood without taking into account the priorities of political actors, and the factors leading to such prioritization. While changes in priorities do not necessarily lead to political changes, political attention is a precondition. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) have shown that most changes occur during periods of heightened general attention to the policy (Givens and Luedtke 2005). In that sense, with regards to immigration, the literature shows that this issue has been highly politicized over time (Akkerman 2015b). By itself, this introduces a condition for changes on immigration policies to happen, although it does not guarantee that they will.

Policy changes do not depend only on political actors' aim of making them happen. First, because the salience of the immigration issue varies over time and among political actors, which I believe is linked to the level of success of Radical Right Parties on elections. Second, because there is a number of factors out of the control of parties in government that can also influence policy measures, either by institutionally constraining their decision-making capacity, or by

establishing normative limits for the actions taken by liberal democratic states, which is particularly applicable for immigration policies (Hampshire 2013).

This work focuses on the government's immigration agenda, since it is considered that electoral dynamics can push established parties to adjust their priorities and to instrumentalize their performance in office in order to respond to challenging political situations. Inspired on the idea of party political agenda found in Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008), which refers to the agenda of key political decision-makers and consists on the issues that political parties focus upon in their competition for voters, the government political agenda refers to the issues and approaches that parties in government focus when they are in office.

Governments in Western Europe display similarities and differences regarding executive-legislative relations and coalition dynamics. Certain institutional features can incentive some types of government more than others. For instance, plurality electoral systems tend to provide incentives to form majority governments as the outcome of elections, while proportional systems are more likely to give origin to coalitions, sometimes of minority size. In spite of its type, governments, in general, have a considerable influence on policy-making. Policy-making tends to be dominated by governments, not legislatures (Powell 2006). Even in the case of multiparty coalitions, the legislative agenda tends to closely reflect the government's agenda, usually established on coalition agreements during bargains to form a government. This is why it makes sense to look at policy outputs in order to study the government agenda in this analysis. In the case of immigration, policies can be an interesting indicator of how the government in place deals with this issue in the context of rising Radical Right Parties. This work looks at immigration policies to assess whether parties in office react to the electoral challenge introduced by Radical Right competitors through adjustments on their agendas in office.

2.4.2 Immigration policies as proxy for government agenda on immigration

This analysis works with immigration policies as a *proxy* for the political agenda of governments on this issue. This choice is primarily based on the "Comparative Agendas Project" (Baumgartner, Green-Pedersen, and Jones 2006), which uses policy outputs (among other sources like speeches of political leaders and media coverage) as source of date to study political agendas in several arenas, including the legislative and executive. In this study, I work with a differential perspective, which is the concept of government agenda. It corresponds to the issues and approaches to which parties are attentive when holding office, not only during electoral

campaigns. The focus on the agendas of governments allows me capture more consequential effects of the recurrent restrictive political debate around immigration, which has so far been mainly studied at the level of electoral competition.

In most cases in Western Europe, the government agenda usually corresponds to the political program of a coalition government, not to the positions of single parties as they display during election campaigns. This is because multiparty governments are very common in the region. Besides, government formation usually involves bargains over policies, procedures and office. It is a process in which coalition partners engage in the effort to build consensus on central issues. As explained by Schain (2018), the rise of RRPs has altered the policy priorities of established parties, and changes in the political agenda also affects the terms of engagement. This affects the manner and issues on the basis of political actors' cooperation or dispute. Policy outputs tend to closely reflect the political agenda of governments, since governments tend to dominate the policy-making process (Powell 2006) in Western European democracies, while opposition parties are rather weak to advance their proposed bills.

Unfortunately, data on the "Comparative Agendas Project" is only available for few countries included my case selection, so this limits its use as the main data source for my quantitative analysis. For this reason, my study of immigration policies is based on two comparative projects, the "Determinants of International Migration Policies - DEMIG" (de Haas, Natter, and Vezzoli 2015), and the "Immigration Policies in Comparison - IMPIC" (Bjerre et al. 2016; Helbling et al. 2017). These two databases allow this analysis to better fulfill its cross-sectional and longitudinal scope. By studying immigration policies, a common output in several political systems, it is possible to approach the process of decision-making in a simplified and comparable way, reducing the specificities of each political system, and focusing on common outcomes that reflect the government agenda.

As all comparative studies, there are some caveats in this approach, since in order to attain comparability, there is inevitably a level of loss of context-specific information. This is one consequence of the effort to cover a larger amount of time and number of countries, as well as to treat some context-sensitive information as outcomes that are more homogeneous and generalized. Comparing agendas is a particularly difficult task in this respect, because agenda-setting usually involves very specific mechanisms, depending on political actors involved, institutional arrangements, and the dynamics of politics in each country. Ideally, agendas should

be studied taking into account the amount of attention that all different issues get by governments over time. This would allow one to assess which issues are prioritized over others, which topics gain more or less attention over time in expense of the others, and how their approach evolve during different policy-making cycles. However, because of the high level of specificity in this process, and considering the comparative aim of the present work, I make the choice to simplify and turn the outcome into a comparable measurement.

Furthermore, instead of focusing on the relative salience of the immigration issue over other policy topics, this approach aims at understanding whether and how immigration policies become more restrictive in the context of rinsing Radical Right Parties, and thus the analysis only considers information on this specific policy issue. The concept I will be working with is the level of restrictiveness of immigration policies in the area of controls. Immigration controls become more restrictive when the requirements for entry and work permits get higher. In the area of stay, more restrictive laws can concern the increase in number of years necessary to obtain a residence permit or citizenship.

2.4.3 Data sources for measuring comparative immigration policies: the DEMIG and the IMPIC projects

These two comparative immigration policy data sources are conceptually and methodologically different. They bring different types of information that are relevant for this work. Both of them are based on legally binding immigration regulations, including primary (e.g. outcomes of legislative process) and secondary law (e.g. laws created by executive authority and derived from primary legislation). To a limited extent, the DEMIG sources includes contextual information, such as parliamentary debates, policy strategies and action plans.

The DEMIG project is a change-tracking migration policy dataset that includes around 6,000 migration policy changes in 45 countries between 1945 and 2014 (de Haas, Natter, and Vezzoli 2015). It captures changes of individual policy measures within a country, compared to its previous regulation. Each policy change is categorized according to disaggregated measures in six main variables: policy area, policy tool, targeted migrant category, origin of targeted migrant, level of restrictiveness, and magnitude of policy change. It is valuable to understand whether a change makes the existing legal framework more or less restrictive than the previous one, but it is not easily comparable across countries. Nevertheless, the DEMIG dataset is suitable for capturing policy evolution over time, allowing to track the changes on policies within each

country and providing a measure of its level of restrictiveness compared to the previous framework in place. As such, it focuses on policy changes, not on absolute levels of restrictiveness. Thus, DEMIG offers adequate measures of policy for understanding what is going on within each country with regards to immigration regulations, and it allows to identify the volume of legislation in a specific country or year. Nevertheless, it can be problematic as a comparative measure across different countries (de Haas, Natter, and Vezzoli 2015).

The Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) database covers regulations in 33 OECD countries for the time period 1980-2010 and four fields of immigration: labor migration, family reunification, asylum and refugees, and co-ethnics. It allows to distinguish regulations from control mechanisms and external and internal regulations, as well as to differentiate between conditions, eligibility criteria, security of status, and migrant rights (Bjerre et al. 2016; Schmid and Helbling 2016). This data set can be used as a supplement to the DEMIG data, because it identifies the annual state of regulations based on common and pre-determined criteria, which are comparable across countries. It provides both disaggregated measurement and aggregated scores by each dimension and policy field. While it does not capture individual policy changes within countries (as DEMIG does), it provides a common threshold of restrictiveness and liberalization for all studied countries. In this sense, IMPIC data allows to compare if measures in a country are more restrictive than in another country, and if the overall trend of immigration regulations goes towards restrictiveness of liberalization.

Therefore, both datasets measure immigration policy with multidimensional indicators. This is ideal, since the literature on immigration policies shows that fields of immigration policy are driven by different factors, which can push subfields towards liberalizing or restricting trends. The next section explores descriptive data on immigration policies in order to empirically assess these trends and variations, using data form the two projects.

2.5 The evolution of immigration policies in Western Europe (1980-2010): liberalizing and restrictive trends in different fields

Using descriptive data from DEMIG and IMPIC projects, this section analyses variations and trends of immigration policies between 1980 and 2010 in Western European countries. As pointed out by the immigration policy literature, liberalizing and restricting pressures seem to unequally affect different fields of immigration policies, across countries and over time. As a

consequence, countries tend to follow a similar liberalizing trend in some areas, notably asylum and labor migration, but a more restrictive approach when it comes to family reunification and controls over immigration, including illegal entrance and stay.

First of all, attention to immigration seems to grow over time. There is a general increase on the volume of immigration policy changes implemented by governments since the 1980s, which is measured by the absolute number of changes enacted by governments, shown in the graph 2.1 below. This is in line with the literature that considers immigration to become politicized over the last years and gaining attention by all major parties in the party system. This suggests that attention to this policy issue has also been more substantial for governments. In some years of this period, the number of adopted measures gets lower. However, even with the slight reduction in 2010, the number of adopted immigration regulations does not go back to the same levels of the 1980s, remaining relatively high. For its turn, some of the highest numbers of immigration policy changes happened in 2003, 2004, 2006 and 2007, possibly linked to the terrorist attacks that happened in Europe following the 9/11 in the United States.

Graph 2.1: Number of immigration policy changes in Western Europe (1980-2010)

Source: Determinants of International Migration Policies Database (DEMIG)

On the aggregate level, in terms of restriction degree, immigration policies in Western Europe become more liberal over time. According to the IMPIC immigration policy index, immigration policies become slowly, but consistently, more liberal when Western Europe is taken as a whole. This index is an unweighted average of all regulations and controls in the different fields of immigration policy. When analyzing this index by country, however, we see that this trend is not the same in all states, as indicates the graph 2.2 below. Although there is a trend towards more liberal policies rather than towards a more restrictive direction, and countries remain overall quite open to the entrance of immigrants in relative terms, the pronounced liberalization that took place in the 1990s was replaced by relative stability. Sometimes a more restrictive trend is observed in some countries, such as Denmark, Spain, Finland, the UK and the Netherlands.

Graph 2.2: Evolution of the immigration policy index across Western European countries (1980-2010)

Source: Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) dataset. The index goes from 0 (liberal) to 1 (restrictive)

When I disaggregate the data in different fields of immigration policy, there are important nuances. In general, labor and asylum/refugees' policies tend to be more liberal than other fields.

They go through periods of liberalization and retain a relative stability in more recent years. For instance, conditions for labor migration go through strong liberalization in the mid-1980s in countries where they used to be restrictive, including Germany, Spain, Denmark, France, Italy and Ireland. However, after a period of liberalization, conditions for labor migration became more stable, without significant liberalizing changes.

Regulations on asylum and refugees show a similar and converging pattern across countries. Usually, these policies already start from a liberal level, further becoming either more liberal or stable over time. In this area of asylum/refugees, countries tend to converge into a similar level of liberalization, as it is illustrated in the graph 2.3 below. Nevertheless, even in the field of asylum and refugees, some countries that used to be very liberal in the past become more restrictive from the 2000s, in particular Denmark and the Netherlands, perhaps as a reaction to terrorist attacks that happened around that period.

Graph 2.3: Evolution of the external regulations in the field of asylum and refugees across Western European countries (1980-2010)

Source: Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) dataset. The index goes from 0 (liberal) to 1 (restrictive)

It is possible that labor migration and asylum/refugees' policies are more influenced by external and/or factors that are common to all countries. For instance, national economic interests and the liberal international economy are likely to affect labor migration regulations in a similar way, pushing governments to liberalize them. Economic sectors usually profit from an open labor market, which allows the entrance of workers from different countries, because this can diversify and reduce labor force costs. With regards to asylum and refugees' migration, the development of an international regime, that started with the signature of the 1951 Refugee Convention, seems to promote a certain level of convergence in this area. In both fields of policies, the European Union can be expected to play a crucial role for openness and standardization of regulations, both because of the common market (facilitating free movements of people), and the Common European Asylum System (providing guidelines for processing asylum applications).

In the field of family reunification, countries tend to display more variation and less convergence. For instance, although the rights associated to family reunification liberalized in countries where they used to be more restrictive (such as Austria, Spain and Portugal), in the 1990s - possibly as a consequence of their membership to the European Union -, these rights later become stable or even more restrictive in some cases. The UK is a clear example of more restrictiveness starting in the second half of the 1990s. Ireland, by its turn, which has a more recent experience with immigration, remains very restrictive in the area of family reunification over the entire period of analysis.

Regarding measures related to the security of status of family migrants, countries displayed a relative stability over time, but with different levels of restrictiveness. Some of them remain very liberal, including Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway. Others start from a restrictive point and liberalize, but not up to the level of more open countries, as in the case of Spain and Austria. This field within family reunification policies is one with more variation among countries. Strong liberalization only affects a limited number of countries, while an incrementally more restrictive trend can be observed in others, in particular since the 1990s.

As an example, the graph 2.4 below shows that external regulations in the field of family reunification has important variation across countries. Austria, Spain, Ireland and Portugal used to have very strict policies, but they liberalized in the 1990s. Portugal continued over a liberalizing trend, while Spain remained stable and Austria started a slightly restrictive trend. Ireland did not show any variation over this period. Other countries, with already liberal policies,

made incremental restrictive changes in different moments in time, particularly Denmark and the Netherlands since the 1990s.

Graph 2.4: Evolution of external regulations in the field of family reunification across Western European countries (1980-2010)

Source: Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) dataset. The index goes from 0 (liberal) to 1 (restrictive)

Whereas immigration regulation becomes generally more liberal in areas of labor migration and asylum, immigration controls become clearly more restrictive, both in the external and internal dimensions. This evidence is strongly in line with the argument presented by Guiraudon and Lahav (2000), which states that national governments found strategies to reinforce their borders and achieve their restriction objectives. Overall, nation-states have granted rights to immigrants and respected their international commitments towards the refugee regime, for example, in which they do not change the conditions and eligibility for demand for asylum. Nevertheless, nation-states simultaneously implement tougher measures for immigrants to access their territories.

Many times, this is done by reinforcing the borders and implementing cross-checks for foreigners coming from third-countries (which are not members of the European Union). This suggests that, while states may be constrained by institutions and international norms, which may limit drastic changes in the rights granted to specific categories of immigrants, they are able to adjust controls over immigration and they remain sovereign regarding decisions of entrance into their territories.

As such, this descriptive data does not support the expectation grounded on the globalization thesis, which argues that states lost control over their borders. Instead, controls became stricter over time, in Western Europe as a whole, meaning that whereas borders opened for citizens of the European Union, they became considerably stricter for foreigners coming from third-countries. For instance, the requirements for visa applications often become higher. Host countries ask for proof of income, language skills, among others. Moreover, security measures were taken by states following recent terrorist attacks, which shows that the porosity of borders within the EU does not mean that member-states have lost their sovereignty. Instead, when countries believe that their integrity is under threat, they can reestablish border control or coordinate with other member-states in order to reinforce police mechanisms within and at the external borders of the EU territory.

In recent debates on immigration, the arrival of illegal immigrants and their supposed threat to national security, as well as their supposed abuse of welfare policies, are at the center of anti-immigration arguments. Consequently, control of the borders and combatting illegal immigration by investing on tougher police action becomes one of the most prominent concerns of national governments at the time. These are also areas in which national governments can pass a strong message about their efforts to "take back control", in attempt to address some of the concerns of citizens that oppose globalization and standardizing international norms in their countries.

Graph 2.5: Evolution of controls over immigration across Western European countries (1980-2010)


Controls over immigration (internal and external)

Source: Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) dataset. The index goes from 0 (liberal) to 1 (restrictive)

2.6 The politicization of the immigration issue and the role of Radical Right Parties

2.6.1 *The emergence of a new dimension of political competition*

The issue of immigration acquired an expressive importance in politics over the last years, across Western European democracies with different experiences with immigration. This includes states with a long history as destination countries, like the UK, Belgium and France, but also those that started to receive foreigners only more recently, like Nordic and Southern European countries. While the 2015 refugee crisis boosted the salience of controlling the entrance of refugees and foreigners, the presence of immigration in the political debate does not seem to be directly explained by the event itself. Immigration has been politicized long before the refugee crisis, and generally speaking, it become increasingly important in electoral competitions from around the 1980s and 1990s.

In some political systems, politicization of immigration was catalyzed by economic crisis or changing waves of immigration, but not in others. Therefore, what better explains the politicization of immigration and its growing level of attention among parties and voters? Discussion about the transformation of the dimensionality of the political space (De Vries and Marks 2012) point out to the emergence of new issues structuring political orientations, which has opened up space for identity politics in general, and debates on immigration, in particular. These issues have been especially mobilized by Radical Right Parties since the mid-1980s, whose issue-entrepreneurship strategy was key to introduce immigration into the political agenda.

Different theories argue for the emergence of a new set of concerns among the public and a general transformation of the political space. Over the last decades, macro changes affecting post-industrial societies, particularly linked to the effects of modernization and globalization, created conditions for the emergence of new political actors and their exploitation of contemporary dynamics triggered by such transformations. Some actors were able to politicize a new set of issues, grounded on the sociocultural dimension instead of traditional political issues. As such, the emergence of a new dimension of competition opens up space for the rising salience of the immigration issue in politics.

Based on the modernization theory, Inglehart (1977) explained that, as advanced industrial societies achieve economic prosperity and higher educational levels, citizens begin to change their concerns and the nature of their issue priorities. In this process, materialist values progressively lose centrality for citizens, while post-materialist values become increasingly important to them[9]. Inglehart expected that societies would evolve towards left-libertarian post-materialist values. This means that citizens would become mostly concerned with questions of protecting the environment, defending universalistic and egalitarian rights, promoting a more inclusive political participation, defending minorities' rights, and multiculturalism. These changes in priorities of voters boosted the emergence of new political movements in the late 1960s, like the Greens, Ecologists and New Social Movements (Bornschier 2010).

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[9] Materialist values concern material well-being and physical security, while post-materialist values regard the quality of life and individual self-expression. According to this post-materialism theory, there are two axis of values that organize peoples' orientations. One of them correspond to a continuum ranging from survival to self-expression values. The other goes from traditional to secular-rational values. As cultural communities become closer to the self-expression and secular-rational poles of values, the more post-materialist they are.

Nevertheless, later on authors identified that a "counter-revolution" movement began to take place, also grounded on the cultural dimension of conflict. Such movements emerged as a reaction to the mainstreaming of universalistic values and the secularization of Western European societies (Bornschier 2010; Inglehart and Norris 2017). In the 1980s, different right-wing movements brought a new emphasis to values like tradition and family, in opposition to the principles of individual autonomy and free choices of lifestyles, represented on the opposite side by the rising libertarian-left. Concern with cultural and national identities, perceived as principles to be preserved from a supposedly homogenizing effect of universalism, became particularly important. Over time, together with the emergence of new values, structural determinants of political alignments along the old class and religious cleavages began to lose their strength, and the growing salience of a new cultural dimension of conflict gave rise to Radical Right Parties, which strongly mobilize on this cultural dimension (Bornschier 2010).

Radical Right Parties represent an expression of this new political conflict, by opposing to universalism and multiculturalism, and by promoting what they call "the right to diversity" (H.-G. H. Betz and Johnson 2004; Hans-Georg Betz 1993; Hans-George Betz 1993). They appeal to the "right" of identity, respect for difference, and cultural distinctiveness among peoples. As such, they contest the growing presence of foreigners in their national communities, but particularly the non-European character of recent waves of immigration. They are alleged to be incompatible with the native culture and values. RRPs are not overtly racist, they rather have strategically adapted their exclusionary discourse by claiming that different peoples have the right to preserve their traditional way of life, and to remain different from each other. They argue that nationals are losing space in their own country, and that national identity is being lost in the context of increasing multiculturalism. For Simon Bornschier (2010), two groups of issues make RRPs the representation of a counter-pole to the libertarian-left on this new cultural cleavage. First, they embody a new anti-immigration discourse, which is based not on ethnic racism, but rather on a "differencialist nativism" or "cultural racism". Second, they represent a reaction against societal changes defended by the libertarian left, including the rejection of the multicultural model of society and universalistic values in general.

Kitschelt (1995) also interpreted the success of contemporary Radical Right parties as an electoral mobilization of a new combination of political preferences particular to contemporary post-industrial societies. According to the author, RRPs represent the authoritarian-particularistic view in opposition to libertarian-cosmopolitan values, mobilized by left-libertarian parties. As

such, in Kitschelt's view RRPs are inclined to market-liberal tendencies combined with a narrow, exclusive definition of citizenship rights, together with norm compliance and hierarchical choice procedures.

The table 2.1 below illustrates some of the main conceptualizations of political cleavages in contemporary post-industrial democracies which have open up space to the immigration issue as a politically relevant topic, mobilized within the cultural dimension of conflict. In addition to the post-materialism theory developed by Inglehart, other approaches emphasizing the relevance that cultural values gained in politics also rely on changes triggered by the phenomenon of globalization. In particular, the effects of globalization have a crucial impact on the national political space, giving rise to a new political cleavage opposing "winners" and "losers" of globalization (Kriesi et al. 2008).

Krisi *et al*. (2008) explain that three mechanisms related to globalization contribute to the formation of the groups of "winners" and "losers": increasing economic competition, increasing cultural diversity, and increasing of political competition between nation states and supra- or international political actors. As the consequences of globalization are very unequal for members of a national community, a group of people who benefit from new opportunities resulting from these effects contrasts with a sector whose life chances were traditionally protected by national borders. These clusters resulting from structural changes constitute political potentials, which can be articulated by political organizations, such as political parties.

The antagonism between "winners" and "losers" is referred as a conflict between integration and demarcation. In the theory developed by Kriesi *et al*. (2008), the integration vs. demarcation divide has both economic and cultural elements. For each axis, a set of open and integrationist positions contrasts with a set of defensive and protectionist orientations. In economic terms, there is an opposition between defense of neoliberal free trade and protectionism. In cultural terms, on the one hand there is a defense of universalistic, multiculturalist, or cosmopolitan views, and on the other hand, a preference for protecting culture and citizenship, in its civic, political and social sense. The new cultural cleavage is also interpreted as an opposition between Green-Alternative-Libertarian (GAL) and Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist (TAN) values, which includes positions on the European integration (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002).

As explained by De Vries (2017), immigration and international integration are key elements organizing the second dimension of political competition, which the author calls the

cosmopolitan-parochial divide. While the cosmopolitan pole comprises culturally-open orientations, favoring multiculturalism and international integration, the parochial pole is built of culturally-closed preferences, emphasizing the protection of national identity and national sovereignty, instead of cooperation at the international level. However, contrary to other authors, in De Vries' view individual-level attitudes on the cosmopolitan-parochial divide are not only grounded on culture, but also motivated by feelings of economic deprivation. In her study, she finds that those who perceive economic losses due to events like the economic crises of 2008-2009 are more likely to oppose immigration and the European integration. Another element that she emphasizes is that, while it seems clear that a two-dimensional political space has developed, the content of this second dimension can be highly driven by context-specific factors, varying considerably between nations.

These different theories help explain how long-term transformations of the political conflict in Western Europe gave rise to cultural cleavages and raised attention to identity issues, among which immigration becomes very prominent. Nevertheless, the existence of specific social circumstances, such as the presence of immigrants, does not automatically become source of political conflict. Social conditions need to be mobilized by political actors in order to be conceived as politically important and dividing. As Kriesi *et al*. (2008) highlighted, social transformations represent a political potential, but they must be explored by political organizations in order to become politicized. While the phenomenon of immigration has historically affected some countries, it has not been framed as a political issue since the arrival of immigrants. Studies show that starting in the 1980s, and increasingly in the 1990s, immigration becomes one of the most contesting issues in politics (Dancygier and Margalit 2018). The rise of Radical Right Parties is a crucial element to understand the politicization of this issue (Schain 2006, 2008; Schain, Zolberg, and Hossay 2002). In other words, mobilization by RRPs is behind the entrance of immigration into the public debate and its prominence in the political agenda.

RRPs have been particularly successful in mobilizing the anxiety of the "losers of globalization" in cultural terms, appealing for protectionist solutions for the perceived threats to national identity (Kriesi et al. 2008). Immigrants are also framed as an economic and security threat by anti-immigrant groups. As Bornschier (2010) highlights, RRPs have been effective in framing the question of identity and community in terms of "us" and "the other". By placing the issues of immigration and the alleged inability to integrate people with different cultural backgrounds into

the political agenda, the Radical Right is an important driver of the second transformation of the dimensions of political conflict in the 1990s (Kriesi et al. 2008).

Table 2.1: New political cleavages in Western Europe and their components

Political cleavage	Main components	Authors
Post-materialism *versus* materialism	Value-orientations	(Inglehart 1977)
Libertarian-cosmopolitan *versus* authoritarian-particularistic	Conception of citizenship, decision-making process and redistribution of scarce resources	(Kitschelt and McGann 1997)
Integration *versus* demarcation	Globalization and its effects; economic, cultural and political dimensions	(Kriesi et al. 2008)
Traditionalist-communitarian versus Libertarian-universalist values	Socio-cultural values, conceptions of nation and cosmopolitanism	(Bornschier 2010)
Green-Alternative-Libertarian (GAL) *versus* Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist (TAN)	Socio-cultural values, conceptions of nation and cosmopolitanism, the European integration	(Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002).
Cosmopolitan *versus* Parochial	Immigration and international integration; cultural orientations and economic perceptions	(De Vries 2017)

Source: Elaborated by the author

In an attempt to enter the political competition, new parties of the Radical Right have implemented an issue-entrepreneurship strategy, which consists in promoting a previously ignored issue and adopting a position which is different from the mean position in the party system (Hobolt and de Vries 2015). Grande and colleagues analyze party manifestos in six Western European countries and show that, with regards to immigration, it is mostly RRPs, and not mainstream parties, that are responsible for the political mobilization of the immigration topic (Grande, Schwarzbözl, and Fatke 2018). They find that the politicization of immigration is not correlated with socio-economic factors, such as the share of immigrants in a country or the level of unemployment. Instead, increasing political awareness to it was driven by issue entrepreneurial strategies of RRPs. Although immigration is not exclusively an issue of Radical Right parties, it is much more present in their manifestos than for moderate parties. Moreover, in most cases, RRPs were the first to introduce immigration in the elections. While the presence of RRPs cannot be considered a sufficient explanation for the politicization of the immigration

issue, their strategic focus on it can explain the increasing importance of immigration in the political competition, and it seems to be a necessary condition for politicization.

2.6.2 *Party systems and the immigration issue: how Radical Right Parties could influence the government agenda*

Studies show that immigration gained attention by all parties in the system since the 1980s, reflecting the rising number of immigrants but, in particular, the rise of Radical Right Parties (Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2017). The electoral success of RRPs had an impact on the policy agendas of mainstream parties, making them aware to key issues of their radical right competitors, particularly in the case of mainstream right-wing parties (Akkerman 2015b). RRPs were pioneers in appealing to anti-immigration sentiments, and their electoral rise helped to introduce this issue in the whole party system agenda. However, at the moment, they are not the only parties to talk about immigration. Political parties behave strategically to pursue their votes, office and policy goals, and they do not operate in a political vacuum. Rather, they pay attention to other parties' results and strategies in order to choose their behavior. Depending on the level of risk involved, and on the characteristics of the political-institutional context, mainstream parties have considerable incentives to put more emphasis on immigration issues, especially because RRPs get better electoral results at the expense of mainstream parties.

Confronted with the rise of Radical Right Parties, mainstream parties have a set of choices of strategies to adopt, either to engage or disengage with them. Heinze (2017) identifies the subtypes of disengagement and engagement strategies discussed in the literature. As the author explains, mainstream parties can implement six different disengage strategies, namely: ignore, legal restrictions, cordon sanitaire (blocking coalitions), demonize, defuse, or hold. These strategies are ideal types, and in practice they can be combined and or evolve over time.

When mainstream parties choose to ignore, the first type, they deny the legitimacy and importance of the RRP. A second choice is to try to actively isolate RRPs using legal or political measures, by establishing legal restrictions to smaller parties (e.g. raise the electoral thresholds, limit their right to speak, or refuse public funding for campaigns). Thirdly, by establishing a cordon sanitaire, mainstream parties coordinate in order to present the radical party as "extremist" and "un-coalitional". As a fourth strategy, mainstream parties can choose to publicly demonize RRPs, their positions and members, and prohibit any collaboration with them. A fifth disengage approach is to try to change the perceived importance of a specific issue by placing

greater emphasis on other topics, for example, located on the socio-economic dimension. That would be a defusing strategy. A final disengagement strategy is to attempt to win debates against RRPs by reinforcing mainstream parties' own policy positions, improving their clarity of communication, and concentrating on their core electorate, which is called the holding strategy (Heinze 2017).

There are two ways that mainstream parties can engage with the Radical Right. They can adopt RRPs' positions, in order to try to decrease their political space and win their voters back. Or, mainstream parties can collaborate with RRPs in legislative or executive terms. Legislatively, they can vote together for or against bills concerning a relevant issue, like immigration for example. In the executive, they can form a government coalition, or a minority government supported by an RRP. These strategies do not come without risks, and they also seem to be more or less effective on different stages experienced by RRPs. At the beginning of their rise, disengage strategies seemed to be more frequently applied, and more effective to keep them in the margins. But they lose their effectiveness after RRPs achieve their electoral breakthrough. By its turn, once engage strategies are adopted, they cannot easily be reversed, and there is virtually no evidence of changes from an engage to disengage strategies in Western European party systems. As RRPs get better electoral results, strategies tend to go from disengage to engage, because the portions of support conquered by RRPs tend to turn harder the task of forming governments without their collaboration, and/or to disregard issues raised by then, which have become salient among the public.

With high politicization of the immigration issue, their anti-immigration appeal is expected to contaminate the government agenda on this policy matter, because other parties also become aware to it and try to respond. Mainstream parties tend to adjust their policy agendas in reaction of RRPs' electoral success, by paying more attention to and/or coopting positions associated to RRPs. For instance, they can adopt more restrictive positions on some immigration policy fields (Akkerman 2015b). The influence of the radical right on the immigration agenda could happen directly, through their active participation in governing coalitions, representing an opportunity for them to put the issue into coalition agreements. It can also happen through legislative cooperation with minority right-wing governments. Or, RRPs' influence on the immigration agenda can also happen indirectly, by contagion effects on mainstream parties. Mainstream parties may remain in control of governments and use their office positions to try to gain

credibility for effectively managing immigration. By doing so, government parties expect to get better results in upcoming competitions.

However, as previously discussed, domestic political factors are not the only drivers of immigration policies. National governments remain relevant decision-makers in the area of immigration, but they are also inserted in a globalized and liberal order in which external and internal pressures for liberalization operate. For this reason, governments are expected to hold more discretionary power over some fields of immigration policy more than other. They are also likely to make a stronger effort to adapt or oppose external standardizing norms in specific fields of immigration, where it is more costly for them to lose control.

In addition, distinctive party families can pursue different pledges on existing immigration fields (Akkerman 2015b). Since immigration policy is composed of different fields, and considering that interest, institutional, international, and normative factors can affect these fields in various directions, I do not expect that RRPs will be able to influence the immigration agenda in all its dimensions towards more restriction. Particularly sensitive to their electoral pressure should be regulations in the area of family reunification and immigration policy controls, which refer to the regulation of the border and admission of new immigrants (Givens and Luedtke 2005). These are fields of immigration in which national governments have larger decision-making power and are exposed to strong restrictive pressures by RRPs and public opinion.

Conclusions

This chapter discussed immigration policies in Western Europe, an issue that becomes increasingly politicized since the 1980s and 1990s. Over time, immigration gained salience and divided opinions, becoming particularly important in elections. Studies show that public opinion in Europe becomes significantly hostile to immigration, a pattern which was reinforced during the recent refugee crises. However, anti-immigrant sentiments did not create political divides spontaneously. During the first wave of massive immigration to Western Europe, foreign labor force was perceived as very positive for the economy of immigration-receiving countries. Anti-immigrant sentiments and the politicization of immigration was not driven by the arrival of newcomers in itself but was later mobilized on political grounds by organized groups. Radical Right parties were key in this process, and their issue-entrepreneurship strategy helped them to attain electoral breakthrough by mobilizing anti-immigration sentiments, particularly

emphasizing cultural concerns. Later in time, RRPs were generally successful to keep a strong position in their respective political systems and even to participate in governing coalitions in some countries. For this reason, it is important to better understand if and how they impact the policies in the fields that are at the core of their appeal.

By exploring a new dimension of political divide, RRPs' success has mainly happened at the expense of established political parties, both belonging to the mainstream left and the mainstream right. Studies suggest that established parties have implemented various strategies in reaction to RRPs' popularity over the years. In general, established parties tried first to simply block or ignore their new Radical Right competitors, expecting to isolate them. However, to the point that such strategies of disengagement did not pay off, most mainstream parties preferred to go for an engagement strategy later on. By doing so, mainstream left- and right-wing parties have, to different degrees, co-opted the Radical Right agenda or cooperated with them within representative institutions. Therefore, the contagion effect is likely to manifest on the activities of mainstream parties in office as well, since governments seek to be responsive to voters' concerns and to gain credibility for well managing salient issues, like immigration.

In effect, some areas of immigration policy have been subject to restrictive changes over the past three decades, particularly family reunification and immigration controls. Contrary to other policy areas that are more exposed to liberalizing pressures, like labor migration and asylum, those policies that become stricter represent fields in which national governments have more decision-making power. These policy fields also correspond to central claims of the anti-immigrant pressures mobilized by RRPs, in particular regarding the cultural assimilation and integration of permanent settlers, and the fight against illegal immigration. Both are considered central issues in the current European political debate. The next chapter examines the Radical Right party family in more detail and shows the centrality of identitarian issues in their programmes, notably immigration.

CHAPTER 3
Radical Right Parties in Western Europe: Definition and Positions

Introduction

Different factors can push immigration regulations and controls towards either more liberal or more restrictive directions. The literature on immigration policies consider that the interests of domestic political actors is an important aspect to be taken into account to explain policy changes in the area of immigration, among which the interests of political parties. However, this literature vaguely assesses the specific agency of Radical Right Parties (RRPs) to pressure for more restrictive immigration measures. Because RRPs are considered to "own" the immigration issue and to largely mobilize on anti-immigration sentiments, I argue in this dissertation that, as they expand their popularity, they become key actors in the process of increasing restrictive regulations on the entrance of foreigners. Opposition to immigration is a central issue in their platforms, under a broader discourse defending cultural homogeneity and opposing the multicultural model. Moreover, mainstream parties have long ignored the immigration issue in their platforms, being one of the factors providing space for RRPs to adopt immigration as a distinguishable topic in their electoral appeal. Before assessing their impact, it is important to define Radical Right parties and to consider in which ways they are different from other political parties.

The aim of the present chapter is to discuss the concept of Radical Right Party and to explain the definition applied in this work. I also present the list of parties included in the study and some of their central policy positions. The classification of Radical Right Parties is based on expert survey data. To fulfill the aim of this chapter, I explore the main definitions and terminologies found in the literature, pointing to the fact that, albeit there is some level of heterogeneity within this group of parties, they do correspond to a distinguishable party family. This family can be defined by a core of programmatic features and policy preferences.

In summary, most Radical Right Parties emerged in European advanced democracies around the 1970s and early 1980s, achieving their electoral breakthrough in the mid-1980s, in most cases at

local and/or European Parliament elections. Before that, they used to be marginalized, and considered as fringe political parties. They were largely ignored by dominant political forces, seen as politically irrelevant, and often compared to reminiscences or a revival of the old Fascism. However, when RRPs started to get relevant shares of the vote, going very quickly from virtually zero to around 10 percent of support, they started to attract attention, particularly because of their radical and anti-system appeal in party systems previously taken as institutionalized or frozen (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Since the 1990s, the Radical Right party family has been largely investigated by social scientists, and today this is the most studied group of parties of all (Mudde 2007, 2016).

Three waves of scholarship on the Radical Right

The largest part of investigations about the Radical Right has focused on explaining their emergence and electoral performance, with a predominance of the "demand-side" approach. This approach emphasizes structural social-economic or cultural conditions as drivers of the demand for RRPs. According to one of the most prominent experts on the topic, Cas Mudde, there are three waves of investigation about this party family in the post-WWII period (Mudde 2016).

The first wave of scholarship went from 1945 to 1980. It focused on the historical continuity between the pre-war and post-war "extreme right". This literature has been mostly historical, descriptive and case-oriented. During this first wave of research, "extreme right" or "neo-Nazism" were terms commonly used terms to describe the emerging phenomenon. The second wave of studies started in the 1980s and went roughly until the early 2000s. In this phase, more social science literature has been mobilized to explain the phenomenon of new Radical Right Parties, generally guided by modernization theories. In this sense, explanations for the emergence of such groups were predominantly framed as "demand-side". The main interest was to understand why new Radical Right parties could be successful in modern democracies, and which factors could explain their different fortunes, both cross-nationally and over time. Finally, the third wave has recently started at the beginning of the 21st century. Scholars began to move beyond the explanations about the rise of the Radical Right itself and become interested in (also) understanding the consequences of their rise, and how this party family impacts its political systems. By doing so, this most recent wave of studies brings "parties back to the equation", and the Radical Right is taken as an agent of change. They are understood as able to shape their own outcomes and their environment.

Heterogeneous electoral trajectory, but common positions

After three decades since Radical Right Parties achieved their breakthrough in the post-war era, many parties consolidated a relevant amount of support, promoting substantive changes in their national party systems. Others have succeeded to participate in national government coalitions or provided crucial legislative support for ruling parties[10]. Nevertheless, although parties in the family display a general progressive electoral strength, they have not been successful in every country. In some cases, there is no Radical Right party, for example in Ireland. In others, they remain fringe parties with minimum or almost irrelevant electoral support, like Portugal, Spain and Greece.

In some situations, the electoral system revealed to be an important factor to contain smaller parties in general, and Radical Right parties in particular. In the United Kingdom, the first-past-the-post system limits major electoral support to the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the British National Party (BNP). For the moment, these parties only obtained more important electoral results in elections at the local level and when their vote is geographically concentrated (Norris 2005), or in competitions for the European Parliament, which runs under proportional rule. Yet, this does not mean that positions and concerns raised by the Radical Right have not affected the broader political agenda. The UKIP was very important on the mobilization for the Brexit Referendum, where the debate was mainly framed with a sovereignty approach. Among other claims, the argument for exiting the EU was to "take back control" of the borders and reduce migration inflows.

Despite some constraining effects of institutional rules, like plurality electoral systems or the existence of constitutional provisions, they do not guarantee that RRPs remain minor political forces. In Germany, for instance, RRPs were not relevant for a long time. Older Radical Right Parties like the National Democratic Party (NPD) and The Republicans (REP), have traditionally been fragmented and weak in the country, often unable to surpass the 5 percent electoral threshold to enter the *Bundestag*. However, more recently in 2017, the party Alternative for Germany (AfD), founded only in 2013, was successful to enter the national parliament, when it obtained 13% of the votes. It was the first time, in Germany, that a Radical Right Party gains presence in the national legislative branch in the whole post-war period.

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[10] Some countries that have experienced the presence of Radical Right parties in the national government are Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland and Finland. With the exception of the 1983 Austrian coalition between the Social democratic party SPO and the Radical Right FPO, all alliances have been formed with a mainstream right-wing party (S. De Lange 2008).

Given the different records of the electoral performance of RRPs in various countries and over time, it is important to better understand their potential and actual impact on European democracies within a comparative framework. The electoral strength of RRPs is closely connected to their ability to affect the broader political agenda, as well as the strategies taken by mainstream parties in reaction to their rise. For this reason, electoral systems and patterns of party competition can create different opportunity structures for Radical Right parties to affect their political systems. Since parties do not operate in a vacuum, their interactions and calculations regarding other parties seem to be crucial to understand the weight of different parties on the political agenda and the policy-making process.

Radical Right parties form a specific party family, because they hold common policy positions and preferences. This distinguished them from other groups of parties. Individual parties belonging to the family can display very dissimilar economic preferences or concerning socio-cultural issues like same-sex marriage and abortion. Nevertheless, I argue that what unites them is the emphasis on the socio-cultural dimension of competition and their opposition to non-Western immigration (Arzheimer 2018a).

In short, this chapter claims that Radical Right parties can be defined based on the combination of three core features: identitarian politics, authoritarian values and a populist style. As said by many experts on the topic, these parties can represent a challenge to democracies because of some illiberal positions they hold. However, as political parties, they are compatible with procedural democracy, and can be approached under traditional theories of political parties (S. De Lange 2008). The definition presented here, based on three core characteristics and expert survey data, is not new. It is based on classifications provided by other authors, particularly the definition developed by Mudde (2007), one of the most frequently used today. In this work, some elements of Mudde's definition are contested and the motivations behind this will be further explained.

The next section of the chapter revisits the debate about the definition and terminology of the Radical Right party family in the literature. The following part explains the adopted definition and clarifies the reasons for choosing the term "Radical Right" over other possible denominations. After providing the adopted definition, I present an empirical analysis of the central policy positions held by members of the party family, comparing them to other groups of parties. The aim is to assess in which aspects the Radical Right can be distinguished from other

party families, and to bring empirical evidence to subsidize the classification I use. In the last part, I provide an overview of the electoral performance of Radical Right parties in Western Europe in light of the main explanations found in the literature for their emergence, growing support and performance variation across countries and over time. The electoral history of RRPs shows important variation over time and space, which conditions their potential to affect their party systems and the policy agenda.

3.1 A Radical Right Party Family? Terminology and definition

This section explains some of the central debates found in the literature of the Radical Right regarding terminology and definition. The major part of the literature argues that parties belonging to this group share common positions, or a common ideology. In a nutshell, the presented argument holds that Radical Right parties can be defined by three characteristics: identitarian politics, authoritarian values and a populist style. Each of these features will be explained further. Additionally, I also clarify the reason to apply the term "Radical Right", which is among the most used terminologies. At the end of this part, I include the list of parties that are considered in the analysis.

3.1.1 Terminology and definition in the literature

As mentioned before, since the mid-1980's there is a new group of parties located on the right pole of the political spectrum that calls attention of political analysts because of their accelerated electoral growth and radical proposals in the context of established democracies. At first, they were assimilated to old fascist movements, but soon their strategies, key issues, and constituencies were understood to be significantly different from those former right-wing extremist groups. Two of the main differences of new Radical Right parties compared to fascist movements are their concern with post-industrial issues (Ignazi 2006), including contestation to questions related to immigration, national identity, globalization and the European Union, and their participation in elections main form to attempt power (Norris 2005). As such, new Radical Right parties are generally seen as compatible to liberal democracy. They do not explicitly defend the replacement of this political regime by an authoritarian alternative.

A lot of progress has been made by the specialized literature, but there is not a clear consensus about the terminology and definition of the Radical Right. Authors emphasize different sets of characteristics to classify a party as part of this party family. Often, operationalization of the

definition is absent, and issues of empirical nature emerge because many works focus on an ideal-type or few case studies to provide a party family definition (Harrison and Bruter 2011), which can make comparisons hard to be conducted. Nevertheless, Arzheimer (2018) argues that the use of different terminologies has not limited the development of this research field, since the literature has not split and co-citations of the same bulk of works happen in spite of dissimilar applied labels.

Overall, scholars consider that there exists a Radical Right or Extreme Right party family – the two most used terms (Arzheimer 2018a), but sometimes they call it or define it using dissimilar approaches and criteria. Yet, different terms are employed by authors referring to a party family that frequently includes a similar core of individual political parties. For instance, parties frequently included in the Radical Right party family are the French FN[11], the Austrian FPO, the Italian MSI-AN and the Belgium VB. By its turn, there are some baseline cases, which often raise controversy in terms of belonging to the same group, like the Dutch LPF and the British UKIP.

The table 3.1 below, based on De Lange (2008) and expanded from further literature review, shows the main terminologies applied to this party family and associated references. The terms most frequently used are "Extreme Right" and "Radical Right". Nevertheless, Arzheimer (2018) notes that over time, particularly in the course of the last decade, the use of "Radical Right" significantly outnumbered the usage of the term "Extreme Right", making the former increasingly rare. This is one of the reasons why this work choses to use the term "Radical Right" to refer to this party family.

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[11] In June 2018, the French National Front (Front National, FN) changed its name to National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN).

Table 3.1: Terminologies and references

Term	References
Extreme right	Arzheimer, 2009; Hainsworth, 2008; Harrison and Bruter, 2011; Ignazi, 2006; Laude, 2011; Mudde, 2000; Perrineau, 2011 Carter 2005; Schain et al. 2002; Perrineau 2001; Hainsworth 2000a; Ignazi 1992; 2003; Pfahl-Traughber 1993; Stouthuysen 1993; Von Beyme 1988
Radical right parties	Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Norris, 2005; Givens, 2005; Stockemer, 2017 Minkenberg 1998; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Merkl and Weinberg 1993; Ennser, 2012
New National Populism	Taguieff, 2012
Populist Right	Eismann apud Mudde, 2007
Populist Radical Right	Betz and Johnson, 2004; Mudde, 2007 Filc and Lebel 2005; Liang 2007; Mudde 2007;
Anti-immigration/Anti-immigrants parties	Van Der Brug and Fennema, 2007 Gibson 2002; Fennema 1997; Van der Brug et al. 2005; Van Spanje and Van der Brug 2007
New Radical Right	Rydgren, 2008
Far Right	Golder, 2016 Jungerstam-Mulders 2003; Marcus 2000
National populist	Backes 1991; Taguieff 1984
Ethno-nationalist	Rydgren 2004a
Exclusionary populist	Betz 2001
Neopopulist	Betz and Immerfall 1998
New populist	Taggart 1995
New right	Delwit and Poirier 2007
Populist nationalist	Blokker 2005
Radical right-wing populist parties	De Lange, 2008 Betz 1994; Evans 2005; Rydgren 2005a; Zaslove 2004a
Right wing	Betz and Immerfall 1998
Right-wing populist	Decker 2000; Pfahl-Traughber 1994
Xenophobic populist	DeAngelis 2003

Source: Expanded and updated form De Lange (2008: 60)

To a certain extent, the debate to establish a common terminology lies on the disputes about the definition of the party family. Definitions search for the constitutive elements and essential features for classifying a party as part of a group. An important part of studies on the topic does not provide a clear and operational definition. Many of them rely on abstract concepts, which are difficult to measure, or they prefer to adopt an already existing definition. In fact, according to Arzheimer (2018), most scholars working in the field are "users" rather than "producers" of concepts. This means they are primarily worried with the application of the concept to substantive problems, rather than to develop their own concepts.

Few works that are mainly concerned with definitions present a list of individual political parties to be included in the party family (see: Harrison and Bruter 2011; Mudde 2007; Norris 2005; Stockemer 2017). Furthermore, most studies do not rely on an empirical definition. Comparative analysis can face significant challenges regarding this point. It can be hard to find comprehensive comparative data about Radical Right parties with information on the party level, for example. Unidimensional scales, frequently found in public opinion, candidate and expert surveys, or applied by analysis of party manifestos, can be limited to characterize and classify the Radical Right, because these radical parties innovatively emphasize a different dimension of competition in their appeal. There is also an important level of heterogeneity within this party family. Internal variation should not be ignored, and they can be difficult to address cross-nationally.

Generally speaking, I identify three main approaches to define the Radical Right in the specialized literature. The first approach defines this group of parties based on their spatial placement in the party system. The second one relies on characteristics of style and strategy employed by them. The third one, which I believe is more accurate, defines the Radical Right based on a set of common policy positions, or ideologies. Below I provide examples of each approach.

In the first approach, some authors define the Radical Right based on their position on the left-right ideological spectrum, so it classifies parties considering their spatial location in relation to other parties in the system. This is the definition used by Norris (2005) and Klandermans and Mayer (2006), for instance. According to this relative-placement definition, Radical Right parties would be located at the most right-wing position within their party system. Norris (2005) operationalizes this notion by selecting political parties placed on a position equal or higher than 8 in the political spectrum (on a scale ranging from left (1) to right (10)).

One problem with this definition is that it can include right-wing parties that are not part of the Radical Right family. By only relying on spatial terms, it can be hard to distinguish between a Radical Right and a mainstream right-wing party, since they could both be closely placed on the political-ideological spectrum, although they may not share all characteristics. In fact, a number of mainstream right-wing parties have changed their policy positions over the last years as a response to the rise of Radical Right competitors. Moreover, there are cases of Radical Right parties that emerged as center-right parties, but radicalized their positions over time, for example the Austrian FPO and the Swiss SVP.

Furthermore, the relative-location conception can be misleading in three aspects. First, it does not explicitly consider that Radical Right parties defend similar policies or share a common core. Second, by often relying on traditional left-right scale measures, it implicitly considers that Radical Right parties can accurately be defined based on the classic unidimensional left-right divide. This traditional ideological cleavage is primarily grounded on economic issues, whereas it has been argued that this unidimensional scale is no longer sufficient to understand party competition in many countries nowadays (Bornschier 2010), particularly because cultural concerns are crucial to approach parties from the Radical Right and the Libertarian Left (Hans-Georg Betz 1993, 2002). Third, the spatial definition reflects that parties could be fully defined on spatial terms in their own national political system. However, it is known that many of the members of the Radical Right party family exchange international support and adopt similar strategies and/or positions from their successful neighbors (Betz, 2002; Mudde, 2007). This behavior suggests that RRPs share cross-national commonalities. They are not fully understood based only on their national contexts. For comparative studies, defining members of the Radical Right only based on their positions in their national political system can be insufficient, because they are usually united by common drivers and projects. In addition, as Mudde (2007: 270) points out: "developments with respect to a populist Radical Right party in one (European) country can have significant effects on the opportunities for populist Radical Right parties in other (European) countries".

While I consider that this spatial definition is limited to capture the phenomenon under study, it does not mean to say that Radical Right parties are randomly distributed on a left-right dimension. In fact, even though they are sometimes placed around more central positions in the left-right spectrum due to their blurry economic positions, expert surveys generally do place parties within this group on the left. However, while Radical Right parties are more likely to be

located on the far-right of the ideological continuum (particularly on scales that measure positions on immigration, multiculturalism or socio-cultural values), not all parties located on the far-right belong to the Radical Right party family. For these reasons, the spatial position by itself seems insufficient to categorize parties as members of the family.

A second perspective to approach Radical Right parties is centered on their political style or strategy they implement. The focus of this set of definitions is not exclusively on ideological-space terms, but on a specific strategy or style characterizing these parties. Usually, they are identified as having a "anti-system", "anti-establishment", "populist", "outsider" or "niche" status. Authors that conceive the Radical Right based on this type of criteria tend to emphasize their criticism towards mainstream parties, the establishment, and liberal democracy (Pelinka 1998; Scarrow 1996). One issue with this definition is that there are also left-wing parties using similar anti-system strategies, but not sharing policy proposals. Anti-establishment may be a strategy used by Radical Right parties, but it is not exclusively applicable to them. Other parties, also from the left, can adopt populist and anti-system strategies. Although RRPs are usually anti-system parties, not all anti-system parties belong to the Radical Right party family. Moreover, studies have shown that support for RRPs is not entirely explained by pure protest vote. RRPs voters are also attracted to the content of parties' appeal and share their programmatic vision.

A third perspective to define the Radical Right party family considers that parties in the group share a common core ideology, discourse or political preferences. They are similar in more substantive terms. This is currently the approach mostly found in the specialized literature, although there is a range of combinations of features used as classification criteria. Some authors consider a long list of necessary conditions to classify parties as Radical Right. Others reduce the number of defining characteristics to a smaller core. From various ideological definitions of this party family, two aspects can be highlighted as frequently found in the definition of the Radical Right. The first is that RRPs attribute high importance to cultural or identity issues. More specifically, they are united in their sharp opposition to *non-Western* immigration. The second point is that RRPs display a problematic and ambivalent relationship with liberal democracy (Arzheimer 2018a).

Early definitions of the Radical Right considered that parties belonging to this group defended the free-market economy in combination with specific socio-cultural positions. In the view of Kitschelt and McGann (1997), who developed one of the first comparative studies on the topic,

new Radical Right parties combined particularistic-authoritarian values[12] to the market economy. In a similar view, Eatwell (1989) considered them as parties combining economic liberalism with moral conservatism and political authoritarianism.

Later, it becomes more consensual that Radical Right parties attribute much more emphasis to socio-cultural positions than to specific economic policies (Golder 2016). Their appeal deeply relies on questions of culture, values and identity (H.-G. H. Betz and Johnson 2004). Bornschier (2010) interprets their rise as a consequence of the growing salience of a new conflict divide taking place in Western Europe, which is based on a cultural cleavage between a libertarian-universalistic pole versus a traditional-communitarian pole of values. In the author's view, RRPs almost exclusively mobilize on the cultural dimension, they share a homogeneous set of cultural preferences, but diverge regarding their position about intervention of the state in economy. Yet, for some authors, RRPs blurring positions towards economic policies is, in fact, a powerful and deliberately chosen electoral strategy they use (Rovny 2013).

While there are some clearer common traits unifying Radical Right parties, there are also elements that can be found in some members of the group, but not in others. Over time, RRPs have also changed some of their positions and adapted their strategies. For this reason, scholars have called attention to the heterogeneity within the Radical Right party family, which can accommodate sub-types of parties, according to some scholars (Golder 2016; Harrison and Bruter 2011; Ignazi 2006). For instance, the definition provided by Ignazi (2006) mixes anti-system discourse and the defense of certain values, but emphasizes the former trait to differentiate the post-industrial extreme right type. The author considers the existence of two sub-types of what he calls "extreme right": the old and the post-industrial. The first one has an ideology that refers to one of the established right-extremist traditions of thought, considered as an "ideology in a strong meaning". The second one presents an anti-system discourse, better understood as an "ideology in a weak meaning". Ignazi (2006) argues that post-industrial extreme right parties hold a system de-legitimizing discourse, they are a by-product of the conflicts of post-industrial society and react to the emergence of new conflicts defending the

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[12] According to Kitschelt and McGann (1997), particularistic values are located in one of the extremes of the range of positions regarding citizenship rights. A particularistic conception refers to a narrow, exclusive definition of citizenship rights, opposed to a broad, inclusive and universalistic conception of citizenship (the cosmopolitan pole, opposed to the particularistic pole). Authoritarian values are opposed to libertarian values in the dimension of positions concerning collective decision modes. Authoritarian values are characterized by collective norm compliance, combined with hierarchical choice procedures, while libertarian values defend individual freedom of political and cultural expression, combined with participatory choice procedures of collectively biding policies.

natural community from alien and polluting presence (racism, xenophobia). They demand for law and order, and express uneasiness over representative mechanisms and procedures.

In an attempt to operationalize a definition, Harrison and Bruter (2011) analyze ideological discourse in party documents and conclude that there are four subtypes of Radical Right parties. For them, the Radical Right party family attributes different levels of priority to two structural ideological dimensions: authoritarianism and negative identity. There are two ideological conceptions in each dimension: "the authoritarianism dimension has a social (reactionary) mode and an institutional (repressive) conception. The negative identity dimension has cultural (xenophobic) and civic (populist) conceptions" (Harrison and Bruter 2011: 22). The reactionary conception of the authoritarian dimension is described as a belief that the state has an authority over the individual, an emphasis on the existence of a natural community, limitations on personal and collective freedoms and the acceptance of hierarchy to organize society. The repressive conception of authoritarianism leans towards oppressive measures to assure strict obedience and state authority. Regarding the negative identity dimension, its xenophobic conception means the exclusion of those seen as essentially different from the community, namely foreigners or ethnic minorities. The populist conception, on the other hand, centrally expresses a contempt for fellow politicians and their parties. Populism is basically understood by the authors as a simplistic discourse that relies on the sovereignty of the people and the denunciation of political elites and institutions. The combination of each of the two conceptions in each dimension generate four subtypes of parties within the Radical Right party family. I find that one limitation of this conception is that xenophobia and populism can perfectly coexist (and usually do) among contemporary Radical Right parties.

Among the emergence of many terminologies and definitions, the one provided by Mudde (2007) has been increasingly used by scholars of the Radical Right (Muis and Immerzeel 2017; Rooduijn 2015). His definition captures well three broad dimensions that, to a certain extent, translate what the literature has identified as frequently observed traits among in the Radical Right party family, but without a clear structure. In the author's conception, these core ideological features are nativism, authoritarianism and populism. Nativism combines nationalism and xenophobia and excludes liberal forms of nationalism. The idea underlying nativism is that "states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ('the nation') and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state. The basis for defining (non) 'nativeness' can be diverse, e.g. ethnic, racial or

religious, but will always have a cultural component" (Mudde, 2007: 19). Authoritarianism does not mean opposition to liberal democracy order or the desire to replace the democratic regime. Instead, it means adhesion to authoritarian values and beliefs. In the author's words, "authoritarianism is defined here as the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely. In this interpretation, authoritarianism includes law and order and 'punitive conventional moralism'" (Mudde, 2007: 23). Finally, populism is defined by Mudde as a "thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people" (Mudde, 2007: 23).

In this work, I use Mudde's (2007) definition and propose some variations to it. First, populism is not an exclusive feature of Radical Right parties. It can also be more or less pronounced in members of this party family. For this reason, I consider that the term "populist" should not be included in the terminology of the party family, because it would represent a limitation of the parties to be included in it. Second, I argue that the notion of "identitarian politics" is more adequate than "nativism" to refer to the search for a culturally or ethnically homogeneous community by the Radical Right, coupled with the opposition to foreigners from different backgrounds or minorities. Some Radical Right parties are not explicitly nationalist, they can defend the autonomy of a region, for example, as in the case of the Italian Northern League (LN) and the Belgium Flemish Interest (VB). In addition to that, some political parties from Central and Eastern Europe that can be included in the Radical Right category are primarily worried with ethnical minorities rather than with immigrants, so it is not clear if "nativism" should also apply to them. I believe the term "identitarian politics" is useful to capture the emphasis on identity issues compared to economic issues and it captures the effort of Radical Right parties to explore the cultural cleavage in the political competition.

The third modification I bring to Mudde's definition regards the concept of populism. I argue that populism is better understood as a political communication style that applies a discourse opposing "the people" and "the elite", and criticizes the establishment, rather than as an ideology. Populist strategies can vary across contexts and can be used to different extent by political parties (not only within the Radical Right). Populism can also be employed as a strategy by mainstream or left-wing parties. The next section explains the definition that I use in this work. I discuss the meaning of each of the three core features of the Radical Right, and, at the

end, I display the list of parties to be included in the analysis.

3.1.2 Applied definition of Radical Right parties: identitarian politics, authoritarian values and populist style

The Radical Right party family is defined in this work according to the presence of three characteristics: identitarian politics, authoritarian values and populist style. There is a hierarchy in the importance of each of them, and identitarian politics is the most important feature. That said, most Radical Right parties are populists, but there can be individual members of this group for which populism is not significantly prominent. Nevertheless, if a political party emphasizes identitarian politics and holds authoritarian preferences, I consider it to be part of the Radical Right party family, while populism would be a secondary criterion.

Starting with the terminology, I consider the term "Radical Right" to be more adequate than others to refer to this party family, because parties classified as such hold more radical positions on socio-cultural issues than mainstream parties (S. De Lange 2008). As such, they are usually placed further to the right on the political spectrum, particularly regarding positions on socio-cultural issues, such as on multiculturalism and immigration. Although their anti-immigration appeal is central to their electoral mobilization (Ivarsflaten 2005), Radical Right parties are not "single issue" and their position against non-Western immigration is inserted in a broader ideology of defense of an homogeneous community, either based on nationality, culture, ethnicity, or other identity criteria. Radical Right parties usually talk a lot about immigration, often linking it to other issues like crime, security and sovereignty. Nevertheless, they do address a range of political issues, including issues on the functioning of democracy, the welfare state, corruption, and sometimes decentralization. Immigration is very salient in their discourse, clearly more than for other parties, but RRPs do not restrict their program and appeal only to immigration.

By its turn, the term "Extreme Right", although also frequently applied by the literature, suggests an anti-democratic stance, and/or makes a direct reference to use of violence (Mudde 2007; Norris 2005), and this is not the case of parties included in this analysis. While there are different levels of radicalism among Radical Right parties, and some of them are rooted on former fascist groups, broadly speaking they are compatible with liberal democracy because they compete on elections as their means to conquer power. Some of their proposals, however, can be in tension with democratic values. Radical Right parties often oppose or challenge certain features of

representative democracy, but they do not explicitly claim to replace democracy for an authoritarian regime. In fact, as Arzheimer has points out: these parties claim to be the true defenders of democracy. They tend to present themselves as the defenders of direct or majoritarian democracy, while they hold a problematic and ambivalent relationship with *liberal* democracy: "while they claim to be champions of some aspects of European democracy such as majority rule and freedom of speech (at least where it favors their own interests), they are highly skeptical of others (minority rights, representation, deliberation) (Arzheimer 2018: 3).

I consider that members of the Radical Right party family are "right-wing" primarily because of their opposition to sociocultural politics, related to value issues such as national identity, law and order, immigration, abortion, and other topics in the so-called sociocultural scale opposing liberalism *versus* authoritarianism. Nevertheless, if we take the common distinction between "left" and "right" based on the position towards egalitarianism *versus* non-egalitarianism (Bobbio 1996), Radical Right Parties cannot be considered to be engaged with fighting political inequalities. Parties of the left actively work against inequalities, while parties that see inequalities as natural, or at least accept them without active political intervention, are usually placed on the right. The economic dimension of politics is not a priority for RRPs, but on a socio-cultural dimension they tend to hold hostile measures concerning the reduction of inequalities founded on ethnicity, citizenship status, or even gender. Additionally, Radical Right programs are often oriented towards the maintenance or even increase of inequalities in favor of the "native people" (Rydgren 2018).

As previously explained, the present analysis proposes some variations on Mudde's (2007) definition. First, here I consider that the term "identitarian politics" is more comprehensive than "nativism" and better to capture not only the nationalist ideology of Radical Right parties, but also the salience of cultural and identity issues in their appeal. "Identitarian politics" can be equally applied to other types of political projects which call for a culturally or ethnically homogeneous society, not being restricted to nationalism. This way, it can refer to the appeal espoused by regionalist parties as well, like the Belgium Flemish Interest, or the Italian Northern League, which focus on questions of identity in the regional level.

In addition to that, although I also consider populism to be associated to Radical Right parties, this is not the central characteristic to define them and, for the purpose of this analysis, it should not be part of the party family terminology because it would restrict the group. If the three

defining characteristics are considered in terms of order of their importance, populism would be the least important, following identitarian politics and authoritarianism. For this reason, I prefer to refer to the party family as "Radical Right" and not as "Populist Radical Right", which is the terminology used by Cas Mudde (2007). This means that there can be Radical Right parties which are not primarily populists. Another difference regarding Mudde's (2007) classification is the definition of populism itself. Instead of considering it as ideology, populism is defined here as a political style. For the purpose of this analysis, the identitarian politics appeal of Radical Right parties, which originates their anti-immigrant stance, is their most important characteristic. In this sense, the term Populist Radical Right could restrict the category of parties to include in this study. Below I discuss each of the three features of the Radical Right party family, as adopted in my analysis.

i.   Identitarian politics

Nationalism is the characteristic most frequently associated to contemporary (and old) Radical Right Parties (Mudde 2007). However, I consider that their nationalist claims are inserted in a broader identitarian appeal, which takes identity issues as a major concern in politics. In addition to the salience of identity issues to the Radical Right, this family also seeks to put them into the center of the electoral competition. Identity can be based on different terms like ethnicity, nationality, culture, religion, language, and others.

Even though immigration became the central concern of RRPs, in particular in Western Europe, this has not always been the case. Several Radical Right parties did not use to address immigration when they were created. Instead, some of them adopted immigration as a salient issue over time, and today this became an important part of their broader exclusionary appeal. Their appeal is grounded on a search for a monocultural, homogeneous society (Bornschier 2010). That said, opposition to immigration is integrated in the logic of the Radical Right to defend the homogeneity of their community around a certain identity. As explained by Rydgren (2018: 3):

> according to the radical right, there are several threats against their nation's identity, of which immigration is the most important. Immigrants from Muslim countries are singled out as particularly threatening, allegedly because they have the least in common with the native population, are the least inclined to assimilate, and are potentially tied to Islamist terrorism.

This identitarian appeal of Radical Right Parties (RRPs) is so important that a relevant part of the literature connects the emergence of a cultural/values-based axis of electoral competition to their rise (Bornschier 2010; Kitschelt and McGann 1997). This suggests that RRPs have contributed to raise the relevance of cultural issues in politics and also benefited from this dimension of issues becoming important in electoral competition. The introduction of non-traditional issues into the political arena is a key element to understand the presence of Radical Right parties. As explained by Bornschier (2010), the rise of populist right parties (according to the author's terminology) is a product of a new cultural conflict developed in Western Europe, which gained center stage in the 1990s. Radical Right Parties conduct a values-based opposition to the process of societal modernization, process accelerated in the 1960s. Their opposition is based on the advancement of a "differencialist discourse" political frame. RRPs hold an exclusionary appeal not explicitly based on race, but on identity. According to the author, these parties almost exclusively mobilize on the cultural dimension, they share a rather homogeneous set of cultural preferences, but diverge on issues of state intervention in the economy. For this reason, scholars argue that it is necessary to move beyond the one-dimensional left-right conception of the political space, and to take into account parties' positions on both dimensions of competition. In a nutshell, "the rise of the populist right is a consequence of the growing salience of the new cultural dimension of conflict at the expense of the economic state-market divide" (Bornschier 2010: 5).

Radical Right parties appeared and started to get increasing support in the context of long-term changes happening in post-industrial democracies. Over time, particularly since the 1960s, new types of concerns emerged within modern societies. Inglehart's (1977) famous modernization theory states that new post-materialist issues[13] gain importance among the public and stimulate new political divisions. In politics, the process of emergence of post-material values fostered the emergence of Green libertarian parties, whose appeals capture voters holding libertarian positions. However, the modernization theory did not anticipate the emergence of authoritarian parties in the other side of the political spectrum, which also take advantage of non-traditional issues, in particular related to identity. The unanticipated rise of Radical Right Parties is considered a "silent counter revolution" (Ignazi 2006) and their increasing support is interpreted as a cultural backlash (Inglehart and Norris 2016), in reaction to libertarian values.

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[13] Post-material values are related to non-material concerns, such as well-being, minorities' rights, creativity, participation, etc.

In a nutshell, Radical Right Parties are essentially grounded and mobilized by cultural-values concerns. Due to the centrality of identitarian issues in their appeal, as well as their defense of homogeneous societies, either based in cultural resemblance, ethnic traits or religion, they can be defined as identitarian parties.

ii.   Authoritarian values

At the time around the end of the war-period, Radical and Extreme Right Parties were directly associated to political violence and opposition to the democratic regime. However, contemporary Radical Right Parties compete on elections like other parties, they respect the procedural rules of the democratic game and do not overtly claim for the replacement of democracy as a regime of government (Norris, 2005; Hainsworth, 2008). These parties are considered to hold authoritarian values not because they want to install an anti-democratic order, but because they defend a strong and predominant state over the individuals' and minorities' freedoms. RRPs believe in the authority of the state over the individual will. In addition to that, they tend to emphasize the existence of a "natural" community, and this conception puts limits to personal and collective freedoms. This way, RRPs accept and claim for a hierarchical principal for social organization. They also believe in a collective identification with a great national destiny (Ignazi 2006).

Nevertheless, to be compatible with democratic procedures does not mean that Radical Right Parties are fully in-line with liberal-democratic values and principles. Many of their claims and pledges are in conflict with a more substantive definition of democracy. For this reason, many authors state that Radical Right Parties are essentially illiberal (Hans-George Betz 1993; Hainsworth 2008; Mudde 2007). Moreover, their (populist) criticism towards the establishment and the functioning of liberal democracy, leads them to defend solutions to societal issues that are not democratic, such as excluding certain groups based on their citizenship. In their point of view, "the inefficiency of political structures cannot be resolved within the traditional democratic system. Extreme right parties propose solutions outside the liberal democratic framework of Western societies" (Harrison and Bruter 2011: 37).

The "group mentality" that guides RRPs suggests that the community needs, as a whole, are taken as superior to the existence and rights of individuals. In this sense, Radical Right Parties hold authoritarian values, which can jeopardize minority's, as well as constitutional rights. They believe that the state authority can correct deviant social behavior, in the name of the idealized homogeneous community. The idea of "evils of society", who deviate from the common social

behavior, is usually associated to certain subgroups or individuals considered to differ from the ideal community. Deviation is conceptualized in terms of crime, origin, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and others (Mudde 2007). Consequently, in the conception of the Radical Right, such "evils" should be excluded, to make possible a harmonized and homogeneous society. By pursuing a homogeneous and uniform community, RRPs are hostile to pluralism, to consensus-making and even to some constitutional provisions, notably the related to minorities' rights.

iii. Populist style

There is a large debate on the definition of populism, perhaps the most controversial feature associated to the Radical Right. Very different leaders and parties around the world, as well as in different moments of history have been called populists, both from left-wing and right-wing traditions. Populism can be combined with different ideologies and policy positions in the political spectrum (Jagers and Walgrave 2007; J.-W. Muller 2016). According to Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012), populism is considered to be a "thin-centered" ideology, with the following meaning: "populism considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people" (Mudde 2007: 23). This definition has three core concepts: the people, the elite, and the general will, as well as two direct opposites: elitism and pluralism.

Although the definition of populism as a thin ideology has the virtue of identifying the three constitutive concepts, and the idea that there is a separation between "the people" and "the elite" (and the people should be prevalent in the equation), this is not clearly appropriate definition for this study. This is because of some conceptual and operational issues. Ideology implies the idea of a coherent vision of the world, and a set of proposals that connect problems to solutions. This is not clearly included in the above definition of populism. The other concern refers to the assumption that populists believe and are indeed guided by the defense of "the people" in this opposition to "the elite". Because political parties are rational actors, the defense of "the people" could be only for strategic reasons, instead of a genuine orientation. What remains also controversial is how the concept of populism as a thin-ideology could be accurately measured.

In spite of these limitations found in the conceptualization of populism as an ideology, the idea of an opposition between "the people" and "the elite" is the most fundamental feature of populism. Muller (2016) considers populism to be a moralist logic. According to him, it is a

"particular moralist imagination of politics, a way of perceiving the political world that sets a morally and fully unified (fictional) people against the elites who are deemed corrupt or in some other way morally inferior" (Muller, 2016: 34-35). Similar to the previous idea of populism as a "thin-centered" ideology, the main characteristic is that there is a conflicting opposition between two internally homogeneous groups: "the people" and "the elite", one being inherently good and the other, inevitably bad. Besides anti-elitism, Mueller adds two other core characteristics to his definition: populism is also anti-pluralist, since populists claim that they, and *only they* represent the people, and it is always a form of identity politics, although not all identity politics is populist (Muller, 2016: 10-11). One issue with this definition of populism as a moralistic logic is that it equally falls short on the operationalization of the concept, which is not clearly measurable and remains vague.

In my opinion, defining populism as a political style favors its narrowness and operationalization. This is one of the concerns brought up by Jagers and Walgrave (2007) , who define populism as a political communication style, which can be measured, for instance, with methods of content analysis. In this definition, populism mainly manifests in political communication and its three common denominators are: reference and appeal to the people, anti-elite feelings, and a contemplation of the people as a monolithic group without internal differences. These three elements, combined, define the "thick" conception of populism. When only the first one is observed, it is considered a "thin" version of populism. In the authors' definition, "populism is conceived of as a political style essentially displaying proximity of the people, while at the same time taking an anti-establishment stance and stressing the (ideal) homogeneity of the people by excluding specific population segments." (Jagens and Walgrave, 2007:319)

From a theoretical perspective, it is not crucial to determine the exact nature of populism, given that the notions of ideology, logics and communication can coexist in politics. An ideology may lead to a specific communication style. However, for the purpose of operationalization, the definition of populism as a political communication style provided by Jagens and Walgrave's (2007) is more accurate and pragmatic. The minimum common denominator of populism is the opposition between "the people" and "the elite", each group understood as internally homogeneous and holding irreconcilable interests. This is the basic idea advanced by populism. Additionally, this opposition leads the populist leader to explicitly take the side of "the people"

against the establishment, to claim that the will of "the people" must be heard and put into practice, and that he/she is the only legitimate representative of the general will.

For the purpose of this work, populism is defined as a political communication style, presenting the three core concepts explained above, developed by Jagens and Walgrave's (2007). In this sense, populism is defined as a political communication style which claims the existence of a divide between "the people" and "the elite", emphasizing the moral superiority of the people, and the exclusive capacity of the populist to legitimately address the general will of the people. Populism is an anti-elitist and anti-establishment style of communication, centered on a moralistic conception of "the people" against "the corrupted elite", and on the construction of an internally homogeneous category of the people, opposed to specific segments of the population (in this case, "the elite").

Therefore, my definition for the Radical Right party family is based on the three core characteristics of parties: identitarian politics, authoritarian values and populist style. I base on this theoretical definition, on policy positions measured by expert surveys (addressed in the next section), and on lists of parties previously created by other scholars in order to generate my own list of parties, below. The list shows the individual parties classified as Radical Right for this analysis, within the covered period (1980-2010). In the following section, I provide more details on the methodology used to support this classification, which is based on policy positions from expert surveys.

Table 3.2: List of Radical Right Parties in Western Europe (1980-2010)

Country	Party name	Label
Austria	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party)	FPÖ
	Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria)	BZÖ
Belgium	Front National (National Front)	FN
	Vlaams Blook/ Belang (Flemish Block/Interest)	VB
Denmark	Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People's Party)	DF
	Fremskridtspartiet (Progress Party)	FRPd
Finland	Perussuomalaiset (True Finns/ Finns Party)	PS
France	Front National (National Front)	FN
	Mouvement pour la France	MFP
Germany	Deutsche Volksunion (*German* People's Union)	DVU
	Alternative for Germany	AfD
	Nationaldemokratische Partei (National Democratic Party)	NPD
	Die Republikaner (The Republicans)	REP
Greece	Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos (Popular Orthodox Rally)	LAOS

	The Golden Dawn	XA
Italy	Lega Nord (Northern League)[14]	LN
	Movimeno Sociale Italiano - Fiamma Tricolore (Social Movement – 3 Color Flames)	MSI-FI
	Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance)	AN
Luxembourg	*National Bewegong (*National Movement)	NB
Netherlands	Centrumpartij'86(Center Party'86)	CP/CP86
	Centrumdemocraten (Centre Democrats)	CD
	Lijst Pim Fortuyn (List Pim Fortuyn)	LPF
	*Partij voor de Vrijheid (*Party for Freedom)	PVV
Norway	Fremskrittspartiet/ Framstegspartiet (Progress Party)	FR
Portugal[15]	Partido Nacional Renovador (National Renovator Party)	PNR
Spain	Democracia Nacional (DN) – Alternativa Espanola – Frente Nacional	
	Allianza por la Unidad Nacional	
Sweden	Ny Demokrati (New Democracy)	NyD
	Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats)	SD
Switzerland	Freiheits-Partei der Schweiz (Freedom Party of Switzerland)	FPS
	Nationale Aktion (National Action) / Schweizer Demokraten/Democrates suisses (*Swiss* Democrats)	NA-SD
	Schweizerische Volkspartei (Swiss People's Party)	SVP
	Lega dei Ticinesi (Ticino League)	LdT
United Kingdom	British National Party	BNP
	National Front	NF
	United Kingdom Independence Party	UKIP

Source: Elaborated by the author.
Note: This classification was developed by the author, based on the theoretical definition of the Radical Right Party family, on policy positions obtained from expert surveys (presented in the next part) and guided by lists of parties found in Mudde (2007), Ivarsflaten (2006), Allen (2015), Betz (1994), Norris (2005), Stockemer (2016).

3.2 Positions of Radical Right Parties and the centrality of identitarian issues

The three core characteristics of Radical Right Parties derive their policy positions on different dimensions. This section explores positions held by RRPs in economic and socio-cultural issues, comparing to other party families. The measures of parties' policy positions come from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, CHES (1999-2004). This analysis is developed to assess if RRPs

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[14] Other "Leagues" merged with the LN, such as the Lega Lombarda (LL) and Lega Veneto (LV).
[15] In Portugal and Spain, RRPs are very small, they rarely obtain more than 1 percent in national legislative elections. They can be more expressive in other elections, at the local and regional levels. Ireland doesn't officially have a Radical Right Party. Some authors consider the Immigration Control Platform as part of the group, but it is not formally a political party, it usually supports independent candidates at the local level.

hold positions that distinguish them from other party families, and if their positions reflect their ideological features, namely their focus on identitarian issues, and their authoritarian values. Populism as a style is not expected to be measured in terms of policy positions. However, there is a question on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey that specifies the importance of anti-elitism in the appeal of different parties, which can be an indicator of populism[16].

3.2.1 Why use expert surveys to measure party policy positions

There are different sources and methodologies to collect information about party policy preferences and to estimate their positions on different issues. Some examples of sources of information are electoral manifestos, roll-call votes, surveys with politicians or party supporters. Each has advantages and disadvantages, according to the specialized literature (Benoit and Laver 2007). Preferences of parties can be assessed from their voters' opinions, from their own published material, or by country experts, for example. Public opinion surveys have the problem of carrying the subjective perception of voters, which can be biased because of their own political proximities, and not necessarily reflect what parties claim. The same applies for information collected directly from politicians. There is the risk of collecting non-sincere information (Benoit and Laver 2006). Material produced by parties themselves, particularly manifestos, are an interesting and widely used way to measure their policy positions, because it is what they publicly claim they would do if they are in the government. It shows what they will be held accountable for. Electoral platforms are the primary source of the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP), a widely used source of policy positions and party ideologies. However, the reason for not relying on it for the purposes of this analysis is because of its limited applicability to the study of Radical Right Parties. First, there are only few Radical Right parties included in the CMP (Harrison and Bruter 2011; Norris 2005)**,** because of their small legislative representation at the beginning of the study, which was a criteria to select parties. Second, the CMP approach focuses on salience, which means the relative weight of different policy dimensions for each party, rather than positions they hold on each dimension (Benoit and Laver 2006). Third, contrary to expert survey methods, the CMP does not allow the estimation of errors, since each manifesto is coded by only one trained coder. Fourth, the CMP focuses on a classic socio-economic definition of left and right, which makes newer issues like immigration and post-materialist values not central in it (Norris 2005). Lastly, connected to this last point, the meaning of the left-right spectrum in the CMP has remained stable over a long period of time

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[16] This question was only asked in 2014.

(Benoit and Laver, 2009), while there is evidence that this traditional spectrum suffered changes over time, and it is not the only dimension structuring party competition in contemporary democracies.

Therefore, in this work I choose to analyze data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES - 1999-2014). In general, expert surveys can be a reliable source of information, since experts are likely to carry less bias than voters or politicians in their judgments, and they have considerable knowledge about the parties and the party systems they analyze (Benoit and Laver 2007). Additionally, expert surveys allow the quantification of uncertainty (because several experts locate the same party in a common scale). These surveys work with predefined scales, which favors comparability. Parties can be compared across countries, and it is possible to estimate their positions in common scales, even if a given dimension is not really salient for a specific party. The CHES covers a wide range of European countries included in this analysis, and it is not restricted to covering only traditional economic dimensions of policies. It also includes a broad range of cultural topics. Finally, it has a satisfactory time range, with four waves within the period 1999-2014. The CHES database covers 28 European countries, from Western and Eastern Europe, from 1999 to 2014. It is a survey applied to country experts who place individual parties on a range of issues. The study covers European questions, ideology and policy preferences, on both cultural and economic dimensions. Respondents are also asked to place political parties on a general left-right ideological scale, on an economic left-right scale, and on a socio-cultural scale, ranging from "Libertarian/Post-materialist" to "Traditional/Authoritarian" views. In addition, the CHES includes questions measuring the salience of issues for individual parties.

The original CHES dataset includes a variable "Family ID", which classifies individual political parties into party families, one of them being the "Radical Right". In order to assess how this CHES category reflects my own definition, I compare the CHES list of Radical Right parties to my own list (previously shown) and to the classification of other reference studies (Mudde 2007; Norris 2005). I could conclude that the CHES list was a good match for my definition of Radical Right. All the parties included in the CHES Radical Right party family are also part of my own classification. However, the CHES list is shorter and does not include all parties covered in my quantitative analysis developed in the following chapters. This is because of a different time coverage. In the quantitative analysis of following chapters of this work, I focus on the period from 1980 to 2010, while the CHES data covers a shorter and more recent timeframe. One

reason why not all RRPs of my analysis are also covered in the CHES study is that a party might have disappeared before the CHES survey started, for instance. After having clarified these limitations, the empirical analysis of policy positions that I present below is based on the party families as defined in the CHES study. It does not include all Radical Right parties considered in the further steps of my work, but all parties included in the CHES Radical Right category are also classified as belonging to this party family according to my own definition[17].

3.2.2   Descriptive analysis of positions held by Radical Right Parties

In general, the CHES data suggests three main conclusions about the Radical Right party family. First, it is a rather homogeneous group regarding the topics with high salience for the member parties. Second, it is distinguishable from other party families when it comes to indicators of socio-cultural policy positions, in particular questions of identity. Third, economic positions are not central to define them as a family, because RRPs are more heterogeneous and not clearly distinguishable from others on this traditional left-right indicator.

The first important evidence found in the CHES data is that immigration is indeed a very salient concern among the Radical Right party family. Members of this group are also quite homogeneous on this issue. Their mean position on immigration policies is considerably higher than for other groups of parties (9.33 in 0-10 scale, standard deviation of 0.77), as can be seen in the table 3.3 below. Moreover, in general no RRP tends to hold permissive positions regarding the entrance of foreigners: the minimum value they get in this scale is 6.67. Hence, immigration is clearly a central issue uniting Radical Right parties. Their appeal for strongly stricter immigration policies distinguishes them from other families. RRPs are also more homogeneous than other groups on this subject.

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[17] Parties included by the CHES in the Radical Right party family, to which the measures refer to, are the following: Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) in Austria, Flemish Bloc/Interest (VB) and National Front (FN) in Belgium, Progress Party (FP) and Danish People's Party (DF) in Denmark, German People's Union (DVU)/National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) and Republicans (REP) in Germany, Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), Independent Greeks (ANEL) and Golder Dawn (XA) in Greece, National Front (FN), Movement for France (MPF) and National Republican Movement (MNR) in France, National Alliance (AN) and Tricolor Flame Social Movement (MS) in Italy, Center Democrats (CD), List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands, United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and British National Party (BNP) in the United Kingdom, True Finns (PS) in Finland, New Democracy (NyD) and Sweden Democrats (SD) in Sweden.

Table 3.3: Immigration policy by party family
Position on immigration policy

	Mean	SD	Median	Min.	Max.	N
Radical Right	9.331	0.777	9.6	6.875	10	39
Conservatives	7.13	1.422	7.586	2.611	9.5	34
Liberal	5.078	1.728	5.25	1.2	8.455	55
Christian-Democratic	6.009	1.483	5.94	2.611	8.71	30
Socialist	4.171	1.23	4.23	1.25	6.6	52
Radical Left	2.516	1.389	2.29	0.3	6	55
Green	2.133	1.257	1.83	0.556	7	39

Importance/salience of immigration policy

	Mean	SD	Median	Min.	Max.	N
Radical Right	9.31	0.617	9.571	7.875	10	25
Conservatives	6.549	1.56	7.17	2.833	8.889	21
Liberal	5.957	1.14	5.833	3.833	8.75	35
Christian-Democratic	6.138	1.119	5.915	4.43	8	20
Socialist	5.767	0.972	6	3.6	7.545	33
Radical Left	6.53	1.172	6.784	3.667	8.818	34
Green	6.208	1.541	6.352	2.667	9	24

Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 1999-2014.

Note: The scales range from 0 to 10. Regarding position on immigration policy, 0 means "strongly opposes tough policy" and 10 means "strongly favors tough policy" (asked in all five CHES waves: 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014). Regarding the importance/salience of immigration policy, 0 means "not important at all" and 10 means "extremely important" (this question was not asked in 2014).

Nevertheless, Radical Right parties are not single-issue. Immigration is a central concern for them, but there are also other policy positions that differentiate the Radical Right from other families. Those other issues are also salient in their appeal. More precisely, a set of CHES indicators related to identity and cultural issues place the Radical Right on positions that are very closed in cultural terms. It shows that they are hostile to multiculturalism and diversity and tend to stick to nationalism. As indicated in the table 3.4 below, the Radical Right is also significantly homogeneous on positions related to nationalism, ethnic minorities' rights and multiculturalism. Their mean position is notably higher than other families', which provides additional support for the conception of their radical nature. RRPs are, thus, more radical than other parties on a range of issues related to identity and cultural diversity, not only to immigration.

Table 3.4: Position on identity and cultural issues by party family
Cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism

	Mean	SD	Median	Min.	Max.	N
Radical Right	9.444	0.424	9.5	8.56	9.89	11
Conservatives	6.611	0.939	6.945	4.13	7.29	10
Liberal	3.392	1.477	3.38	0.8	6	18
Christian-Democratic	6.073	0.708	6.145	4.83	7.43	10
Socialist	3.75	0.991	3.915	1.8	5.29	16
Radical Left	3.895	1.892	3.5	1.4	7.75	15
Green	1.897	0.937	1.67	0.63	3.5	11

Ethnic minorities' rights

	Mean	SD	Median	Min.	Max.	N
Radical Right	9.018	0.957	9.111	5.5	10	10
Conservatives	6.659	1.36	6.635	3.875	9.5	9.5
Liberal	4.43	1.416	4.621	1.2	7.1	7.1
Christian-Democratic	5.516	1.051	5.522	3.2	7.5	7.5
Socialist	3.481	0.965	3.558	1	5.75	5.75
Radical Left	2.45	1.225	2.6	0	5	5
Green	2.178	1.285	1.875	0.5	8	8

Multiculturalism (Integration of immigrants and asylum seekers)

	Mean	SD	Median	Min.	Max.	N
Radical Right	9.452	0.68	9.6	6.286	10	39
Conservatives	6.924	1.438	7.347	3.263	9	34
Liberal	4.993	1.595	5.25	1.6	8.17	55
Christian-Democratic	6.545	1.436	6.889	3.842	9	30
Socialist	4.161	1.2	4.225	1.833	6.6	52
Radical Left	3.036	1.541	2.8	0.6	6.2	55
Green	2.353	1.381	2.1	0.67	7.5	39

Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 1999-2014.

Note: The scales range from 0 to 10. Regarding position on cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism, 0 means "strongly advocates cosmopolitanism" and 10 means "strongly advocates nationalism" (only asked in 2006). Regarding position towards ethnic minorities, 0 means "strongly supports more rights for ethnic minorities" and 10 means "strongly opposes more rights for ethnic minorities" (asked in all five CHES waves: 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014). Regarding position on multiculturalism (original wording: position on integration of immigrants and asylum seekers – multiculturalism vs. assimilation), 0 means "strongly favors multiculturalism" and 10 means "strongly favors assimilation" (asked in all five CHES waves: 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014).

In addition to holding more radical policy positions than other parties on immigration and identity issues, the Radical Right attributes much more importance to cultural and post-material issues than to traditional economic topics. As explained by scholars, the Radical Right emerges in the context of "new politics" and they almost exclusively mobilize on cultural grounds (Bornschier 2010), being the expression of a new cultural divide. The table 3.5 below shows that issues of nationalism, multiculturalism and ethnic minorities are of high importance for Radical Right parties, while less so for other families. On the contrary, the trade-off between improving

services and reducing taxes, a classic economic issue, receives less attention from the Radical Right, for example.

Table 3.5: Salience of different new and traditional issues by party family

Cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism

	Mean	SD	Median	Min.	Max.	N
Radical Right	8.693	0.97	9	7	9.75	11
Conservatives	5.97	1.276	6.055	3.88	7.4	10
Liberal	5.25	1.207	5.125	3.43	7.6	18
Christian-Democratic	4.623	0.881	4.635	3.25	6.38	10
Socialist	4.736	0.838	4.815	3.5	6.43	16
Radical Left	5.233	1.055	5.2	3.75	7.17	15
Green	5.49	1.299	5.5	3.75	8.67	11

Multiculturalism (Integration of immigrants and asylum seekers)

	Mean	SD	Median	Min.	Max.	N
Radical Right	9.108	0.691	9.227	7.667	10	14
Conservatives	5.745	1.838	6.522	2.5	7.875	10
Liberal	5.743	1.294	5.879	2.5	8.273	16
Christian-Democratic	5.74	1.338	5.682	3	7.786	10
Socialist	5.737	1.072	6	3.5	7.5	17
Radical Left	6.263	1.344	6.167	2.667	9	19
Green	6.113	1.565	6.5	2.667	8.143	13

Ethnic minorities

	Mean	SD	Median	Min.	Max.	N
Radical Right	8.339	1.116	8.63	6.25	10	25
Conservatives	4.969	1.588	4.75	1.33	7.14	21
Liberal	5.451	1.441	5.5	2	8.25	35
Christian-Democratic	4.723	0.957	5.032	2.75	6.17	20
Socialist	5.166	1.15	5.231	2.2	7.5	33
Radical Left	6.194	1.488	6.231	2	8.5	33
Green	6.092	1.29	6.32	3.286	8.077	24

Improving public services vs. reducing taxes

	Mean	SD	Median	Min.	Max.	N
Radical Right	4.914	1.15	5.4	3	25	6.5
Conservatives	6.544	1.323	6.5	2.571	21	8.364
Liberal	6.989	1.056	7	4.5	35	9
Christian-Democratic	6.136	0.736	6.249	4.67	20	7.38
Socialist	7.024	0.822	7	5.14	33	8.5
Radical Left	7.757	0.861	7.9	5.8	35	9.143
Green	6.079	1.063	5.95	2.9	24	8.143

Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 1999-2014.

Note: The scales range from 0 to 10. Regarding importance/salience on cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism, 0 means "not important at all" and 10 means "extremely important" (only asked in 2006). Regarding importance/salience of integration of immigrants and asylum seekers, 0 means "not important at all" and 10 means "extremely important" (asked in 1999, 2002, 2006, and 2010). Regarding importance/salience of ethnic minorities, 0 means "not important at all" and 10 means "extremely important" (asked in 1999,

2002, 2006, and 2010). Regarding importance/salience of improving public services vs. reducing taxes, 0 means "not important at all" and 10 means "extremely important" (asked in 1999, 2002, 2006, and 2010).

However, when one looks to more traditional positions, both in the economic and in the socio-cultural dimensions, the Radical Right holds more heterogeneous views. This is the case for the topic of redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor, as well as social lifestyle (e.g. homosexuality). As the table 3.6 below shows, the mean position of RRPs on redistribution (5.19, with standard deviation of 1.71 - higher than for other families) is close to the mean position held by other right-wing families, in this case the Liberals and Christian-democrats. While RRPs tend to be more conservative on social lifestyle than other parties (their mean position is 8.92, and standard deviation is 0.78), this is not a particularly salient topic for them (mean is 6.71, with a standard deviation of 1.11). Therefore, traditional issues are, overall, less salient for RRPs as a family, and their positions on this set of topics are probably more sensitive to specificities of their national contexts, since they show more differences within the family.

By its turn, Radical Right parties tend to be quite homogeneous and particularly radical on their position on law and order (mean position is 8.92 and standard deviation is 0.78), although the salience of this issue can also vary relatively more than identitarian questions within this group. With regards to the salience of the dimension "civil rights vs. law and order", the Radical Right scores 7.96 (with a standard deviation of 1.14). Their distance from the importance given by other parties is also less pronounced. The salience of the same issue is 6.70 for Conservatives (standard deviation of 1.09), 6.44 for Liberals (standard deviation of 1.10), and 6.04 for Christian-Democrats (standard deviation of 1.06). This means that all right-wing families tend to attribute a similar level of importance to law and order topics, while the Radical Right is slightly more concerned with it and holds a more radical position, on average. The tendency of RRPs to be placed more to the right on social lifestyle and law and order illustrates their affinity with authoritarian and conservative values.

Table 3.6: Position on traditional economic and socio-cultural issues by party family

Redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor

	Mean	SD	Median	Min.	Max.	N
Radical Right	5.194	1.711	5.091	1.5	8.4	39
Conservatives	6.574	0.97	6.736	3.75	8.8	34
Liberal	5.894	1.307	5.955	2.429	8.545	56
Christian-Democratic	5.349	1.078	5.417	3.364	7.143	30
Socialist	2.865	0.727	2.955	0.8	4.38	52
Radical Left	0.938	0.807	0.707	0	3.67	56
Green	2.554	0.82	2.5	1	4.167	39

Social lifestyle

	Mean	SD	Median	Min.	Max.	N
Radical Right	8.149	1.459	8.5	3.714	10	39
Conservatives	6.41	1.708	6.652	3.211	9.75	34
Liberal	2.955	1.726	2.71	0.4	7.2	56
Christian-Democratic	6.315	1.357	6.232	3.2	8.8	30
Socialist	2.438	1.018	2.429	0.5	4.2	52
Radical Left	2.266	1.63	2	0	7.5	55
Green	1.356	1.268	1	0.17	8	39

Civil liberty vs. Law and order

	Mean	SD	Median	Min.	Max.	N
Radical Right	8.921	0.787	9.125	6.88	10	39
Conservatives	7.365	0.951	7.396	4.88	9.2	34
Liberal	4.797	1.778	5.156	0.5	7.909	56
Christian-Democratic	6.536	1.029	6.765	4.4	8.86	30
Socialist	3.917	1.235	3.955	1.2	7.14	52
Radical Left	2.612	1.192	2.5	0.5	5.429	55
Green	2.201	0.846	2.143	0.5	4.2	39

Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 1999-2014.

Note: The scales range from 0 to 10. Regarding position on redistribution of wealth form the rich to the poor, 0 means "strongly favors redistribution" and 10 means "strongly opposes redistribution" (asked in 1999, 2002, 2006, and 2010). Regarding position on social lifestyle (e.g. homosexuality), 0 means "strongly supports liberal policies" and 10 means "strongly opposes liberal policies" (asked in all five CHES waves: 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014).). Regarding position on civil liberties vs. law and order, 0 means "strongly promotes civil liberties" and 10 means "strongly supports tough measures to fight crime" (asked in all five CHES waves: 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014).

Although there is no direct measure of populism in the expert survey, the CHES includes an item measuring the salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric, which could be an indicator of populism for individual parties. Both the Radical Right and the Radical Left families score high on this anti-elite rhetoric dimension. As table 3.7 below shows, their mean is significantly higher than other party families, which are usually part of the so-called "establishment" or

"mainstream" and have more often been in office positions. Criticism towards the establishment and the elites is very prominent in the discourse of the two ideological extremes.

Table 3.7: Populism among party families
Salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric

	Mean	SD	Median	Min.	Max.	N
Radical Right	8.695	1	9.056	6.889	10	14
Conservatives	3.314	2.465	2.333	0.667	9	13
Liberal	2.882	1.962	2.8	0.5	6.778	21
Christian-Democratic	1.71	0.505	1.8	0.8	2.5	10
Socialist	3.148	1.481	2.778	1.286	6.8	19
Radical Left	7.287	1.979	7.5	2.9	10	21
Green	4.998	2.298	5	1.714	10	15

Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 1999-2014.

Note: The scales range from 0 to 10, in which 0 means "not important at all" and 10 means "extremely important" (question only asked in 2014).

This descriptive analysis using data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey provides further evidence in favor of approaching the Radical Right as a party family. The Radical Right can be defined as such not only from a theoretical, but also from an empirical point of view. In general, Radical Right parties are clearly oriented towards nationalist and culturally closed positions with regards to diversity. This set of positions supports the argument to characterize them by identitarian politics. It is not only immigration that is very salient in their appeal, but also the topics of ethnic minorities, nationalism and multiculturalism, which distinguish the Radical Right from other party families. This is the case with regards to the importance they attribute to these issues, as well as their more radical positions on them. Furthermore, Radical Right parties tend to hold authoritarian positions on traditional socio-cultural dimensions, for example with regards to same-sex marriage, and law and order. In contrast, economic positions do not seem to unite the Radical Right party family, because members tend to be much more heterogeneous in this domain, and not highly concerned with it.

3.3 Electoral performance and support

Overall, the electoral performance of Radical Right Parties has progressively increased over time in Western Europe as well as in other post-industrial democracies. While their results were negligible in the 1980s, when they started to compete in elections, in the present RRPs have

achieved a pivotal role in a number of political systems. Even though they have not (yet) reached a majoritarian or dominant status, they have recently participated in national governments as junior coalition partners in Austria, Italy, Norway, Switzerland and Finland, for example. RRPs also provided external support for governments in Denmark and in the Netherlands, although not formally composing the executive coalition. The graph 3.1 below displays their progressive trend of support in national legislative elections, for Western Europe as a whole, since the 1980s.

Graph 3.1: Overall electoral support for Radical Right Parties in Western Europe (1980-2017)

Support for Radical Right Parties in Western European countries, 1980-2018

Source: Author's dataset. Results of the following PRRPs in legislative elections at the national level are included: FPO/BZO (Austria), FN/VB (Belgium), DF/FrP (Denmark), FN (France), REP/DVU/NPD/AfD (Germany), BNP/UKIP (UK), SVP/UDV (Switzerland), FP/SD (Sweden), FrP (Norway), CD/LPF/PVV (The Netherlands), ADR since 1998 (Luxembourg), MSI/LN/AN (Italy), LAOS/ LS-CA/AE (Greece), PS (Finland). Spain, Ireland and Portugal are not included, because there are no similar party in Spain and Ireland, and a very weak radical right in Portugal (PRN), which often achieves around 0% of the votes.

In spite of the general increase in popularity and vote share, Radical Right Parties have not been equally successful in all countries, which can reflect differences in terms of electoral rules and patterns of national competition. In fact, their results and trajectory vary substantially across countries, over time and within different types of election. In summary, RRPs have been relatively consistent in their results in Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway and Switzerland.

In such countries, their average support since the 1980s is at least 15 percent of the votes. However, the support for RRPs has been traditionally weak or volatile in Germany, Greece, Sweden and the UK. In the Netherlands, which featured extremist but small RRPs in the 1980s and 1990s, modern RRPs arose later than in other countries, they emerged only in the 2000s. In Belgium, the Walloon National Front remained at the margins in Wallonia, while the Vlaams Blok (later named Vlaams Belang) gained strenght in the Flemish part of the country during the 1990s and early 2000s, but lost around three-quarters of its support between 2004 and 2014 (Arzheimer 2018b).

Why have Radical Right Parties prospered in many advanced post-industrial democracies, where political systems were considered to be very stable? What explains the different trajectories of RRPs across countries? The literature on the Radical Right considers three broad types of explanations to the rise and support for these parties (Norris 2005). First, the demand-side approach is fundamentally grounded on a sociological perspective which considers the evolution and distribution of popular demands in mass societies as the main factors driving political outcomes. According to this perspective, the general argument is that developments in the socioeconomic background and political attitudes of the electorate generated opportunities for new parties to emerge and become popular. This behavior and changing preferences are driven by macro phenomena such as modernization, globalization and the crisis of traditional political institutions.

Within the set of demand-side explanations, Piero Ignazi (1992) considers that the Radical Right incarnates a "silent counter-revolution" as a reaction to the emergence of post-materialism and the development of the New Politics (Inglehart, 1977). Their rise represents the growth of authoritarian preferences on socio-cultural issues within a process of radicalization and anti-system polarization not controlled by conservative and neoconservative parties. In the same lime of explanation, Norris and Inglehart (2016) consider that RRPs emerge due to a "cultural backlash" against the cultural liberalization taking place over the past decades.

Within the demand-side approach, the phenomenon of globalization is also very important to understand the rise of the Radical Right (Betz, 1992; Betz, 2002), because it transformed the notions of belonging and the functioning of nation-states. Globalization produced a new cleavage in Western Europe, opposing the "winners" to the "losers" (Kriesi et al. 2012). The "winners" are characterized by support for the opening of national borders, they have higher professional

qualifications, and a positive perception of the international competition. The group of "losers" is composed of the most patriotic citizens, economic sectors traditionally protected by the state, which have more limited professional qualifications, and low cultural competence. As the "losers" are in a disadvantageous position to face the international competition, they are hostile to the effects of globalization, seen as a damaging process. Radical Right parties are identified as the spokesmen of the "losers of globalization", since they offer cultural and economic protection to these individuals by defending the closure of national borders.

Another element constantly mobilized to explain the growing electoral support for Radical Right Parties focuses on the evolution of anti-political attitudes among citizens, who show progressive distrust and disaffection towards democracy, traditional institutions and mainstream parties (Delwit, 2007). These attitudes are seen as fostering behaviors such as electoral abstention (Wattenberg, 2002 apud Delwit, 2007), unconventional forms of political participation (Norris, 2005) and the choice for populist, radical and anti-system parties (Taguieff, 2013). While different attitudes related to authoritarianism, cultural closeness, conservatism and protest have been related to voting behavior for RRPs, anti-immigration sentiment is clearly the single most important driver of their support (Arzheimer, 2018).

The second approach to explain the rise of the Radical Right is centered on "supply-side" factors. This perspective is grounded on an institutional approach and considers that, instead of only counting on a favorable context at the public level, political parties are also agents of their success. They operate in interaction with their competitors. In this sense, factors such as party organizational strength, party ideology and party system features are important to understand the rise of RRPs. One of the discussions is that specific organizational or ideological treats of RRPs pay off electorally. Carter (2005), for example, argues that strongly organized, well-led but factionalized parties perform substantially better than weakly organized, poorly led and divided parties or weakly organized, poorly led but united parties. Art (2011) shows that prospective RRPs need to attract ideologically moderate, high-status activists early in the process to build sustainable party structures and become electorally viable. The presence of a charismatic leader is also pointed out as an important factor for electoral success. However, this factor might be more important to RRPs' breakthrough than to their consolidation of support, since the institutionalization and professionalization of parties like the French FN and the Austrian FPO have proved favorable to their sustainable electoral success. Leadership, organization and

ideology are considered to be internal supply-side factors (Mudde 2007), because they can be controlled by partisan agents.

In contrast, external supply-side factors are those out of the control of individual parties, and some of the most commonly discussed are the political context, the cultural context, the media, and the institutional context (Mudde, 2007). Kitschelt and McGann (1995) consider that two main factors could explain the rise of successful RRPs. The first is the ideological convergence of mainstream center-right and center-left parties, which opens an electoral niche for new and more radical parties. The second is the adoption of a certain ideological strategy by emerging radical right competitors, which is called "the winning formula". This "winning formula", according to the authors, combines a pro-market appeal on the economic axis with an authoritarian position on the socio-cultural dimension. Ideological features and the adoption of a less extremist strategy are judged important to the emergence of Radical Right Parties. In particular, the implementation of a "culturalist" approach to oppose non-Western immigration, instead of a classic racist frame.

The third perspective to explain the rise of the Radical Right is grounded on an institutional context approach. It is essentially based on the literature about electoral systems and emphasizes the role of formal electoral rules constraining both the supply and the demand in the regulated marketplace. According to Norris (2005: 18), "formal electoral rules are understood here as the legislative framework governing nomination, campaigning, and elections, as embodied in official documents, constitutional conventions, legal statutes, codes of conduct, and administrative procedures, authorized by law and enforceable by courts". These rules regulate the matching between demand and supply, making it imperfect. Based on this perspective, Pippa Norris (2005) understands the varying fortunes of the radical right as the product of the way in which the formal institutional rules set the context of, and thereby interact with, both party supply and public demand in elections. In this process, nomination, campaign and electoral rules are particularly important. Although the electoral system per se does not explain the vote share of RRPs, rules do affect their presence and size into representative institutions. Consequently, electoral rules and institutions are crucial to understand their capacity to influence policy outputs, since they regulate partisan interaction as well.

Finally, different combinations of micro-, mezzo-, and macro-level factors (Arzheimer, 2018) belonging to those three approaches to explain the Radical Right can be applicable for specific

cases and account for country-specificities. In general, the literature shows that a complex interaction of elements and dynamics related to the context, the agency of Radical Right Parties and their political-institutional environment are behind their emergence and trajectories.

Conclusions

This chapter provided a broader discussion about the Radical Right party family in Western Europe. Starting from the definition discussion found in the literature, I agreed that a conceptualization of RRPs should be based on their core features and preferences. In spite of displaying different trajectories and levels of support across countries, RRPs share a common set of policy preferences, notably on the dimension of socio-cultural values. I argued that parties belonging to this family can be defined based on identitarian politics, authoritarian values and a populist style. In general, RRPs emerged in the mid-1980s in the context of reactions to macro socio-economic changes affecting post-industrial societies and a growing public discontentment with traditional institutions and political parties. Even if political disaffection with the establishment helped to open the space for the emergence of new political offers in the market, I consider that ideological features and strategic considerations of Radical Right Parties are key to comprehend their success in several Western European countries.

One of the central drivers of Radical Right support are anti-immigrant attitudes, in particular the opposition to non-Western immigration. In their appeal, RRPs drastically oppose the entrance of immigrants, especially from Muslim countries, promoting that Islam is incompatible with Western values. They also tend to push for higher barriers for residence permits, access to welfare policies, and access to naturalization. To a large extent, the immigration issue gained attention in politics because of the issue-entrepreneurship strategy of Radical Right Parties. As a result, even parties that usually did not pay attention to immigration issues are pushed to take a position and to provide alternatives to this central question in current Europe. As a consequence, in the context of rising Radical Right parties and high attention to immigration, it is relevant to understand how parties in government frame this issue and how their policy agenda looks like. Do RRPs affect the nature of immigration policies because they increase their electoral support and have a contagious effect on the broader party agenda? This is the question under empirical investigation in the following chapters. Before going to the empirical analysis, the next chapter presents the methodological strategy and the information about the data.

CHAPTER 4
Research Design and Data

This chapter aims to explain the methodological strategy used for the empirical analysis, which its developed in the following chapter. First, I summarize the argument and hypotheses to test, followed by an explanation about the selection of countries and time-frame. After that, I explain the data operationalization and describe the variables to include in the model. The last part of the chapter discusses the use of OLS models with random effects to estimate the influence of Radical Right Parties on immigration control policies. The results and the discussion of findings is presented in chapter 5.

4.1 Argument

The literature on the Radical Right increasingly explores the consequences of their emergence and their impact in advanced democracies. However, it remains unclear whether Radical Right Parties (RRPs) affect immigration policy outputs, the size of their effect, and under which conditions it happens. In general, according to existing research, the influence of RRPs is considered to be very limited and only observed as indirect in most cases. At this point, however, RRPs have not only significantly increased their electoral strength and parliamentary representation in many countries, but also engaged as junior coalition partners in a number of cases. This provides them with more opportunities to directly affect the policy agenda on their core issues, going beyond their indirect impact.

Radical Right Parties appear to have significant influence on policy positions of other mainstream parties in the electoral competition (Schain 2006; Schain, Zolberg, and Hossay 2002; van Spanje 2010). Nevertheless, their impact on immigration policies is subject to more controversial findings. Some researchers consider that RRPs have limited capacity to influence immigration policies (Akkerman 2012; Dancygier and Margalit 2018; Minkenberg 2001; Mudde 2013). Others emphasize that center-right parties have changed course before and independently from the electoral rise of RRPs (Bale 2008).

One of the limitations of previous studies is that they tend to apply a "policy success" logic to assess the direct impact of RRPs on immigration policy. In other words, they usually analyze the extent to which specific policy pledges defended by Radical Right Parties are actually implemented during their presence in government. Another limitation is that existing works mostly rely on case studies or qualitative comparisons. Although this is a very rich approach in terms of contextual details and mechanism specification, it lacks the capacity to simultaneously test rival hypothesis and the generalizability of findings to other contexts. Qualitative studies tend to use abstract and subjective criteria to measure RRPs' effect, making it often hard to define their influence as relevant or not in terms of its magnitude. In this sense, a quantitative, large-N study can be useful to estimate the significance and size effect, also in light of alternative explanations driving restrictive immigration policies.

It is important to better understand if Radical Right Parties are able to advance their restrictive immigration policy agenda because this is linked to the capacity of democratic political systems to process demands on non-traditional issues and originating from expansive constituencies. Some of these demands, although chosen within elections, can be in tension with core concepts and values of liberal societies. For instance, the immigration debate has often let to the adoption of measures that discriminate types of immigrants, or negatively affect their individual freedoms at the expense of national security. More broadly, it is important to provide further elements to understand whether and how established democratic political systems are able to process demands that are addressed by political forces that emerged more recently. Or if it is the case that advanced democracies remain resilient to the entrance of new competitors and inflexible to new demands of the public.

To a large extent, advanced democracies have experienced a drastic crisis of legitimacy and trust, resulting in considerable losses for dominant political forces, as well as a growing political disaffection among the public. It is crucial to study if challenging actors are able to advance their agendas in terms of policy outcomes, because this provides elements to assess how these democracies adapt to threats of credibility and disengagement, and how electoral demands may go through filters over the process of democratic and institutionalized decision-making. The emergence and persistence of Radical Right Parties in Western Europe raised the salience of the immigration issue in the broader political agenda. By gaining political relevance in the context of their party systems, RRPs push mainstream parties to also address their core issues, notably on questions related to the entrance of foreigners, multiculturalism and border control. At the same

time, national governments generally attribute more importance to immigration than in the past, and over the last years, they passed increasing volumes of legislation concerning the entrance and stay of foreigners.

As discussed in previous chapters, the specialized literature explores different factors that can drive immigration policies, such as socio-economic conditions, international pressures, or political interests operating at the domestic level. Among the potential factors influencing policies in the field of immigration, I argue in this work that the electoral pressure of Radical Right Parties is a relevant driver of more restrictive immigration policies, particularly in the context of proportional political systems, where the threat perceived by mainstream parties should be higher. Therefore, the questions addressed in analysis are twofold: 1) to what extent is the increasing restriction level of immigration control policies explained as a reaction to the electoral performance of RRPs? 2) By increasing their electoral support, can RRPs influence immigration policies towards a more restrictive direction, or only when they enter governing coalitions and can have a more direct impact?

The general argument is that mainstream parties, both from the left- and right-wing traditions, feel threatened by the electoral rise and persistence of Radical Right Parties, particularly in systems with proportional representation (PR). In PR systems, I assume that a relatively small change in the vote shares could have bigger consequences in terms of electoral outcomes and government formation for established parties. Under PR rule, established parties tend to perceive a higher threat to the rise of RRPs, because of the higher entrance barriers for smaller parties in the case of plurality systems. When established parties are exposed to an increasing strength of Radical Right challengers, they tend to co-opt some of their positions in attempt to (re-)gain credibility among voters on non-traditional issues that became salient. In addition to this contagion effect, the other mechanism by which RRPs could affect the immigration agenda is via direct influence, when they participate in governing coalitions or support minority governments in exchange of policies. For mainstream right-wing parties, the rise of the Radical Right can also represent a new possibility of alliance, so it can be an opportunity for them to remain in power (Bale 2003). These two possible reactions of established parties to the rise of RRPs (issue co-optation or alliance) lay behind their indirect and direct impact on immigration policies.

Based on this argument, I expect to find a relationship between the electoral performance of Radical Right Parties and more restrictive levels of immigration controls. However, because

immigration policies are not only driven by political parties in government, this analysis also takes into account a set of factors described in the literature as potentially affecting immigration policies.

RRPs advocate for more restrictive immigration policies in general. This includes decreasing the volume or even stopping the entrance of foreigners, implementing stricter selectivity criteria, among other measures. However, I argue that these parties are particularly worried with closing the national borders and creating barriers for the entrance of newcomers, because they claim that national governments allow too much foreigners to enter, without enough controlling measures in place. RRPs tend to associate the entrance of foreigners (particularly of non-Western decent), with insecurity, terrorism, loss of national identity and misuse of welfare policies. In addition, the lack of sufficient control over national borders is, for the Radical Right, a symptom of loss of national sovereignty. They also frame this as the inefficiency of incumbent parties to address anti-immigration demands, which increase among the population. The need to limit the entrance of new immigrants is particularly emphasized in times of crisis, when resources like jobs, housing and welfare policies are perceived as already limited to address the needs of the native people. For this reason, RRPs often defend the "national preference" to distribute these resources, claiming that natives should have priority over non-natives to receive services and jobs.

Therefore, I focus on the area of controls over immigration to assess if and to what extent parties in government react to the rising support of RRPs in terms of policy shifts. This reaction is particularly likely to be observed in the area of control over the entry and stay of foreigners, because border control is often linked to issues of security, national-sovereignty, illegal immigration and access to welfare policies. The freedom of movement within the European Union transformed the way that national borders operate according to different countries of origins, but it did not destroy the sovereignty of member states. Instead, member states center their efforts to regulate the entrance and stay of non-EU nationals. In effect, nation-states keep a large room of maneuver to control their borders (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000a). Accordingly, this is one of the areas within the field of immigration policy in which political pressures from anti-immigration parties are most likely to be felt by governments in place.

4.2 Hypotheses

In the first chapter of this work, I presented four dimensions of factors potentially driving immigration policies: 1) the electoral competition, 2) characteristics of governments, 3) institutions and 4) contextual factors. The multivariate analysis that I develop in the fifth chapter considers a number of variables identified within all four dimensions to explain levels of restriction of immigration control policies. I consider that the central dimension to explain more restrictive levels of control is the electoral competition. The electoral increase of Radical Right Parties, which rely on an anti-immigration appeal, pushes mainstream parties to adapt their strategies, their positions and behavior. Mainstream parties should feel threatened and start to give more attention to the immigration issue. This is shown to be true during campaigns (Abou-Chadi and Krause 2018). What I argue is that this shift in mainstream parties' positions is likely to also manifest in terms of policies, because their activity in government should reflect their adapted preferences. From this expectation, the first and main hypothesis of this work is the following:

> *Hypothesis 1: The restriction level of immigration control policies increases as Radical Right Parties increase their electoral support*

In addition to the electoral pressure of Radical Right Parties, since the 1990s they also gained coalition potential and became junior partners in a number of governments in Western Europe. By taking office positions, RRPs amplify their chances to directly affect the policy-making process. I expect that RRPs are likely to amplify their ability to push policies towards their desired direction when they hold cabinets in the executive branch or provide external support to the government (in the legislative). This means that they can include policies in coalition agreements, they can initiate policies from within the executive branch, or bargain for specific measures in exchange of providing legislative support to the survival of the government. Therefore, the second hypothesis that I test refers to support of RRPs to the government:

> *Hypothesis 2: The restriction level of immigration control policies increases when Radical Right Parties provide internal or external support to the government*

Beyond the agency of RRPs, some characteristics of the government in charge could influence immigration policies as well. The literature argues that left-wing governments are more likely to implement liberalizing policies, while right-wing governments tend to be more inclined to restrict the entrance of immigrants. In this line, previous research indicates that Social

Democratic parties have not consistently chosen to follow a tougher line on immigration and integration issues (Alonso and Fonseca, 2011; Bale et al., 2010: 423; Duncan and Van Hecke, 2008: 434; Lahav, 2004). Furthermore, I argue that right-wing parties are more pressured than left-wing parties to change their stances on immigration when threatened by the Radical Right. One reason for that is their ideological closeness and affinity with conservative values.

> *Hypothesis 3: The restriction level of immigration control policies increases under right-wing governments*

At the institutional dimension, the effect of electoral systems and the European Union are also included in the model of explanation, because these factors can influence the capacity of RRPs to push for more restrictive immigration policies. Regarding electoral rules, I expect the following:

> *Hypothesis 4: The effect of Radical Right Parties on the level of restrictiveness of immigration control policies is higher in proportional electoral systems*

As demonstrated, part of the literature on immigration policies considers that institutional constraints, both at the domestic and international levels, can prevent more restrictive policies to pass and/or induce liberalization. The European Union would function as a supranational force towards internal liberalization. Due to the EU values of universalism, rule of law and democracy, European institutions would function as an obstacle to discriminatory and excluding measures against migrants. Additionally, the so-called "embedded liberalism" thesis considers that nation-states are subject to internal legal mechanisms that tend to protect the rights of immigrants and limit the capacity of governments to drastically restrict their entrance. Based on these two points, my analysis also considers membership to the European Union as a potential limiting factor to more restrictive immigration policies. Although all countries in the sample are currently members of the EU, with the exception of Norway and Switzerland, the member states entered the EU in different points in time, so for each year there is sufficient variation in this indicator. I add an indicator of the presence of a judicial review mechanism as a control variable.

> *Hypothesis 5: The absence of supranational institutional constraints of the European Union allows national governments to adopt more restrictive immigration policies*

The last dimension of factors that can potentially influence the direction of immigration policies is the context. With respect to this, the presence of immigrants could influence the demand for certain immigration policies. When the inflow of foreigners is high, governments could try to reduce their entrance with more restrictive measures. In addition to immigration demand, the

state of the economy (measured by the unemployment rate) could also influence measures on immigration and voting for Radical Right Parties. In this sense, when the economy is running well, countries could be more open to foreigners, whereas when the economy deteriorates, they would prefer to restrict the entrance. The next section explains the case selection for this analysis, which focuses on Western Europe during the period 1980-2010.

4.3 Selection of countries and time-frame

To test the hypotheses presented in the previous section, within the effort to understand the extent to which the strength of RRPs is a significant driver of more restrictive immigration policies, I develop a cross-national and longitudinal analysis comprising the following 17 Western European countries during the period from 1980 to 2010: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. This selection provides sufficient variation of cases, across countries and within-countries.

The 1980-2010 period comprises the time-frame in which RRPs started to compete elections, increased their results and consolidated their support. Over these 30 years, RRPs experienced different electoral performances and opportunities to influence the political agenda. This time-frame includes elections in which RRPs are weak or strong and captures within-country variation. It also includes years when RRPs start to take part in governing. Additionally, this selection includes variation on immigration policies, party system variables, experiences with the immigrant population, and different types of governments in power.

Regarding the selection of countries, there are three main reasons to focus on Western Europe, without including Central and Eastern European countries. First, Western European countries share a similar democratic history and development of their party systems. Their political institutions and party systems are comparable because of their longevity and common developments. In the case of Central and Eastern European countries, which have a Communist past, their party systems are much younger and less consolidated. To some extent, the emergence of Radical Right parties is understood as a phenomenon affecting stable and consolidated democracies. Although there are nationalist and radical parties in Central and Eastern Europe too, the meaning of their emergence is not the same. Post-communist democracies are much younger, and the communist past introduces different characteristics to the development and

institutionalization of political parties. As a result, the meaning and content of liberal and nationalist ideologies of political parties can be very different from the West and are hard to compare.

Second, although some parties in Central and Eastern Europe can be considered as part of the Radical Right party family, they often display very specific features compared with their Western counterparts. This regards their ideology, structure and party organization. As a central point, I also ponder that immigration was not a long-term central concern for Radical Right Parties in post-communist countries. Many RRPs in that part of Europe are mainly worried with ethnic minorities. Massive immigration is more recent as a phenomenon in that part of the continent. Since the immigration issue is the focus of this analysis, it makes sense to concentrate this research on Western Europe, where Radical Right parties are explicitly worried with immigration, which makes them potential drivers of the immigration agenda. In Western Europe, countries are exposed to varying, but substantive, experiences with massive immigration. Therefore, the third reason why I focus on Western Europe is the importance of the phenomenon of immigration itself, which is much more recent in the Central and Eastern part of Europe.

Unfortunately, this analysis is limited to 2010 because of the availability of reliable and comparative data. For the moment, there is no other comparative data on immigration policies available for more recent years. Comparative data on immigration policies, collected from the Immigration Policies in Comparison Database – IMPIC (Bjerre et al. 2016) have only recently been made available to the public, and this project does not cover more recent years.

4.4 Data operationalization and description of variables

I build a longitudinal and cross-sectional dataset, including 17 countries for the period 1980-2010, collecting data from five main sources. The dataset is organized as a panel in which each country has an observation per year, summing up 31 observations per country (n=527). First, the Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) (Bjerre et al. 2016) provides quantitative indices to measure immigration policies in a comprehensive way across time, countries and policy fields. Originally, the IMPIC dataset includes information on the degree of restrictiveness of immigration policies in 33 OECD countries for the period 1980–2010 (Helbling et al. 2017). The dependent variable for my analysis comes from IMPIC. Second, electoral data is mainly

collected from the Parliaments and Governments database (ParlGov) (Döring and Philip 2019), which covers all EU and most OECD countries (37 countries) combining information about political parties, elections and cabinets. ParlGov is the main source of the independent variables that measure the strength of Radical Right Parties. Third, the Comparative Political Dataset (CPDS) (Armingeon, Wenger, Wiedemeier, Isler, Knöpfel, and Weisstanner 2018; Armingeon, Wenger, Wiedemeier, Isler, Knöpfel, Weisstanner, et al. 2018) includes political, institutional and socio-economic variables for 37 democracies from the period ranging from 1960 to 2016 or since their transition to democracy. For this work, the CPDS provides information related to characteristics of governments, EU membership and institutional variables, as well as unemployment rate. The project "Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World" (Bormann and Golder 2013; Golder 2005) offers information about electoral systems, institutions and elections of about 1,341 legislative and 498 presidential elections several in democracies since 1946 (or independence) and up to 2016. It is, thus, the main source for information on the electoral system dimension. Finally, I use information from OECD Statistics to measure the inflow of immigrants.

Dependent variable: restriction level of immigration control policy index

To measure the level of restrictiveness of immigration control policies (the dependent variable) I use an index from the IMPIC dataset, which corresponds to the unweighted average of all measured mechanisms of controls over immigration for a given country in a given year. Controls refer to the implementation of regulation of the borders and admission of new immigrants. Countries implement controls both in their external and internal dimensions. In the external dimension, controls relate to issues of illegal residence, airlines/carriers' penalties, alien' register, information sharing/international cooperation, biometric information, forged/expired documents. In the internal dimension, controls refer to aid to irregular immigrants, identity check, amnesty programs, public schooling, employer sanctions, marriage of convenience, and detention (Schmid and Helbling 2016). Immigration control policy is originally measured as an index on a scale ranging from 0 to 1, in which 0 means liberal and 1 means restrictive. In this analysis, this variable is transformed to fit a scale ranging from 0 to 100, in order to facilitate the interpretation of results.

This analysis chooses to work with immigration controls as the dependent variable because this is a dimension of immigration policies that has become consistently more restrictive over time

and it is the area in which RRPs hold a clear position. These parties tend to defend a drastic reduction on the number of entrants and the implementation of tougher control on the borders. When it comes to controls over immigrants, RRPs hold relatively homogeneous positions towards stricter border controls, which tend to be distinguishable from center-right parties (Duncan 2010). Control of migrant movements is considered to be directly linked with a range of issues, such as security, prevention of terrorism, and use of welfare policies. They also affect non-European foreigners more clearly, given that nationals of EU member countries enjoy freedom of movement within the block. Through control policy, states are able to select on the origins of other immigrants, their type and numbers. In this area, national governments retain strong and even rising decision-making power. As such, states have sufficient room of maneuver to make changes. Compared to other areas, it is more likely to observe changes in controls, if it is the case that governing parties respond to the rise of the Radical Right by adapting their immigration policies.

Table 4.1 below displays a ranking of countries according to their average level of restriction for the whole 1980-2010 period. Overall, the most restrictive countries are Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Greece and Austria. The most liberal countries are Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Finland. There is no apparent link between the region of the country in Europe, or the overlapping of its borders to the external limits of the EU, and the level of restrictiveness of its immigration control policies. For instance, Greece and Italy are both Mediterranean countries at the Southern limits of the European Union. While Greece is among the most restrictive countries, Italy is among the most liberal nations. Finland, Spain and Italy display the lowest average restriction levels for the period, but their experience over time shows a significant shift towards restriction. More recently, those same countries are among the nations displaying the most restrictive levels. It is interesting to see that there is a drastic variation within countries that started from a very liberal level. In the Italian case, this evolution seems to be more clearly linked to the rise of Radical Right Parties, while in the Spanish case the RRP remains marginal at the same time that immigration policies become more restrictive over time. By its turn, in the Finish case, where the RRP is volatile but not traditionally strong, there is a peak in the level of restriction of immigration control policies in the 1990s, followed by more incremental changes afterwards.

Table 4.1: Ranking of countries according to average level of restriction of immigration control policies in Western Europe (1980-2010)

Country	Average immigration control index
Sweden	74.74
Denmark	74.37
Belgium	70.14
Greece	69.10
Austria	65.46
France	59.97
Switzerland	58.71
Norway	56.70
Ireland	54.89
Luxembourg	54.59
Germany	54.57
Portugal	53.45
United Kingdom	51.74
Finland	50.70
Spain	50.17
Netherlands	50.03
Italy	45.28

Source: Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) Dataset

The graph 4.1 below shows the evolution of the level of restrictiveness of immigration controls across Western European countries within the analysis. Controls over immigration become increasingly more restrictive over time. In general, this happens in an incremental way, but there are some exceptions. Overall, in the first part of the 1980s, changes are minor and do not indicate a clear restrictive trend. However, particularly in the 1990s, restrictive changes start to take place in a clearer fashion. Yet, there are important differences across countries. Some of them start from an already restrictive level and become even more restrictive over time. This is the case of Austria, Belgium and Denmark. Cases like France, Finland, Ireland, Italy and Spain used to be more liberal, but become more restrictive over time. Other countries show relatively stable tendencies, with minor changes concentrating in most recent years. This includes Luxembourg, Greece, Norway and Sweden. In spite of the general liberalizing trend of immigration policies around the word, as presented by the literature (when immigration policies are taken as a whole package), this graph suggest that controls become consistently more restrictive over time. Considering that controls apply especially to non-EU citizens, this suggests a clear European tendency to close its borders to third-country nationals.

Graph 4.1: Evolution of the restriction level of immigration controls in Western European countries (1980-2010)

Immigration controls in Western Europe (1980-2010)

Source: Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) Dataset

Measurement of RRPs' strength: vote share and government support

I use two measures for the strength of Radical Right Parties in the analysis. The first one is the valid vote percentage obtained by Radical Right Parties (*totalvote_RRPs*). I aggregate the results of all Radical Right Parties in each country/election, in cases where there is more than one party. The list of parties defined as RRPs and included in the analysis can be found in page 112, Chapter 3. Information about RRPs' vote share is collected from the ParlGov database (Döring and Philip 2019). The expectation is that the electoral performance of RRPs in a given election will affect the subsequent immigration policy enacted by the government. Based on this, I organize the dataset using the following criteria. If the election happens up to August of a given year, the immigration policy for the same line of observation corresponds to the same year. In this case, I consider that the election of that same year influences the immigration policy within

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the same year. However, if the election happens later than August, the electoral results should only affect the immigration policy of the following year. In sum, the dependent variable (restriction level of immigration policy) and independent variable (electoral results of RRPs) refer to the same year for a given observation only when the election takes place until the month of August of that year.

Overall, RRPs increased their average vote share in Western Europe over time, since their emergence in the 1980s. The graph 4.2 below shows that there is considerable variation of RRPs strength and trajectories across and within countries. RRPs have been traditionally strong in Austria, France, Italy, Norway and Switzerland. They progressively increase their support in Norway, Belgium and Denmark over this period. On the contrary, RRPs are volatile in the Netherlands and historically weak in Sweden, Finland and Germany. RRPs are virtually inexistent in countries like Luxembourg, Portugal, Ireland and Spain between 1980 and 2010.

Graph 4.2: Evolution of vote share of Radical Right Parties in Western European countries (1980-2010)

Source: ParlGov database

The table 4.2 below displays the rank of countries according to the average vote share of RRPs over the entire period under analysis (1980-2010). As already noticed in the previous graph, RRPs are particularly strong in Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Norway, Denmark, France and Belgium. In the other countries their vote share is relatively weaker or shows an unstable pattern, resulting in an average support that is less prominent.

Table 4.2: Ranking of countries according to average vote share of Radical Right Parties in Western Europe (1980-2010)

Country	Average vote for RRPs
Switzerland	21.23
Austria	14.87
Italy	14.26
Norway	11.13
Denmark	9.26
France	8.89
Belgium	7.92
Finland	4.16
Netherlands	2.94
Sweden	1.45
Germany	1.32
Luxembourg	0.89
United Kingdom	0.77
Greece	0.72
Portugal	0.05
Ireland	0.00
Spain	0.00

Source: ParlGov database

The second measure of RRPs' strength refers to their formal or informal participation in government. This includes cases where RRPs gained cabinets as a formal coalition partner, as well as cases where RRP provided legislative support to the government in place, in exchange of policies. The variable named *RRgovsup* is a dummy variable measured by year, where 0 means absence of RRP support to the government and 1 means formal or informal support to the government. To build this variable, I based on information about government participation or support from the ParlGov database and the paper authored by Lutz (2019).

Radical Right Parties have formally or informally participated in governing coalitions in six of the 17 countries covered by this analysis: Austria, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland. This correspond to 10.3 percent of the cases in my database. The table 4.3 below shows the cabinets receiving support or participation of RRPs.

Table 4.3: List of cabinets with support/participation of RRPs

COUNTRY	CABINET	COALITION	PERIOD
AUSTRIA	Vranitzky I	SPO, **FPO**	1983-1986
	Schussel I	OVP, **FPO**	2000-2003
	Schussel II	OVP, **FPO/BZO**	2003-2007
ITALY	Berlusconi I	**LN, AN**, FI, CCD, UdCe	1994
	Berlusconi II	FI, **AN, LN**, CCD	2001-2005
	Bersusconi IV	PDL, LN, DCpA	2008-2011
NORWAY	Bondevik II	KrF, H, V, **(FrP)**	2001-2005
SWITZERLAND	Bundesrat 1999	**SVP**, SP, FDP, CVP	1999-2003
	Bundesrat 2003	**SVP**, SP, FDP, CVP	2003-2007
	Bundesrat 2007	**SVP**, SP, FDP, CVP	2007-2011
DENMARK	Fogh Rasmussen I	LIB, KF, **(DF)**	2001-2005
	Fogh Rasmussen II	LIB, KF, **(DF)**	2005-2007
	Fogh Rasmussen III	LIB, KF, **(DF)**	2007-2009
NETHERLANDS	Balkenende I	CDA, LPF, VVD	2002
	Rutte I	VVD, CDA, **(PVV)**	2010-2012

Source: Lutz (2009) and ParlGov database. The parties printed in bold represent RRPs and the parties in brackets represent RRPs providing external/informal support to the minority government.

Characteristics of the government: ideology and type

The characteristics of the government in a given year are measured with three different variables. The first one (*ideologyPPM*) indicates the ideological orientation of the party of the Prime Minister. This information is collected from the ParlGov database. This variable has three categories: "right", "center" or "left", following the same classification from the Comparative Political Dataset. The second variable (*gov_typep)* is a dummy that categorizes the government into single-party or coalition. The third one (*gov_typem*) is also a dummy that classifies governments into majority or minority. I create the two last variables that measure the type of government from one variable found in the CPDS project that originally has seven categories, which mix information on the size and number of parties in a government.

Taking my whole set of observations, 39.8 percent of the governments are headed by a left-wing Prime Minister, 31.7 percent by a centrist, and 28.5 percent by a right-wing. The table 4.4 below describes the ideology and type of government in each country, showing the the percentage of each category by country. Over the period 1980-2010, there is a relative balance between right-wing, center and left-wing governments for the countries covered in the analysis, with a slight predominance of left-wing governments. Additionally, for most of the time, governments in Western Europe are majority coalitions. In my dataset, 73.8 percent are majority governments and 26.2 are minority. In terms of government composition, 68.3 percent of the cases are coalitions, while 31.7 percent are single-party.

The table 4.4 below shows the characteristics of governments by country for the entire period (1980-2010). Single-party governments are prevalent in the UK, Sweden, Spain, Portugal and Greece, while coalition governments are the most common type in the other countries, except Norway, which displays a more balanced pattern. Most governments in the analysis are of majority type. Majority governments have been the rule in Switzerland, the UK, Luxembourg, Greece, Germany, Finland and Austria. However, minority governments have been common in Sweden, Spain, Norway and Denmark, they are present in some cases in Portugal, Italy and France, and rare in the Netherlands and Belgium.

Table 4.4: Ideological orientation and type of governments by country in Western Europe (1980-2010)

| Country | Ideology of Prime Minister Party | | | Type of government | | | |
| | | | | Cabinet type | | Size | |
	Left	Center	Right	Single-party	Coalition	Majority	Minority
Austria	77%	23%	0%	10%	90%	100%	0%
Belgium	0%	71%	29%	0%	100%	97%	3%
Denmark	39%	0%	61%	10%	90%	6%	94%
Finland	48%	39%	13%	0%	100%	100%	0%
France	48%	0%	52%	3%	97%	77%	23%
Germany	32%	68%	0%	0%	100%	100%	0%
Greece	58%	0%	42%	100%	0%	100%	0%
Ireland	0%	23%	77%	16%	84%	52%	48%
Italy	23%	47%	30%	3%	97%	81%	19%
Luxembourg	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%	100%	0%
Netherlands	23%	77%	0%	0%	100%	94%	6%
Norway	65%	19%	16%	52%	48%	26%	74%
Portugal	45%	0%	55%	81%	19%	71%	29%
Spain	65%	35%	0%	100%	0%	35%	65%
Sweden	68%	10%	23%	68%	32%	16%	84%
Switzerland	42%	29%	29%	0%	100%	100%	0%
UK	42%	0%	58%	97%	3%	100%	0%

Source: Comparative Political Systems Dataset

At the institutional dimension, I include three variables in the analysis. The first one is the type of electoral system (*leg_type3*), categorized into proportional representation, mixed or majority, according to the "Electoral Systems Around the World" dataset. Most countries in my dataset have a proportional representation rule (82.4%). The UK and France have a plurality system. More specifically, the UK applies the rule of first-past-the post and France the two-round. Germany, Italy (since 1994) and Greece (since 2007) operate under mixed rules.

To indicate membership in the European Union in a given year, a dummy variable is included, drawn from the Comparative Political Dataset (CPDS). The graph 4.3 below shows that the proportion of membership to the EU goes from less than 60% in the early 1980s to almost 90% in 2010, considering the countries included in this analysis. In the 1980s, countries like Greece, Portugal and Spain became members of the European Union. In the 1990s, further enlargement included Austria, Finland and Sweden. In this analysis, the only countries that are not members of the EU for the whole period (including today) are Switzerland and Norway, whereas other countries entered the block in different years.

Graph 4.3: Proportion of EU membership over time considering 17 Western European countries (1980-2010)

Source: Comparative Political Dataset

The third variable (*judrev*) is also a dummy that measures the existence of an independent body which decides whether laws are conform to the constitution. It is coded 0 if there is no such measure and 1 if it is in place. This variable is also collected from the CPDS. With the exception of Belgium (with a new court created in 1984), all countries remain under the same condition regarding this classification, for the entire period.

Table 4.5: List of countries according to existence of judicial review (1980-2010)

Yes	No
Austria	Belgium (until 1984)
Belgium (from 1985)	Finland
Denmark	Luxembourg
France	Netherlands
Germany	Switzerland
Greece	UK
Ireland	
Italy	
Norway	
Portugal	
Spain	
Sweden	

Source: Comparative Political Dataset

Contextual factors: Influx of asylum seekers and unemployment rate

As contextual variables, I include an indicator of the influx of migrants, and another one indicating the economic situation in the country. Influx of migrants is indicated by the variable influx of asylum seekers (*asylum*), which I collect from the OECD Statistics database. It is originally measured as the absolute number of asylum seekers entering the respective country each year. Although there are other available statistics of immigration, influx of asylum seekers offered more complete observations for the entire period, and thus fewer missing values for this analysis. This indicator, originally measured as the absolute number of asylum seekers entering a given country per year, is transformed into the natural logarithm because of its highly skilled distribution. The graph 4.4 below shows that countries receive different volumes of asylum seekers and there is also variation within-countries over time. For some countries, there is a peak in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when there was a significant rise of asylum seekers in Western

Europe due to the fall of the communist regimes and intense East-West flux, particularly having Germany as destination.

Graph 4.4: Evolution of influx of asylum seekers in Western European countries (1980-2010)

Source: OECD Statistics

Finally, I include annual unemployment rate as an indicator of the economic situation in a country. This information is also collected from the CPDS. Unemployment rate is defined by the European Central Bank as the number of unemployed, as a percentage of the labor force. It can assume values from 0 to 100. In my dataset the range of this variable goes from 0.18 to 22, with a general mean of 7.25 and a standard deviation of 3.79. Unemployment follows a European economic cycle. Overall, it shows a peak in the mid-1990s due to the oil price shock, and the European monetary system crisis during a period of mild recession. Afterwards, unemployment rapidly increases in the great financial crisis of 2008. The graph 4.5 below shows the evolution of this indicator for each country. In the multivariate models of the next chapter, this variable is lagged by one year.

Graph 4.5: Evolution of unemployment rate in Western European countries (1980-2010)

Unemployment in Western Europe (1980-2010)

The cyclical behavior of unemployment rates is perceived in all countries to different degrees. There are relatively high unemployment rates in Spain in the 1980s and 1990s, in Finland in the 1990s, in Ireland up to the 2000s, and in Greece for the whole period.

4.5 Method

4.5.1 *Comparative approach*

This is one of the few large-N studies about the impact of the Radical Right on immigration policies. There are several advantages of applying a quantitative comparative analysis for the purpose of this investigation. This approach allows high external validity due to its potential to make generalizations. By working with a large number of cases and a variable-based approach, it is possible to focus on large variations, to provide statistical control for specific variables, and to

identify empirical relationships between operationalized concepts. The objective of this research is precisely to test a number of hypotheses connecting the electoral performance of Radical Right Parties and the restriction level of immigration control policies, identifying variation and common patterns over time and across countries.

As this approach is mainly concerned with understanding the big picture behind the drivers of immigration policies, and the precise effect of Radical Right Parties in particular, I consider that a large-N analysis is helps to avoid (or at least reduce) selection bias. Both countries in which RRPs are strong and weak, with different institutional settings, and a varying range of levels of restriction characterizing their immigration policies are included. Another advantage of this analysis is that it allows to test multiple hypotheses at a time, and the statistical control of certain factors, so it is possible to estimate the relative effect of different explaining factors.

As every method, a large-N approach also has some limitations. It is not adequate to capture in-dept mechanisms, because the researcher cannot develop detailed understanding of each case included in the study. In addition, this approach is largely dependent on the availability of data. The search for generalizability can eventually compromise the understanding of context-specificities and allow for the simplification of very complex phenomena, as well as the homogeneous treatment of potentially heterogeneous concepts.

4.5.2   Random effects model

To estimate the effect of Radical Right Parties on the restriction level of immigration control policies, I use multivariate linear regression models to analyze panel data. As previously detailed, I build a new dataset based on existing sources of comparative longitudinal and cross-sectional information about immigration policies, political institutions, elections, and socio-economic conditions. Panel data has some advantages that allow for more accurate inference of the parameters. Variation in time and space allows one to control for unobserved or unmeasured factors. Moreover, panel data usually allows more degrees of freedom and sample variability than cross-sectional data or time-series, improving the efficiency of estimates (Hsiao 2007).

In general, panel data can be modeled using two standard approaches: fixed effects or random effects. One of the assumptions of a fixed-effect model is that there is an additive and constant causal effect of the main independent variable over the dependent variable. As explained by Clark and Linzer (2012: 5): "the fixed effects model is a linear regression of y on x, that adds to

the specification a series of indicator variables *zj* for each unit, such that *zj[i]* = 1 if observation *i* is in unit *j*, and zj[i] = 0 otherwise". The unobserved individual effects are coefficients on dummies for each individual, while the year effects are coefficients on time dummies. This estimation of a set of dummy variables drastically increases the degrees of freedom of the analysis. Although fixed-effects controls for a certain type of omitted variables, its estimates are susceptible to attenuation bias from measurement error (Angrist and Pischke 2008).

The observations included in this dataset cluster together within the countries and are likely to be related to each other, as well as over time. In this case, including random effects is necessary to account for clustering of subjects and observations (Weiss 2005). In this analysis, random effects allow to capture different effects for different countries over time. It does not assume that the main independent variable will have the same additive effect for every unit of analysis. Moreover, the random effects model estimates the distribution of unit effects – including the mean effect – in the broader underlying population (Clark and Linzer 2012). Contrary to the fixed-effects model, the random effects allow to make predictions about unobserved units. In short, the random effects account for clustering of observations in a group, as well as for subject-specific effects, and saves degrees of freedom.

The random effects model forms a compromise between fixed effects and pooled models and, for that reason, is more flexible. According to Clark and Linzer (2012:5) : "In the random effects model, the αj are not estimated directly, but are rather assumed to follow a specified probability distribution; typically normal with mean $\mu\alpha$ and variance $\sigma^2\alpha$. The average unit effect is estimated by $\mu\alpha$, and $\sigma^2\alpha$ describes by how much the other unit effects vary around that value". In addition to that, the random effects model can constraint the variance of the estimates, leading to estimates that are closer, on average, to the true value in any particular sample. In this this analysis, the models use random effects for the variables "year" and "country". The random effects model equation is described below:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \Sigma_{k=1}^{K}\beta_k X_{itk} + (\alpha_{it} + \varepsilon_{it})$$

where the intercept for each country *i* as ($\alpha_i + \varepsilon_{it}$). Y_{it} is restriction level of immigration controls in Western European countries, X_{itk} is a vector of *k* covariates for every country *i* on year *t* including vote share of radical parties in Western European countries. Random effects allow for heterogeneity in the regression intercept without requiring one to estimate each α_{it} individually.

Finally, an additional reason for using random effects models is based on the results of the run Hausman test, which compares the appropriateness of fixed compared to random effects to a certain dataset. The advantage to use random effects in reinforced by the non-significant p-value of the Hausman test (chisq = 93.038, df = 11, p-value = 4.223e-15). In the next chapter, I develop the empirical analysis and I discuss the mains findings in light of the literature and my own hypothesis.

CHAPTER 5
Analysis and findings

Introduction

In this chapter I develop the empirical analysis based on the constructed dataset, which includes 17 Western European democracies over the period 1980-2010. I discuss the central findings in light of the literature and the analytical model presented in the first chapter. The analysis aims at answering the following research questions, by testing five hypotheses: 1) to what extent is the increasing restriction level of immigration control policies explained as a reaction to the electoral performance of RRPs? 2) By increasing their electoral support, can RRPs push immigration policies towards a more restrictive direction, or only when they enter governing coalitions and have the potential for a more direct impact?

The chapter is divided into five parts. The first part focuses on preliminary results of the level of restrictiveness of immigration policies according to the strength of Radical Right Parties. The second part analyses how other factors potentially driving immigration policies are related to the level of restrictiveness. The third part develops a multivariate analysis based on linear models with random effects to estimate the effect of RRPs on immigration control policies. The last part of this chapter discusses the findings in light of the theoretical debate presented in this dissertation.

5.1 Are immigration policies more restrictive when Radical Right Parties are stronger?

This empirical analysis starts with a preliminary assessment of the relationship between the main explanatory variables, which measure the strength of Radical Right parties, and the dependent variable, which is the indicator of the restriction level of immigration control policy. Are immigration policies more restrictive when Radical Right Parties perform better in elections, representing a threat to mainstream parties? I start with an assessment of the average immigration policy under different levels of electoral strength of RRPs. To see if the average level of restriction of immigration policy is different under various levels of support to RRPs, the numeric variable measuring vote share for Radical Right Parties is grouped into three categories:

"none", "small" and "threat". In the "threat" group, I include observations where RRPs obtain 10 percent or more of the votes. It is possible to see that immigration policies indeed display a more restrictive patter when RRPs are a threat, compared to when they are inexistent or small, as shown in the graph 5.1 below. The graph plots the average level of restriction of immigration control policies by group of electoral strength of RRPs. The "threat" category refers to cases in which RRPs get 10 percent of the votes or more. The "small" category is in-between and the "none" category refers to the observations where RRPs score 0 percent.

Graph 5.1: Level of restriction of immigration controls by electoral strength of Radical Right Parties

Source: Authors' elaboration

I also make the test with other thresholds of vote share defining the "threat" category (3, 5, and 8 percent). Nevertheless, even if the "threat" category is defined at smaller levels of votes, the average level of restriction remains significantly different when there is exposition to strong RRPs. The table 5.1 below shows the average immigration policy by group of Radical Right Parties (classified into "none", "small" or "threat"), with different levels attributed to the "threat" and, by extension, to the "small" category. This descriptive analysis suggests that immigration

policy tends to be more restrictive under better electoral performances of RRPs, and lower when RRPs are absent or small.

Table 5.1: Average level of restrictiveness of immigration controls by levels of Radical Right threat

Level of threat (vote %)	**3%**		**5%**		**8%**		**10%**	
Strength of RRPs								
None	0.55	(34)	0.55	(34)	0.55	(34)	0.55	(34)
Small	0.59	(21)	0.59	(27)	0.58	(27)	0.58	(41)
Threat	0.60	(45)	0.61	(39)	0.62	(39)	0.65	(25)

Source: Authors' elaboration.

Note: The proportion of observations in each category is indicated in brackets. The index of immigration control varies between 0 (liberal) and 1(restrictive). The "none" category is always defined Radical Right Parties valid vote share equals zero. Small is defined as the range larger than zero and smaller than the threshold established for threat category.

In addition, statistical tests of difference of means, which I show in table 5.2 below, confirm that this difference is statistically significant. Therefore, under different levels of threat, the average restriction level of policy control is higher than when RRPs are negligible. To support these findings, the table 5.2 below displays the results of the ANOVA and Tukey tests. They indicate that, compared to the "none" category, the "threat" category displays a stricter immigration policy, on average, and that this difference is statistically significant. This is valid for different levels of the "threat" category (3, 5, 8 or 10 percent of vote share). Furthermore, when the "threat" category is defined at the levels of 8 or 10 percent, the difference between the average restriction level is also statistically significant comparing the categories "small" and "threat".

Table 5.2: Tests of differences of the average level of restriction of immigration control by levels of Radical Right threat

Level of threat (vote %)	3%	5%	8%	10%
ANOVA (F-value)	6.892	7.711	9.989	12.75
(Pr>F)	0.001*	0.000*	0.000*	0.000*
Tukey Test				
none-small	0.02	0.06	0.08	0.1
none-threat	0.001*	0.000*	0.000*	0.000*
small-threat	0.91	0.38	0.03*	0.002*

Source: Authors' elaboration.
Note: Statistically significance signaled with a *

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The second measure of RRPs' strength that I use in this work is their support or participation in the government, measured with a dummy variable. I expect that, when RRPs support the government, they have more potential to directly influence immigration policies towards their preferred direction. In this dataset, RRPs have supported or participated into governing coalitions in only about 10 percent of the cases. However, it is still possible to observe an important difference on the average level of restriction of immigration policies under these two conditions. This is shown in the graph 5.2, below. When RRPs participate in the government, the average level of restriction of immigration policy reaches 0.67. By contrast, this value is only 0.58 when RRPs do no participate or support the government. In support to this finding, the ANOVA test shows that this difference is statistically significant (F-value = 18.21, Pr(>F) = 0.000), suggesting that the participation of RRPs in the government is likely to be associated with more restrictive levels of immigration policy.

Graph 5.2: Average level of restriction of immigration controls by participation of Radical Right Parties in government

Source: Elaborated by the author

5.2 Other potential drivers and their relation to immigration control policies

In the previous section, I showed preliminary evidence suggesting that immigration policies tend to be more restrictive when RRPs are stronger in elections, and when they provide formal or informal support to the government. Are there other factors, based on the literature, that could be empirically associated with more restrictive levels of immigration policy?

Starting from government characteristics, it has been argued that the ideological orientations and the type of government could be linked to policy outputs, because of partisan preferences and arrangements facilitating (or complicating) policy consensus. This data shows that centrist governments tend to enact more liberal immigration policies than both left and right-wing governments. As displayed in the table 5.3 below, the average level of restriction is close between right-wing (0.61) and left-wing (0.60) governments. However, the average level is relatively lower under centrist administrations (0.54). The ANOVA test shows that these differences are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level (F-value = 10.46, Pr(>F) = 0.000). Nevertheless, only the differences between left *versus* center, or center *versus* right are confirmed as statistically significant. This suggests that left-wing and right-wing governments could be closer to each other with regards to their immigration policy outputs. At the same time, both are further away from centrist governments, which are more likely to have a liberalizing approach to the entrance of foreigners.

Table 5.3: Government orientation and average level of restrictiveness of immigration control policy

Ideology of Prime Minister's Party	Left	Center	Right
Average restriction level of immigration policy (0-1)	0.60	0.54	0.61
Percentage of cases in dataset	39.7%	31.8%	28.5%

Source: Elaborated by the author.

In addition to the ideology of the government, I also compare the policy outputs enacted by single party and coalition governments. These two types of government display the same average level of restriction of immigration controls (0.58). However, I observe a difference when I contrast minority and majority governments. Minority governments score 0.57 on average, while majority governments score 0.61 (F-value = 7.196, Pr(>F) = 0.007). Minority governments seem

to be more dispersed in the issue of immigration than majority governments, as the graph 5.3 below shows. However, the difference between these types of government is not statistically significant. This may reflect that it can be difficult to build compromise under minority governments when deciding on highly politicized issues like immigration. This limitation could be driven by polarizing policy preferences among different parties, which prevents considerable policy changes to happen.

Graph 5.3: Level of restriction of immigration controls by types of government

Source: Elaborated by the author.

So far, there is preliminary evidence suggesting that distinctive levels of restriction of immigration policy can be found under different ideological orientations of governments, while

different types of governments tend to display similar levels of restriction, on average. I identified in the literature that other factors could also influence immigration policies, in particular external events. The figure 5.1 below compares the evolution of the average level of restriction of immigration policy (for Western Europe as a whole) with the average support for Radical Right Parties (my main independent variable), and the contextual variables: influx of asylum seekers and unemployment rate. When observing the development of these indicators, the picture suggests that immigration controls and the performance of RRPs follow both a linear trend over time, so they might be linked. In contrast, there is no apparent link between the contextual variables and the average levels of restriction of immigration controls. Immigration controls continue to get more restrictive even when influx of asylums seekers decreases, while there is no linear pattern. Unemployment and immigration controls do not seem to share similarities in terms of their distribution over time, with unemployment showing a cyclical pattern.

Figure 5.1: Evolution of level of restriction of immigration controls and explanatory variables

Source: Elaborated by the author.

5.3 Multivariate analyses

To simultaneously test the explaining power of different drivers and to conduct a more rigorous assessment of the effect of RRPs, I analyze panel data using multivariate regressions with random effects. I develop the analysis in three steps. First, I run a set of models for the entire dataset (the pooled data) using vote share of RRPs as indicator of their strength, which is my central explaining variable. Second, I split the dataset into two groups of observations, according to the type of electoral system: proportional representation on the one hand, and mixed or majority systems on the other. The group of mixed and majority countries is considerably smaller, this is why the two categories are kept together. Therefore, the conclusions and generalizations derived from it should be taken cautiously. In the third step, I run models, again for the pooled data (the full dataset), using the second indicator of Radical Right strength: their participation in government. This dummy variable measures whether RRPs formally or informally support the government in a given year. It tests their direct impact on immigration control policies.

In the first step, I use vote for RRPs as the independent variable measuring their strength. The models apply to the pooled data and I progressively include variables from each of the four dimensions of analysis. The first model is a basic one, only with the dependent variable and main independent variable, without controls. The second model includes the contextual factors, which are the influx of asylum seekers and the unemployment rate. These contextual variables are lagged in one year. The third model adds to the analysis the ideological orientation of governments, using "right-wing" as the reference category. The fourth model adds the type of government (coalition or single-party). The fifth model adds the other variable for type of government, according to its size (majority or minority). In model six, I add the dummy variable of membership to the EU. In model seven, I include the dummy for judicial review. Finally, in the full model, which is the last one, I include the categorical variable for the electoral system.

In the second step of analysis, I also use votes for RRPs as an independent variable. The difference is that I run two different sets of models, one for proportional systems and the other for mixed and majority systems, together. For the analysis of proportional systems, the random effects by year and country are kept. Similar to the previous step, I progressively include the same variables by the dimension of analysis, except the categorical variable for electoral system, which is unnecessary in this case. For this reason, there are seven models for the proportional

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systems. In the analysis for the group of mixed and majority systems, the data does not contain enough observations for the random effects to be used. For this reason, I run multiple linear regression models. This set of models only has six specifications, because all countries in this subset are EU members over the entire period, there is no variation of this indicator in this case.

In the third step of analysis, I work with the other indicator of RRPs' strength: the dummy variable measuring their support or participation in the government. I progressively include the other independent variables following the same order as the first pooled data model, which sums up eight models. I present the main findings for each group of model specifications in the following section, which is followed by a more substantive discussion of the results.

5.3.1   Models for pooled data using vote for RRPs as independent variable

The results of this first set of models are reported in table 5.4, below. The table shows that vote for RRPs has a positive and statistically significant effect on the level of restriction of immigration policy (the dependent variable) in all model specifications. The effect of the vote share of RRPs remains when I add the control variables and "resists" to all of them, although its magnitude slightly decreases in the full model. Without controls, one additional percentage point of valid votes for RRPs raises 0.6 percentage point of the restriction level of immigration control. In the intermediate models, this effect is about 0.4 percentage points. In the full model, holding the other independent variables constant, one additional percentage point of votes for RRPs increases the restriction level of immigration controls in about 0.3 percentage points. This indicates that there is an effect of the vote of RRPs on immigration policy outcomes, albeit the magnitude of the effect is small.

The second finding is that contextual factors also matter for immigration policy outcomes, but not all of them. Only influx of asylum seekers (the year before) has a positive effect that is statistically significant. Unemployment only displays a negative and statistically significant effect in the last model specification.

With regards to the ideological orientation of the government, centrist governments compared to right-wing administrations tend to be associated with lower levels of restriction of immigration control policies (about 3 percentage points). This variable is negative and statistically significant in all model specifications. Although left-wing governments tend to be negatively correlated with the dependent variable when compared to right-wing governments, this effect is not

statistically significant. This suggest that the difference between left-wing and right-wing governments is limited, if it exists.

The variables indicating types of government do not have statistically significant effects to predict immigration policies, with the exception of coalition governments, in the fifth model. Coalition governments display a negative and significant correlation with the dependent variable. This means that, coalition governments are likely to decrease the restriction level of immigration controls in about 3.6 percentage points.

EU membership shows a positive and statistically significant effect, and this is one of the coefficients with the highest magnitude. In other words, being a member of the EU increases the level of restriction of immigration control policies in about 14 percentage points, compared to not being an EU-member in a given year. This effect is contrary to my initial expectation. The other institutional variable, which measures the existence of judicial review in the country, also displays a positive sign (contrary to expected), but the effect is not statistically significant.

Contrary to what I anticipated, mixed systems (compared to proportional representation) and majority systems (compared to proportional representation), are positively correlated with the dependent variable, and this effect is statistically significant. This suggests that, holding all else constant, the level of restriction of immigration control policies is likely to be about 10 to 11 percentage points lower in proportional electoral systems. Mixed and majority systems (compared to proportional representation) tend to display more restrictive levels of immigration controls.

Table 5.4: Estimation Results – Models for pooled data using vote for RRPs as independent variable
Dependent variable: level of restriction of immigration control policies (0-100)

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Votes RRPs	0.608***	0.432***	0.399***	0.439***	0.453***	0.415***	0.413***	0.270***
	(0.111)	(0.102)	(0.104)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.102)
Influx asylum seekers		4.471***	4.554***	4.627***	4.597***	3.982***	3.986***	3.628***
		(0.402)	(0.403)	(0.405)	(0.404)	(0.387)	(0.390)	(0.383)
Unemployment		0.193	0.209	0.211	0.221	-0.224	-0.221	-0.400**
		(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.191)
Center (ref.=right)			-3.415**	-3.439**	-3.224**	-4.165***	-4.112***	-2.948**
			(1.535)	(1.533)	(1.544)	(1.445)	(1.456)	(1.435)
Left (ref.=right)			-0.953	-1.451	-1.249	-0.986	-0.957	-0.460
			(1.233)	(1.279)	(1.291)	(1.202)	(1.205)	(1.181)
Coalition				-2.991	-3.628*	-2.094	-2.077	-1.523
				(2.043)	(2.107)	(1.989)	(1.998)	(1.936)
Minority					-1.913	-1.913	-1.979	-2.264
					(1.557)	(1.454)	(1.458)	(1.425)
EU						14.253***	14.277***	14.560***
						(1.721)	(1.723)	(1.674)
Judicial review							0.826	2.718
							(3.711)	(3.465)
Mixed system								10.534***
								(2.393)
Majority system								11.739***
								(3.495)
Constant	54.937***	16.701***	17.496***	18.901***	19.783***	16.530***	15.876***	13.777***
	(2.344)	(4.537)	(4.584)	(4.738)	(4.714)	(4.555)	(5.134)	(4.159)
Observations	527	465	464	464	464	464	464	464
R2	0.054	0.266	0.274	0.278	0.280	0.375	0.376	0.412
Adjusted R2	0.052	0.261	0.266	0.268	0.269	0.364	0.364	0.397
F Statistic	29.833***	166.687***	172.558***	175.399***	176.682***	273.220***	273.395***	316.012***

Notes: The table reports the estimates obtained from OLS random effects models for the panel of 17 countries from 1980 - 2010. Standard errors are reported within the brackets below the estimates. ***, ** and * report significance at 99%, 95% and 90%.

5.3.2 *Models for proportional and majority/mixed systems using vote for RRPs as independent variable*

The table 5.5 below shows the results of the models run for proportional representation systems. In these models, contrary to expected, the effect of RRPs is slightly lower than the results with the pooled data. Without controls, one additional percentage point in the vote share of RRPs has an effect of 0.4 percentage points in the level of restriction of immigration controls. In the final model, this effect is event smaller, in which the level of restriction only increases 0.2 percentage points. Nevertheless, the effect of the vote for RRPs on the dependent variable remains statistically significant even controlling for the other factors.

As previously found, the influx of asylum seekers has a positive and statistically significant effect on the dependent variable. Unemployment displays a negative sign but is only significant in the models six and seven. Contrary to the previous set of models, the ideological orientation of the government does not display effects with statistical significance. In spite of that, the sign of centrist and left-wing governments is negative (compared to the reference right-wing category), as expected.

The type of government also loses its statistical significance in this set of models. The exception is model five, in which coalition governments negatively affect immigration policies, with statistical significance. As the previous set of models, EU membership has a positive and significant effect on more restrictive levels of controls, which is contrary to what I expected. This coefficient indicates that being an EU-member increases more than 14 percentage points the level of restriction of immigration control policies. Finally, the variable indicating the presence of a mechanism of judicial review remains without statistical significance, but in this model, it is negatively correlated to the dependent variable, suggesting that, when there is a mechanism of judicial review in place, the level of restriction of controls should decrease.

Table 5.5: Estimation Results – Models for proportional systems using vote for RRPs as independent variable
Dependent variable: level of restriction of immigration control policies (0-100)

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Votes RRPs	0.422***	0.256**	0.231**	0.276**	0.280**	0.200*	0.198*
	(0.124)	(0.110)	(0.112)	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.104)	(0.105)
Influx asylum seekers		4.703***	4.727***	4.839***	4.855***	4.150***	4.166***
		(0.422)	(0.426)	(0.427)	(0.427)	(0.394)	(0.397)
Unemployment		-0.007	-0.015	-0.006	-0.002	-0.522***	-0.522***
		(0.208)	(0.210)	(0.209)	(0.210)	(0.198)	(.198)
Center (ref.=right)			-0.757	-0.878	-0.772	-1.647	-1.594
			(1.667)	(1.661)	(1.671)	(1.509)	(1.520)
Left (ref.=right)			0.025	-0.811	-0.765	-0.271	-0.236
			(1.444)	(1.509)	(1.509)	(1.358)	(1.359)
Coalition				-3.909*	-4.135*	-2.016	-1.954
				(2.084)	(2.194)	(1.997)	(2.004)
Minority					-0.636	-0.558	-0.613
					(1.689)	(1.523)	(1.523)
EU						14.842***	14.894***
						(1.634)	(1.634)
Judicial review							-0.059
							(4.038)
Constant	54.489***	16.320***	16.546***	18.481***	18.570***	15.736***	10.526**
	(2.824)	(4.912)	(4.881)	(5.095)	(5.217)	(5.020)	(4.895)
Observations	434	372	371	371	371	371	371
R2	0.023	0.280	0.280	0.289	0.290	0.425	0.427
Adjusted R2	0.021	0.275	0.270	0.277	0.276	0.412	0.413
F Statistic	7.855***	142.556***	140.947***	146.870***	147.455***	266.619***	268.555***

Notes: The table reports the estimates obtained from the random effects for the panel of 14 countries with proportional electoral system, from 1980 - 2010.
Standard errors are reported within the brackets below the estimates. ***, ** and * report significance at 99%, 95% and 90%.

The table 5.6 below displays the findings for the subset of cases under majority and mixed electoral systems. These results should be interpreted carefully, because only five countries do not have proportional systems in Western Europe (UK, France, Germany, Italy and Greece) and for some of them this is not the case for the entire time-frame of the analysis, because there was a change in their electoral rule (Italy and Greece).

In this set of models for cases with majority or mixed systems, the first point to highlight is that, contrary to what I expected, the effect of vote share for RRPs is positive and stronger than in proportional systems. For each added percentage of vote share for RRPs, there is an increase of 0.4 percentage points on the level of restriction of immigration controls. This effect is statistically significant in all but one model (number four). Similar to previous models, there is a positive and significant effect of the inflow of asylum seekers, and no statistically significant effect of unemployment. In contrast to what I find in the previous models for proportional systems, the ideological orientation of the government has a statistically significant effect in all models. The results indicate that centrist governments are correlated with lower levels of restriction of immigration control policies (around 5 to 9 percentage points), compared to right-wing administrations. However, left-wing governments display a positive correlation with the dependent variable, even though this effect is not statistically significant. In the full model, this would suggest that left-wing governments are correlated with higher levels of immigration control policies, compared to right-wing governments.

Table 5.6: Estimation Results – Models for majority and mixed systems using vote for RRPs as independent variable

Dependent variable: level of restriction of immigration control policies (0-100)

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Votes RRPs	0.419***	0.527***	0.534***	0.107	0.571***	0.431**
	(0.139)	(0.144)	(0.152)	(0.220)	(0.188)	(0.184)
Influx asylum seekers		2.823***	3.677***	2.219*	1.727*	1.256
		(0.929)	(1.048)	(1.159)	(0.929)	(0.895)
Unemployment		0.242	0.157	-0.297	0.254	-0.205
		(0.590)	(0.599)	(0.606)	(0.490)	(0.488)
Center(ref=right)			-5.315*	-9.725***	-5.434*	-7.290**
			(3.152)	(3.490)	(2.854)	(2.774)
Left (ref=right)			-2.663	-2.255	3.354*	2.876
			(2.276)	(2.209)	(1.936)	(1.846)
Coalition				8.839**	7.618***	-0.788
				(3.393)	(2.716)	(3.692)
Minority					-21.870***	-20.900***
					(3.101)	(2.963)
Judicial review						11.839***
						(3.718)
Constant	55.672***	23.990*	17.946	34.260**	31.941***	39.419***
	(1.305)	(12.373)	(12.951)	(14.017)	(11.204)	(10.902)
Observations	93	93	93	93	93	93
R2	0.091	0.182	0.210	0.268	0.538	0.588
Adjusted R2	0.081	0.154	0.164	0.216	0.500	0.548
Residual Std. Error	9.519 (df=91)	9.132 (df = 89)	9.077 (df= 87)	8.790 (df = 86)	7.022 (df = 85)	6.673 (df = 84)
F Statistic	9.099***(df =1;91)	6.592***(df =3;89)	4.618***(df =5;87)	5.235***(df =6;86)	14.134***(df =7;85)	14.964***(df =8;84)

Notes: The table reports the estimates obtained from the linear models for the panel of 5 countries from 1980 - 2010. Standard errors are reported within the brackets below the estimates. ***, ** and * report significance at 99%, 95% and 90%.

From the results of the analysis, the type of government seems to be an important factor to understand immigration policy outcomes in majority and mixed systems. In models four and five, coalition governments are associated with an increase of about 7 to 8 percentage points on the level of restriction of immigration policies, compared to single-party governments. The size of the government appears to have an even more relevant effect. The size of the government has a negative effect on the dependent variable, with statistical significance and an important magnitude. Compared to majority governments, minority administrations are associated with a decrease on the level of restriction of immigration controls (about 20 percentage points). Finally, contrary to the other models and against previous expectations, the presence of a judicial review mechanism in this case increases the level of restriction of immigration control policies and the effect of this variable is statistically significant.

5.3.3   *Models for pooled data using RRPs' government support as independent variable*

In this third step, I develop a set of models with a different indicator of the strength of RRPs: a dummy variable indicating their (internal or external) support to the government. The results are displayed in the graph 5.4 and the table 5.7 below. The first result to be highlighted is that support of RRPs to the government has a positive and statistically significant effect to predict the dependent variable in all model specifications. When RRPs support the government, the level of restriction of immigration controls increases about 6.5 percentage points, holding everything else constant. Among the contextual factors, only the influx of asylum seekers has an effect which is statistically significant and positive. Unemployment is not statistically significant to predict immigration policies here.

Governments with a centrist Prime Minister display a negative and statistically significant effect on the level of restriction of controls, which indicates that, compared to right-wing governments, centrist administrations display immigration control policies that are about 2.6 to 4 percentage points less restrictive. However, the left-wing coefficient is not statistically significant, despite its negative sign. None of the variables indicating the type of government has a statistically significant effect in these models. Nevertheless, both the coalition and the minority types display a negative sign, suggesting that coalition and minority governments could be more liberal in terms of their immigration control policies. Membership to the EU, as in all previous sets of models, shows a positive and significant effect on the dependent variable, and the magnitude of

this effect is also high. This means that, being an EU member increases the level of restriction of immigration policies in about 14.5 percentage points, holding all else constant. The coefficient of judicial revision does not show statistical significance. Finally, mixed and majority systems are positively correlated with the dependent variable and this effect is statistically significant. Compared to proportional systems, the level of restriction of immigration control policies tends to be about 11 to 13 points higher in mixed or majority systems.

Table 5.7: Estimation Results – Models with pooled data using government support of RRPs as independent variable

Dependent variable: level of restriction of immigration control policies (0-100)

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
RRP in government	9.347***	6.611***	6.705***	6.743***	6.921***	6.547***	6.573***	6.554***
	(1.902)	(1.695)	(1.727)	(1.728)	(1.738)	(1.614)	(1.614)	(1.562)
Influx asylum seekers		4.488***	4.569***	4.616***	4.583***	3.951***	3.927***	3.473***
		(0.403)	(0.403)	(0.406)	(0.406)	(0.388)	(0.391)	(0.381)
Unemployment		0.218	0.228	0.232	0.238	-0.212	-0.211	-0.408**
		(0.200)	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.189)
Center(ref=right)			-3.639**	-3.673**	-3.503**	-4.411***	-4.255***	-2.675*
			(1.528)	(1.530)	(1.541)	(1.439)	(1.452)	(1.424)
Left(ref=right)			-0.235	-0.443	-0.244	-0.035	0.043	0.624
			(1.259)	(1.306)	(1.322)	(1.229)	(1.232)	(1.196)
Coalition				-1.237	-1.715	-0.365	-0.328	-0.502
				(1.988)	(2.037)	(1.921)	(1.927)	(1.842)
Minority					-1.636	-1.676	-1.804	-2.341*
					(1.554)	(1.449)	(1.453)	(1.409)
EU						14.454***	14.490***	14.585***
						(1.719)	(1.721)	(1.654)
Judicial review							2.726	4.194
							(3.683)	(3.359)
Mixed system								11.266***
								(2.325)
Majority system								13.620***
								(3.383)
Constant	57.638***	18.359***	18.758***	19.274***	20.123***	16.843***	15.046***	16.488***
	(2.252)	(4.548)	(4.578)	(4.751)	(4.715)	(4.548)	(5.111)	(4.729)
Observations	527	465	464	464	464	464	464	464
R2	0.044	0.262	0.274	0.275	0.276	0.374	0.376	0.423
Adjusted R2	0.042	0.257	0.266	0.265	0.265	0.363	0.363	0.409
F Statistic	24.149***	163.228***	172.827***	173.124***	174.011***	272.236***	273.208***	330.718***

Notes: *The table reports the estimates obtained from the random-effects models for the panel of 17 countries from 1980 - 2010.*
*Standard errors are reported within the brackets below the estimates. ***, ** and * report significance at 99%, 95% and 90%.*

Graph 5.4: Regression coefficients of predictors of restriction level of immigration control policies - Full model with pooled data using RRPs' government support as independent variable

Source: Elaborated by the author.

5.4 Discussion of the findings

How could these findings be interpreted and how do they answer my research questions? In short, the findings provide evidence that the electoral threat of Radical Right Parties is a relevant, but not sufficient condition to drive the government's agenda on immigration. Although political actors are important to account for restrictive or liberalizing trends within immigration policies, these actors do not act without constraints (Howard 2010). In line with Abou-Chadi (2016), it is crucial to incorporate the institutional context and political dynamics of competition in studies about policy-making outcomes, because governmental actors' preferences are not directly translated into policy outputs.

In line with this reasoning, the findings of the present work indicate that the effect of RRPs tends to be different under proportional and majority or mixed systems. This is something that has not

been studied by the literature, at least not from a quantitative and comparative framework. The electoral system has been virtually ignored in the studies about immigration policies, although this dimension seems to be important to account for the strength and strategic choices made by political elites and party organizations. However, contrary to my previous expectation, RRPs tend to have more impact on immigration policies when they are operating in majority or mixed systems, compared to proportional systems. Moreover, when RRPs provide support to the government, the level of restriction of immigration controls is higher, although this is not the strongest predictor of immigration policy outputs.

Additional factors that are largely taken in the literature as drivers of immigration policies are confirmed to be relevant in this analysis as well, notably the presence of immigrants (indicated by the annual influx of asylum seekers), and international norms or institutions. My findings point that, when the influx of asylum seekers increases, the level of restriction of immigration control policies also increases, suggesting that nation-states could implement more stricter measures controlling the entrance of foreigners as a reaction to the volume of refugees seeking protection in their territories. However, in the case of presence of international norms or institutions (in this analysis measured in terms of membership to the European Union), the observed effect does not lead towards liberalization of immigration controls, but more restriction.

Therefore, in this work I show that the electoral support for the Radical Right has a small impact on the immigration agenda. For these parties to have a more prominent (indirect) impact, they would have to conquer very high levels of electoral support. To illustrate this point, if one considers the results of the full model with the pooled data, RRPs should get about 20 percent of the votes to increase the level of restriction of immigration control policies in about 5.4 percentage points (in a scale from 0-100). Their impact tends to be higher in majority and mixed systems, compared to proportional rule, which goes against the fourth hypothesis of this work. My findings raise a relevant question to the thesis on the contagious effects of RRPs. What I observe in this analysis suggests that this contagious effect should not apply equally to all types of electoral systems. Instead, it suggests that the contagious effect of RRPs is especially pronounced in majority and mixed systems. A possible explanation for this is that, even though it is harder for RRPs to translate their voters into seats in mixed or majority systems (as for any smaller party), once they start to represent a threat to established parties in electoral competitions, they may be even more powerful to affect the policy agenda as a whole. When established parties start to feel threatened by the popularity of RRPs, they may feel pressured to

provide urgent and perceivable responses in the government, hoping to limit the rise of new challengers.

In this sense, it is important to take into account not only the electoral strength of RRPs *per se*, but also the degree of electoral competition and politicization of immigration issues. As explained by Abou-Chadi (2016), the degree of electoral competition affects how susceptible political parties are to the anti-immigrant sentiment present in the population and, by extension, to the rise of RRPs. The author argues that increased levels of electoral competition coupled with the politicization of the immigration issue reduces the likelihood of liberal reforms. This could theoretically apply to account for changes in immigration policies towards a more restrictive direction as well.

The extent to which political parties in the government take more restrictive measures in response to RRPs also depends on the competitiveness of elections. The competitiveness level of elections is higher if small changes in votes can lead to big changes in seat share and bargaining positions and, when this is the case, parties will tend to pursue a vote-maximizing strategy (Abou-Chadi 2016). This provides elements to understand why in mixed or majority systems the electoral performance of RRPs tends to affect immigration policy outputs to a larger extent than in proportional systems. It is precisely in majority and mixed systems that smaller changes in vote-share can represent big changes in terms of access to representative institutions and bargaining power. Therefore, this could help understand why in proportional systems the indirect effect of RRPs is smaller. The perceived level of competitiveness introduced by RRPs can be relatively small, compared to majority or mixed systems, where small changes in the vote share can imply more drastic consequences for ruling parties. In addition to that, in proportional systems there are usually more veto points operating. This could prevent more restrictive immigration reforms to be enacted by governments, when veto points would act as a counterbalance to the anti-immigration pressure of relevant RRPs.

Previous research showed that the type of electoral system does not discourage voters to support RRPs (Carter 2002). Actually, their average vote share is very similar in proportional and disproportional systems. Even though it remains harder for RRPs to get institutional representation under disproportional systems, they could be even more powerful (than in PR) to promote policy changes from "outside" the institutions as soon as they overpass some minimum barriers and create a sense of threat to established parties. When confronted with this electoral

threat, established parties operating in disproportional systems could decide to take strong measures in the government. In majoritarian democracies, decision-making powers tends to be more concentrated, and decision-makers have more room of maneuver to promote changes. In proportional systems, on the contrary, RRPs would have to share power with multiple actors, since decision-making is more dispersed and requires building consensus.

This is also in line with Schmidt's (1996) arguments stating that, in consensus democracies, where the political-institutional circumstances allow for co-governance of the opposition party, party influence is much more complex than in majoritarian democracies. Departing from the classic hypothesis of party influence on public policy, which considers that a major determinant of variation in policy choices and outputs is the party composition of government, Schmidt (1996) explains that other elements such as clarity of responsibility, the connection between parties and voters and the room of maneuver available to the national government turns this party effect much more complex to assess. The partisan influence on public policy is stronger in majoritarian democracies, and weaker in consensual democracies.

Regarding the electoral competition, it should be clearer to identify the logics of the classic Downsian approach of politics as a market in which politicians deliver policies in exchange of political support operating in majoritarian democracies. This implies that parties inserted in majoritarian systems could feel more pressured to respond to the electoral threat represented by the Radical Right in terms of policy delivering, compared to parties operating in consensual, more proportional systems. Therefore, the contagious effect of RRPs on established parties seems to be higher in disproportional systems, where the perceived threat tends to be higher.

In majority and mixed systems, democracy tends to be less consensual, and power is more concentrated. In this sense, the rise of a new competitor can represent a higher danger for established parties, because losing a small share of support can represent losing the majority and, as a consequence, any access to power. In France, for instance, which has a two-round majority system, the electoral performance of Radical Right candidates has, in several occasions, prevented mainstream right- and left-wing candidates to win in the first round, or even to fail to get the required majority of votes in the second round. In these cases, although the National Front (now, National Rally) was not able to win the elections, the Radical Right party was a key actor to determine the gains of established forces in several cases, including by recommending their voters not to provide support for a given mainstream candidate.

In proportional systems, because of the often higher number of parties, rather than a threat the rise of RRPs could in some cases represent an opportunity for mainstream right-wing parties to form new governing alliances and remain in office without relying on centrist parties (Bale 2003). With the exception of Italy, which has a mixed system, all the observed cases of RRPs support to the government happens in proportional systems. In France, for example, the FN still remains a pariah party for mainstream parties, who refuse to cogitate any alliance with the Radical Right. To a large extent, this behavior prevents further wins for the FN at the national level, because the majority system requires the negotiation of electoral alliances to win the majority of the votes.

My analysis brings more precision to understand the significance and size of the effect of RRPs on immigration policies. The findings suggest that, while they do have a small impact on immigration policy outputs, and the statistical significance of this effect resists to several important controls, their effect is also conditioned to institutional features. The first hypothesis, which states that more restrictive immigration control policies would be adopted in reaction to the electoral strength of RRPs, is partially confirmed.

There are few quantitative comparative studies about the influence of RRPs on immigration policy outcomes. One of the main works to which my findings could be compared is the study developed by Lutz (2019), in which he finds impact of RRPs of immigration policies when they participate in government, but not based on their electoral performance. This difference of results could be explained by the operationalization of the dependent variable, which in his study originates from the Determinants of Immigration Policies Dataset (DEMIG) and does not focus on one specific dimension of immigration policy. The DEMIG dataset is limited to conduct comparisons across countries. In addition, the conception of influence used by Lutz (2019) is based on the idea of policy success, which means the capacity of RRPs to fulfil their desired policy outcomes. However, in my analysis, I study the influence of RRPs considering variations on the level of restriction of immigration policies of controls. In this sense, if policies become more restrictive, this is an indicator that they are pushed into the Radical Right direction.

I also find evidence for the influence of RRPs on immigration policies when they support the national government. When this is the case, the findings show more restrictive levels of immigration policies, and this effect resists to all controls. Therefore, this confirms the second hypothesis stating that immigration policies would display more restrictive levels when RRPs

provide internal or externa support to the government. This finding is in line with what Lutz (2019) finds, as the author also observes that the direct influence of RRPs is more important than their indirect influence or their impact on the opposition. Support to this conclusion is also found in other studies on the Radical Right in government (Minkeberg, 2001), which state that the agency of RRPs in governing coalitions is, to some extent, successful to passing more restrictive immigration measures. By getting access to governing positions, RRPs seem able to directly influence policy-making outputs, even if in all observed cases of RRPs entering the government, they were in the position of junior coalition partners. Apparently, even in this non-dominant position, these parties have been able to negotiate their preferred policies with their coalition partners, at least to a certain extent. As explained by Lutz (2019: 535): "it seems that RRPs are able to use their bargaining power inside the government coalition to demand restrictive policy reforms (…)". In general, at least with regards to the immigration issue, the empirical evidence does not support the common expectation that RRPs do not suit well for the governing task (Minkenberg 1998), which would be assumed either because of their supposed organizational weakness, lack of experience, or inflexible ideological convictions. This does not mean to say that RRPs can fulfill their whole program when they enter the government coalition, neither that they do not have costs to put certain policies into the agenda. It is likely that RRPs are not successful in every policy area, and they may be pushed to moderate some of their preferences in order to have certain policies accepted and implemented by established parties. Nevertheless, their support to the government seems to push immigration policy outcomes towards more restrictive levels.

In fact, the direct influence of Radical Right Parties seems to be conditioned to the strategic choices and behavior of other parties in the system (Akkerman and Rooduijn 2015; Bale 2003, 2008), particularly from the mainstream right. The entrance of RRPs into governing coalitions not only depends on their own electoral strength, but also on coalition considerations of other parties, often the dominant party of the right. In some cases, like in Austria, Italy and Denmark, the largest center-right party decided to ally with the Radical Right. However, in other cases, like France or Belgium, this has not been the case, and the Radical Right remains excluded from coalition considerations. In those cases, established parties still hold the strategy of "*cordon sanitaire*", which excludes any cooperation with the Radical Right. The question that remains is the following: how long can the mainstream right politically survive without considering any cooperation with the Radical Right, particularly in systems with proportional representation?

When controlling for the other drivers of immigration policies, my analysis suggests that the level of restriction of immigration control policies can be very similar under left- and right-wing governments, particularly in proportional systems. This finding goes against what part of the literature on immigration policies argues about prominent differences between the outputs of left- and right-wing governments. Scholars tend to consider that left-wing parties would support liberalizing immigration policies (Howard 2010), while right-wing parties are would be more inclined to restrict them (Akkerman 2015b). However, from my findings, there should be more focus on centrist parties, which seem to display a more discernible liberal trend in government. Central parties could be more likely to adopt liberalizing changes on immigration control. I find some evidence that centrist governments hold a clearer liberal approach of immigration controls, which is in line with findings obtained by Lutz (2019). From the analyzed data, I observe that centrist governments pass more liberal immigration measures than right-wing governments. By its turn, left-wing governments are not systematically more liberal than right-wing ones. With these findings, I can only partially confirm the third hypothesis, which expected the level of immigration control policies to be more restrictive under right-wing governments.

It could be argued that, because of liberal and cosmopolitan values, and openness to immigration, centrist (liberal) parties would represent the opposing pole to the nationalist and anti-immigration position of the Radical Right. At the same time, the mainstream right and the mainstream left are currently more internally divided on the issue of immigration (Davis 2012). Traditional right- and left-wing parties are historically driven by economic divides, they are many times lost in terms of the best strategy to implement in reaction to the Radical Right, and often end up holding unclear positions on the immigration issue. Often times, established parties lack a consistent and well-defined record of immigration policies, and the left has even been associated with more restrictive policy measures than the right.

One of the possible reasons why centrist parties are more likely to pass less restrictive immigration policies is that they are not as threatened by the Radical Right as the left and the right, because of different constituencies. While the right loses part of its constituency to the culturally protectionist and nationalist appeal of RRPs, the left also loses voters to the protectionist appeal of RRPs (Davis 2012; Zaslove 2006). This call emphasizes, for instance, that closing the door to immigrants is a way to protect the jobs of the native people, which has proved appealing to the working class, a traditional base of support for left-wing parties. Another reason

for centrist parties in government to adopt more liberalizing policy changes is that they are in a better position to implement unpopular reforms (Lutz 2019).

It could be argued that the new cleavage opposing culturally open *versus* culturally closed forces is represented by liberal, often centrist parties on the one side, and the Radical Right on the other. This implies that traditional left- and right-wing parties are not in the best position to incarnate this new cleavage, they struggle to reinvent their strategies and adapt their preferences on new issues that are prominent on the debate, like immigration. One example that illustrates this emerging divide is the French case, in which recent electoral dealignments considerably weakened traditional left- and right-wing parties, that used to dominate the political system over decades. Although it is still too early to argue for a new electoral realignment, there are signs that the new political conflict could be structured around the opposition between Emmanuel Macron's *En Marche!* and Marine Le Pen's *Rassemblement National*. These parties and their respective leaders represent the two cultural poles of closeness and openness, nationalism and cosmopolitanism. They also start to gather considerable parts of the electorate. The French case illustrates how the traditional left- and right-wing parties struggle to provide clear-cut answers to the immigration issue. This issue has frequently divided established parties, leading them to make contradictory statements about cooperation with candidates of the Radical Right, and/or driving some party members to leave in order to integrate more radical alternatives.

With regards to the institutional dimension of analysis, I find an effect of EU membership which is contrary to what I expected. This leads to a rejection of hypothesis five. Based on the literature, it was expected that the EU would constraint governments to pass more restrictive immigration policies because of European values of diversity, human rights, inclusiveness and universalism. However, my findings suggest that the EU could be providing an arena for member-states to cooperate with the aim to strengthen the European external borders and implement more restrictive controls. This seems particularly important for member-states in the context of frequent terrorist threats. EU membership is observed to be a significant driver of more restrictive controls over the entrance of third-county citizens, which reinforces the idea that Europe evolves towards the notion of the "fortress Europe". For instance, the Schengen agreement in the 1990s' pushed member-countries to adopt standardizing measures of border control, such as the use of biometrics. In a way, it appears that the same European Union that expands the rights and freedoms of its own citizens, is willing to pay the price of raising the barriers for non-EU citizens. This raises the question of a possible trade-off between these two

developments. Is it a necessary condition to strengthen controls of the external borders, in order to guarantee the desired internal freedom for the European community? At the heart of this tension is the fact that nationalist forces and, in particular, Radical Right Parties gain increasing representation in the European Parliament and other EU institutions. Their institutional presence could counterbalance the pro-immigrant agenda within the EU, resulting in less supranational constraints over the restrictive action of national governments. In addition to those findings, I also observe that, at the domestic level, the presence of a mechanism of judicial review does not seem to prevent the adoption of more restrictive immigration policies, contrary to what part of the literature on immigration policies states (Joppke 1998).

The influence of RRPs on immigration policies is, nevertheless, limited. The Italian case, for example, illustrates that their electoral pressure is modest because of the pressure of other parties (Zaslove 2006). The influence of RRPs can be especially felt in terms of their ability to politicize the immigration issue. However, this politicization happens in specific moments of time, rather than following a linear progression. Sometimes the Radical Right can push policies towards a more restrictive direction because they can affect specific immigration measures, such as impose sanctions to illegal immigration, national quotas of foreigners to enter the country, and stricter conditions for visa applications. However, these particular measures are often counterbalanced by more liberal preferences of other relevant parties, which are often pressured by social sectors close to them. Immigration laws are usually voted in packages containing several measures, which might have been requested by different parties. Thus, this dynamic might affect how the overall level of restriction of immigration policies looks like in a given year, and could partially explain the small effect of RRPs detected in this analysis.

Finally, I believe my analysis brings additional evidence for two key points that Abou-Chadi (2016) raises. The first is that rules structure actors' goals, choices and behavior. Institutions can operate as constraints or possibilities for parties in their effort to translate preferences into policy outputs. Therefore, the institutional context should not be overlooked when accounting for policy-making processes and policy outcomes. The second point, which is connected, is that the frequent assumption that parties' ideological preferences are directly transferred into policy outputs is not always valid. This also seems to apply to the anti-immigration pressure of Radical Right Parties. Although they can be loud and strong in the elections, with their anti-immigration claims, their ability to transform their preferences into policy outcomes goes through a long process involving interactions with other actors within a complex institutional context.

CONCLUSIONS

In several advanced democracies, Radical Right Parties (RRPs) gained electoral importance and political representation over the last years. Beyond the understanding of the reasons for their rise and varying electoral performance, scholars have more recently also investigated their impact on the party system, policy-making and democracies. The literature argues that established parties are expected to react to the phenomenon of the rise of the Radical Right by different means (Bale et al. 2010; Meguid 2005). The increasing support of RRPs puts pressure on mainstream competitors, which tend to react in an attempt to limit their challenger's political influence, as well as their own electoral losses. In this sense, one way in which established parties react to the rise of the Radical Right is by co-opting its core issues in the electoral competition (Abou-Chadi and Krause 2018; van Spanje 2010).

The aim of this research was to assess the extent to which RRPs' strength can affect policy outputs. More specifically, I wanted to understand if they could influence the adoption of more restrictive levels of immigration control policies by national governments. Immigration is the most prominent issue of RRPs, and their support is largely based on anti-immigration attitudes. It is also one policy area in which mainstream parties have mostly suffered the pressure to adapt their responses, both in elections and in office. To what extent are more restrictive immigration policies adopted in reaction to the rising electoral performance of RRPs? By increasing their electoral support, can RRPs influence immigration policies towards a more restrictive direction, or only when they enter governing coalitions and can have a more direct impact? I explained that Radical Right Parties were expected to affect the restriction level of immigration control policies by two mechanisms: indirect and direct influence. Their indirect influence is described as a contagious effect on mainstream parties, which by their turn start to adopt, and finally implement a more restrictive immigration approach in office. By its turn, RRPs' direct effect is considered to happen when they participate in governments, either as a formal coalition partner, or as an external supporter of minority governments, in exchange of policies.

My study was based on a comparative-empirical analysis of the restriction level of immigration control policies in 17 Western European countries between 1980 and 2010. I found that the indirect influence of Radical Right Parties (through their electoral performance), can be observed, but it is very small and conditioned to institutional factors, particularly the type of

electoral system. This factor seems to be important to understand the limitations of the impact of RRPs via elections. Notably, in proportional systems their impact is smaller than in mixed or majority systems. This finding suggests that, while RRPs may more easily gain some space to advance their agendas in proportional systems, these systems are generally more opened to other political forces as well, which are likely to counterbalance anti-immigration pressures. In proportional systems, which tend to provide room for multiple decision-makers, coalitions are common, and there are probably forces that are less hostile to immigration also influencing policy-making in this area. Additionally, when there is more sharing and dispersion of power, as in the case of most proportional systems, RRPs' may be confronted with the need to make themselves present in different arenas of representation in order to have a durable and more efficient impact on policies. In other words, in countries that have elections for different levels of government, for example, RRPs are confronted with a challenge to expand their support and win seats not only at the national level, but also in the regional and local levels.

In systems that are more disproportional (majority and mixed), I find that the influence of RRPs via elections is more pronounced, although they remain an insufficient force to exclusively drive the government agenda on immigration. This is how I interpret this finding. Although it is harder to gain political relevance and formal representation in disproportional systems, when minor parties manage to overpass specific barriers, they are perceived as a threat to dominant parties more than in proportional systems. When RRPs are perceived as a threat in disproportional systems, political parties that are in charge of the government would be willing to quickly respond by adapting their policies towards the medium voter, since marginal vote losses could represent exclusion from power in following elections.

One possible reason why the influence of RRPs is smaller in proportional systems is that, rather than a threat, they can represent a potential of new alliance formation for mainstream right-wing parties to remain in power without relying on traditional centrist or leftist partners (Bale 2003). At this time, the participation of RRPs has been contingent to the strategic choices made by mainstream right-wing parties. This implies that the direct influence of RRPs on policies should largely depend on the opportunities provided by the mainstream right. When the mainstream right identifies a more favorable potential to remain in office by forming alliances with the Radical Right, that established force could also be opening room for RRPs to affect policy outputs towards more restrictive immigration measures. For this reasons, the question on policy proximity is a major one to which the mainstream right is confronted when considering to

partner with the Radical Right. Another issue that matters in this case of alliance formation is the internal dynamics of the coalition, including mechanisms of control, policy commitments and the balance of power among coalition partners.

This research also found that, controlling for the type of electoral system, when RRPs participate in governing coalitions or support minority governments, they can affect policy outputs in the field of immigration. This is interpreted to happen either because RRPs can exchange legislative support for policies, or they have direct access to policy-making processes when they are formal coalition partners.

In summary, this work makes important contributions to the literature on Radical Right Parties and on comparative immigration policies. First, my analysis estimated the statistical significance and the size effect of Radical Right Parties on the restriction level of immigration control policies. By doing this, I provide additional evidence for something that the literature expected in theory: that the potential of RRPs to affect the policy-making is indeed limited and constrained to structural factors. Second, through a quantitative approach that covers 17 countries over 30 years, this analysis expands the use of this methodological strategy to investigate the field of immigration policies and the effect of RRPs, which is still uncommon. Panel data analysis has advantages, like controlling for rival hypothesis and expanding the external validity of the research. Third, this research includes a factor in the model that is still underexplored in the literature on immigration policies and RRPs' policy effects, which is the electoral system. By observing that the influence of RRPs on policy outputs tends to have a different size in proportional and in disproportional systems, this study opens new research questions regarding the opportunity structures that RRPs can find under different political systems. For instance, it would be interesting to address questions like: what is the mechanism behind the policy influence of RRPs under different electoral rules? What kind of party strategies are more successful to influence policies under different institutional arrangements?

One implication of the finding that RRPs have a bigger effect on immigration policies under majority and mixed systems compared to PR is that those disproportional systems cannot be taken as able to mechanically block the growth and influence of RRPs (or any other smaller party in general). On the contrary, it suggests that, when RRPs are able to gain support in disproportional systems, the perceived threat of mainstream parties is even more consequential to policy-making than in proportional systems. Instead, in PR systems RRPs could represent an

opportunity for center-right party organizations to remain in power. In PR systems coalitions are more common and if RRPs manage to enter the governing coalition, then their direct impact on immigration policy is favored. In other words, their direct impact on policy is more likely to happen in PR systems because there is where they are more likely to enter governing coalitions.

On the side of Radical Right Parties, participation in government potentially represents a dilemma involving trade-offs among votes, policy and office. On the one hand, the Radical Right is usually very critical to the "establishment" and the performance of mainstream parties in government. The Radical Right portraits itself as the "outsider", the only alternative to promote drastic political changes. On the other hand, RRPs could directly influence the course of policies by entering the government, even if this happens through the alliance with a mainstream right-wing party. To be considered as a potential coalition partner, RRPs are confronted with the need to moderate their discourse and create an image of "governing" party. However, to which extent this could compromise their own (anti-establishment) electoral mobilization?

The findings of this research also raise new questions within the topic of the Radical Right and its impact on policy. Regarding Radical Right Parties as organizations, is their successful impact conditioned to a specific party structure? Is there a type of RRP which proves more powerful to promote policy changes than others? Moreover, future work could make relevant contributions by addressing how and the extent to which the timing of party choices and the context matter to understand RRPs' policy impact. For example, there is some research showing that RRPs have an important impact on policy preferences and party behavior at the moment of their electoral breakthrough, but this impact is not necessarily persistent over time. Furthermore, the momentum of choices taken by mainstream parties can represent a turning point for the fate of RRPs in some situations. For instance, when one mainstream party decides to desert a strategy that was built based on consensus with other parties (such as the exclusion of any cooperation with the Radical Right), this move can hardly be taken back. Instead, this could change the "coalitional" image and the bargaining power of RRPs in a durable way.

Is the impact of RRPs limited to their core issues, or do they also affect policies in other areas? Further research would benefit from studies focusing on other policy areas, beyond immigration. It is equally important to understand how RRPs are transformed by their environment and by the experience in government, notably if they moderate their policy preferences.

One of the limitations of this work is that it exclusively relies on secondary sources. Because of this, problems related to measurement validity and the operationalization of concepts are overlooked and could not be properly addressed in detail. Another limitation is that it only focuses on Western Europe, which considerably limits the cases of disproportional representation. Studying the effect of electoral systems is a challenging task, since this is usually a factor that does not display variation over time. It is hard to find observations in which all other factors, but the electoral system, are kept constant. Nevertheless, Italy could be, in this sense, an interesting case study to explore the extent to which and how the electoral system conditions the strategies of established political parties towards the Radical Right, as well as the influence of the latter on policies. This research is equally limited for its focus on the performance of RRPs only on national legislative elections. It is possible that RRPs also affect the choices of other parties and the policy-making process by getting relevant results in other elections as well, especially for President and for the European Parliament. Lastly, although a quantitative analysis has the advantage of identifying general patterns and differences, qualitative studies are more adequate to understand the underlying mechanisms and the specificities of individual cases. This field of research would benefit enormously from the combination of quantitative and quantitative methods.

Despite its limitations, the main contribution of this work is to provide evidence that Radical Right Parties have, to a certain extent, influenced policy-making in the area of immigration, via their electoral support and their participation in governing coalitions. While the literature shows that their influence on party system and issue priorities in electoral competitions is more clearly observed, my results suggest that party preferences tend to be diluted over the democratic process of policy-making. This seems to apply not only to the Radical Right, but probably to dominant parties as well. After all, established parties are apparently changing their policy positions in the context of party competitions, but are probably not fulfilling all their promises once they get office. One of the reasons for this is that political parties operate under important constraints. Finally, since the balance of forces and the configurations of political alliances in Western Europe go through major transformations in recent years, it is likely that RRPs will be a key component in this process of adjustments, as they incarnate the anti-immigration appeal and become politically stronger. While their electoral support is not necessary to change the course of immigration policies, their influence seems to be an additional and non-negligible component of incrementally restrictive changes.

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