UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE MINAS GERAIS

Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas

Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciência Política

THALES LEONARDO DE CARVALHO

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Belo Horizonte

2022

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Doctoral Dissertation submitted to the Graduate Program in Political Science at the Federal University of Minas Gerais in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor in Political Science.

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Research Area: Political Institutions and International Politics

Belo Horizonte

2022

UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE MINAS GERAIS
FACULDADE DE FILOSOFIA E CIÊNCIAS HUMANAS
PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM CIÊNCIA POLÍTICA

ATA 11ª/2022 DA DEFESA DE TESE DO ALUNO THALES LEONARDO DE CARVALHO

Realizou-se, no dia 25 de novembro de 2022, às 13:00 horas, por videoconferência, a defesa da tese, intitulada "International Security Policies in Latin America: a new framework for analysis", elaborada e apresentada por THALES LEONARDO DE CARVALHO, número de registro 2018687470, graduado no curso de RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS. A defesa é requisito parcial para a obtenção do grau de Doutor em CIÊNCIA POLÍTICA, e foi submetida e analisada pela seguinte Comissão Examinadora: Prof. Dawisson Elvécio Belém Lopes - Orientador (DCP/UFMG), Prof. David Richard Mares - Coorientador (UCSD), Profa. Mariana Alves da Cunha Kalil (ESG), Prof. Luis Leandro Schenoni (UCL), Prof. Rafael Antonio Duarte Villa (USP), Prof. Lucas Pereira Rezende (DCP/UFMG). A comissão considerou a tese APROVADA. Finalizados os trabalhos, lavrei a presente ata que, lida e aprovada, vai assinada eletronicamente pelos membros da Comissão. Belo Horizonte, 25 de novembro de 2022.

Para os meus pais,

que sempre me deram a coragem e a força

para enfrentar todos os desafios,

onde quer que estejam nesse universo.

To my parents,

who always gave me the courage and strength

to face all the challenges,

wherever they are in this universe.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

RESUMO

A América Latina não é uma região tão pacífica quanto parece. Problemas transnacionais, como o crime organizado, se juntam a questões interestatais, como disputas fronteiriças e divergências políticas, em uma região com um dos maiores números de disputas militarizadas interestatais no mundo. Nesse sentido, enquanto um volume razoável de informações sobre essas dinâmicas está disponível, tendo em vista os diversos trabalhos descritivos sobre a região, ainda não dispomos de uma teoria capaz de explicar as políticas de segurança internacional (PSI) na América Latina, mesmo considerando que tal teoria poderia nos ajudar a entender o passado e a nos prepararmos para o futuro. A produção dessa teoria é o objetivo de minha tese doutoral, ao responder: o que explica as diferentes PSI adotadas pelos países latino-americanos? Neste trabalho, eu construo tal teoria em sete passos. Primeiro, utilizo a literatura existente para propor uma definição de PSI e operacionalizo o conceito para a análise, propondo seus diferentes eixos analíticos. Segundo, desenvolvo uma tipologia para as referidas políticas na América Latina, baseada em cinco tipos de políticas: Anti-Hegemônica, Balanço de Poder, Coexistência, Cooperação em Segurança Pró-Democracia e Ameaças Transnacionais. Terceiro, apresento minha teoria para explicar essas políticas, baseada em três variáveis: a influência de grandes potências, o papel dos líderes e instituições domésticas. Quarto, mensuro os diferentes eixos que compõem a PSI por meio de técnicas estatísticas, como a Análise de Componentes Principais e a Modelagem de Tópicos Estruturais. Quinto, me utilizo de testes estatísticos, por meio da análise de dados em painel, para investigar o papel da minha teoria em explicar cada eixo da PSI em separado. Sexto, por meio da análise de clusters, classifico as PSI latino-americanas considerando a tipologia proposta e testo como minha teoria se ajusta à explicação e à predição desses tipos. Sétimo, combino três estudos de caso com o método de controle sintético para corroborar a causalidade proposta e ilustrar os mecanismos causais. Por fim, apresento a conclusão.

Palavras-chave: Segurança Internacional; América Latina; Política Externa; Política de Defesa Nacional; Pesquisa Multimétodos.

ABSTRACT

The Latin American security environment is not as peaceful as frequently seen. Transnational problems, such as organized crime, join interstate issues such as border disputes and political disagreements in a region with one of the highest numbers of militarized interstate disputes in the world. Scholars often have good information about these dynamics because of several descriptive works about them. However, we still have no theory to explain international security policies (ISP) in the region, although such a theory could help us in more than understanding the past and preparing for the future. Producing such a theory is thus the objective of this dissertation by answering: what explains the varying ISP adopted by Latin American states? I build such a theory in seven steps. First, I rely on the existing literature to propose a definition for ISP, as well as to operationalize the concept for the analysis, showing different axes through which it can be assessed. Second, I provide a typology for ISP in Latin America based on five policy types: Anti-Hegemonic, Balance of Power, Coexistence, Pro-Democracy Security Cooperation, and Transnational Threats. Third, I introduce my theory to explain these policies based on three variables: great power influence, the role of leaders, and domestic institutions. Fourth, I measure different ISP axes by using statistical techniques, such as a Principal Component Analysis and a Structural Topic Model. Fifth, I conduct statistical tests using panel data analysis to investigate the role of my theory in explaining each of the ISP axes. Sixth, I use cluster analysis to classify Latin American ISP, considering the proposed typology and test how my theory fits in explaining and predicting ISP types. Seventh, I combine a within-case analysis with the synthetic control method to conduct three case studies in order to corroborate my causal claims and show causal mechanisms. Finally, I introduce some concluding remarks.

Keywords: International Security; Latin America; Foreign Policy; National Defense Policy; Multimethod Research.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABACC - Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Account and Control of Nuclear Materials

ALBA - Bolivarian Alternative for Our Americas

AUC - *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia*

BLR - *Batallónes de Lucha Irregular*

CDMA – Conferences of Defense Ministers of the Americas

CINC – Composite Index of National Capability

DCA - Defense Cooperation Agreement

EEBI - *Escuela de Entreinamiento Básico de Infantería*

EGP - *Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres*

ELN - *Ejército de Liberación Nacional*

EPL - *Ejército Popular de Liberación*

EPS - *Ejército Popular Sandinista*

FARC - *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionárias de Colombia*

FELCN - *Fuerza Especial de Lucha contra el Nacrotráfico*

FP – Foreign Policy

FMLN - *Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional*

FSLN - *Frente Sandinista de Libertación Nacional*

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

HIV – Human Immunodeficiency Virus

IADB - Inter-American Defense Board

ICJ - International Court of Justice

ICOW - Issues Correlates of War

IMF - International Monetary Fund

ISP – International Security Policy

ISPT - International Security Policy Theory

ISS – International Security Studies

JGRN - *Junta de Gobierno de Recconstrución Nacional*

LDA - Latent Dirichlet Allocation

M-19 - 19th Movement

Mercosur - Southern Common Market

MID - Militarized Interstate Disputes

MLE - Maximum Likelihood Estimations

MPS - *Milicias Populares Sandinistas*

MRTA - *Movimiento Revolucionário Tupac Amaru*

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCR - Neoclassical Realism

NPT - Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NSD - National Security Doctrine

OAS - Organization of American States

PCA - Principal Component Analysis

PCC - *Primeiro Comando da Capital*

PKO – United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

PRN - *Proceso de Reorganización Nacional*

ROC - Receiver Operating Characteristic

SADC - South American Defense Council

SMP - *Servicio Militar Patriótico*

STM - Structural Topic Modeling

UCDP/PRIO - Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo

UCR - *Unión Cívica Radical*

UDEL - *Unión Democrática de Liberación*

UK - United Kingdom

UMOPAR - *Unidad Móvil de Patrullaje Rural*

UN - United Nations

UNASUR - Union of South American Nations

UNGA - United Nations General Assembly

UNRG - *Unidad Nacional Revolucionaria Guatemalteca*

US/USA – United States

USAID - United States Agency for International Development

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

SCM - Synthetic Control Method

WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

ZOPACAS - Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic

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1 INTRODUCTION

Since Latin American states became independent from colonial rule, they had to respond to several international security challenges - as did almost all the countries in the world. While the poorly defined borders after decolonization seem to be one of the main reasons for these security concerns (Buzan and Wæver 2003; Hensel and Mitchell 2007; Mares 2015; 2001; Kacowicz 1998), since then, other issues have also emerged in the regional security agenda. Transnational crimes, such as arms smuggling, money laundering, and drug trafficking, are frequently seen as the primary regional security problems. Natural disasters affect several places, impacting lots of people and raising governmental concerns about them. Energetic, environmental, and indigenous matters became increasingly important issues on the agenda. Other issues, such as disputes between local *caudillos*[1] and social problems, can lead to political instability and crises that tend to assume regional proportions, such as the recent case of Venezuela (Mares 2015; Fuccille and Rezende 2013; Abdul-Hak 2013; Buzan and Wæver 2003; Weiffen and Villa 2017; Hirst et al. 2020; Rojas Aravena 2003; Braga and Villa 2022).

To a greater or lesser extent, Latin American states also need to respond to some global issues, such as the Cold War, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and nuclear matters. At the same time, the existing domestic conflicts around the globe, and multilateral efforts such as the United Nations (UN) peace operations to deal with these disputes, have also been of Latin American states' concerns (Ullman 1983; Ayoob 1983; Huntington 1993; Villa and Jenne 2020; Kenkel 2013; Rojas Aravena 2014).

These countries have been addressing different measures to these challenges in the last decades - from now, we will call these measures "International Security Policies" (ISP), which will be better defined in the next chapter. For example, in the late 1970s and 1980s, there was a higher emphasis on the use of hard power, primarily through military instruments, compared with the post-World War II period (see Figure 1). The greater involvement of these nations in

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[1] I understand *caudillos* as "a political boss or overlord, the leader or chief of a politically distinctive territory." They emerged within the "power vacuum left by the fall of the Spanish empire in the Americas" and became "the guarantors of basic social peace and political stability in the regions they controlled militarily" (Oxford Reference n.d.).

Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs)[2] at the time suggests that their behavior was more aggressive from 1976 to 1988 than at any other time in the second half of the 20th century.

Figure 1 - MIDs involving Latin American states since the end of World War II

Source: own elaboration, based on Maoz et al. (2019) and Mares (2001; 2012a; 2012b)

In the 1990s and 2000s, MIDs gradually gave place to cooperation involving Latin American countries. As we can see in Figure 2, for example, there was an increasing number of Defense Cooperation Agreements[3] (DCAs) involving at least one Latin American state, either with intra or extra-regional partners.

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[2] Militarized Interstate Disputes consist of "united historical cases in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state" (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996, pp. 168).

[3] According to Kinne (2020, pp. 2), "DCAs establish broad legal umbrellas for the range of cooperative defense activities in which states might engage, from coordinating defense policies to conducting joint exercises to jointly producing weapons and technology."

Figure 2 - Defense Cooperation Agreements involving Latin American states

Source: own elaboration, based on Kinne (2020)

Together with changes in either resource mobilization (including the choice to militarize disputes) or cooperation patterns, scholars note shifts in the conceptualization of ISPs implemented in the region. There is some kind of consensus in the sense that the comprehension of these policies has become wider over the last decades. During the late 1980s and 1990s, for example, democracy became a crucial element in Latin American security views. In the 2000s, according to the existing literature, social welfare and development were also included, as well as other elements such as gender and environment (Buzan and Wæver 2003; Abdul-Hak 2013; Kacowicz 1998; Mares 2015; Fuccille and Rezende 2013; Vaz, Fuccille, and Rezende 2017; Hurrell 1998; Tickner and Herz 2012; Weiffen and Villa 2017; Mathias, Zague, and Santos 2019).

Considering the multidimensional nature of states' policies towards international security, which can be assessed through different indicators such as involvement in MIDs, civil wars, and emphasis on democracy, for example, the literature proposes some ideal types aiming to capture such a multidimensional conception. Two mentionable examples are the Democratic Security and the National Security Doctrine (NSD). At this point, ambiguities start emerging in the literature on Latin American security. It is hard, for example, to define

what was the Democratic Security concept beyond its emphasis on democracy, as states which presented such an emphasis also showed differing standards in other indicators, such as MIDs and cooperation (Tickner and Herz 2012; Tickner 2016; Domínguez 1998; Mares 2001; Levitt 2006; Hurrell 1998). It is also hard to classify the NSD as an ideal type since it is hard to say what it was beyond the counter-insurgent objectives and practices - i.e., there is no clear pattern of states' behavior towards other states or about the concepts involved in these policies (Pion-Berlin 1989; 1988; McSherry 2005; Loveman 1999). This ambiguity goes beyond this descriptive classification, extending to existing explanations for international security policies in the region. First, we need to take a look at which explanations are currently used to explain these policies.

Of course, the aforementioned challenges (e.g., border disputes and transnational crimes) have to do with these outputs, as well as different global contexts, such as the Cold War and the War on Terror. This is relatively consensual, presenting no ambiguities. However, in order to understand how states translated them into policies, we need to access a crucial realm: politics. Having a territorial dispute will not necessarily lead to a MID all the time - actually, as Pion-Berlin (2016) notes, these countries will remain at peace most of the time. Sometimes they will choose not to militarize a dispute at any time. On the other hand, states may not always address transnational crimes in the same way. Even when we look at global issues, in Carvalho (2019), I discuss how these countries have been approaching the United Nations (UN) Peace Operations differently. At the end of the day, different political attributes can lead to different outputs. This is the point at which new ambiguities emerge.

Politics can take place at different levels - and the literature sees the impacts of all of them on Latin American ISPs. Starting from the interregional/global level, several authors look at the role of the United States, the most influential external power in the region, in shaping these policies. While authors such as Butt (2013) say that higher US action towards the region tends to lead to less interstate militarization in Latin America, Mares (2001) provides evidence that the hegemonic management of conflicts seems not to apply to the region since the US was not able to reduce the number of MIDs, including Latin American states. Actually, the latter author provides evidence that in some periods in which Washington exercised more influence over the regional security environment, Latin American countries were more prone to deploy interstate violence. This, however, is just one indicator of ISP.

When we look at the Cold War, for example, the argument that higher US action leads to increased aggressivity in the region is illustrated by authors such as Smith (2000), Westad (2007), and Halliday (1986) regarding other indicators than MIDs, such as arms transfers. On the other side, looking at the post-Cold War decades, authors such as Fuccille and Rezende (2013), Abdul-Hak (2013), Hurrell (1998), Riggirozzi and Tussie (2012), and Sanahuja (2012) note that the reduced US action over the region favored regional and sub-regional cooperation in defense and security issues. Other authors discuss that even under reduced US influence, Argentina and Chile, for example, were able to implement a more belligerent policy during the late 1970s and early 1980s, while Bolivia did not become very aggressive under increasing influence from Washington during the 1980s (Schenoni, Braniff, and Battaglino 2020; Paul 1994; Villar 2016; Morales 1992; Lehman 1999).

It is also essential to note that global security debates also tend to influence, to some extent, regional conceptions about security. For example, the inclusion of issues such as organized crime, democracy, social welfare, gender, and environmental matters in security conceptions, which took place in Latin America in the 1990s and 2000s, respectively (Mathias, Zague, and Santos 2019; Carvalho 2019; 2018; Bonilla and Cepik 2004; Rojas Aravena 2003) is somehow correlated with the broadening security debates at the global level. Authors such as Ullman (1983), Kolodziej (1992), Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde (1998), Kenkel (2013), and Buzan and Hansen (2013) note that, after the end of the Cold War, these matters became increasingly discussed within the international arena. At the same time, authors such as Tickner and Herz (2012) and Tickner (2016) note that (re)democratization in the region in the 1980s introduced democracy to the regional security thinking, while left-wing governments which took office during the 2000s tended to account for the widening concepts. Other authors, such as Pion-Berlin (1989), Bagley (1986), and Farer (1985), note that inequalities and democracy were included in these policies by some non-democratic governments.

At the same time, on the one hand, Mares (2001) and Hurrell (1998) note that democracy has not been effective in preventing Latin American states from engaging in MIDs. On the other hand, looking at military spending, Lebovic (2001) and Brown and Hunter (1999) show that democratic rule led to a decreasing budget for military issues. It means that maybe saying if a government adopted a more or less offensive policy depends on the indicator we are observing.

Alongside political regimes, leaders may also play a role in defining ISPs, especially in a region where, under presidential regimes, they can influence these policies through different mechanisms (Danese 2017; Carey and Shugart 1998; Merke, Reynoso, and Schenoni 2020; Malamud 2015). There is evidence, as I mentioned, that left-wing presidents tended to present wider policies (see Mathias, Zague, and Santos 2019; Carvalho 2018; 2019; Carvalho and Souza 2019; Tickner and Herz 2012). On the other side, authors such as Pion-Berlin (1989) and Couto e Silva (1967) perceive wider policies under right-wing military rule in the region, by including the role of inequalities, for example.

At the same time, Abdul-Hak (2013), Vaz, Fuccille, and Rezende (2017), and Fuccille and Rezende (2013) note that, under the leftist rule, cooperative trends also appeared in the region, together with reduced militarization. These authors, however, focus on the 2000s and 2010s in a way that there is little evidence to infer if this also applies to the Cold War, for example. Other authors, such as Oelsner (2009), note that cooperation started flourishing not under the left-wing rule but after democratization, introducing another ambiguity in this understanding. Westad (2007), Wright (2001), and LeoGrande (1986) also show that left-wing leaders are not necessarily more peaceful and cooperative.

Previous studies point to interesting explanations for the changing ISPs implemented by Latin American countries. However, there are some concurring or, at least, ambiguous explanations and some points that need further exploration, as I discussed in the last paragraphs. Such an exploration is even more necessary, as few publications attempt to test causal connections between variables. Actually, as put by Mares (2015, pp. 430), "[t]he study of intra-Latin American security relations has largely been ignored and, when studied, generally lacks theoretical rigor." Tickner and Herz (2012) and Jenne (2018) agree with Mares (2015) at this point. According to the authors, Latin American security studies adopt a purely descriptive nature and often lack theoretical frameworks. They neither use Western approaches nor develop a theory to explain regional dynamics. Tickner and Herz (2012) and Jenne (2018) also point to three more features in Latin American security literature: parochialism, state-centrism, and the role of expert communities.

Parochialism means that the literature often addresses only one country's problems or outcomes, recurring to qualitative descriptions to present local matters. Comparative analyses of Latin American countries are rare, and the inclusion of other regions in investigations is almost nonexistent. It lacks research that covers a broader regional sample, analyzes a more

significant number of cases, and produces inferences with greater external validity[4]. Also, it lacks interaction with other subject areas. For example, those who study drug trafficking as a regional security problem rarely have some kind of dialogue with social scientists who study crime (Tickner and Herz 2012; Jenne 2018). Large-n designs could, for example, resolve part of the aforementioned ambiguities by providing some systematic comparison between Latin American states in an attempt to comprehend patterns behind international security policies in the region.

Latin American security studies are also state-centric. These investigations emerged to provide analyses and proposals for policy-makers. When the first investigations were published (mid-20th century), authoritarian governments wanted to protect the state (not the people), and it helps us understand this state-centrism, which remains until the current days. At that time, few scholars elaborated on research in this area, which was dominated by diplomats and militaries. It was only after the re-democratization of most countries in the region (in the 1980s) that civilians actively participated in Latin American security studies. The role of these expert communities is still increasing in the search for more civilian knowledge and advice about an area that remains mostly dominated by militaries and diplomats. Therefore, there is still much to advance in knowledge production about ISP in the region, as well as to incorporate other referent objects than the state in these analyses (Tickner and Herz 2012; Jenne 2018; Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2007; Mares 2015; Belém Lopes, Nicolini, and Carvalho 2022).

In this Ph.D. dissertation, I intend to advance the understanding of the Latin American security environment and the ISP implemented by the countries in the region. I also intend to address most of the ambiguities I mentioned before. I look at all the Latin American States from 1975 to 2010 to answer the following question: what explains the varying international security policies adopted by these countries during this period? We already know that there were differences both through a longitudinal perspective (Tickner and Herz 2012) and by comparing contemporary cases (Carvalho 2018; 2019). But which factors explain it?

I answer that by proposing a theory to understand Latin American ISP, which I call "International Security Policy Theory" (ISPT). According to my argument, the interaction among international factors, especially the differing US action over the region during the last

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[4] We can understand external validity as "[t]he degree to which descriptive or causal inferences for a given set of cases can be generalized to other cases. It is also called generalizability" (Seawright and Collier 2010, pp. 330).

decades, and domestic factors, specifically the leaders and domestic institutions, can account for the implementation of different ISP over time and between cases.

While analyzing all Latin American countries is essential for comparing differences among states, the time frame adopted here is also crucial because it allows us to explore three different moments in the region: (1) the Cold War and the end of the authoritarian governments; (2) the return of democracy and the rapprochement with the neoliberal thinking; and (3) the post-9/11, the "Left Turn" and the so-called "post-liberal" regionalism. In this context, we could also see three different sets of security practices in the region, as put by the existing literature: (1) national security doctrine, including the "war on communism"; (2) democratic security, when democracy became at the center of Latin American view about security; and (3) the phase when domestic security, transnational threats, and multidimensional visions were included in ISP (Tickner and Herz 2012; Carvalho and Souza 2019; Fuccille and Rezende 2013; Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Mainwaring 2018; Serbin 2003). Having enough variation in both contexts and policies, as well as a large-n, I will be able to increase the validity of my inferences in an attempt to address a gap pointed out by Tickner and Herz (2012). I also propose and justify a re-examination of this classification by proposing a new typology to classify ISP in Latin America and conducting an analysis using both the classification and separate analytical dimensions that compose such dimensions.

Answering the aforementioned question also leads us to secondary questions, such as: how to analyze international security policies to a broader extent? Which ISP types took place in Latin America? How to assess these policies? Is it possible to predict ISP in the region? I intend to also answer these questions, as well as address other gaps in this work, in a way that each of its nine chapters (including this introduction and the concluding remarks) has its own objective towards bringing contributions to the existing literature on both Latin America and International security.

In the next (second) chapter, I review the literature on international security studies. From this literature, I draw a definition of "international security policies." While providing a clear concept about my research object, I intend to offer an alternative to see it as a public policy. I also propose an approach to deal with the excessive state-centrism in Latin American studies, seeing the state as a necessary but not sufficient referent object in ISP. I see the state as a means for governments to implement their policies instead of a black box that merely reacts to international inputs.

After providing such a conceptual debate on these policies, in the same chapter, I present its main tools (foreign and defense policy) and operationalize my concept, providing a framework to compare these policies among different cases and analyze them to a broader extent. I discuss that it can be divided into different axes, and for the analytical proposes of this dissertation, I introduce three axes, their concepts, and indicators: postures, conceptualization, and cooperation.

The main objective of the first chapter is to provide the conceptual and analytical basis for the dependent variable of my dissertation. At the same time, the conceptual bases I propose in this chapter are aimed to be a contribution to the current literature by operationalizing a definition of international security policies - which are the key object in my theory - discussing three of its axes and indicators to assess it in an objective and comparative way. Such a framework can also be used to understand these policies in other regions and be applied in cross-national or even cross-regional analyses.

At the same time, more than showing how ISP axes can be analyzed, such a discussion also paves the road to producing a new typology for these policies based on the combination of these axes in an attempt to address descriptive ambiguities on these policies. Then, in the third chapter, I combine this conceptual framework with the existing literature about international security in Latin America to contextualize my argument and provide a typological classification for my dependent variable. Based on this literature, together with some descriptive statistics and network analysis, I propose a new typology for ISP in Latin America based on five types: (1) Pro-Democracy Security Cooperation, (2) Coexistence, (3) Balance of Power, (4) Transnational Threats, and (5) Rebel Policy. I also discuss how my typology fits the existing types (i.e., National Security Doctrine and the Democratic Security), showing how it can better describe states' behavior along the three proposed axes: postures, conceptualization, and cooperation. This typology is in itself an important contribution to Latin American studies by allowing us to understand and classify past policies.

Such a typology also allows us to capture the multidimensionality behind the ISP concept. It means moving beyond analyses about isolated outputs (e.g., military expenditure and involvement in MIDs) and providing a better picture of (1) which dimensions tend to take place at the same time (i.e., was there a Democratic Security policy based on states' reducing militarization of interstates disputes and increasing emphasis on democracy on these

policies?), and, on a later stage, (2) why these ISP types take place. This is also a contribution to improving our capacity to analyze increasingly multidimensional policies.

In the fourth chapter, I introduce my theory to explain these policies. Although having some of its variables inspired by the Neoclassical Realism - NCR (Rose 1998; Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016) - I adopt an analytically eclectic perspective (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993; Lake 2011) since the causal mechanisms I propose rely mostly on foreign policy actors and domestic institutions. This choice is also justified by the fact that, as I discuss in the fourth chapter, no existing theoretical approach can account for international security policies in Latin America. However, a combination of elements from different approaches can produce a good explanation for these policies.

My theory acknowledges that, as we are talking about a peripheral region, Latin American security policies are heavily influenced by great power politics, while the reverse is not true (Escudé 1992; 2016). However, it is not anarchy that determines the options for these countries, but the actions implemented by the United States, as a hegemonic actor in the region, to influence these states. At the same time, American pressures (or the lack of them) do not necessarily convert into ISP automatically. They need to be translated into outputs by these states' domestic institutions (and institutional actors). Also, as with any third-world state, regional and domestic politics and variables play a crucial role in defining ISP (Ayoob 1983; 1991; Mares 2001). Considering this puzzle, I will propose, in the fourth chapter, which variables and causal mechanisms can lead to ISP changes (or continuities). More than looking at the US influence, I consider two domestic variables to understand these policies: leaders and domestic institutions. To my knowledge, this is the first theory to understand these policies in a broader sense in the region, allowing us to have some capacity to predict whether a state tends to become more or less aggressive and cooperative and when they tend to emphasize more topics on their ISP. It is also intended to consist of a contribution to understanding international security in other third-world regions based on their relations with great powers and domestic politics.

Then, in the fifth chapter, I provide the first quantitative treatment of data by measuring ISP postures, conceptualization, and cooperation - is to say, I measure the dependent variable of this dissertation at the disaggregated level. These measures are obtained using techniques such as Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and quantitative text analysis. While building my theory, I also intend to contribute to the literature in these chapters by

presenting measures to assess these policies over time, which can be used in future initiatives and applied to other parts of the world. These axes will be later aggregated into the typologies proposed in chapter three.

In the sixth chapter, I conduct statistical analyses to investigate how my theory fits at the disaggregated level - i.e., over each ISP axis separately. I deploy panel data regressions using maximum likelihood estimations to understand the relations between my theory and each ISP axis. Then, in the seventh chapter, I aggregate these axes by classifying states' ISP based on the typology proposed in chapter three, using a K-Means Cluster Analysis, and investigate how my theory fits each ISP type using a multinomial logistic regression, aiming to analyze how patterns observed in the disaggregated analysis maintain in the aggregate level. In the same chapter, after testing whether my theory is statistically associated with Latin American ISP, I also investigate its capacity to predict these policies using a random forest approach. More than explaining real-world outcomes, a good theory must be able also to predict them. Then, I provide statistical evidence that my theory can do both.

In the fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters, I intend to fill the parochialism gap as much as possible. While not comparing Latin America with other regions, I intend to provide an understanding of ISP patterns for the entire region. Finally, in the eighth chapter, I rely on case studies using one case to illustrate the role of each of the three variables that are part of my theory - US influence, leaders, and domestic institutions. I combine the use of the synthetic control method (SCM) with within-case analyses on the critical junctures of changes in both independent and dependent variables to confirm the causal relations established by the regressions and supported by theory, as well as to show how mechanisms worked. Such a move is necessary as my statistical analyses, although corroborating associations between my theories' variables and ISP outcomes, cannot be claimed as causal analyses, as they do not find assumptions from quasi-experimental designs. Then, I move from dataset to causal-process observations to corroborate causal relations and illustrate mechanisms. After that, I finish this dissertation with some concluding remarks.

2 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

States have implemented international security policies since they were created and could deploy public policies. However, these policies remained primarily relegated to state rulers, militaries, and diplomats until the mid-20th century. It was only within the context of World War II that civilians became increasingly involved in ISP planning, which also included researchers - and maybe even later in the specific case of Latin America. After that war, these policies became discussed by an increasing body of people, and International Security Studies (ISS) emerged as a field of study (Waltz 1996).

Since the 1940s, ISS has developed several approaches to analyzing the challenges of each different time through increasingly diverse lenses. And so did states with ISP. Initially, international security issues were highly related to Cold War matters. Most security debates ranged from reflections about the United States (US) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to how to deal with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or how to act in a nuclear war. Conventional warfare and offensive/defensive postures from states were also important in order to preserve state survival. Thus, the primary ISS purpose was to understand and avoid interstate military conflicts worldwide (Walt 1991; Buzan and Hansen 2013).

Notwithstanding, the prominence of this traditional view was reduced at the end of the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of bipolarity, there was no imminent need to avoid an interstate nuclear war. At the same time, there were also new policy options - or, at least, there was increased attention to the other options. Within that context, non-military issues became increasingly notorious, such as the role of epidemics, crimes, social, ethnic, cultural, and environmental issues. State security gave place to other concepts, such as human security. Therefore, new approaches emerged within the ISS. From the 1950s until the current days, we can see more than ten perspectives on dealing with international security issues, as shown in Figure 3. Buzan and Hansen (2013) summarize their distinctions in five questions:

> "Whose security should be protected and studied? Should the military be considered the primary sector of security? Should security be concerned exclusively with external threats or also with domestic ones? And, is the only form of security politics one of threats, dangers, and emergency? […] What epistemologies and methodologies should be brought to the study of security?"

Figure 3 - ISS perspectives concerning the five questions

ISS perspective	Referent object	Internal/external	Sectors	Views of security politics	Epistemology
Strategic Studies	The state	Primarily external	Military (use of force)	Realist	Positivist (from quite empirical to formal modelling)
Neo(realism)	The state	Primarily external	Military–political	Realist	Rationalist
Poststructuralist Security Studies	Collective–individual	Both (constitution of boundaries)	All	Change of Realism possible, but not utopian/Idealist	Deconstructivist and discursive
Post-colonial Security Studies	States and collectivities	Both	All	Change of Western dominance possible, but difficult to accomplish	Critical Theory, deconstructivist, historical sociology
Peace Research	State, societies, individuals	Both	All (negative: predominantly military)	Transformation possible	Positivist (from quantitative to Marxist materialists)
Human Security	The individual	Primarily internal	All	Transformative	Mostly highly empirical or soft-constructivist
Feminist Security Studies	Individual, women	Both	All	Mostly transformative	From quantitative to Poststructuralist
Critical Security Studies	Individual	Both	All	Transformative (emancipation)	Critical Theory (hermeneutics)
The Copenhagen School	Collectivities and the environment	Both	All	Neutral	Speech act analysis
Conventional Constructivism	The state	External	Military	Transformation possible	Soft-positivist
Critical Constructivism	Collectivities	Mostly external	Military	Transformation possible	Narrative and sociological

Source: Buzan and Hansen (2013, pp. 38)

Considering these varying views, what could we call "international security policy"? What a tricky question! Not just because there is no definition in the literature but also because of the numerous approaches to define what can be included in the category "international security," as we saw in Figure 3. In this chapter, I will answer this question by reviewing the literature related to ISS.

Our definition must capture these various choices, being broad enough to include a range of issues that vary over time and across actors while also being restrictive enough to establish a border about what can be included under its umbrella. This is the chapter's greatest challenge. Also, being it my research object – and the dependent variable of this dissertation – it is not sufficient to discuss what it is. To make this definition useful for further analysis, it is also imperative to answer: how are they formulated and implemented in practical terms? How can we empirically assess them?

Therefore, I begin this chapter by drawing a definition for "International Security Policies" based on the ISS literature. I promote a discussion around the first three Buzan and Hansen's (2013) already mentioned questions in order to build a comprehensive while restricted concept. Having a definition, I discuss its two main instruments - foreign and

defense policies (Nye and Lynn-Jones 1988; Kolodziej 1992; Foucault 2009; Morgenthau 1978), providing a way to observe this definition in practical terms: assessing ISP means looking at what states do in terms of foreign and defense policies. Then, I introduce the postures states can assume related to their peers towards these policies, which means states' mobilization of resources towards accomplishing international security objectives. After that, I introduce how cooperation should also be understood as part of these policies. Finally, I propose a model to observe and compare these policies based on three axes: ISP conceptualization, posture, and cooperation. I conclude by presenting a framework to analyze International Security Policies as a dependent variable.

2.1 Who should be protected? The referent object of international security policies

Security is necessarily about protecting someone or something from some threat (Nye and Lynn-Jones 1988). Hence, I begin my definition by discussing who is the referent object of these policies – is to say, who or what should be secured (Buzan 1983). During the Cold War, the state was considered the only important actor by most ISS scholars and by most ISP practitioners. States were thought to represent their people, and thus protecting states was equivalent to protecting people – and fighting states also meant fighting their people, institutions, and territory (Wolfers 1952; Wohlstetter 1959; Walt 1991; Buzan and Hansen 2013; Rothschild 1995). In Latin America, at some point, there was even the notion that state security was so important that it could come at the expense of people's security (Couto e Silva 1967; Pion-Berlin 1989; Feierstein 2010)

This became a key characteristic of realist approaches. For example, during the Cold War, Kenneth Waltz's (1979) Structural Realism was about the international outcomes from states' interactions within an anarchic international structure, including explaining the eventual stability within bipolar systems. In this context, the state was a unitary actor, the only one to be protected, which acted based on systemic inputs. This notion considered neither internal actors nor domestic and transnational threats, just external issues embedded in the systemic structure.

After the end of the Cold War, while state-centric approaches remained important, broader approaches emerged. Feminists, such as Tickner (2004) and Enloe (1990), exhorted women's role in security issues. For the Copenhagen School, collectivities should be

emphasized, such as groups of individuals or states (Waever 1995; Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998). According to other approaches, such as Human Security and Critical Security Studies, individuals should be considered the ones to be protected (Booth 1991; United Nations Development Program 1994; Bonilla and Cepik 2004). Booth (1991, pp. 319), for example, stated that "we should treat people as ends and not means" of security policies. All of these extended conceptions agree that state sovereignty should, at maximum, be considered a tool to reach peace or at least to keep away from its people and society as many threats as it can. But state security should not be considered the end of an ISP.

These varying approaches to ISP referent objects reached states' and governments' agendas. When we look at United Nations Peace Operations, for example, there was an increasing trend to include the protection of people, especially women and children, within conflicts (Kenkel 2013). In Carvalho (2019), I perceived this increasing trend while also finding that the Latin American left-wing governments consider gender issues within these operations more than the right-wing ones. Both emphasized the role of the states and state-building processes, but the leftist presented a wider security conception. It is to say that they agree more with Booth (1991) and the United Nations Development Program (1994), with an increasing focus on individuals, and notably with Tickner (2004), that women should have a more significant role as the referent object in ISP. Then, our notion about the possible referent object within ISP adopted here might be broad enough to embody these different visions, capturing how distinct actors (states or governments) deal with this issue.

That notion also might not be binary. It is not a matter of whether governments see or not an element as a referent object of these policies, but a question of how much it considers. Just to illustrate it, according to Carvalho (2019), after 2005, left-wing governments mentioned the role of gender issues in Peace Operations at a rate of 0.439 times per speech, while the right-wing ones mentioned 0.212 times per discourse. It means that Latin American countries' ISP carried by leftist presidents tended to understand women as a referent object more than right-wing, but both consider this referent object. Discovering what exactly explains this difference is one of the objectives of this thesis. For now, we just need to keep in mind that states and governments can diverge on what and how much they consider a referent object for ISP.

Notwithstanding, a minimal state-centric conception is necessary since public policies are outputs of state action (Dye 2017; Rua 2014). It is to say, the state is the one that

formulates and implements ISP. And it is unlikely that a state (and its governments and representatives) will not care about its survival (Morgenthau 1952). To some extent, it means that referent objects from widening approaches can be seen in the ISP of a given government. However, states are necessarily part of these policies, one to be protected by these initiatives. Therefore, for this first part of our conception of *International Security Policies,* we can say that they *are public policies – and thus implemented by states and governments – to protect states and the interests of their governments.*

2.2 Is security only a military issue?

If someone or something needs to be protected, what could be the source of these threats? Until the end of the Cold War, a more traditional view approached military issues as the main sources of threats to state survival. International security was about the most beneficial actions toward the US, the USSR, and a country's partners, in order to produce a more permissive environment for state survival (Walt 1991; Rothschild 1995). It also meant defining strategies toward nuclear weapons, how to deploy conventional forces and the eventual role of arms control (Bull 1976; Weltman 1981; Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982). Those efforts aimed to propose guidelines for using military force and diplomatic means to avoid interstate armed conflicts.

Since the final years of the Cold War, while the traditional approach remained the most prominent, there have been increasing dissents from this view. Ayoob (1983) perceived that, at that time, non-military issues affected international security, mostly in the Third World (while also being accepted by other states), due to poorly solved matters from colonial times. The author pointed out that the Indo-Pakistani War (1971) could not have occurred if it was not for the separatism of people from the Pakistani region of East Bengali – now Bangladesh. According to the scholar, there were [are] several differences regarding political and social issues and opinions among domestic groups in Third World countries – which, in cases such as Somalia, Egypt, Vietnam, and Central America, would be exacerbated by the support of either the United States or the Soviet Union (Ayoob 1991). Therefore, in some cases, divergences rooted in non-military reasons could shape organized (and armed) groups that fight for their ideas and interests (Ayoob 1983).

Huntington (1993) and Posen (1993) adopted a similar approach that pointed out the potential of ethnic and cultural differences and disputes to cause armed conflicts – the "clash of civilizations." Ayoob (1991) adds to this point the fact that especially the former colonies and Soviet Republics were passing through state-building processes that Western Europe and the US dealt with centuries ago. As it happened in the developed world, these processes involved conflicts, solving ethnic and cultural problems, and even dismembering territories until meeting a reasonable and more peaceful organization – as we saw in the case of the former Yugoslavia. The international community reacted to these clashes, deploying an increasing number of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4 - Number of United Nations peacekeeping operations around the world, 1948-2014

Source: Our World in Data, based on data from the United Nations[5]

Non-military threats to security are not restricted to ethnic and cultural divergences. Deudney (1990), for example, points to the role of environmental issues, such as droughts, in causing transborder insecurity. A report from the United Nations Development Program (1994) extended this notion, including social problems, such as hunger; health problems, such as diseases and epidemics, e.g., the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV); transnational crimes, e.g., drug trafficking; and reinforcing the role of environmental issues, such as climate

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[5] Available in: https://ourworldindata.org/peacekeeping. Access in August 2022.

change. Drug trafficking was highly problematized by the United States, which declared the "War on Drugs" (Sikkink 2018; White 2019).

Since all of these topics may harm people's well-being and even put their lives in danger, they could all be considered by governments as international security issues – or threats to human security. In the end, according to Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde (1998) and Wæver (1995), anything could be an (inter)national security matter once securitized by a state or a group of them. This widening view could be seen on the international agenda, and security acquired an increasingly multidimensional aspect (Kenkel 2013; United Nations 2000; 2008; Kolodziej 1992; Ullman 1983; Huntington 1993; Baldwin 1995; Rothschild 1995).

Considering this debate, I depart from a realist view that international security is necessarily related to "the threat, use, and control of military force" (Walt, 1991, pp. 212). It is about dissuading threats and preparing for, avoiding, or solving armed disputes – and so is ISP. A necessary component of a public policy that aims to protect state survival is to rely on or, at least, prepare to recur to the military force to some degree if we consider that the military is responsible for states' armed forces. However, I also agree that if a policy is everything a state chooses to do (or not), governments can go beyond the traditional perspective, including widening issues to ISP – and this is also extremely relevant. The military component must always be kept. But other elements can be added to these policies, depending on the situation, actor, and moment.

Also, ISP components can vary not just according to the international agenda but also depending on the governments in charge and the international context. Authors such as Sikkink (2018), White (2019), Bagley (1989), and Carpenter (2003) note, for example, that crimes became increasingly incorporated into the Latin American security agenda due to the US diffusion of the "War on Drugs." At the same time, Mathias, Zague, and Santos (2019) and Saint-Pierre (2011) perceived differences in the topics handled in the Conferences of Defense Ministers of the Americas (CDMA) from 1995 to 2014. Military issues were always part of the agenda. However, in 1995, for example, after the re-democratization and when (center)right-wing presidents were in office in most Latin American countries, democracy was also considered a way to keep mutual security in the region - at least from a rhetorical point of view. In 2002, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, terrorism was included in the regional security agenda. In 2006, in a context in which most Latin American presidents were

left-wing, social issues were also embodied in ISP discussed in CDMA, as well as natural disasters.

In the aforementioned Carvalho (2019), I corroborate Mathias, Zague, and Santos' (2019) claim about the widening left-wing agenda towards security. I show how differently left, and right-wing governments see the components involved in getting peace through the UN Peace Operations. While the leftists see social inequalities, gender issues, and other extended security elements as a means to bring peace to conflictual places, the right tends to focus more on traditional military security issues. Hence, international security acquired an increasingly multidimensional character in the region during the 2000s. But military issues were always there.

Even when we look at de-militarized countries, such as Panama and Costa Rica, the military component takes place to some extent. Although these states do not use their own militaries to defend against threats, they face military threats. Nicaragua, for example, still claims parts of the Costa Rican territory and militarizes these disputes (Mares 2012b; Domínguez et al. 2003). It means, first, that they need to employ other instruments, such as diplomacy, to defend themselves from these threats. Second, if the diplomatic instrument fails, these countries can often rely on someone else's forces, as Costa Rica did in the 1950s, receiving support from the Organization of the American States, especially through the United States armed forces, to face Nicaraguan aggressions.

Based on this brief discussion, I conclude that considering the (possibility of the) use of military force is a necessary condition for anything to be considered part of an International Security Policy. States or governments can decide to include cultures, ethnicities, hunger, social inequalities, diseases, transnational crime, and environmental issues in these policies. However, these issues must be related to the eventual use of military force to be part of an ISP. That is to say, these widening issues are part of an ISP when they are seen as causes, potential originators, or solutions to situations that may involve the use of military force - e.g., if a government sees the need to militarize the dispute against drug organizations, then drugs can be considered part of ISP. This possibility can relate to a states' own forces or others'. For example, the position of a state towards a Peace Operation elsewhere, even though this country is not part of that operation, is part of its ISP. Consequently, even states that do not have armed forces, such as Costa Rica and Panama, have ISP since they are able to discuss international security problems, they need to defend themselves from international military

threats, and they use diplomacy in order to defend their own security interests, including gathering others' support for that. That is the border of the second part of our conception. Hence, so far, we have that *an International Security Policy is a public policy implemented to protect states and the interests of their governments related to the employment or the control of military force.*

2.3 Threats from where?

Having understood which threats we are dealing with when we talk about ISP, we will now discuss the origins of these threats. Of course, both discussions are directly connected since, while determining what is dangerous, we can indirectly observe where these elements are. Until the end of the Cold War, we saw that international security was predominantly related to interstate military threats. Consequently, this traditional focus relies on external threats, accurately on other countries (Walt 1991; Nye and Lynn-Jones 1988; Waltz 1979; Ullman 1983).

Ayoob (1983; 1991) noted that this traditional approach fitted well with the Global North and Western states, but the situation was very different for Third World countries. While Western Europe and the United States worried about a conflict with the USSR (and vice-versa), less developed countries had internal problems to solve. Separatism, misrepresentation, and cultural and ethnic tensions, for example, represented threats to several countries at that time, leading to Civil Wars and internal conflicts. After the end of the Cold War, Huntington (1993) and Posen (1993b) would extend this conception, seeing the "clash of civilizations" – and not the clash of states – as a significant threat to international security. At that time, their point could be empirically represented by the dismantling of Yugoslavia or the Rwandan Genocide due to internal disputes. And some years later, terrorism would be at the center of the global ISP agenda, having at the same time domestic and external origins.

In Ayoob's (1983) and Huntington's (1993) perspectives, non-state actors gained prominence. This notion was also expanded after the 9/11 terrorist attacks when terrorist organizations became at the center of the international security agenda (Andréani 2004). Then, when we look at Ullman's (1983) and Deudney's (1990) works, as well as the report from the United Nations Development Program (1994), we can see that it is not a matter of "who" is the threat – states or non-state actors. It is a matter of what. Poverty and drug

trafficking have no nationality but can shape internal and transborder conflicts. The 2010 Haiti earthquake could neither be predicted by any rational choice model nor fought with fire weapons. Climate change is not emerging from a single actor or a small community of states. Even the global pandemic context in 2019-2022 may not be caused by a human being but by a virus. And, despite not being clear if it will produce a military action at any moment, we cannot deny that armed conflicts can happen based on the pandemic's impacts or even those which may emerge from natural disasters, such as floods, droughts, and hurricanes.

Hence, it is undeniable that international security issues can emerge both from inside or outside borders - or even have no borders. What makes a security issue international is its range, not from where it comes. An external security problem that surpasses a state's borders is, by definition, an issue that requires an International Security Policy since it is related to a threat that can transcend boundaries. An internal security matter, in its turn, can give shape to an ISP when any of its dimensions also surpasses domestic borders (e.g., a non-state actor with transnational connections), reaching other countries. Notwithstanding, states can also act on security situations far from their own territories. The mere fact that a security threat is capable of transcending borders and that a state addresses measures to it makes these measures part of an international security policy if they attend to the other two aforementioned criteria.

Therefore, it is not the origin of an issue that defines if it is international but its capacity to cross borders. And this is what delimits the last part of our conception of an ISP. Then, for this Ph.D. dissertation, I assume that *an International Security Policy is a public policy implemented to protect states and the interests of their governments related to the employment or the control of military force to deal with issues capable of transcending state borders.*

2.4 Implementing ISP: Foreign Policy and Defense Policy

Whatever the public policy, there must be state representatives, especially bureaucracies, to formulate and implement it (Dye 2017). And it is not different in the case of International Security Policies. When we look at ISS literature, it becomes evident which instruments are used to implement ISP and their main actors (Weltman 1981; Nye and Lynn-Jones 1988; Walt 1991; Waltz 1993; Kagan 2002). As Rothschild (1995, pp. 63) puts it,

especially after the French Revolution, international security is "a principally collective good, to be ensured by military or diplomatic means."

Foucault (2009) provides a better understanding of it. According to the author, the emergence of the so-called *Raison d'État* in European countries (since the 17th century) would demand three main instruments. The first was war. It is not surprising since the maintenance of the European Balance at that time was based on politics, and war is nothing more than the "continuation of state politics by other means" (Clausewitz 2013, pp. 64). Therefore, if politics were not sufficient to prevent a strong state from prevailing over the others, then war was an option (Kissinger 1994). The other two instruments are the political ones: diplomacy and a permanent military apparatus.

Diplomacy[6] is a crucial tool for improving information flows among states' representatives and enhancing the negotiation capacity among countries, keeping permanent dialogues among them. Diplomacy and, from a broader perspective, foreign policy (FP) builds and maintains relations among states (Arenal 1984) and helps them make decisions about the international arena, including ISP. Through FP, states build peace, cooperate, combine joint action regarding non-state actors, defend traditional or widening security agendas, denounce and impose sanctions on other states, pressure themselves, or even declare war among themselves[7] (Morgenthau 1978; Foucault 2009). States can also use this tool to express the contents they think should be included in these policies while assuming different postures to defend their interests.

Also, according to Foucault (2009), a permanent military apparatus would be primordial to keep other nations away from one's territory by increasing the perceived costs of a military incursion and bargaining with other actors in order to achieve its own interests or even attack them. The armed forces are important both during war and peacetime since it is the military strength that, summed up to the capacity to negotiate, could contribute to a peaceful or conflictual environment, depending on states' interests. It is an essential component of defending the national interest - which is, in the end, state survival

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[6] I call diplomacy "the formal techniques and strategies modern states have developed, over the last four centuries, to deliver their views and pursue their interests on the global scenery, usually by way of specific protocols, institutes, and well-trained professional personnel" (Lopes 2020, pp. 13).

[7] I acknowledge that foreign policy is not always about security. Here, we are talking about foreign policy only when it is connected to security issue. I provide a better comprehension about it in the next chapter.

(Morgenthau 1952; Wolfers 1952). For this work, I call *any output from state action through military means to protect and pursue the national interest as a defense policy*.

These three instruments proposed by Foucault (2009) remain until these days. Recalling my definition of international security policy, if the use of military force is a necessary condition for these policies, then it is essential to have an army to employ - or to have an ally state with an army to protect its territory - as well as a diplomatic corps to negotiate the necessity and the terms to employ this force. Combining diplomatic and military means is necessary to achieve states' interests in the international arena – and security is always one of them (Morgenthau 1978).

Depending on the government's conception, it can include other dimensions into ISP, such as economic and social issues. Consequently, bureaucrats related to the economy, such as the Finance Ministers, and even to social policies can eventually join the formulation of these policies. For example, Waltz (1993) notes that the Marshall Plan was part of an American strategy to contain the Soviet advance over Western Europe and thus related to a large ISP. And it was not a plan elaborated only by militaries and diplomats. However, in the end, these two bureaucracies are the only ones involved in every ISP.

Just to provide some examples of this vision based on the literature, in 1950, for instance, Lasswell *apud* Baldwin (1995, pp. 130) said that "our greatest security lies in the best balance of all instruments of foreign policy, and hence in the coordinated handling of arms, diplomacy, information, and economics." Providing a more contemporary citation, according to Andréani (2004, pp. 31), "[t]he struggle that began in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, however, is a long-term, many-faceted undertaking, involving police and judicial repression and intelligence, as well as diplomatic and military action." While Lasswell was analyzing the security context within the Cold War, Andréani looked for 9/11. Despite the different backgrounds, we can see the remaining necessity of diplomats and militaries within these policies' framework in both cases.

Foreign and defense policies are thus the primordial means to implement an ISP. The capacity to negotiate, combined with military power, can help a state to reach its interests and, for our purposes, search for international security (Morgenthau 1978). More than defending traditional or widening security issues, ISP is also about whether to go to war or not and about deciding whether (and who) to cooperate with or not. States can assume different postures by mobilizing different levels of resources towards achieving their interests and cooperating with

different actors in different ways. Then, in the next section, I discuss resource mobilization and, after that, cooperation.

2.5 State postures towards ISP

Understanding the conceptualization of an ISP (as we did from 2.1 to 2.3) is key to getting a definition for these policies. However, ISP is not only about what countries consider an international security issue. It is also imperative to understand *how intensively a state mobilizes its resources in order to contain threats and defend its interests in terms of international security* - which I call ISP posture. As the military component is the defining issue for an international security policy, then by "resources" here I mean those related to the military force.

How much a state mobilizes its ISP resources is very different from *which* and *how many* resources it has - and this is the key difference between my concept and other definitions and indicators, such as the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) and the Global Firepower Index, which measure *how strong* a state is. This mobilization can assume different levels. Some governments reduce it to the minimum level needed to show potential enemies the high and punitive cost of attacking its territory and dissuading their eventual intentions to attack it, as in the case of contemporary Brazil. Others simply dismantle their armed forces, such as Panama and Costa Rica. At the same time, other governments raise this mobilization to defend their interests or even to engage in military clashes (Posen 1984; Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001; Vitelli 2016; Mares 2001; Calderon 2000; Høivik and Aas 1981).

Such a mobilization can be divided into at least two components. First, if states perceive a threat or see the need to defend any kind of interest abroad, they tend to engage in arrangements in order to get ready to do it. These arrangements are related to maintaining and improving the military and include (but are not restricted to) increasing the size of the military, training soldiers, and developing and acquiring equipment. This *preparation* is thus the first component of resource mobilization, in which states use existing resources to get ready to defend their interests. The second component relates to *deploying* these resources by using military force to fight against enemies to achieve the national interest (Clausewitz 2006; Proença and Duarte 2005; Carvalho forthcoming).

Some metrics become handy at this point to assess this mobilization. On the preparation side, if a country decides to spend more resources towards accomplishing its objectives, it, of course, includes financial resources. Then, if a state wants to extend military operations, increase equipment acquisition, and get its equipment ready to accomplish its objectives, it tends to raise its military expenditure. Together with financial resources, this state will also raise its human resources by increasing its military personnel (Posen 1984; Murray and Viotti 1994; Greenwood 1994; Ball 1993).

Then, on the deployment side, it is useful to look at military missions and operations[8] (Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux 2000; Shemella 2006). To be more specific, one good indicator for assessing it in an objective and comparative way is to look at states' decisions to militarize interstate conflicts. Whether originating or not these disputes, participating in them means the governments' mobilization of resources towards military means. Involving in MIDs, however, is not the only way to assess it. First, because, according to my ISP definition, threats are not necessarily built by state actors. Fighting non-state actors is also a way to militarize disputes, making it necessary to include it in our hall of indicators. Second, militarization does not necessarily take place in a direct way. States can also provide support to third parties in order to achieve their interests, such as sending weapons, sharing intelligence, economic support, and training others' troops[9]. Hence, we need to look at these three indicators in order to assess states' mobilization of ISP resources towards reaching their interests: MIDs, fighting non-state actors, and sending support to other actors around the world.

A methodological note should be introduced here: in order to operationalize the ISP postures as an objective indicator, I chose to include only resources directly related to the military force, considering the fact that an ISP is necessarily related to this component. It means that it includes issues related to the armed forces and to the part of diplomacy related to deciding and negotiating the use of this force. I acknowledge that some other indicators, such as (1) the action, by a country, as a mediator in a crisis, (2) the imposition of either bi or multilateral sanctions against other states that may consist of a threat to international security, (3) diplomatic aid, and (4) the signing of arms control agreements (e.g., prohibition of

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[8] According to Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux (2000), "a mission refers to those primary and permanent military assignments usually codified into law, while operations, by contrast, are specific and more episodic campaigns undertaken either independently or in compliance with a mission."

[9] I do not look at indicators related to other kinds of support, such as humanitarian aid, because their meaning is imprecise. For example, one state can offer humanitarian aid to another state either in order to support people in poor conditions or to help one side in a conflict.

chemical and biological weapons) can also contribute to identifying the posture of a country. However, I do not consider them in my analysis because of one practical reason: these indicators do not allow for a comparison that is both cross-national and longitudinal at the same time since they consist of either very recent initiatives (in the case of the agreements) or happen only when there is some kind of crisis (some sanctions and mediation).

Let me illustrate this point. A country may not mediate a crisis at a given time because it does not want or because there is no crisis to be mediated. Although the outcomes in both situations are the same, they mean different things in terms of the disposition of a country to mobilize resources. In the first case, it does not want. In the second case, maybe we are talking about a country that often mobilizes resources to mediate disputes when they exist. Therefore, considering how I am designing my analysis here, these indicators are not analytically useful since they do not allow for the longitudinal and cross-section comparison I am proposing here. It does not mean that they cannot be analyzed on other occasions since they can indicate something about states' ISP postures.

At the same time, one could point to the need to include other indicators. Two examples are the existence of nuclear programs and equipment acquisition. While I agree with this suggestion, I also recall that both kinds of initiatives (as well as others that were not cited here) demand money to be implemented and are thus represented by military expenditure. Another point relates to deploying the armed forces in peace operations. Although agreeing that it is necessary to analyze the involvement in such operations, I see it as a completely separate axis. Participation in peace operations attends to objectives other than the defense of the immediate national interest, such as improving states' insertion within the multilateral system, and should thus be seen as a different ISP dimension related to such insertion.

Other issues, such as humanitarian aid, and the provision of foreign aid for economic reconstruction, are not included in my concept, as they are related to other dimensions of an international security problem. These other dimensions (e.g., post-conflict reconstruction) may or may not be included in the ISP conceptualization, depending on the government. It means that it is hard to objectively compare, in a longitudinal, cross-sectional, and quantitative way, this kind of action between a country that considers it part of an ISP with another state that does not consider it. This is not that these issues are useless. It is just that, for the analytical purposes of this dissertation, it is better not to include them. Focusing only on issues related to the employment of the military force allows for such a comparison.

2.6 ISP Cooperation

A last key axis to assess states' ISP in this dissertation is to understand how they behave regarding cooperation. Of course, I acknowledge debates on how cooperation, to a broader extent, can be related to a more peaceful behavior, especially at the regional level (Keohane 1988; 2018; Diehl, Goertz, and Gallegos 2019; Goertz, Diehl, and Balas 2016). However, consistent with my ISP concept, I look here at cooperation involving the military force, aiming to produce confidence and mutual benefits for the countries involved. As ISP is necessarily implemented through military means, I focus here on defense cooperation, as it provides us with a means to compare Latin American states.

By defense cooperation, I am not talking about alliances. As put by Gibler (2009), alliances consist of formal agreements made by two or more states, in which they commit to adopting a future action in case some specific things happen. It means, for example, that one or more states must intercede in case a country that is part of an alliance is attacked, such as in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Cooperation, on the other hand, is not about future commitments but routine relations between states (Kinne 2018). And by looking at these routine practices, we can assess states' ISPs at any given moment[10].

Defense cooperation varies in terms of objectives, issues, and participants. It can take place between two (bilateral) or more (multilateral) states. It can be related to specific issues (e.g., developing specific equipment) or broader. It can be limited to one region or reach others and include great powers. Each kind of cooperation can have a different meaning, e.g., confidence-building, great power influence on a region, or simply mutual benefits.

In my analysis, I focus on intraregional defense cooperation for confidence and mutual benefit. I made such a specific choice for two reasons. First, considering the regional scope of this analysis, it makes sense to focus only on agreements within the region I am studying. Second, it makes it easier to understand the meaning of this cooperation. Including cooperation with non-Latin American states would mean, for example, including agreements between Brazil and China, Russia and Venezuela, and Colombia and the United States. These agreements, however, have different meanings. The first is mostly related to developing

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[10] It does not mean that alliances necessarily exclude cooperation. NATO members, for example, often cooperate with each other. It means that alliances do not necessarily come with cooperation. Members from the Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance, for example, do not often cooperate between each other.

equipment (i.e., satellites) for the Brazilian government to use in a diversity of actions - and, of course, to reinforce the spatial capabilities of the Brazilian Air Force with peaceful purposes. The second aimed to provide weapons and training to Venezuela in a Russian movement to reinforce the capabilities of a state that publicly opposed the United States in the global arena. The third aims to reinforce Colombian capabilities within the context of the "War on Drugs" in order to comply with a US agenda. Therefore, in some of these cases, we have that, depending on the point of view, cooperation may not be seen with peaceful purposes. Why? Answering this question could demand an entire paper. And this is exactly why I am excluding agreements with extra-regional actors from my analysis: their meaning is imprecise.

I intend to make this dissertation a contribution to understanding security relations in Latin America. To make this contribution more interesting, my analytical objective while looking at cooperation here is to measure how much these states built cooperative relations between themselves, in the sense of confidence-building and mutual benefit cooperation, in a region where militarizing disputes are common (Mares 2001; 2012a).

I assume that intraregional defense cooperation in Latin America is mostly related to creating confidence, mutual benefits, and more peaceful relations between neighbors, following a literature about it (Pion-Berlin 2016; Vitelli 2016; Carvalho 2021; Vaz, Fuccille, and Rezende 2017; Rojas Aravena 1998; Mares 1998). This cooperation is often connected with confidence-building measures, in a way that they tend to produce better relations between Latin American states, either in a bi or multilateral scope (Mares 2007). It can be seen in bilateral agreements, such as those between similar former rivals such as Argentina and Chile, for example. It also takes place in multilateral terms, as within the South American Defense Council, for example (Carvalho 2021; Vitelli 2017). However, I do not include the multilateral initiatives in this dissertation because of a methodological reason: there is very little variability in membership in these institutions (e.g., SADC and OAS) in my sample.

An important note should be introduced here. I acknowledge the existence of cooperation between military governments in the region during the 1970s - i.e., Operation Condor. However, this operation did not fit the criteria to be considered defense cooperation. While defense cooperation is about institutionalized routine dialogues regarding military activities (Kinne 2018; 2020), Operation Condor's scope was much beyond such a conception, as it was made by efforts from intelligence officers which came either from the military,

police, or intelligence institutions from South American states to track those who opposed military regimes in the region (McSherry 2005). It does not mean that it is not part of ISP. First, Intelligence activities should, of course, be understood as a separate ISP. Second, as it was related to addressing a perceived threat, it should be seen more as "external support" towards fighting an enemy than routine dialogues related to confidence-building or reinforcing states' capabilities. It means that it may not be analyzed within the defense cooperation umbrella, as it comprises a different and broader phenomenon.

2.7 An empirical proposal to assess international security policies: ISP conceptualization, posture, and cooperation

Considering all the literature presented in this chapter, I introduce here an approach to assess ISP and make it empirically analyzable, especially through a comparative quantitative analysis. My proposal to observe and quantify it begins by dividing it into three axes: ISP conceptualization, posture, and cooperation. The first *reflects the number and intensity of issues included in states' conceptions about ISP*. The second consists of *how intensively a state mobilizes its resources to contain threats and defend its interests in terms of international security* - focusing on military resources. The latter *identifies the cooperative relations a state is building in terms of defense policy*. In Table 1, I present some indicators that might help us to identify states along with these axes, either in this dissertation or in future initiatives. A detailed discussion about the actual indicators, proxies, and measurement procedures used in this analysis will be provided in Chapter 5.

Of course, I do not intend to mean that these three axes are the only existing ones. One could argue, for example, about other axes, such as a "global multilateralism" one, by assessing states' actions in UN Peace Operations. However, for my analytical purposes, it is important to restrict it to the scope of the theory I want to propose. I chose to keep them because, as I discuss in the next chapter, they are key to classifying the ISP types that took place in Latin America and producing my theory.

Having divided ISP into three axes, we will be able to situate and compare each country's policies at a certain time along those axes. In Chapter 5, I present the empirical strategy to quantify these axes by transforming them into indexes based on objective

indicators. For now, we already have a model to analyze the ISP implemented by the Latin American states from 1975 to 2010 in a comparative way.

Table 1 - Indicators for assessing ISP axes

Axis	Used in this dissertation	Other indicators (examples)
Conceptualization	Inclusion of a wide set of issues in the conceptualization about international security, e.g., crimes, gender, social, and environmental issues	
Postures	Military Expenditure, Military Personnel, involvement in MIDs, fighting against non-state actors, provision of support to external actors in conflict situation	Mediation of crisis, imposition of sanctions
Cooperation	Intraregional Defense Cooperation Agreements	Intraregional Multilateral Institutions, DCAs with great powers and countries from other regions, cross-regional organizations, other kinds of external support

Source: own elaboration

2.8 Conclusion

In this chapter, I defined the dependent variable of this dissertation – International Security Policies. I conceptualized it as *a public policy implemented to protect states and, eventually, their institutions, territory, individuals, or a community, related to the employment or the control of military force to deal with issues capable of transcending state borders.* Then, I proposed a framework to empirically assess and compare it for this work. The framework for analyzing the dependent variable of this dissertation is available in Figure 5 below.

ISP is implemented via foreign and defense policy. Foreign policy, most commonly based on diplomats, is the instrument related to gathering information, expressing states' international priorities, negotiating with other actors in the international arena, declaring war, and making peace. Defense policy relates to employing the military apparatus in order to pursue the national interest. This combination allows states to bargain, to make the international environment more peaceful, or to deploy military forces - depending on the national interests. We can assess ISP by looking either at the posture each state adopts

towards this policy, the conceptualization it presents and defends, and its cooperative behavior.

Figure 5 – A framework for analyzing International Security Policies as a dependent variable

Source: own elaboration

Therefore, we already have the framework to analyze ISP as a dependent variable. In the next chapter, I discuss how Latin American ISP in the analyzed frame can be classified based on the three axes I proposed in this chapter. Then, in the fourth chapter, I present the theoretical basis of this work, proposing the factors that may explain ISP outcomes.

3 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA: A TYPOLOGY

Having a conceptual framework, it is now time to look at the object of my research: international security policies in Latin America. In this chapter, I provide an overview of these policies in the region during the historical frame of my analysis (1975-2010), building a typology for the ISP implemented in the region. I have three main objectives while doing it. First, I intend to build a more specific dialogue with the literature about international security in Latin America. Second, I provide some contextualization on these policies and show which kinds of ISP Latin American states have been implementing in the last decades. Third, I provide a typology that is analytically useful, considering the conceptual basis proposed in the last chapter, based on the three axes. An ISP typology allows us to analyze these policies as the multidimensional phenomenon it is and has been used by other scholars who study Latin American security (Tickner and Herz 2012).

One of the most accepted typologies of these policies in the region is based on three broad types: the National Security Doctrine (NSD), implemented during most of the Cold War; the Democratic Security, during the late 1980s and 1990s; and a widening security concept during the 2000s. These categories are commonly divided according to the axes I mentioned in the last chapter: postures, conceptualization, and cooperation. However, some ambiguities and disagreements emerge in the literature, making it hard to say what is particular to each of these types.

Regarding the NSD, the literature agrees that it was directed at fighting left-wing groups and, to a broader extent, those who disagreed with regimes. However, scholars do not precisely point to (1) its conceptualization, specifically whether and how much it included issues such as inequalities and economic development, and (2) its postures since there was no clear pattern regarding the use of the military force outside state borders (Feierstein 2010; Loveman 1999; Pion-Berlin 1989; 1988; Serbin 2003). Then, when we look at Democratic Security, while it is consensual that a greater focus on democracy characterized it, the literature disagrees on whether it consisted of higher or lesser resource mobilization and cooperation (Hurrell 1998; Levitt 2006; Mares 2001; Tickner 2016; Tickner and Herz 2012).

Even when we look at the 2000s, while most of the literature sees a greater focus on inequalities (Carvalho 2019; Mathias, Zague, and Santos 2019; Tickner and Herz 2012), it is possible to say, first, that this was not necessarily an innovation, since these issues were

already discussed even under the NSD (Pion-Berlin 1989; 1988). Such a notion can also be visualized in Figure 6 below by looking at how much Latin American governments mentioned words including the radical "inequ*" in speeches at the United Nations General Assembly. Second, the widening security policy took place in the entire region (Carvalho 2019; Herz 2010; Mathias, Zague, and Santos 2019; Rojas Aravena 2003) and thus was not necessarily related to a particular posture or cooperative behavior.

Figure 6 - Mentions to "inequ*" in speeches delivered at the United Nations General Assembly

Source: own elaboration, based on data from Mikhaylov et al. (2017)

At the same time, ISP types were not homogeneous within each decade. During the late 1970s, for example, while Argentina implemented a hardline version of NSD, Venezuela was not implementing NSD at all. During the late 1980s and 1990s, while Democratic Security looked relatively common in the region, a different kind of policy seemed to emerge in Colombia within the emerging US-sponsored "War on Drugs." Then, during the 2000s, intraregional cooperation became key for some states' relations, while others did not

cooperate too much (Corrales and Penfold-Becerra 2011; V. Mijares 2018; Trinkunas 2011; Vaz, Fuccille, and Rezende 2017; Westad 2007).

Addressing these ambiguities and providing a more fine-grained classification for these policies is thus the main objective of this chapter. I choose not to use the three aforementioned types, as it is hard to precise their characteristics based on at least two axes. For analytical purposes, I consider that any type of policy only exists if we can classify it according to at least two axes - preferably all three axes. A type of policy must be a combination, for example, of higher resource mobilization and increased emphasis on a particular content(s) - e.g., anti-imperialistic issues or crimes - or reduced mobilization, increased cooperation, and no focus on particular contents. Otherwise, it is either a perennial component of these policies - such as the role of inequalities on Latin American ISP - or a temporal trend - as it happened regarding democracy during the late 1980s and 1990s, as I will discuss in this chapter. In other words, creating such a typology raises the need to ask: what makes each ISP type so particular that we can observe distinctions between these types?

In this chapter, I answer this question by dividing the ISP implemented in the region from 1975 to 2010 into five types: Rebel Policy, Balance of Power, Transnational Threats, Coexistence, and Pro-Democracy Security Cooperation. I present a set of characteristics for each of them based on ISP postures, cooperative patterns, and conceptualizations for each of these types.

Two notes should be introduced at this point. First, as I discuss in this chapter, conceptualizations commonly associated with Latin American ISP, such as democracy, inequalities, gender, and environment, cannot be connected with any particular kind of policy and are thus not used in my typology. More than not being connected to a particular combination with the other axes, they do not help us understand the objectives of the employment of the military force - i.e., Latin American states will hardly use the military force to impose the implementation of gender issues by other actors. Even in the case of democracy, it may appear as one of the objectives of peace operations, for example, but it is unlikely that states will militarize disputes with other actors with the only objective of implementing democratic institutions.

Therefore, as the military component must exist in order for us to talk about an ISP, I evaluate states' conceptualizations of these policies by focusing on the intensity they approached two particular contents, which I claim are key to analytically differentiating

policies: crimes and anti-hegemony. These components can help us understand the objectives behind states' initiatives of using military force: fighting criminal organizations or resisting the hegemonic power and the liberal order while also challenging it. As I will discuss in this chapter, higher mobilization, together with a higher focus on criminal organizations, can mean involvement in the "War on Drugs" by adopting a Transnational Threats policy, for example. Second, by cooperation, I refer to intraregional cooperation, as I mentioned in the last chapter.

At the end of the chapter, we should be able to see how interactions between these indicators lead to different policies, such as we can see in Table 2 below. For the particular case of Latin America, as I mentioned, I claim that only five out of sixty-four possible combinations are present in the region.

Table 2 - Building a typology for ISP

Policy	Axes			
	Postures	**Cooperation**	**Conceptualization**	
			Anti-Hegemony	**Crimes**
Policy A	< Mobilization	High	Low	Low
Policy B	< Mobilization	Low	Low	Low
Policy C	> Mobilization	Low	Low	High
Policy D	> Mobilization	Low	Low	Low
Policy E	> Mobilization	Low	High	Low
Policy (n…)	It goes for every possible combination…			

Source: own elaboration

I provide such a typology by combining a literature review with some descriptive statistics and network analysis. In the latter case, using data on Defense Cooperation Agreements - DCAs (Kinne, 2020) - and Militarized Interstate Disputes (Maoz et al., 2019; Mares, 2001, 2012a), I plot the related networks to support my claims. Each country is represented by a vertex (a point), and each DCA or MID between two states represents an edge (lines linking nodes). I also use two network statistics to allow for better observations.

The degree of each vertex, which consists of "the number of edges attached to it[11]" (Newman 2010, pp. 9), responds to the node side. At the same time, modularity, which compares the number of existing edges within different groups with the number in simulated networks with random edges, responds to the node colors (Newman, 2010, 2006). Similar colors mean belongingness to similar groups.

As I did in Figure 6, I also use automated content analysis in speeches delivered by state representatives at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) during General Debates sessions, based on a dictionary that will be provided in footnotes together with each figure. These sessions provide opportunities for these representatives, often heads of state, to share their foreign policy priorities with the rest of the world, consisting of a productive way to assess the intensity attributed by governments to some issues (Baturo, Dasandi, and Mikhaylov 2017; Carvalho and Schenoni 2021; Eckhard et al. 2021; Kentikelenis and Voeten 2021). Then, by assessing mentions to particular terms, I intend to show the varying longitudinal emphasis on democracy and other broader security issues.

As I want to contextualize these policies from a historical perspective, I design this chapter to respect a chronological order. I divide it into three sections, considering broad global contexts, which also allow us to tell a better story about these policies: the Cold War (the late 1970s and 1980s, considering the time framing for my analysis), the post-Cold War, with the emergence of a Transnational Threats policy (the late 1980s and 1990s), and the War on Terror, with the emergence of a Cooperative Policy (2000s). In each section, I introduce and discuss the ISP types implemented by Latin American states, highlighting the presence of each axis on these policies.

3.1 Latin American ISP at the end of the Cold War

The Cold War provided the ground for at least three different ISP types in Latin America: Coexistence, Balance of Power, and Anti-hegemonic Policy. No, I do not include the National Security Doctrine among these policies, as most literature does. Here I provide a more detailed explanation.

NSD was basically a set of ideas, concepts, principles, and actions aimed to reinforce national security for most Latin American states during most of the Cold War. At that time,

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[11] Is to say, the number of DCAs or MIDs a given country was engaged in a given year.

ideology became the key to defining allies and enemies of a state in a way that Marxist principles and supporters became the main threats to the "Western-Christian" values to be defended by Latin American governments (Pion-Berlin, 1989, 1988). As the USSR and its allies did not represent a clear threat to the region at the interstate level, the main threats were considered to be located inside the states. The idea was that left-wing movements and supporters, sometimes backed by the Soviets, should be combated by states (Tapia Valdés, 1980). At the end of the day, the counterinsurgency techniques diffused by the American-led military schools, such as the School of the Americas, as well as within the Condor Operation, led to the tracking, fighting, kidnapping, torturing, and murdering not only members of left-wing *guerrillas* but also "union leaders, social democrats, Christian democrats, nationalists, dissident generals, former presidents, and congressional representatives" (McSherry 2005, pp. 8).

The levels of resource mobilization, however, varied across states and stages of NSD implementation. When we look at the military budget of NSD governments in the late 1970s, for example, while Argentina raised its military expenditure to around 4.5% of its GDP, Brazil spent 1.6%. This expenditure was also not constant within the same country. Paraguay, for example, reduced its expenses from 3.8% of its GDP in 1972 to 2% in 1979[12].

We can also see it by looking at these states' engagement in militarized interstate disputes. Loveman (1999) and Herz (2010) note that the militaries of the Latin American countries did not forget their geopolitical concerns and ambitions, which led to militarized interstate disputes during the implementation of NSD. This notion can be partially illustrated by Figure 7 below. Peruvians and Ecuadorians, for example, kept their longtime rivalries. The same applied to the Chilean and Argentinean armed forces. The latter would even engage in a war against the United Kingdom (Mares, 2001; Schenoni et al., 2020; Schenoni et al., 2020). Other states, however, were not so prone to get into this kind of dispute.

Nevertheless, it is hard to say that MIDs were indeed part of the NSD. When we look at other states that implemented the doctrine, Guatemala and El Salvador kept a medium-to-low profile in militarizing disputes in the late 1970s, while Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay did not militarize many disputes. On the other hand, Venezuela and Colombia, which did not adopt the doctrine, had several disputes. As this mobilization varied, it is complicated to associate NSD with a specific kind of posture.

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[12] Data on military expenditure were retrieved from the World Bank.

Figure 7 - Latin American MIDs' network (1975-1985)

Source: own elaboration, based on Maoz et al. (2019)

NSD's conceptualization is also hard to precise. Economic development was seen as a key to reinforcing national security for some governments by alleviating socio-economic problems in these countries. At the same time, others did not pay too much emphasis to this point. A "Third Worldism" and some criticism of global asymmetries were also part of these policies for some states, while others kept higher alignment with the American-led liberal values and accepted the liberal order as it was (Mares, 2011; Pion-Berlin, 1989, 1988; Ricupero, 2017; Tickner and Herz, 2012).

Defense cooperation was low, at least towards confidence-building. Most military dialogues at the time took place through sharing intelligence information and eventually coordinating counterinsurgency operations within Operation Condor (Feierstein 2010; Gill 2004; McSherry 2005; 2002). However, as this cooperation was not in the sense I am considering for my analysis (involving confidence-building and mutual benefits), it is possible to say that this specific kind of cooperation was rare at the time. Notwithstanding, classifying

a policy based only on low cooperation is hard since four out of the five ISP types I introduce present this trait.

Having that said, it is hard to point to NSD as a type of ISP since it is hard to say what made it particular in terms of international security. The national security component is clear, but it is hard to say what it was in international terms. Then, what I propose in the following pages is that, during the late 1970s and 1980s, most Latin American ISP, even those implemented by states under the NSD, could be divided into two main types: Coexistence and Balance of Power.

Back to Figure 7, there are two other actors to which policies should be addressed appropriately: Cuba and Nicaragua. The former is a key actor within this network, as we can see by its high degree (as it consists of the biggest node), especially because of its support to left-wing governments and movements in countries such as Grenada, Somalia, and South Africa. We can see Cuba as a determinant actor in the pink cluster related to the Cold War dynamics. The latter faced strong resistance from its neighbors and the US due to the rule of a left-wing group, which also supported left-wing *guerrillas* in Central American states. It became a crucial pole in the green cluster, related to the Central American dynamics at the time.

Both Cuba and Nicaragua were at the core of Cold War dynamics during the late 1970s and 1980s and mobilized several resources to conduct a policy of rejecting the US hegemony over the region (and the world) together with their ally, the Soviet Union. This policy thus had a straightforward anti-hegemonic conceptualization by criticizing the US hegemony. It also had a key orientation regarding postures, in a way that resource mobilization was high to allow these states to implement a rebel and anti-liberal ISP. Then, this Anti-Hegemonic policy must appear in any kind of typology about ISP in the region and is thus the third type, according to my claims, that took place in the region during the Cold War.

Coexistence, Balance of Power, and the Anti-Hegemonic Policy are the three ISP types that took place in the region during the late 1970s and 1980s. The difference between the first two types is basically about postures: while Coexistence means lower resource mobilization, a Balance of Power policy means medium-to-high mobilization. Both of them do not present a broader conceptualization regarding threats compared to the regional average in terms of crimes and anti-hegemonic matters or higher levels of cooperation. It means that

both types can accommodate either NSD or non-NSD governments based on their different levels of resource mobilization. As we will further discuss, these types can also accommodate governments in later decades after. The Anti-hegemonic policy, however, is different from these two types in the sense that it is based on increased resource mobilization and anti-hegemonic conceptualization. I will spend the following three subsections digging deeper into these types.

3.1.1 Coexistence

Coexistence means that a state's policy is neither based on confrontation nor cooperation with other states. It means a lower profile in terms of ISP by keeping a low resource mobilization and paying low (or no) emphasis on defense cooperation. This low profile also extends to the conceptualizations of these policies in a way that a state tends not to emphasize issues such as crimes and anti-hegemony - or, at least, not in comparison with other states in a region.

Costa Rica provides us with one of the most illustrative examples of such a policy. In 1948, after a civil war, the country decided to abolish its armed forces. It decisively means a low resource mobilization towards international security by not even having a military. It is true that the country has been involved in militarized interstate disputes since then, mostly with its neighbors, Nicaragua and Guatemala, because of border claims and other political issues. However, in these cases, it tends to be protected by allies if needed, such as US forces, and collective security agreements, such as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, considering its previous decision to keep a more peaceful ISP posture. Its focus remains on collective security and does not extend to a huge number of cooperative initiatives. Also, most of the time, the Costa Rican government did not emphasize either crimes or anti-hegemonic issues (Høivik and Aas 1981; Lincoln and Lauderdale 1985; Olander 1996; Rojas Aravena 1985).

Costa Rican policy is, of course, a more extreme example of a Coexistence policy. Another example of such a policy was Brazil, under the NSD during Ernesto Geisel's (1974-1979) and João Figueiredo's (1979-1985) rule. At the time, the Brazilian ISP was based on avoiding militarized disputes and decreasing military expenditure. Even when disagreements emerged with neighbors, e.g., the Argentinean dissatisfaction with the *Itaipu*

hydroelectric plant, they were solved through negotiations (Ricupero 2017). Paraguay implemented a similar policy during part of Alfredo Stroessner's rule, also under the NSD (Roett 1988; Williams 1983).

Another example of a Coexistence policy at the time was the one implemented by the Dominican Republic. Having no credible external threat, the country did not focus on mobilizing military means for maintaining its national security interests. Its armed forces were mostly deployed to deal with migration issues on the border with Haiti (Hartlyn 1991; Metz and Library of Congress 2001). Overall, it mostly kept a policy of coexisting with other states in the region.

In terms of conceptualization, in all of the aforementioned cases, these policies tended not to be wide - at least in comparison with the region. These governments tended not to mention issues such as crimes and anti-hegemony more than the regional average. They also did not focus on deepening cooperative ties with other states in the region. *This is, thus, the Coexistence policy: low levels of resource mobilization and cooperation and more restricted conceptualization compared to the region.*

3.1.2 Balance of Power

A Balance of Power policy is similar to Coexistence in terms of conceptualization and cooperation: contents are often more restricted, and cooperation is not frequent. However, contrary to Coexistence, there is an increased resource mobilization in this kind of policy. It is often related to states pursuing their geopolitical objectives by improving their armed forces and/or militarizing disputes with other actors.

Argentina provided one of the clearest examples of such a policy during the late 1970s and 1980s. At the time, while domestically implementing a hard version of NSD, the military *junta* that ruled the country decided to modernize its armed forces, buying equipment such as submarines, ships, and jet fighters. It meant, of course, an increasing military expenditure, as a percentage of the Argentinean GDP, to pay for the related costs (Pion-Berlin, 1988; Regalsky et al., 2015; Schenoni et al., 2020).

This increased resource mobilization also included militarizing disputes with other actors. The most famous action implemented by the *junta* was getting into a war against the United Kingdom, reclaiming Argentinean control over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands.

Militarization was not restricted to this war, taking place multiple times by rivaling - and almost getting into war against - Chile over the Beagle Channel islands (Schenoni, Braniff, and Battaglino 2020; Mares 2001; Villar 2016). On the other hand, Chile was also implementing such a policy, reinforcing itself and its territorial claims against Argentina (and also Peru), keeping its *status quo*, as it had sovereignty over the claimed islands (Kahhat 2008; Lacoste 2003).

Balance of power policies were also implemented in the Andean region during the late 1970s and 1980s. Peru and Ecuador had a long-term rivalry due to territorial disputes, which led to multiple militarized disputes and even wars between the two states (Buzan and Wæver, 2003; Domínguez et al., 2003; Mares, 2001; Schenoni et al., 2020). This rivalry was kept during the 1970s and 1980s, with both states mobilizing the necessary resources to reinforce their claims, including persisting MIDs and higher military budgets. In the case of Peru, there was also an emerging need to contain domestic threats - which I will address in section 4.2 (Herz and Nogueira 2002; Jaskoski 2013).

At the same time, in Central America, a combination of civil wars and external support to armed groups led to the implementation of Balance of Power policies. Honduras, for example, decided to support the US efforts in fighting against the *Sandinistas* in Nicaragua by allowing the United States to use its territory to train and provide weapons to the *Contras* while also eventually using its own resources. In El Salvador, the fight against the *Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional* (FMLN) demanded more resources, while the same applied to Guatemala in fighting the *Unidad Nacional Revolucionaria Guatemalteca* (UNRG) and the *Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres* (EGP). Border claims were also militarized at the time, in a way that Guatemala used its troops to claim part of the Belizean territory - which belonged to the United Kingdom until 1981 - and Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua fought for their claims over the Gulf of Fonseca (Buzan and Wæver 2003; Child 1992; Domínguez et al. 2003; LeoGrande 1986; Mares 2001).

These countries were not the only ones to implement an ISP related to increased resource mobilization at the time. However, their policies were not related to any particular conceptualization, putting them under the Balance of Power umbrella. At the time, there was another policy related to this kind of mobilization, but with an emphasis on a particular content: anti-hegemony.

3.1.3 Anti-Hegemonic Policy

An Anti-hegemonic policy is similar to a Balance of Power one. It is also related to higher levels of resource mobilization and lower levels of intraregional cooperation. However, it differs from the latter because of its conceptualization. Such a policy comes together with criticism against the liberal order, capitalism, and the US hegemony over the region and the world, in an attempt to implement actions to resist and weaken this order.

The most classic example of such a policy during the Cold War was Cuba. From when Fidel Castro took office, in 1959, to the fall of the Soviet Union, the Cuban ISP was marked by increased resource mobilization towards countering the US leadership around the world. It raised its military budget and personnel and supported several left-wing actors worldwide. In Figure 7, we can see part of this policy, with Cuba acting in conflict situations in Angola, South Africa, and Somalia, for example. This support assumed different forms, taking place either by supporting left-wing non-state movements in militarizing disputes against local governments or helping left-wing governments to survive, sending instruments such as troops and weapons (Halliday 1986; Spektor 2020; Westad 2007; Wright 2001).

After taking office in Nicaragua in 1979, the left-wing *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* (FSLN) also joined Cuba in this kind of policy. While criticizing the liberal order, the *Sandinistas* also supported *guerrilla* movements in their neighbors, such as the *Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional* (FMLN) in El Salvador. The FSLN government also raised resource mobilization in the country, especially after the US government started supporting a non-state group - the *Contras* - to undermine the *Sandinista* regime (Halliday, 1986; Pastor, 1988; Soares, 2006; Westad, 2007; Wiarda, 1992).

Cuba and Nicaragua were the only states to adopt an Anti-Hegemonic policy at the time. Such a policy was expensive and hard to implement. Both states faced hindrances provided by the United States, such as embargoes, blockades, and support for a civil war inside the Nicaraguan territory. Still, both states sustained the anti-hegemonic content in their policies, allowing us to fit them in such a singular ISP type.

3.2 The late 1980s and 1990s: the emergence of the Transnational Threats policy

The late 1980s and 1990s provided a different context for International Security Policies in Latin America. As I will discuss in the next chapter, issues such as the end of the Cold War and the re-democratization in most of these countries changed views, perceptions, and actions towards these policies. Within this context, the literature perceives the emergence of a different kind of ISP: Democratic Security (Herz 2010; Tickner 2016; Tickner and Herz 2012). However, as I argue in this section, it was not an ISP type but only a temporary focus on democracy by Latin American states while mostly keeping the aforementioned types. At the same time, I propose that there was another kind of policy that emerged at the time: the Transnational Threats policy.

The emergence of a democratic component within ISP in Latin America could be first perceived during declarations and negotiations for the end of the conflict in Central America. While discussing solutions for resolving the conflict, states started proposing democracy as a potential solution to the crisis. Either within the *Contadora* Group - or later in the *Contadora* Support Group and the Rio Group[13] - or in other negotiations, it was constantly reaffirmed (Bagley 1986; Bagley et al. 1985; Child 1992; Farer 1985; Frohmann 1989; LeoGrande 1986).

During the 1990s, democracy also became widely discussed in regional bodies, such as the Organization of American States (OAS). In 1990, OAS created the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy. Then, in 1991, Resolution 1080 was unanimously approved, attributing a role to the Organization in acting and eventually intervening in any context of democratic breakdown in the region. Considering this framework, OAS intervened on several occasions in which it saw democracy at risk, such as in Haiti (1991), Peru (1992 and 2000), Guatemala (1993), and Paraguay (1996, 2000). In 1997, after being ratified by two-thirds of the OAS members, the Washington Protocol also entered into effect, granting the organization's General Assembly the role of suspending any member in case of democratic

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[13] In 1985, the *Contadora* Group received the support of four recently democratized Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay, which became the *Contadora* Support Group (Bagley 1986; Farer 1985). In 1986, both groups decided to create the Permanent Mechanism for Consultation and Concertation (*Mecanismo Permanente de Consulta y Concertación*), which became known as the *Rio* Group (*Grupo de Rio*). Democracy was a key element for the group, in which all members were required to have democratic regimes (Grupo de Río, 1990; Ricupero, 2017; Yopo, 1991). The group exists until the current days and received an increasing number of members along the time, in a way that it now contains all the Latin American states.

breakdown (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013; Levitt 2006; Sikkink 2018; Mares 2012a; Serbin 2003). At the same time, the role of democracy in regional security, as well as the need for increased democratic control over the armed forces, were expressed at the meeting of the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas - despite domestic difficulties faced by Latin American states to keep this control until the current days (Mathias et al., 2019)**.**

Democracy became part of Latin American states' foreign policies as a whole. In Figure 8, for example, I show how average mentions to any term starting with "democ*" skyrocketed in speeches delivered by state representatives at the United Nations General Assembly, during General Debates, in the mid-1980s and 1990s. Then, from 1995 onwards, it declined. A possible conclusion is that (1) a higher emphasis on democracy was brief and highly contextual, but (2) some increased attention to these issues remained compared to the 1970s.

Figure 8 - Mentions to "democ*" in speeches delivered at the United Nations General Assembly

Source: own elaboration, based on data from Mikhaylov et al. (2017).

The analytical problem that emerges here is that, while the inclusion of the democratic component in Latin American ISP during the late 1980s and the 1990s seems unequivocal, this component did not necessarily come with particular kinds of posture or patterns of cooperative behavior (Domínguez 1998; Hurrell 1998; Mares 2001). While in the Southern Cone, for example, it was associated with reduced resource mobilization and increased cooperation, in Central America and the Andean region, during the 1980s, it was accompanied by higher mobilization and no defense cooperation (Child 1992; Hurrell 1998; LeoGrande 1986; Oelsner 2009).

Another important point is that the democratic component does not help us identify either the objectives or the possibility of deploying the military force, which is a key part of ISP, as I proposed in this dissertation. This is why I do not consider Democratic Security a type of ISP: it is not possible to identify what it was beyond associating democracy with international security. While highlighting democracy, Latin American states remained mostly divided among two types of ISP: Coexistence and Balance of Power. It does not mean that democracy cannot be included in future analyses about ISP in the region. It just means that, for the purposes of this analysis, it is not useful.

However, in some cases, the inclusion of democracy in ISP came with another relevant content: crimes. And this component, as I discuss in the following subsection, was related to a particular kind of posture, leading to another kind of policy in the region: Transnational Threats. After discussing this policy, I discuss the implementation of Coexistence, Balance of Power, and Anti-Hegemonic policies in the region at the time.

3.2.1 Transnational Threats

During the 1980s and 1990s, on the one side, criminal activities, especially drug trafficking, became increasingly incorporated by armed factions and *guerrillas,* which also had political objectives in the region. It offered these groups a way to become richer and, consequently, stronger, so they joined other criminal organizations in these activities. On the other hand, the emergence of the US-led "War on Drugs" led some Latin American states to mobilize more resources to fight drug dealers and cartels and securitize these groups as terrorist organizations. The result was a different kind of ISP, based on the increased resource mobilization to fight organized crime and groups that combined, to some extent, *guerrilla*

tactics with criminal (mostly drug trafficking) activities, which became more emphasized in states' ISP conceptualization: the Transnational Threats policy (Sikkink 2018; Wiarda 1992; Herz 2002). In these cases, there was almost no room for intraregional cooperation.

The most famous case was Colombia. Since the middle of the 20th century, the country has been fighting either nationalist or extreme left-wing *guerrillas*, such as the 19th Movement (M-19), the *Ejército Popular de Liberación* (EPL), the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN), and the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionárias de Colombia* (FARC). Together with their ideological agendas, some of these organizations - especially the latter - also developed links with drug trafficking. These groups joined drug cartels, such as the Medellin and the Cali ones, as key actors in exporting drugs to the Northern Hemisphere. The fight against these groups and the "War on Drugs" became thus the same thing for Colombia and assumed a prominent role in its ISP (Bagley 1989; 2013).

During the 1980s and 1990s, different presidents (i.e., Belisario Bettancourt, Virgilio Barco, César Gavíria, and Ernesto Samper) tried to negotiate a solution with these groups. Some of them, such as the M-19 and the EPL, accepted these solutions and became political parties. Others, such as FARC and ELN, continue to fight the Colombian government. Considering that, although negotiations took place, these presidents had to mobilize resources to fight these groups continuously. Consequently, crimes, such as drug trafficking, assumed a prominent role in Colombian ISP (Bagley 1989; Chernick 1999; De La Pedraja Tomán 2013).

Peru also provided a good illustration of this policy. At the beginning of the 1980s, the Peruvian government attributed the armed forces with the task of fighting *Sendero Luminoso*, a left-wing Maoist organization, and the *Movimiento Revolucionário Tupac Amaru* (MRTA), also a left-wing group, as efforts by the police proved not to be enough to face these groups, which also had connections with drug dealers. Over the following two decades, this fight became a key focus for the Peruvian security policy, although with differing actions. During Alan García's rule, for example, an attempt to redesign the militarization of the conflict failed, *Sendero* posed an even more significant threat to the Peruvian state, and resource mobilization had to increase to face the group. Then, under Alberto Fujimori, greater militarization took place, including higher tolerance of human rights violations. In both cases, the key focus of this policy was to fight non-state groups (Basombrío 1999; De La Pedraja Tomán 2013; Lora Cam 1999; McClintock 1999).

To illustrate the higher prominence assumed by the crime component in the Colombian in Peruvian policies, in Figure 9, I show how many times representatives from these countries mentioned crime-related words[14] in speeches at the UNGA. This is why I include Transnational Threats policies as a different kind of ISP. It can be clearly defined as having a higher resource mobilization, low levels of cooperation, and a clear component related to crimes.

Figure 9 - Mentions to crime-related words in speeches delivered at the United Nations General Assembly

Source: own elaboration, based on data from Mikhaylov et al. (2017).

Peru and Colombia are surely the most famous examples of such a policy. However, a Transnational Threats policy could also be seen in Bolivia at the time. Consuming coca leaves is a long-term tradition in the country because of its biological benefits. However, as the drug markets grew in the 1980s, of course, they became used for drug trafficking. Then, the "War

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[14] It included mentions to words beginning with the following terms: "crim*", "kidnap*", "pirac*", "drug*", "hijack*", "assass*", "extort*", "illicit*", "launder*", "cartel*", "narcot*", "terror*", "violent*", "illeg*", "delinq*". This vocabulary will be properly addressed in Chapter 5.

on Drugs" also arrived in Bolivia, with the government deploying the armed forces in fighting people who produce coca leaf producers - the *cocaleros* -, drug dealers, and peasants (Morales 1992; Brienen 2015; Lehman 1999). Some Central American states, such as Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Costa Rica, also joined such a policy after the end of the civil wars (Carpenter 2003; White 2019; Sereseres 1998).

Militarization also took place outside state borders under the Transnational Threats policy. Although the Bolivian government did not focus on this kind of dispute, Peruvians and Colombians had several disputes against Ecuadorians and Venezuelans, respectively. Guatemala kept complicated relations with Belizeans, and the same happened between Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador. Issues such as territorial claims, or even the extrapolation of fighting transnational threats, which reached others' territories without authorization, contributed to these kinds of disputes. It, of course, leads us to a context in which these neighboring states implemented Balance of Power policies.

3.2.2 Balance of Power and Rebel Policies

While some countries raised resource mobilization to fight non-state criminal organizations, others kept in on higher levels, aiming at other actors than these organizations, such as states and *guerrillas* - this time not necessarily related to drug trafficking. Central American states provided such a case, for example. In Guatemala, during the late 1980s, a massive resource mobilization took place to fight the left-wing paramilitary groups UNRG and EGP. A similar situation occurred in El Salvador during the civil war against FMLN, which lasted until 1992. In Honduras, the support for American efforts to undermine the *Sandinista* government in Nicaragua remained until the beginning of the 1990s. While these countries implemented Balance of Power policies at the time, in Nicaragua, the *Sandinistas* struggled to remain in power with their Rebel Policies (Child 1992; De La Pedraja Tomán 2013; LeoGrande 1986; Hoekstra 2021).

This mobilization was reduced after peace agreements during the 1990s, but the militarization of interstate disputes persisted, mostly related to border claims. In Guatemala, for example, border claims against Belize were reinforced, keeping a higher resource mobilization (Domínguez et al. 2003; Domínguez 1998; Mares 2001).

Actually, as we can see in Figure 10 below, although the militarization of interstate disputes seems to have reduced, it did not cease in the region during the late 1980s and 1990s. The blue cluster confirms that it remained in Central America. It means that, although these governments were fighting non-state threats, interstate militarization persisted, either due to the transnationalization of domestic conflicts or because of border claims. In the same region, the red cluster also shows a persisting militarization by Guatemala, which claimed part of the Belizean territory.

Figure 10 - Latin American MIDs' network (1985-2000)

Source: own elaboration, based on Maoz et al. (2019) and Mares (2001)

Three other clusters deserve special attention here. The beige one shows Cuba keeping its Rebel Policy until the end of the Soviet Union, militarizing disputes against the US and South Africa under the *Apartheid* regime. In the purple and the orange, we can confirm that the Transnational Threats policy also implied maintaining the militarization of interstate disputes against Ecuador and Venezuela, which implemented a Balance of Power policy at the

time. In the case of the former, territorial disputes provided the *casus-belli* for years of militarized disputes that remained after the incorporation of democracy into ISP. In the case of the latter, the transnational character of the Colombian conflict led to interstate crises, while border claims led to disputes against Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago (Domínguez et al. 2003; Mares and Palmer 2013).

The green cluster represents a different kind of militarization, which is not related to a Balance of Power policy. It is related to Argentina's participation in US-led multilateral initiatives in Haiti, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia. The intervention in Haiti, which had the installation of a democratic regime as one of its *casus-bellis*, also included the Dominican Republic (Metz and Library of Congress 2001; Sikkink 2018).

A last mentionable case of a Balance of Power policy during the 1980s was the Panamanian policy during Manuel Noriega's rule. As soon as he became the *de facto* leader in the country, Noriega raised resource mobilization for at least three reasons: (1) to prepare to protect the Panama Canal, as the responsibility for the canal would be transferred to the country by the end of the 20th century; (2) to face domestic opposition and other groups, such as labor organizations, and (3) to adopt a more proactive action within the context of Central American civil wars. Then, Noriega transformed the Panamanian National Guard, which was closer to a police force, into National Defense Forces, closer to an army. He also doubled both the personnel and the budget of these forces. This policy would become Rebel in the late 1980s, joining Cuba and the *Sandinista* Nicaragua, as the United States increased its opposition to Noriega's regime. Then, after the US invasion in 1989, the Panamanian ISP was transformed into a new Costa Rican-type policy based on Coexistence (Calderon 2000; Gandasegui 1993).

3.2.3 Coexistence

In 1990, Panama decided to adopt an extreme version of a Coexistence ISP. After Noriega's policy and the US invasion, the country abolished its military-like forces - the National Defense Forces. It opted to remain only with public security forces, with a reduced budget and personnel (Calderon 2000). Today, Panama and Costa Rica remain the only Latin American states to adopt such an extreme version of a Coexistence policy.

At the same time, reduced resource mobilization took place in other parts of the region. In the Southern Cone, the inclusion of democracy in ISP coincided with more peaceful relations and incipient defense cooperation. Brazil and Argentina decided to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which also meant the end of their nuclear programs - at least in terms of developing weapons. Both states also created a binational institution, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Account and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), to mutually monitor their nuclear developments (Spektor 2020; Carasales 1995; Redick, Carasales, and Wrobel 1995; Jácome, Milet, and Serbin 2005).

The two countries also led the creation of the Southern Common Market - Mercosur - together with Paraguay and Uruguay. Although being created as an economic integration organization, Mercosur would also deliver benefits in terms of confidence-building measures, reducing resource mobilization, and giving place to some defense cooperation between its members (Hurrell 1998; Malamud 2018; Oelsner 2009; Ricupero 2017; Serbin and Serbin Pont 2016). In Figure 11, we can see, for example, that most intraregional DCAs in force between Latin American countries during the 1990s involved Mercosur members. It is important to note, however, that these low levels of cooperation were not enough to qualify these countries as implementing a Cooperative policy, as I will discuss in the following section. Still, it is possible to say that the four Mercosur members adopted a Coexistence policy at the time.

Figure 11 - Intraregional DCAs in force in Latin America (1990-2000)

Source: own elaboration, based on Kinne (2020)

In the case of Argentina, a peaceful posture was also reciprocated by Chile. In 1984, both states signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship to finish the dispute over the Beagle channel. Then, after the Chilean re-democratization, leaders from both states decided to negotiate to settle the lasting border claims. It gave place to decreasing resource mobilization and increasing confidence building by both sides (Domínguez et al. 2003; Hurrell 1998; Rojas Aravena 1998; 2002). In 1995, Argentina went further and agreed not to use force anymore in its claims over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands (Herz 2010).

3.3 Towards a Cooperative policy: the 2000s

The 2000s in Latin America were characterized by a reduced militarization in the region (Fuccille and Rezende 2013; Tickner and Herz 2012). After some increasing dialogues during the 1990s, as well as settling borders - as mentioned in the last section - it was possible to see a reduction in the number of MIDs in the region: while 9 disputes involved Latin American states in 2000, this number dropped to 2 in 2005. This notion can also be perceived by looking at Figure 12 below and comparing it with Figure 10 in the last section. While a few hotspots remained (i.e., Nicaragua-Honduras, Nicaragua-Costa Rica, Colombia-Venezuela, and Belize-Guatemala), others disappeared (e.g., Peru-Ecuador, Nicaragua-El Salvador).

The change towards a less militarized environment can be assessed by looking at other happenings. In 2002, for example, South American states declared the region a Zone of Peace, and in 2006 they organized the first joint meeting of their defense ministers. Within this context, security and defense issues were incorporated into regional integration policies in a way that, more than militarizing a decreasing number of disputes, states started to discuss intersections in their ISP (Abdul-Hak, 2013; Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012; Sanahuja, 2012).

At the same time, the literature sees a widening security concept in the region during the 2000s by including the role of inequalities, gender, and environmental matters in these policies. These concepts became broader in a way that authors, including myself, already showed in different ways (Carvalho 2019; 2018; Herz 2010; Mathias, Zague, and Santos 2019; Tickner and Herz 2012; Saint-Pierre 2011). Considering that, we should be able to see a new type of policy in the region at the time based on lesser resource mobilization and a

broader conceptualization, right? According to the literature, yes. However, I claim the opposite.

Figure 12 - Latin American MIDs' network (2001-2013)

Source: own elaboration, based on Maoz et al. (2019)

The widening conceptualization did not come together with any particular characteristic in other axes. As I showed at the beginning of the chapter, inequalities were discussed by Latin American states since the NSD, and it was not possible to establish connections between postures, cooperation, and the inclusion of this content during the Cold War (Loveman 1999; Pion-Berlin 1989; Tickner and Herz 2012). If this concept was not new, then it is hard to say that it led to a new policy during the 2000s.

When we look at the other contents - gender and environment - as I show in Figure 13 [15] and in Carvalho (2019), the inclusion of gender and environmental issues in these policies was based on a global trend as a result of international debates. As these matters became more discussed in international arenas, these countries also internalized them. Then, while it is true

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[15] For this plot, I captured mentions to environmental issues by using the terms "environ*" and "climate change", and to gender by using "gend*" and "wom*".

that the extent of this internalization varied between states, it is possible to say that the inclusion of these issues into ISP, to a greater or lesser extent, occurred in the entire region.

Figure 13 - Mentions to environmental and gender issues in speeches at the UNGA

Source: own elaboration

If the entire region implemented wider policies, it is possible to infer that this broader conceptualization is not necessarily associated with a particular posture or cooperative behavior. Countries such as Venezuela and Colombia mobilized higher resources even after including these issues on their ISP. The wider conceptualization did not prevent them from almost getting into war in 2008, for example (Rojas Aravena 2014). The same applies to Nicaragua, which continued to militarize disputes with its neighbors. This is not to mention that these issues do not help us identify why the military force was used, making them unuseful for our typology. In none of these cases these components could be useful to help identify intentions in deploying the military force.

On the other hand, countries such as Guatemala and the Dominican Republic mixed a wider security policy with a more peaceful posture and less cooperative behavior, while Brazil and Argentina were highly cooperative and mobilized few resources but also mentioned these

matters. Therefore, as it is hard to provide a classification based on a combination of a kind of posture, cooperative behavior, and a wider ISP conceptualization with increasing mentions to inequalities, gender, and environment, I claim it did not give place to a type of ISP. As I already discussed, only the Crimes and the Anti-Hegemonic contents proved analytically useful to my purposes.

If the wider conceptualization was not enough to characterize a new kind of policy, the same could not be said about cooperation - especially in South America. This subregion saw several different cooperative initiatives during the 2000s, either bilaterally or multilaterally. The most representative of them was probably the creation of the South American Defense Council by the end of 2008, which bolstered cooperative initiatives, including confidence-building measures and the joint-development of equipment (Bragatti 2019; Carvalho 2021; Mijares 2018; Vaz, Fuccille, and Rezende 2017). Either by coincidence or not, this cooperation came together with a reduction of MIDs between most South American states, as we can see by comparing Figure 12 to Figure 10. Coupling these two axes, together with the absence of particular contents, allows us to talk about a new type of ISP: a Pro-Democracy Security Cooperation policy.

3.3.1 Pro-Democracy Security Cooperation

The Pro-Democracy Security Cooperation policy that emerged in the region during the 2000s was characterized by more intraregional cooperation and less resource mobilization, together with a low focus on crimes and anti-imperialistic issues. Its main representatives were some of the South American countries, which strengthened multilateral defense cooperation within the South American Defense Council. As I show in Carvalho (2021), it included several (128) initiatives such as joint-military exercises, common protocols, the joint development of aircraft, common protocols regarding natural disasters, and a standard methodology to report military expenditure. At the same time, in Mercosur, cooperation increased, including joint-military exercises and a Regional Intelligence Center (Oelsner 2009).

Bilateral cooperation also advanced in the region at the time. In Figure 14, we can see the network of intraregional DCAs in effect at the time. Once again, we can see that almost all of them were signed by South American states.

Figure 14 - DCA network (2001-2010)

Source: own elaboration, based on Kinne (2020)

Figure 14 already shows us the main cases of such a cooperative ISP: Brazil and Argentina. Brazil, the largest country in the region, tried to be a protagonist in bolstering regional cooperation. It tried to increase dialogues with all states in the region, sharing expertise and technologies, such as systems for border protection. The country also led the negotiations to create the South American Defense Council, where it was ahead of 19 initiatives - the second country that most coordinated initiatives within SADC (Carvalho 2021; Oelsner 2009; Vaz, Fuccille, and Rezende 2017). At the same time, it kept its posture of mobilizing fewer resources while also not highly emphasizing crimes and anti-imperialistic issues in its foreign policy.

Argentina also implemented a highly Cooperative policy. Within SADC, it was the most proactive country, leading 28 projects, including developing a common training aircraft and organizing several joint-military exercises. It also hosted the Center for Strategic and Defense Studies to bolster the production of knowledge about defense in the region (Carvalho 2021). In bilateral terms, after settling borders with Chile during the late 1980s and 1990s, it developed increasing dialogues which, during the 2000s, converted into joint-military training

and the proposal to create a joint force for UN Peace Operations, named *Cruz del Sur*. With Brazil, it reinforced the capabilities of ABACC in maintaining the region as a nuclear-free zone (Spektor 2020).

Chile also provided a remarkable case for such a policy. More than strengthening its cooperative relations with Argentina, it led 14 initiatives within SADC, including elaborating a standard methodology to report defense expenditure. At the same time, it kept resource mobilization at a lower level and tried to negotiate interstate disagreements, including the Bolivian claim about its access to the sea, using diplomatic means. During the 2000s, other countries implemented this type of policy, such as Bolivia, Uruguay, and Peru.

3.3.2 Coexistence

While some states decided to increase regional defense cooperation, most countries in the region opted to maintain a Coexistence policy during the 2000s or implemented such a policy before enrolling in an increasing number of cooperative initiatives. In Central America, for example, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador implemented such a policy at the time after resolving several inter and intrastate disputes from the past times. Costa Rica and Panama kept their more extreme Coexistence policy by (1) maintaining a lower resource mobilization, (2) not emphasizing particular contents, and (3) not engaging in a highly cooperative policy.

In the Dominican Republic, the policy was kept by maintaining a lower resource mobilization, mostly aimed at controlling migration flows from Haiti. In Mexico, during the first half of the 2000s, the Coexistence policy was kept until Felipe Calderón decided to break the *pax narcotica*. In South America, such a policy could also be seen in Peru and Ecuador after settling their border claims in 1998 or by states such as Uruguay before increasing their emphasis on cooperative initiatives.

3.3.3 Balance of Power

Balance of Power policies were not common during the 2000s, as nearly all countries in the region kept low resource mobilization. As we will see in the following sections, when

higher mobilization levels happened, they were often related to specific contents, such as anti-hegemony or crimes.

3.3.4 Transnational Threats

During the 2000s, Colombia kept its Transnational Threats policy and even intensified it after *Plan Colombia* and when the "War on Drugs" was matched with the "War on Terrorism," including an approach regarding FARC and other *guerrillas* as terrorist groups. The country increased militarization in the dispute against paramilitary groups by sending the army to fight these organizations in rural areas of the country. There were also other measures, such as declaring a state of siege in the country (Dugas 2003; Echandía Castilla 2008; Sikkink 2018).

In the middle of the 2000s, another government joined Colombia in this policy. After Felipe Calderón took office in Mexico, he decided to change the previous *pax narcotica* - based on a higher degree of conviviality between the state and drug dealers - to confront organized crime. Calderón's policy was based on an increasing militarization of this domestic dispute, which also reflected in a rising number of deaths (Morton 2012; Watt and Zepeda Martínez 2012).

While Mexico's policy was mostly restricted to its own territory, the Colombian ISP trespassed its own borders - sometimes without any authorization from its neighbors. In 2008, when coupled with a Rebel Policy adopted by Venezuela, it led to a regional crisis and almost a war. I will explain it better in the next section.

3.3.5 Rebel Policy

While Cuba remained the only country implementing a Rebel Policy during the 1990s, Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez revived such a policy during the 2000s - especially after remaining in power after a coup attempt in 2002. Chávez became a critic of the global liberal order and the United States and tried to propose an alternative regional order. By using an oil-based clientelistic diplomacy, he created institutions, such as the Bolivarian Alternative for Our Americas (ALBA) and PetroCaribe, which allowed him to gather support for his policies

in exchange for oil and other financial advantages (Carvalho and Belém Lopes 2022; Rojas Aravena 2014; Mijares 2017).

Within this context, his anti-hegemonic policy was coupled with an increased resource mobilization in order to achieve his ISP objectives. While implementing a nationalist policy, he reinforced Venezuelan border claims against Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. At the same time, Chávez allegedly supported FARC in Colombia and resisted any actions adopted by its (geographically) Western neighbor by considering it an instrument for the US rule over the region. More than leading to militarized interstate disputes, in one of these opportunities, the Venezuelan president joined Ecuador in raising its voices against a border violation by Colombia while attacking a FARC hotspot. The crisis almost led to a war putting, on one side, left-wing leaders in Venezuela and Ecuador and, on the other, the US-supported government of Colombia (Abdul-Hak 2013; Corrales and Penfold-Becerra 2011; Domínguez et al. 2003; Giacalone 2013; Mares 2012b; Andrés Serbin and Serbin Pont 2014; Rojas Aravena 2014).

A less famous but still valid case of such a policy during the 2000s was provided by Nicaragua. In 2006, Daniel Ortega, the same who led the *Sandinistas* during the 1980s, took office in the country, once again ahead of FSLN, which was then a political party. Ortega also raised resource mobilization by advancing Nicaraguan territorial claims against Colombia, Honduras, and Costa Rica. At the same time, he joined Chávez's projects and openly criticized the liberal order.

3.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I built a typology for the ISP implemented in Latin America from the mid-1970s to the 2000s based on five types: Cooperative Policy, Coexistence, Transnational Threats, Balance of Power, and Rebel Policy. These policies were classified based on the current literature and some descriptive statistics along three axes: (1) their postures, is to say, levels of resource mobilization, (2) their cooperative behavior, based on how much states cooperated with others, and (3) their conceptualizations, focusing on the intensity in which states adopted two main concepts - fighting the organized crime and criticizing the US hegemony and the liberal order. The classification, as well as its examples, can be found in Table 3 below.

Table 3 - A typology for ISP in Latin America (1975-2010)

Policy	Axes				Examples
	Postures	**Cooperation**	**Conceptualization**		
			Anti-Hegemony	**Crimes**	
Cooperative Policy	< Mobilization	High	Low	Low	Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay (2000s)
Coexistence	< Mobilization	Low	Low	Low	Dominican Republic (1975-2010), Chile (1990s), Cuba (after 1991), Costa Rica (1975-2010), Panama (after 1989), Guatemala (during the 2000s)
Transnational Threats	> Mobilization	Low	Low	High	Colombia (after the 1980s), Peru (1980s and 1990s), Mexico (late 2000s)
Balance of Power	> Mobilization	Low	Low	Low	Argentina (late 1970s and early 1980s), Panama (late 1980s), El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala (late 1970s and 1980s), Peru and Ecuador (until 1998)
Rebel Policy	> Mobilization	Low	High	Low	Cuba (Cold War), Nicaragua (1979-1991 and 2006-2010), Venezuela (after 2002)

Source: own elaboration

This typology, as we can see in Table 3, offers us some analytical leverage. First, it allows us to clearly separate ISP implemented by Latin American states over several decades, showing what was particular to each of them. As I also discussed, other concepts such as democracy, inequalities, gender, and environment, which are commonly seen by the literature as offering distinctive ISP types in the region (Herz 2010; Tickner and Herz 2012; Tickner 2016), do not offer us huge analytical gains in classifying these policies, since (1) there was no pattern in applying them, and (2) they do not help us understand the reasons for mobilizing the military resources.

Second, the typology I proposed proved to match the cases, as we can see in the examples, showing some preliminary validity. Of course, this validity needs further assessment, which will be delivered in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. Before testing it, however, it is necessary to complete the framework to analyze these policies. This is what I will do in the next chapter.

4 COMPLETING THE ISP FRAMEWORK: THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY THEORY

After conceptualizing and operationalizing this dissertation's dependent variable, it is now time to complete the framework presented in Figure 5. We already know what International Security Policies are and how to assess them empirically. But which political factors can influence these policies? How can they vary across states and governments over time? Which are the causal mechanisms through which these variables act? In this chapter, I propose my theory, which I call "International Security Policy Theory" (ISPT), to answer all these questions.

The absence of theories about Latin American security policies (Tickner and Herz 2012; Jenne 2018; Mares 2015) is not without reason. More than the lack of large-n comparative studies (Carvalho, Gabriel, and Belém Lopes 2021; Tickner and Herz 2012), no existing theoretical framework seems applicable to the region. On the one hand, global dynamics seem to affect politics and policies in the area, especially through the US direct or indirect influence over these states, considering its material and geopolitical prominence over the area (Smith 2000; Escudé 1992; Loveman 1999; Buzan and Wæver 2003). At the same time, the material distribution of power seems not to play a role at the subregional level, while border disputes continue to cause insecurity in the region (Mares 2001; Schenoni 2015; Buzan and Wæver 2003; Mares 2012b).

On the other hand, the domestic politics of Latin American states matter to understanding ISP in the region, as these dynamics can either lead to conflicts, such as civil wars, or determine how states will translate international inputs into policies (Ayoob 1983; 1991; Fuccille and Rezende 2013; Buzan and Wæver 2003). Presidential regimes, which prevail in these countries, concentrate several powers to decide countries' foreign and defense policies in the hands of the leaders in office, who own great autonomy to implement their ideas. At the same time, differing levels of democracy across countries impose varying levels of constraints on these leaders, being able to increase or reduce their capacity to implement certain policies, and lead to different kinds of civil-military relations (Mares 2012a; Mares and Palmer 2013; Carey and Shugart 1998; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013; Merke, Reynoso, and Schenoni 2020; Malamud 2015; Pérez-Liñán 2014; Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux 2000; Pion-Berlin 2016; Amorim Neto and Malamud 2015; 2019; 2020).

Considering that, it is possible to say that no single current theoretical approach might be able to address Latin American particularities. A pure realist approach, focusing on the role of anarchy and material capabilities, is surely not enough to explain ISP in the region. First, because we need to look, at least, at the role of leaders and institutions. For example, anarchy and capabilities can explain neither why democratic Argentina behaved differently from authoritarian Argentina during the 1980s nor why Venezuelan ISP changed from Rafael Caldera to Hugo Chávez. Second, because the proposed concept of ISP, while having a state-centric and military component, is also open to broader conceptions. Third, although two currents within the realist scholarship - namely Neoclassical Realism and Peripheral Realism - can provide some valuable insights to think about these dynamics, especially by incorporating the role of domestic variables, it does not account for the mechanisms of a necessary causal chain to explain ISP outcomes. Anarchy, for example, does not have any direct role in defining these policies in Latin America. As I claim in the next section, the international factor that most matters for the region, at least since the 20th century, is not whether the global order is uni or bipolar, for example, but how the United States approaches the region.

At the same time, when we look at the domestic level, purely liberal, institutional, and psychological approaches seem not suitable for the model by themselves. First, policy formulation and implementation in the region depend on integrating different domestic mechanisms, such as leaders and regimes. Second, they can account for only a small part of the explanation, leaving aside international drivers of state action. It is not possible to understand ISP in peripheral regions without looking at the role of great powers in influencing these policies. In the case of Latin America, for example, while the US influence does not exercise a deterministic role in these policies, it surely determines most of the available options for these states. At this point, it is also possible to say that constructivism and other approaches seem inapplicable to this puzzle. While ISP has an ideas-based component, it is also about how states deal with material power.

Actually, why should we be tied to a single framework? In this dissertation, I join authors such as Lake (2011; 2013), and Sil and Katzenstein (2010), in saying that we should not. As I discussed, paradigmatic approaches do not offer us analytical inputs for this research. Nor do other approaches, which leads us to the need to formulate a new approach. Then, I choose to break free from the straitjackets provided by these paradigms, keeping only the analytically useful parts. I combine realist elements, especially the role of great powers in

influencing peripheral states' policies, with institutionalist variables and mechanisms, focusing on the role of domestic institutions in order to explain ISP implemented by Latin American states.

As a note on the validity of my construct, the fact that I am designing and testing my theory using the case of Latin America does not restrict its validity to this region. On the contrary, its key points (relations between great powers and peripheral states and the role of domestic variables) also hold for other peripheral areas around the world. It means that, although I am building and testing it based on the Latin American case, it can be extended to other regions after future research.

It is now time to present the variables and mechanisms in my theory. I do that by dividing this chapter into six sections, one corresponding to each variable and related causal mechanisms in the model and another one aiming to introduce alternative explanations and the role they have *vis-a-vis* my theory, together with this introduction and a concluding section. In the following section, I introduce the role of great powers in shaping Latin American ISP, focusing on the US actions towards the region and its possible impacts on each ISP axis. In sections 4.2 to 4.3, I discuss the role of domestic variables by looking at leaders and domestic institutions, respectively. In these three sections, I propose hypotheses on how these variables affect ISP at the disaggregated level, which is to say, how each of these variables can affect ISP postures, conceptualization, and cooperation. Then, in section 4.4, I discuss alternative hypotheses that concur with my theory. Finally, in section 4.5, I use the proposed hypotheses to discuss how they influence ISP at the aggregated level - is to say, how they can lead states to implement a Pro-Democracy Security Cooperation, Coexistence, Balance of Power, Transnational Threats, or a Rebel Policy. In the same section, I conclude by summarizing the entire theoretical model I am proposing in this dissertation and presenting the predictions generated by my theory.

4.1 Power distribution and great power action

One of the starting points of my argument comes from realism: power distribution is a key to understanding state behavior within the international system. It determines the available options to act, searching for maximizing states' interests. First, the more power a country has, the more options it has to perform and the wider its "margins of safety in dealing

with the less powerful" (Waltz 1979, pp. 194-195). Second, it defines the leaders of a system and how they will relate to each other, making it possible to understand who are the great powers and the polarity of the system.

Considering that, I also adopt a realist conception of power, understanding it as the material capabilities a state can deploy to reach its objectives. Some usual measures to assess it include

> state's gross domestic product (GDP); level of annual defense spending (in absolute terms, as a percentage of GDP, or as a percentage of government expenditures); the size and the composition of the armed forces; military research and development; the size of the population, as well as demographic trends within the population; natural resource endowments; and the size of territory (Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016, pp. 44).

The global distribution of power is a key issue in my model. However, instead of a variable, it gives place to an assumption. To be more specific, I assume that my theory is about states that are at the periphery of the international system. Consequently, their options to act are constrained by this peripheral position, which, in the Latin American case, did not vary over history (Escudé 2016; 1992; Schenoni and Escudé 2016; Cardoso and Faletto 2004; Jaguaribe 1979). What varied, however, was how great powers approached the region over the years - and this is, thus, the first variable of my model.

During the 19th century, powers such as the United Kingdom, France, and the United States influenced these policies (Buzan and Wæver 2003; Loveman 1999; Schwarcz, Azevedo, and Costa 2002; Bandeira 1995) - which means that any analysis of ISP in the region at the time must consider how these powers approached the region. Then, during the 20th century, following the Monroe Doctrine, the United States consolidated its role as the main power in influencing the region: "[Latin] America for [the North] Americans" (Smith 2000; Buzan and Wæver 2003; Mares 2001; 2012a). As my analysis begins in the 20th century, the US influence over Latin American ISP represents the first key variable of my model. If we were talking about other regions in the same period, other powers should be included, such as France in the context of post-colonial Africa.

As the leader of the Western Hemisphere since the beginning of the 20th century, the United States was able to influence the costs and benefits associated with the different options Latin American (and other peripheral) states had available to act in terms of security outputs.

By using different mechanisms, from a "big stick" to being a good neighbor, the US showed these nations that they should choose options that the great power could accept; otherwise, they would be punished (Smith 2000). Of course, each different way the US used to approach each Latin American state over time can lead to a different outcome. The result of this influence is not uniform, based on a hegemonic management view (Gilpin 1981). We need to keep in mind that different inputs can lead to different results.

The American approach during the Cold War, for example, was completely different from what happened during the "War on Terror." While during the former the US attributed greater importance to Latin American states in order to avoid the "communist" threat, translating this importance into more resources deployed to influence these policies, during the "War on Terror," it paid nearly no attention to these states (Mares 2016; Herz 2002; Smith 2000; Domínguez and Fernández de Castro 2016). It also varied within the Cold War itself. After the Cuban Revolution, for example, the approach was to increase support for Latin American states to fight left-wing supporters using (nearly) all necessary means. However, under Jimmy Carter, for example, the US changed this approach and ceased support for authoritarian governments which did not comply with human rights guidelines (Sikkink 2018; Wright 2001; Pastor 1988).

American action towards Latin American states' ISP varied not only longitudinally but also cross-sectionally. During the 1980s, for example, while US president Ronald Reagan attributed greater emphasis to Central America, using several resources to intervene in civil wars in the region, he paid little attention to South American states. Another illustration for this point took place more recently, within the context of the "War on Terror." While the US paid nearly no attention to most of the region, Colombia continued to receive American support as the "War on Drugs" in the country was also included in the context of the global fight against terrorism (Sikkink 2018; Carothers 1991; Wiarda 1992; Buzan and Wæver 2003). This differing level of resources spent with the region tends to produce a varying American capacity to convince these states to follow its priorities, thus leading to a different ISP.

But how can this differing great power action affect peripheral countries' ISP? First, they create different instances to increase political access to policy-makers from these countries. Within the context of a Nazi threat, the United States led the creation of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), for example, to bring defense policy-makers of all

countries in the Western Hemisphere together in the same institution where most rules were proposed by the US. Then, after the beginning of the Cold War, the IADB became aimed at discussing anti-communist issues, and new institutions were created, such as the Organization of the American States (OAS). While the IADB provided the US with increased access to defense policy-makers, OAS allowed further dialogues with leaders and foreign policy-makers. There were also US-led initiatives in order to get increased access to training Latin American militaries within the School of the Americas and the Inter-American Defense College (Shaw 2006; Abdul-Hak 2013; Gill 2004; Meek 1975).

A second mechanism great powers can use to influence these policies is providing support for peripheral states in exchange for compliance with these powers' objectives. By support, I mean either economic resources (e.g., foreign aid) or other issues, such as military support. By providing peripheral states with resources, they can convince these governments to pursue their foreign policy objectives (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Kegley and Hook 1991; Sawyer, Cunningham, and Reed 2017; Tickner and Morales 2015). During the Cold War, for example, specifically after the Cuban Revolution, the United States started providing foreign aid for Latin American states under the Alliance for Progress. The initiative was an attempt to prevent communist revolutionaries from becoming stronger in the region while also keeping governments in the region in line with American positions, providing them with incentives in exchange for political support (Taffet 2012; Ricupero 2017). A more contemporary example of the provision of foreign aid and military support is the US support to Colombia in the "War on Drugs."

Sometimes convincing a government is not possible. In these cases providing hindrances to this government from accomplishing its international security objectives becomes an option, leading us to our third mechanism. Great powers can act (often successfully) towards raising barriers for peripheral states not to adopt certain ISPs at certain times. They can do it by raising sanctions or destabilizing regimes, using either covert or overt operations, or even supporting non-state groups to fight against governments (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011; Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér 2011; O'Rourke 2018). Illustrations of this in the case of Latin America were the Bay of Pigs invasion, the US support to the *Contras* in Nicaragua, and the operation in Panama in 1989 (Wright 2001; Westad 2007; LeoGrande 1986).

Therefore, using the aforementioned mechanisms, great powers can influence ISP in peripheral regions. In the specific case of this dissertation, it is to say that the United States was able to influence ISP implemented by Latin American states over the 20th century and, even more specifically, after World War II. It leads us to the following causal chain:

| US ENGAGEMENT ON LATIN AMERICAN STATES' ISP | -> | SUPPORT (E.G., MILITARY, ECONOMIC) AND DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH POLICY-MAKERS, SUPPORT FOR NON-STATE ACTORS | -> | ISP |

Having that in mind, I propose some hypotheses that can move this mechanism, related to the already presented ISP axes. First, I claim that if a great power uses its resources to change a peripheral state's ISP, it necessarily leads to increased resource mobilization - this is to say, it changes ISP postures. If a great power spends its resources on influencing a peripheral state's ISP by providing incentives for this country, it tends to result in more resources mobilized by this state towards complying with great powers' interests. On the other side, if this engagement takes place in terms of hindrances (e.g., support to non-state armed groups), it also changes postures because these states will try to resist these barriers. It leads us to the following hypotheses - which we all be renumbered in section 4.5:

H1 - The more resources the US spends to support a Latin American state, the more ISP resources this state tends to mobilize.

H2 - The more hindrances the US raises against a Latin American state, the more ISP resources this state tends to mobilize.

At the same time, it is important to consider the conceptualization great powers want to include in these policies. First, we need to consider the priority attributed to crimes on these policies. Although the US government declared the "War on Drugs" during the 1970s, it was during the 1980s and 1990s that presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush decided to "escalate" the war and also exported this discourse. Latin America was one of the places to which this speech could be sent, considering that it was already a drug exporter (Bagley 1989; 1988; Sikkink 2018; White 2019). Considering that, it is plausible to expect that the US could use its resources to convince some Latin American states to also escalate the fight against drug dealers to comply with the American policy. It leads us to the following hypothesis:

H3 - The more resources the US spends with a Latin American state, the more it tended to include crimes, especially drug trafficking, in its ISP.

On the other hand, it is also possible to think that hindrances imposed by the US on certain governments can lead them to adopt a more anti-hegemonic conceptualization on their ISP. More than mobilizing more resources towards resisting these hindrances, these governments also tend to use their rhetoric to denounce and resist the United States and to propose alternatives to the US hegemonic management. If that is true, then we can see a higher emphasis on this component when these hindrances exist, leading us to the following hypothesis:

H4 - The more hindrances the US raises against a Latin American state, the more this country will adopt an anti-hegemonic conceptualization in its ISP.

4.1.1 The (non-)role of the regional power distribution

If power distribution is an important element of our model, then another obvious step should be to also look for the role of regional power distribution. However, for the specific case of Latin America, I did not consider it in the model. Let me explain why.

Schenoni (2015) provides an interesting point for considering it. While analyzing South American countries, the author tests the following neorealist hypothesis: states which possessed higher military capabilities (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela) were supposed to balance the Brazilian unipolarity in the region, while the others (Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay) tended to adopt a bandwagoning behavior. According to the author (2015, pp. 7), realist expectations suggested that "the more the major regional power, Brazil, grows, the greater the incentives for secondary regional powers [...] to safeguard their autonomy from their rising neighbor." However, these predictions held true only under certain domestic political characteristics: government stability, institutionalized party systems, and representative presidents (Chile, Colombia, which adopted a balancing behavior, and Uruguay, which adopted a bandwagoning posture).

Schenoni's findings support the notion that states will not automatically engage in bandwagoning or balancing behavior (and, consequently, an offensive or defensive ISP)

according to their capabilities and systemic inputs. A possible reason for that is that Brazil, the Latin American giant, has not implemented expansionist policies over the late 20th and the 21st centuries, in a way that it is not possible to observe the effects of key variations in the policies of the country with the highest capabilities in the region. Actually, the Latin American giant was not even able to gather followers for a regional leadership project (Malamud 2011; Mares and Trinkunas 2016). At the same time, while Brazil seems to matter for South American dynamics, the same tends not to apply to the Central American ones, which tend to be more connected with the US actions (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998; Buzan and Wæver 2003; Mares 2012a). Considering all that, I see no reason to propose hypotheses connecting regional power distribution and ISP postures.

The same applies to conceptualization. Neither Brazil nor other major countries in the region (i.e., Argentina and Mexico) tried to diffuse any particular ISP conceptualization over the next decades. It is true that Brazil tried to act as a norm entrepreneur in these policies (Tourinho, Stuenkel, and Brockmeier 2016). However, it did not contain the diffusion of specific ISP contents. As there was no attempt to diffuse these values, there can be no claim on the role of regional distribution of power in affecting ISP conceptualization in the region. Even if that was the case, there is also evidence that Brazil was not able to gather followers for this leadership in the region (Malamud 2011; Mares and Trinkunas 2016)**.**

This lack of leadership is also reflected in terms of cooperation. It is true that Brazil played an important role in the creation of the South American Defense Council (Abdul-Hak 2013; Fuccille and Rezende 2013; Vaz, Fuccille, and Rezende 2017). This kind of multilateral cooperation, however, is also dependent on others' efforts. It can be seen, for example, when we look at the Council's initiatives: most activities that led to developing joint policies and interactions were carried out by Argentina and Chile, not Brazil (Carvalho 2021). Then, when we look at bilateral cooperation, it is true that Brazil seemed to be more cooperative during the 2000s, but there is no evidence (nor theoretical causal mechanism) pointing out that it led other states to cooperate between themselves. Considering all of that, I see no reason to include regional power distribution in the model, at least in the case of Latin America.

4.2 Leaders

One of my theory's key points is recognizing that states are not "black boxes" that merely react to international or threat inputs. It is necessary to accept that "[s]tate action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state" (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 2002). Every policy implemented by a country was necessarily planned, decided, and implemented by some of its representatives (Dye 2017). Hence, if we want to investigate ISP, understanding the policy-makers behind these measures is undoubtedly an exciting way to do it. Everyone has opinions, beliefs, cultures, and interests. No one is equal. And it reflects in policy-making processes in the sense that different decision-makers can make different decisions about the same problems. This is why looking properly at these individuals can help us to understand foreign policy, especially for the leaders of the nations.

Consider, for example, Germany during the interwar period. After signing the Versailles Treaty, one could expect a more deterrent ISP by Berlin at that time if we look at the international systemic factors. National capabilities were drastically reduced because of war losses and the Treaty's clauses. Although Germany traditionally was a revisionist state, the international system and even the German people were still horrified by the frightening consequences of World War I. There were no systemic incentives for the country's expansionist policy adopted during the 1930s, risking engaging in another war. The main explanation lies in domestic politics. First, there was great dissatisfaction with the Weimar Republic. Germans wanted to build a different country. But also, it is unimaginable that the country would adopt an aggressive policy if it was not for Adolf Hitler's aspirations. And to understand these measures, we must look at Hitler himself (Byman and Pollack 2001; Zakaria 2001).

Hitler is just an extreme example of what we are talking about here. It is possible to cite some practical examples for our purposes. It is unlikely that Hugo Chávez's military career produced no effects on the Venezuelan ISP during Chávez's presidency. The same applies to Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. It is also plausible that after being tortured during the Brazilian military dictatorship, former president Dilma Rousseff would support the Brazilian Truth Commission, which had as its object to elucidate human rights violations during the authoritarian rule.

Independently of states' political regimes and systems, either in authoritarian or democratic places, with presidential and parliamentary systems, leaders - heads of state and government, to be more precise - have institutional mechanisms through which they can influence ISP - or any public policy. Although varying in extent, leaders often control agendas and bureaucracies related to these policies. Consequently, they can use these mechanisms to put forward their political objectives (Wood and Waterman 1991; Huber and Shipan 2002; Volden 2002; Hammond 1986; Kingdon 2011; Baumgartner and Jones 2009; True, Jones, and Baumgartner 2007; Santos forthcoming). It means that when the chief executive wants to change some policy, they are often able to do it by (1) advancing their political objectives for debates by both the legislative and bureaucracies and (2) choosing the bureaucrats who will formulate and implement these policies. If they have no interest, the policy tends to remain the same way, with only some incremental changes, according to external variables.

In the specific case of Latin America, we are talking about countries where presidential political systems prevail. Presidents often concentrate great capacity to define policy agendas in nearly all issue areas in the region, which means that their conceptions might also be introduced into ISP. There is plenty of evidence about the presidential impact on foreign policy in the region (Jenne, Schenoni, and Urdinez 2017; Merke, Reynoso, and Schenoni 2020; Carvalho 2018; Belém Lopes and Carvalho 2020; Hey 1997; Mora and Hey 2003; Mares and Palmer 2013; Amorim Neto and Malamud 2015).

Also, it is true that conventional wisdom points to a lack of political interest in military issues - and it includes the politicians themselves (Bruneau 2013; Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux 2000; Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2007). However, in this dissertation, I intend to challenge this conception partly. In Carvalho (2018), for example, I present some changes that occurred in defense policies since left-wing presidents took office in most Latin American countries, such as an increasing focus on regional cooperation. As I mentioned, I assume there is a lack of people's attention to these issues. However, I claim that presidents may influence defense (and foreign) policy. Despite the lack of a broad debate about ISP, presidents can input their ideas in a top-down manner when they have the interest. Consequently, looking at leaders' images is relevant to understanding both foreign and defense policies - is to say, ISP as a whole.

First of all, Latin American presidents have the power to propose and constrain agendas, which allows them to introduce their propositions while negating others (Carey and

Shugart 1998; Mares and Palmer 2013). Second, Amorim Neto and Malamud (2019; 2020) note that presidents can also control diplomatic bureaucracies in the region, consisting of another instrument for them to influence ISP[16]. Military bureaucracies are a little more complicated to deal with since it is related to civil-military relations - I will approach them in the next section. Still, it is also possible to say that presidents have a role in these bureaucracies, being able to define Defense Ministers (or equivalent) and determine some agendas, depending on the stage of civil-military relations.

More than controlling ISP agendas and bureaucracies, Latin American presidents themselves are often the actors who implement these policies. Presidential diplomacy is an essential characteristic of Latin American foreign policy (Danese 2017; Malamud 2015; Merke, Reynoso, and Schenoni 2020; Jenne, Schenoni, and Urdinez 2017; Amorim Neto and Malamud 2019). Chief executives carry their proposals to their pairs, conducting state interests outside borders according to their views and assuming a personal attitude towards, for our interests, ISP. I summarize this discussion in the following causal mechanism:

LEADERS -> PRESIDENTIAL DIPLOMACY AND CONTROL -> ISP
OVER POLICY AGENDAS AND BUREAUCRACIES

But what exactly can activate this mechanism? How does it change the analyzed axes? In the case of Latin America, I propose that one variable can answer these questions: the agreement with the liberal order. At this point, before talking more about it, I must acknowledge the existence of a broad literature discussing the role of ideology in defining foreign policy in the region (Jenne, Schenoni, and Urdinez 2017; Merke, Reynoso, and Schenoni 2020; Amorim Neto and Malamud 2015; Carvalho 2019; Riggirozzi 2014; Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012; Mathias, Zague, and Santos 2019). I agree that leaders' ideas and ideologies can influence these policies and that this influence can reach ISP. However, I disagree with the common explanation about why.

A common point of this literature is that left-wing governments tend to pay more attention to issues such as social, gender, and environmental matters, and this would lead to the implementation of these concepts on ISP. However, in the last chapter, I already presented preliminary evidence that this proposition does not necessarily hold empirically. Here, I also

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[16] Of course, there are often limits to presidential action. We will discuss it in the next section when talking about domestic institutions.

hold that this conception is not theoretically sustainable: there is no theoretical reason to think that left-wing leaders are necessarily more favorable to gender and environmental matters. If we think about a traditional socio-economic division between left and right-wing leaders, based on their views about the need for the state to intervene (or not) in reducing economic inequalities (Luna and Kaltwasser 2014), it means that this cleavage should remain mostly in terms of these economic inequalities. The role of gender, environment and other issues constitute other dimensions of political action and should be considered separately.

Let me illustrate this point using the case of Latin America. We can associate some left-wing leaders, such as Rousseff in Brazil, and Kirchner in Argentina, with a more feminist and environmental agenda than their predecessors. But we could neither see Venezuela's Chávez as a feminist leader nor Nicaragua's Ortega as an environmental gladiator (Wiesehomeier 2010; Wiesehomeier and Benoit 2009; Wiesehomeier and Doyle 2012). At the same time, in the case of ISP, the role of inequalities is not a particular left-wing flag. It was raised even by right-wing military leaders during the 20th century (Pion-Berlin 1989; 1988) in a way that tends to be more related to the peripheral position of the region.

Another possible claim is that left-wing leaders tend to reduce resource mobilization towards international security, as they tend to use state resources in other areas, such as social policies. To put it in other words, authors claim that the socio-economic views of left-wing leaders lead to reduced resource mobilization (Van Dalen and Swank 1996; Whitten and Williams 2011). It is definitely true for cases such as Bachelet's Chile. This, however, does not hold true for Ortega's Nicaragua, or Castro's Cuba, which intensively mobilized resources during the Cold War. In theoretical terms, it can be explained by the fact that socio-economic views tend to matter to understand what is implemented inside state borders (e.g., social programs). However, if we want to understand what explains policies with international meanings, we need to look at foreign policy views. Therefore, a simple left-right wing cleavage is theoretically unuseful for our purposes.

This is the point where the acceptance of the liberal order becomes important. This is the ideological component that matters for ISP, as it is related to the international level. A higher level of rejection regarding the liberal order necessarily means a costlier ISP. First, because rejecting the system also means proposing an alternative for it, and such a proposal demands resources. It means, for example, supporting actors willing to join the cause or providing incentives for convincing others to become allies. Second, because choosing to

break the rules means that the system will react to punish rule-breakers, especially in a region highly influenced by the United States, which is the leader of such an order. This reaction often comes in terms of sanctions, embargoes, and overt and covert operations (Escudé 2016; 1992; Schenoni and Escudé 2016; O'Rourke 2018) and demands states mobilize more resources in order to resist these hindrances. It leads us to the following hypothesis:

H5 - more rejection of the liberal order leads to increased ISP resource mobilization.

Another consequence of this rejection tends to be the rise of an anti-hegemonic concept in these states' ISP. This time the relation is more obvious: as they become rule-breakers, they will express their positions, which means openly criticizing the system - and it tends to reach ISP, as it is also made by foreign policy. It can be simply put in the following hypothesis:

H6 - more rejection of the liberal order leads to a more intense anti-hegemonic component in ISP.

Both H5 and H6 can be illustrated by the cases of Castro's Cuba, Ortega's Nicaragua, and, more recently, Chávez's Venezuela. As I discussed in the last chapter, these countries presented both characteristics in their ISP. They also had in common the fact that all of them were highly critics of the liberal order (Wright 2001; Corrales and Penfold-Becerra 2011; Carvalho and Belém Lopes 2022; LeoGrande 1986; Westad 2007; Andrés Serbin and Serbin Pont 2014).

Leaders can also play an indirect role on ISP, considering their potential impacts on democracy. Anti-democratic leaders, who support the use of political violence to achieve their interests, often tend to either rule in non-democratic regimes or undermine democratic regimes (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013; Haggard and Kaufman 2021). Then, as we will discuss in the next section, ISP suffers the impacts of a non-democratic regime. It leads us to the following mechanism:

NON-DEMOCRATIC/   ->   DEMOCRATIC   ->   ISP
POLITICAL VIOLENT   BREAKDOWN
LEADERS

Of course, I am not saying that democracy breakdown is exclusively caused by non-democratic leaders - there are also other factors. What I am saying is that they can play a role in changing regimes, and, as I will discuss in the next section, regimes can play a role in ISP. Testing their role in changing regimes is not the objective of this dissertation, as it was already tested by authors such as Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013), and Haggard and Kaufman (2021). Based on these authors, I assume that this indirect effect can happen, being important to acknowledge it while not testing it again. Then, discussing the role of regimes in shaping ISP is the objective of the next section.

4.3 Domestic institutions

Leaders' powers tend to be limited by domestic institutions. Not only leaders' but also the role of other policy-makers, especially the armed forces, according to civil-military relations. Being the key specialized bureaucracy to deal with defense issues, militaries tend to try to influence these policies to gather as many resources as they can to accomplish their objectives (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; True, Jones, and Baumgartner 2007; Huntington 1957). Therefore, it is important to look at the limits of these powers.

According to authors such as Maoz and Russett (1993), Morgan and Campbell (1991), Hermann and Kegley (1995), Mares and Palmer (2013), Ripsman (2011), and Huntington (1957), institutional constraints inherent to democratic regimes, such as competitive elections, legislative role in ISP decision-making, civilian control over the military, and even the participation of other bureaucracies, tend to avoid belligerent postures. Higher resource mobilization only takes place when leaders or policy-makers are able to convince several different actors about the validity of this action.

Consider, for example, Snyder's (1994) example of the aggressive ISP adopted by Wilhelmine Germany in the late 1800s and the beginning of the 1900s. The author qualified the country at the time as a "cartelized system" - is to say, when information, resources, and even material strength are concentrated in a particular group. Therefore, some integrants of this group - especially the armed forces, which were not controlled by civilians, and the owners of heavy industries - engaged in campaigns to mobilize mass support for their interests - a belligerent policy. In the end, as they had the main instruments to control a not-so-free media, they were able to influence public opinion, and mass groups became

convinced about the adoption of this kind of attitude. Thus, within this combination of the lack of civilian oversight over the military, elite and military pressure, and social acceptance, more resources were mobilized towards ISP (Posen 1984; Snyder 1994).

In a democratic system, together with better civilian control over the military, it would be harder. First, because there should be institutional and bureaucratic constraints for leaders, militaries, and owners of industries to effectively raise resource mobilization. Also, there would be more information available to the mass public based on freedom of expression and civil liberties, thus making leaders more accountable. This accountability would thus be a key issue for leaders to decide whether to engage in electorally risky behavior since they tend to want to remain in power. Snyder (1994) himself shows that, in the late 1870s, when British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli was adopting an increasingly expansionist attitude, his political opponent, William Gladstone, engaged in a campaign to convince the British people not to support it. As his party won the 1880 elections, this overexpansionist posture ceased for a moment.

At this point, more than institutional constraints, we can observe that convincing voters is another mechanism that leads democracy to reduce the probability of a more aggressive policy. As leaders want to be re-elected, they choose, especially in democracies, policies that will not cause great dissatisfaction in their electorate (Mares 2001; Mares and Palmer 2013). Then, in a region in which civilians tend not to care about ISP (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2007; Bruneau 2013), getting people's support tends to mean emphasizing other areas than international security.

Civil-military relations are also an important mechanism that can influence these policies in democratic regimes. On the one hand, the military is trained to identify and combat threats, and thus, they tend to focus states' resources on accomplishing their missions when they have increased prominence in ISP policy-making. On the other hand, when increased civilian oversight exists over the armed forces, it tends to affect ISP, as civilians tend to (1) reduce threat perception in order to have greater control over the military, as well as (2) allocate resources to other policies, as they will often have a broader dialogue with different governmental areas (Pion-Berlin 2016; Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux 2000; Bruneau 2013; Bruneau and Goetze Jr. 2006).

Finally, it is interesting to consider that states often externalize their domestic behavior. Domestic institutions, procedures, and laws are often spread in states' actions

around the world - which means that democratic states tend to spread the democratic word, and the same applies to autocracies (Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1993). It leads us to the following causal mechanism:

REGIME TYPE -> INSTITUTIONAL AND BUREAUCRATIC CONSTRAINTS, -> ISP
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS,
EXTERNALIZATION OF STATE'S BEHAVIOR

The first hypothesis regarding this mechanism is based on the Democratic Peace Theory, considering the aforementioned examples. If democratic states are less likely to fight each other, it also means that they will tend to mobilize fewer resources towards their ISP objectives, considering the incentives to do so (Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1993). It leads us to the following hypothesis:

H7 - The more democratic a state is, the fewer resources it tends to mobilize regarding ISP.

This hypothesis can also be written in the opposite way, which means:

H7 - Less democratic states tend to mobilize more resources.

Of course, democracy by itself cannot avoid the existence of belligerent ISPs. In the British case, for example, Gladstone's block to Disraeli's overexpansionist policy did not mean low resource mobilization by Great Britain at that time. Being one of the most powerful states in the world, the country continued to implement its imperialistic policy around the world. It only meant a less aggressive attitude. Think, for example, about the fact that, as authors such as Snyder (1994) and Zakaria (2001) show, although being a democracy, the United States adopted, during certain periods, a more aggressive ISP. What my model predicts is not that, being democratic, the US should mobilize fewer resources than an autocratic Cambodia. What it says is basically that if the US was not democratic, its ISP postures would probably consist of higher resource mobilization.

This conception is important because there is a literature showing that democracy in Latin America did not necessarily avoid militarized disputes - which means that it was not likely to reduce resource mobilization (Mares 2001; Mares and Palmer 2013; Domínguez et

al. 2003; Hurrell 1998). My point is not that democratic Colombia should mobilize fewer resources than the Dominican Republic under authoritarian rule, for example. My point is that democratic Chile mobilized fewer resources than autocratic Chile, for example.

One last hypothesis should be put here, now focused on cooperation and civil-military relations. We are talking about a region in which civilian control over the armed forces emerged since the re-democratization cycle during the 1980s and, although not being very consolidated until the current days, it exists (Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux 2000; Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2007; Bruneau 2013). Part of the process of reinforcing this control includes, first, finding missions for the militaries under democratic contexts. Second, it is also important to develop better relations with neighboring states so that the militaries have fewer incentives to claim increased space and resources in domestic politics. One interesting way to do both things is to develop cooperative agreements with neighbors regarding defense issues so that militaries from all the involved states can build confidence between themselves while also engaging in productive activities. Having no clear external threat leads to a lesser margin for the military to claim more resources (Pion-Berlin 2016; Mares 1998). If that is true, it leads us to the following hypothesis:

H8 - Greater civilian oversight over the military tends to increase security-related cooperation.

4.4 Alternative explanations and confounders

It is also important to discuss how my theory relates to the two main alternative explanations for Latin American ISP: threat perception and the global context. First, there are authors discussing how threats can impact states' ISP, especially by making them raise resource mobilization (Jervis 2017; Schweller 2008; Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016; Carpes 2015). In the Latin American case, the existing literature poses border disputes as the main international security threat, considering the poorly defined borders left by the colonial rule and the militarized disputes they already produced in the region (Mares 2001; 2012b; 2012a; Domínguez et al. 2003; Schenoni, Braniff, and Battaglino 2020; Schenoni et al. 2020; Buzan and Wæver 2003). Consequently, one could infer that *the existence of territorial disputes may lead to higher resource mobilization.*

Second, considering a broader discussion regarding the role of the global context in shaping these policies (Mearsheimer 2001; Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016; Taliaferro 2012; Buzan and Wæver 2003), some authors discuss the role of different global contexts on shaping Latin American ISPs. Some of them focus on the role of the US in changing these policies (Mares 2016; Herz 2002; Smith 2000; Sikkink 2018; Martins Filho 1999) - and this discussion led to the hypotheses presented in section 4.1. Others focus on how the global context changed these policies beyond the US influence by looking at the global structure, polarity, and debates (Herz 2010; Tickner and Herz 2012; Fuccille and Rezende 2013; Vaz, Fuccille, and Rezende 2017; Rezende 2014; Mijares 2018; 2020; Domínguez 2016). Their discussion can be summarized in the following points:

- *The bipolar order during the Cold War created higher incentives for these states to mobilize resources for intraregional disputes due to reasons such as the lack of hegemonic management on conflicts, increased US influence over Latin American ISP, and few incentives for confidence-building measures. It also created higher incentives for governments that were more friendly to the USSR to emphasize their anti-US component in ISP, to support the anti-capitalist fight.*

- *The bipolar order during the Cold War provided Latin American states with few incentives for broadening the ISP conceptualization (in this case, to include crimes), as the main global debates were focused on how to deal with the US-USSR dynamics. It also provided few incentives for intraregional cooperation, as the cooperation tended to be more directed to the poles, towards containing the antagonist side.*

- *The post-9/11 world structure provided higher incentives for cooperation in the region. As the attention of the main security debates turned to the Middle East, Latin American states could develop intraregional ties towards collectively improving their capabilities while also building confidence between themselves. Such increasing proximity between these countries also led to reduced resource mobilization in the region.*

My theory does not intend to deny these propositions. On the contrary: I acknowledge that models consist of simplifications of our reality, and thus there are other elements that can

explain ISP in the region. What my theory does is to claim that there is a political use of threats and contextual elements. For example, territorial disputes may exist, but governments may decide whether to escalate them or not, depending on some political factors. The objective of my theory is thus to shed light on political factors that can take place together with other elements in order to produce ISP in Latin America. The other explanations, as we will see, will be included as controls in empirical tests.

4.5 A model to explain international security policies

The eight aforementioned hypotheses tell us how the model expects countries to behave at the disaggregated level. To say it in other words, they express the expected behavior regarding each separate ISP axes. By connecting these hypotheses, we can understand how the model predicts states' behavior towards the five ISP types mentioned in the last chapter. A Pro-Democracy Security Cooperation policy, for example, should be seen in countries that combine variables that led to lower resource mobilization, lower mentions to both crimes and anti-hegemonic issues, and higher cooperation. Balance of Power and Rebel Policies would be seen in the opposite: countries presenting variables that led to higher resource mobilization, lesser cooperation, and lower mentions to crimes. The difference between the two of them is that, in the case of the latter, variables that lead states to raise anti-hegemonic issues should also be present. I summarize this point in Table 4, on the next page, by also presenting the hypotheses regarding the aggregate level and renumbering the aforementioned hypotheses to make them easier to understand. I renumbered the hypotheses so that they are now in line with the aggregated propositions. Coexistence policies are not included since they can be seen as the reference, as it is made by low scores in all axes.

Although Table 4 presents all the propositions in a complete way, I acknowledge its complex structure. Then, Table 5 introduces the predictions made by my theory on the aggregate level - i.e., regarding the five different ISP types - in a simpler way, with examples of expected results. Simply put, according to my theory, Rebel Policies tend to emerge in the presence of more radical anti-hegemonic leaders and in non-democratic regimes. The combination of these two variables accounts for both the more aggressive and the more anti-hegemonic policies. US hindrances to these states can boost these policies, making them even more rebel.

Table 4 - Hypotheses on the aggregated and the disaggregated levels

Hypotheses	Causal Mechanism	Predicted Outcomes
H1: Balance of Power policies are implemented by less democratic countries and also governments that receive support from the US.		
H1.1: Less democratic states tend to mobilize more resources.	Veto Players, Civil-Military Relations, Externalization of Values	+ Mobilization
H1.2: The more resources the US spends to support a Latin American state, the more ISP resources this state tends to mobilize.	Political Contacts, Military Training and Support, Foreign Aid, Supporting non-state groups	+ Mobilization
H2: Rebel Policies are implemented by governments that strongly oppose the liberal order, and are intensified by US hindrances to a government.		
H1.1: Less democratic states tend to mobilize more resources.	Veto Players, Civil-Military Relations, Externalization of Values	+ Mobilization
H2.1: The more hindrances the US raises against a Latin American state, the more resources it tends to mobilize.	Political Contacts, Military Training and Support, Foreign Aid, Supporting non-state groups	+ Mobilization
H2.2: The more hindrances the US raises against a Latin American state, the more this country will adopt an anti-hegemonic conceptualization in its ISP.	Political Contacts, Military Training and Support, Foreign Aid, Supporting non-state groups	+ Focus on Anti-Hegemonic matters
H2.3: The more leaders reject the liberal order, the more anti-imperialistic are their ISP.	Presidential Diplomacy, Agenda and Bureaucracy Control	+ Focus on Anti-Hegemonic matters
H2.4: The more leaders reject the liberal order, the more resources they tend to mobilize.	Presidential Diplomacy, Agenda and Bureaucracy Control	+ Mobilization
H3: Transnational Threats policies are implemented by countries that are influenced by the United States.		
H1.2: The more resources the US spends to support a Latin American state, the more ISP resources this state tends to mobilize.	Political Contacts, Military Training and Support, Foreign Aid, Supporting non-state groups	+ Mobilization
H3.1: The more resources the US spends with a Latin American state, the more it tended to include crimes, especially drug trafficking, in its ISP.	Political Contacts, Military Training and Support, Foreign Aid, Supporting non-state groups	+ Focus on crimes
H4: Pro-Democracy Security Cooperation Policies are implemented by more democratic countries, with greater civilian oversight over the military.		
H1.1: Less democratic states tend to mobilize more resources. (Reverse logic here)	Veto Players, Civil-Military Relations, Externalization of Values	+ Mobilization
H4.1: Greater civilian oversight over the military tends to increase security-related cooperation.	Veto Players, Civil-Military Relations, Externalization of Values	+ Cooperation

Source: own elaboration

Table 5 - Theoretical Predictions

		Domestic level			
		Non-democratic regimes AND Radical Anti-hegemonic leaders	*Democratic Regimes AND Moderate Anti-hegemonic leaders*	*Non-democratic Regimes AND NO Anti-hegemonic leaders*	*Democratic Regimes AND NO Anti-hegemonic leaders*
US influence/intervention	Higher	Rebel Policy Cuba (Cold War) Nicaragua (1980s)	Transnational Threats Peru (Garcia, 1980s) Bolivia (late 1980s)	*If threat perception: Balance of Power* Nicaragua (Somoza) Guatemala (Oscar Mejía) Panama (until 1988) *If no threat perception: Coexistence* Dominican Republic (Balaguer) Panama (Torrijos)	Transnational Threats Colombia (since the 1990s) Peru (Fujimori until 1991) Mexico (Calderón)
	Lower	Rebel Policy Venezuela (since 1999) Nicaragua (since 2006)	Pro-Democracy Security Cooperation Policy Brazil (Lula da Silva, Rousseff) Argentina (Kirchner) Chile (Bachelet) Uruguay (Vázquez, Mujica) Bolivia (Morales)	*If threat perception: Balance of Power* Argentina (Videla, Galtieri) Chile (Pinochet) *If no threat perception: Coexistence* Brazil (Geisel, Figueiredo) Paraguay (Stroessner)	Coexistence Costa Rica (since 1948) Panama (since 1990) Dominican Republic Paraguay (after Stroessner) Brazil (from Sarney to Cardoso)
Notes: (1) Democratic regimes often include greater civilian oversight over the military. (2) Radical Anti-Hegemonic leaders often come with non-democratic regimes, either by taking office on these regimes or by undermining them.					

Source: own elaboration

Balance of Power policies also takes place in non-democratic regimes. However, differently from the Rebel Policies, leaders in these cases are not very anti-hegemonic - otherwise, they would prefer a Rebel behavior. At this point, a control becomes handy to the puzzle: states will only balance an opponent if there is an opponent. It means that, in order for a Balance of Power to take place, there must be either an interstate threat to contain or an objective to accomplish. Otherwise, having no clear reason to balance other countries, a state may choose to coexist with its neighbors.

In democratic states, the US influence becomes especially handy in predicting ISP. A higher influence may lead governments to a Transnational Threats policy, as they tend to raise resource mobilization towards fighting crimes in order to comply with the American "War on Drugs" policy. If the US has no great influence over these countries, then it will depend on the leaders' ideologies. When they moderately refuse the liberal order, they tend to adopt a Pro-Democracy Security Cooperation in an attempt to present some resistance to hegemonic management. If not, coexistence is the most likely result.

This is thus how my theory predicts states' ISP to behave considering the proposed variables. In the next chapter, I start to observe these behaviors empirically by measuring the presence of each of the proposed axes across cases. Then, in Chapter 6, I present a quantitative empirical test of this model through panel data analysis on the disaggregated level - i.e., on the different axes. In Chapter 7, I empirically classify these policies along with the proposed types and test the predictions from Table 5.

5 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES IN NUMBERS: MEASURING THE AXES

It is now time to measure each of the axes I am analyzing to assess International Security Policies in Latin America. Considering the proposed framework, it is necessary to measure the presence and intensity of four components of these policies: ISP postures, ISP cooperation, and, in the case of ISP conceptualization, we need to measure the role of crimes and anti-hegemonic issues. Then, I do this for all Latin American states from 1975 to 2010, having the time scope limited by data availability. Considering the different data sources for each of these components, I use different tools to measure each of them.

This chapter is organized as follows. I begin by building an index to assess states' resource mobilization towards international security - is to say, ISP postures. I do that by using five indicators and merging them in a single index using a rotated Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The elaboration of the index is fully based on my own paper (Carvalho, 2022), in which I propose such an index for all the countries in the world. Then, I measure the contents present in states' ISP conceptualization by looking at their foreign policy priorities, as mentioned in speeches delivered by their representatives at the United Nations General Assembly. Using a Structural Topic Model (STM), I capture the intensity of the two topics I already presented as necessary for the presented typology (crimes and anti-hegemonic issues) in these speeches and use these results as indicators. Finally, I measure ISP cooperation by counting the number of Defence Cooperation Agreements in force with other Latin American states for each state each year.

5.1 ISP Postures

This section is fully based on Carvalho (forthcoming).

I start by building an index to assess ISP postures using a set of indicators, which will be described in detail in the next subsections. I convert these indicators into a single index using a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) - or, to be more specific, a rotated PCA. PCA is a technique to reduce the dimensionality of a given set of variables. In other words, it allows us to convert a wide set of somehow correlated variables (e.g., 5, 8 variables) into a smaller

set of components (e.g., 1 or 2) that are uncorrelated with each other. While doing it, it maximizes the variance in each of these components in an attempt to account for most of the information available in a dataset (Jolliffe 2002; Sanguansat 2012).

What PCA does to the data is an orthogonal linear transformation in a set of variables. Okay, I agree it seems hard to understand, but it becomes clearer in Figures 15 and 16 below, drawn from Jolliffe's (2002) example. Consider a sample with 50 cases and two variables, x_1 and x_2. In Figure 15, we can see that they are very correlated. Then, when we do this orthogonal linear transformation of the data, it is like we have traced a line in the direction of the correlation between both variables, and the result can be observed in Figure 16 when the resulting principal components z_1 and z_2 are presented. Each component is composed by a proportion (loading) of each variable included in the model. Then, the first component, z_1, accounts for most of the variance, as we can see variables more spread along axis X, and the second account for the rest (Jolliffe 2002; Sanguansat 2012). At the end of the day, considering this model with two variables, these two components were able to account for all the variance available in both x_1 and x_2.

Figure 15 - Plot of 50 observations on two variables x_1 and x_2

Source: Jolliffe (2002)

Figure 16 - Plot of principal components resulting from applying a PCA in Figure 15

Source: Jolliffe (2002)

Then, what I will do in this section is use this technique to reduce the dimensionality of a set of indicators for ISP Postures. The difference is that I will use not only two but five indicators.

After reducing dimensionality, I also use a rotation of these components because, sometimes, principal components are hard to understand. Keep in mind that, as I mentioned, each component is composed of a proportion - is to say, a loading - of each indicator, ranging from -1 to 1. In Figure 16, for example, we can suppose that z_1 is composed of $0.7x_1$ plus $0.6\,x_2$. In this case, it is easy to understand that this component is basically a result of the sums of both variables. However, consider, for example, a model in which $z_1 = 0.7\,x_1 + 0.3\,x_2 - 0.5\,x_3 + 0.001\,x_4$. In this case, it is easy to understand that x_1 and x_3 are the main contributors for z_1. It is also possible to say that x_4 is not relevant for this component, considering its low loading. However, what about x_2? Should we consider this small loading as being part of the component or simply ignore it?

In order to avoid this kind of situation, I rotate the components. While rotation is not a standard rule in PCA as it is in Factor Analysis, it tends to make the components easier to interpret. It consists, in our case, in multiplying results by an orthogonal matrix **M,** changing

the positions of the axes regarding the principal components as a consequence (Jolliffe 2002; 1987). I illustrate it in Figure 17. As a result, in our case, with this *varimax* rotation, we have access to an easier interpretation of the principal - actually, rotated - components.

Therefore, in the following subsections, I will present the data used in PCA to obtain the indexes regarding ISP posture and conceptualization. I also provide a closer description of the data in order to build a framework for an increased validity of our results. Then, I discuss their validity after estimating the indexes.

Figure 17 - Rotating the resulting axes after a Factor Analysis (and PCA)

Source: Jolliffe (2002)

In order to calculate an index to measure the postures of a state, we must answer: what indicates a greater or lesser resource mobilization towards accomplishing international security objectives? In Chapter 2, sections 2.5 and 2.6, I presented the answers to this question. A higher military budget and increased military personnel allow us to assess resource mobilization in order to get prepared to defend states' interests. The concession of military support to other actors elsewhere and the militarization of interstate and intrastate

disputes are key indicators of a state deploying its mobilized resources. Then, in the following sections, I will describe each of these indicators, introduce their sources, and show the score Latin American states presented in each of them each year.

As a note, this section is fully based on my own article (Carvalho forthcoming), in which I propose the index to assess ISP postures based on available data about all countries in the world from 1975 to 2010. In this section, I present the same procedure while also getting deeper into descriptive statistics for each indicator in the case of Latin American states, which are the focus of this analysis.

5.1.1 Military Expenditure

The first indicator I use to assess states' resource mobilization is their military expenditure, as reported by the World Bank. In order to input some very important missing data from the original source (e.g., about Cuba and Nicaragua during the *Sandinista* government), I also rely on data from the World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers report, which has been released yearly by the United States Department of State since 1964. Then, considering that my objective is to measure states' mobilization based on their capabilities, not their capabilities themselves, I use the proportion of the GDP spent on military issues as the indicator of military expenditure. Mobilization is not necessarily high if a state spends more than others since it can also be bigger than others, thus demanding more money to protect its interests; it is higher if it mobilizes a greater portion of its resources to defend its interests.

Let me provide an example for this argument. In 1991, while Japan spent US$32,785 billion on military issues, Kuwait spent US$12,924 billion. Does that mean that the first was more aggressive than the latter that year? Japan was at peace at that time. Kuwait was fighting for its survival after Iraq tried to annex its territory. Then, it was only another normal year for Japan, which spent 0.94% of the sum of the goods and services produced in its territory in 1991 (is to say, GDP). For Kuwait, however, that amount represented 117.35% of its GDP in an attempt to defend its survival. This is why I consider the latter much more aggressive than the former that year - and this is why I use military spending as one of the indicators to assess an ISP in a given year. Higher spending might be related to a more aggressive policy, while the contrary applies to lower expenditure.

Figure 18 - Military Expenditure by Latin American states (1975-2010)

Source: own elaboration, based on data from the World Bank and the US Department of State

Figure 19 - Military Expenditure by Nicaragua (1975-2010)

Source: own elaboration, based on data from the World Bank and the US Department of State

Some "macrotrends" can be perceived while looking at Figures 22 and 23, in which I show information about this indicator for all Latin American states for the analyzed period, and confirm the literature presented in Chapter 3. Military expenditure was raised in most Central American countries during the civil wars in the 1980s - especially in Nicaragua, in which the spending was so high that it demanded a separate plot - and reduced after Peace Agreements (Child 1992; De La Pedraja Tomán 2013).

In Cuba, a country that had one of the highest military expenditures (as % of GDP) in the region during the Cold War, a sudden decrease in this indicator took place immediately after the end of the bipolarity, which can be expected because of the end of the Soviet Union. It meant reduced concession of Soviet foreign aid to the country, reducing its capacity to implement a more aggressive policy, as well as the end of disputes between the capitalist and the socialist blocs, in which it was a key actor, by supporting the latter bloc (Wright 2001).

In South America, there was a reducing trend in these values as these countries democratized, as we can see in the cases of Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay, as also pointed out by Lebovic (2001). On the other hand, an increasing expenditure took place

as the so-called "War on Drugs" became more intense in Colombia (Bagley 1988; Echandía Castilla 2008; Buzan and Wæver 2003). In Bolivia and Venezuela, this trend was more uncertain, with plenty of variation over time. In the Venezuelan case, together with Ecuador and Nicaragua, scores related to this indicator also seem to have increased after leaders who presented heavy critics of the liberal order took office from 1999 onwards (Corrales and Penfold-Becerra 2011; Abdul-Hak 2013). In the cases of Costa Rica and Panama, military expenditure is zero since they have no armed forces. In the case of the latter, it was higher during the authoritarian government and especially within the context of the American invasion of its territory (Gandasegui 1993; Calderon 2000; Høivik and Aas 1981; Olander 1996).

This descriptive evidence points to the fact that military expenditure looks like a good indicator to assess Latin American ISP Postures. From a practical point of view, it is part of the process of a state preparing its military force to defend its interests, making sense of looking at it as one of the means to assess this preparation. From an analytical point of view, it allows us to assess some trends in these policies, which meet what is discussed by the local literature.

5.1.2 Military Personnel

Our second indicator is the size of the armed forces in each case. In other words, it indicates most of the manpower (and also womanpower) deployed in implementing a state's defense policy objectives - and, partly, ISP. As my objective is to assess how much of its capabilities a state mobilizes, I use the military personnel as a proportion of the total population as an indicator. Data were retrieved from the sixth version of Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey's (1972) database, containing data until 2016. Bigger armed forces mean increased resource mobilization towards defending states' interests.

Figure 20 - Military Personnel in Latin American states (1975-2010)

Source: own elaboration, based on data from the World Bank and the US Department of State

Then, in Figure 20, we can see similar trends as in the case of military expenditure. Central American countries, especially Nicaragua, presented higher values during the civil wars in the region. The same applied to Cuba during the Cold War. After the end of the bipolar order and the redemocratization in most of the region, there was a decreasing trend in this indicator in most cases. The most remarkable contrary case within this context was Colombia, which increased the size of its armed forces within the so-called "War on Drugs." Venezuela and Bolivia also followed this path under the rule of radical left-wing governments. Overall, from a practical and analytical point of view, this indicator seems to be as useful as military expenditure for the same reasons.

5.1.3 Militarization of Interstate Disputes

The two aforementioned indicators are good proxies to assess how states are preparing their resources for pursuing their international security interests. Then, this third (and the fourth and fifth) indicator is intended to capture whether states deployed their resources. In this section, I approach one of the ways to assess it: the militarization of interstate disputes.

One of the most valuable metrics to assess states' resource mobilization in a given year is to look at how they behaved regarding other states in terms of militarizing interstate disputes. The *rationale* is simple: the more they militarize disputes against other states, the more aggressive they are. Considering that, different measures emerged for assessing these disputes (see Terechshenko 2020; Diehl, Goertz, and Gallegos 2019; Pettersson et al. 2021). In this dissertation, however, I choose the most widely used of them: the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) database (Maoz et al. 2019; Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996), available on the Correlates of War Project website[17].

The first benefit of choosing this proxy relates to the fact that it is widely known, used, and cited, making it an easier indicator to deal with. At the same time, two analytical reasons emerge to justify this choice. First, it provides a very accurate measure, allowing us to assess whether a specific state engaged in MIDs - not only conflicts themselves - in a given year. Second, militarized disputes are multidimensional data. It is not only about militarizing. We also need to look at other indicators in order to assess how a state engaged in these events.

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[17] https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/MIDs

Getting into war is surely more aggressive than violating borders, which in its turn, is more aggressive than just threatening to use force.

Hence, using Jones, Bremer, and Singer's (1996) data, updated by Palmer et al. (n.d.) until 2013, I will be able to assess this multidimensional information accurately, using three indicators. First, the number of MIDs a state participated in a given year is crucial to understand how aggressive it was. The more it militarized disputes in a year, the more aggressive it was towards defending its interests. Second, the higher level of hostility in a MID allows us to observe the intensity of the violence used by a state. The number of fatalities in a dispute is also important to understand this intensity, being the third indicator in this analysis.

Okay, we now have three indicators for one variable. So how to put them together in one indicator? PCA, of course! But now, instead of a rotated-PCA, I use the standard PCA because the objective is to try to get the weights for all of these indicators and put them together in one component. Results, which are reported in Table 6 below, show that the mission was successful: the first component accounted for 68.6%, so that I could accept it as the only variable for this indicator. Table 6 also reports the weights each variable had in this component. Then, the behavior of each state considering this variable is available in Figure 21.

Table 6 - PCA Results for the MIDs indicator

Variable/Indicator	Weights/Percentage
Fatality Level	0.457
Higher Act	0.634
Number of Conflicts	0.624
Total Variance Explained (%)	68.6

Source: own elaboration

Figure 21 - MIDs Indicator (1975-2010)

Source: own elaboration

Overall, this indicator had the expected behavior, according to the literature. Higher scores were related to more complex MIDs. The highest score, for example, was registered by Argentina when it got into war against the United Kingdom. Ecuador and Peru also presented high scores in 1995, related to the Cenepa War. Also, during the Cold War, Cuba presented higher scores, together with Nicaragua, meeting the current literature.

States that had border disputes (Nicaragua-Honduras-El Salvador, Ecuador-Peru until 1998, Chile and Argentina until the 1980s) presented more disputes than those which do not have them, just as shown in the networks presented in the last chapter (Mares 2001; 2012b; 2012b; Domínguez et al. 2003). At the same, other variables might have played roles in these scores. After the Cold War and re-democratization processes, for example, MID scores were reduced across the region. Overall, the indicator seems valid as a means to assess militarization in the region and looks ready for my purposes.

5.1.4 External Support conceded to Foreign Actors in conflict situations

While militarizing interstate disputes is a way to deploy resources towards pursuing international security objectives, it is not the only one. There are situations in which one's interest can be represented by others' actions against another actor. Sometimes, engaging in direct military shocks with other states sometimes can be costly either in terms of financial or human resources or international prestige and influence. In these cases, providing support to other actors emerges as a good option (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011; Lemke and Regan 2004).

I know it might seem confusing, so let me illustrate this point. In the last chapter, I mentioned that the United States supported a paramilitary group - the *Contras* - in an attempt to overthrow the left-wing government that took office in Nicaragua in 1979. Neither Jimmy Carter nor Ronald Reagan considered a direct military intervention as the best option to accomplish their objectives in Nicaragua - as Reagan did regarding Grenada, for example. Among the costs was the possibility of losing international prestige and eventually facing a direct Soviet intervention, which could escalate to a larger conflict. Then, American representatives preferred to back non-state groups in order to accomplish their objectives. While it does not consist of a direct clash between one state and another(s), thus being not considered a MID, it means resource mobilization towards accomplishing one's international

security objectives. Also, this support is not necessarily sent to non-state actors. Russia, for example, has been providing closer support to the Syrian president, Bashar Al-Assad, within the context of the Syrian Civil War (Averre and Davies 2015; Stent 2016; Allison 2013).

Therefore, using data from UCDP/PRIO (Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér 2011), it is possible to assess if and how many actors a state supported in a given year. In Figure 22 below, we can observe the Latin American states that provided this kind of support to at least one external actor each year. As sending troops to a conflict could configure a militarization against either a state or a non-state actor, this kind of support was excluded. Other types are contained, including sending weapons, training others' troops, and sharing intelligence.

Figure 22 - Support to external armed actors conceded by the Latin American States (1975-2010)

Source: own elaboration, based on Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér (2011)

Results provide some interesting thoughts. When we look at the Cold War context, for example, during the conflicts in Central America, Argentina and the Dominican Republic decided to support Guatemala. At the same time, Cuba decided to support the Nicaraguan *Sandinista* government to consolidate itself, considering trends in the bipolar order. The Nicaraguans, for their turn, supported the Salvadorean insurgent group *Frente Farabundo*

Martí de Liberación Nacional in an attempt to take the *revolución* to its neighbor and advance their anti-systemic policy. At the same time, the Latin American closer ally Honduras joined the United States in providing support to the *Contras* to fight against the *Sandinistas* in Nicaragua. Most of these trends were already described in the preceding chapter, and this data just reinforced that evidence.

Then, after the end of the Cold War, in 2003, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama also decided to support the United States in its invasion of Iraq. Some of them also remained to help the newly installed Iraqi government after the fall of Saddam Hussein. This, together with evidence from the Cold War, reinforces the idea that US actions tend to influence Latin American ISP - in cases in which it wants to act. Finally but not least important, the anti-systemic government of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela provided help to the Colombian left-wing *guerrilla* FARC.

As we can see, all these initiatives seem to be aligned with some interests of states - e.g., fighting communists/capitalists, anti-systemic policies, or joining the US in its initiatives around the world. Also, it is worthy to say that democratic governments presented reduced trends to provide support to external actors, being mostly limited to supporting the US in their operations around the world. Together with the aforementioned evidence, which confirms this trend, it is also reinforced by the fact that, during the 1970s, authoritarian governments in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay provided support to Argentina in fighting domestic groups. Overall, for the same analytical and practical reasons as the other three indicators, I consider external support a worthy indicator for the ISP Postures index, allowing me to capture a different dimension of deploying ISP resources that cannot be captured by the militarization of either inter or intrastate disputes.

A last note should be introduced here. External support means supporting other actors in their own objectives. It has a very different meaning to participating in UN-sponsored initiatives, such as Peace Operations. While external support is related to the interests of particular actors, UN Peace Operations are approved and sponsored by different actors (mostly members of the UN Security Council) and have a very different meaning. While the former often means support to one's fight when it relates to its own interests, the former can take place for other reasons, such as compliance with the multilateral system.

5.1.5 Fighting non-state armed actors

The previous indicators were crucial to understanding how states acted towards militarized disputes involving other states, as well as their support to non-state armed groups. States, however, can also choose to militarize disputes against non-state actors. Civil wars and domestic conflicts, for example, can take place in every region in the world (okay, except for Antarctica, so far), opposing governments, and non-state actors. Together with domestic disputes, fighting non-state actors is increasingly common worldwide. The "War on Terror," for example, was mostly fought against terrorist organizations (i.e., Al-Qaeda, Islamic State, and others). Therefore, it is also important to look at how states engage in this kind of dispute.

In the case of Latin America, fighting non-state actors, such as *guerrillas*, insurgent groups, militias, and gangs, is, indeed, mostly related to domestic conflicts. In Figure 23 below, we can see states that militarized disputes against non-state actors, based on Pettersson et al. (2021) data. All cases are related to this kind of dispute. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua are related to fighting left or right-wing groups within the context of the Cold War (e.g., *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional*, *Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional*, *Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres*). Most of these fights were boosted by the US action toward containing socialism in the region (Westad 2007; LeoGrande 1986). A similar situation applied to Argentina in the late 1970s while fighting the *Montoneros*.

Figure 23 - Latin American states involved in fighting non-state actors

Source: own elaboration, based on data from Pettersson et al. (2021)

Left-wing ideologies also provided the background for states to militarize disputes against non-state groups after the end of the Cold War, such as the *Ejército Popular Revolucionário* (Mexico), *Sendero Luminoso* (Peru), and FARC (Colombia). However, in the case of the latter (and, to some extent, also in the Peruvian case), these groups also became involved in drug trafficking. In the Colombian case, this involvement led to American support for fighting insurgent groups within the context of the "War on Drugs," leading to a lasting conflict.

More than ideological *guerrillas*, local leaders or militaries can also fight between themselves, as we could see in the cases of Panama, Paraguay, and Venezuela. In all of them, the state needs to adopt more aggressive measures in order to establish normality. Radicalism and authoritarianism are often at the roots of these fights.

An important note should be added at this point. This indicator is aimed to reflect when states militarize disputes against non-state actors - and the mere existence of non-state armed actors does not necessarily lead to militarization. While Colombia decided to militarize disputes against FARC, and Peru militarized the dispute against *Sendero Luminoso*, Brazil does not present such militarization against groups such as the *Primeiro Comando da Capital* (PCC), and Mexico took a while to do such regarding *cartels*. Also, sometimes members of these groups receive amnesty. In these cases, as militarization tends to cease after agreements, they are not coded as militarized disputes (Cruz 2011; Cruz and Durán-Martínez 2016; Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010; Chernick 1999; Procópio Filho and Vaz 1997).

Considering all of that, this seems to be a good indicator for accessing states' deployment of resources towards reaching their objectives. It showed us when states decided to militarize disputes against non-state actors, being valuable to access a different way of militarization than against other states, which, as we can see in Figure 23, is relatively common in Latin America.

5.1.6 A measurement for ISP posture

Having the indicators, I proceeded to elaborate on the index. Although my focus here is on Latin American states, the index was created using (available) data for all countries in the world (see Carvalho, 2022). The results for the rotated-PCA model from Carvalho (forthcoming) can be found in Table 7 below.

As these two components together accounted for more than 60% of the total variance, I accepted them as a result. What we can see is that Component 1 is related to getting ready to defend states' international security interests based on raising the military budget and personnel. While these indicators presented loadings higher than 0.5 for this component, as marked in grey in Table 7, other variables presented low loadings (< 0.3), which means a very low contribution to this component[18]. On the other hand, Component 2 is more related to using these resources by either involving itself in a militarized dispute, supporting other actors in armed conflicts, or fighting civil wars - these indicators presented loadings higher than 0.5, as marked in grey.

Table 7 - Rotated-PCA results for the index on ISP postures

Variable/Indicator	Loadings	
	Component 1	Component 2
Military Personnel	0.902	0.049
Military Expenditure	0.871	0.159
MIDs index	0.253	0.794
External Support	0.229	0.638
Non-state armed groups	-0.158	0.690
Total Variance Explained (%)	34.3	30.8

Source: own elaboration

Considering that, and the fact that the objective of this index is to measure states' resource mobilization given year, it is possible to say that both components can help us in this mission. When we look at Component 1, it points to higher mobilization on the preparation side, and the more a state acts in this sense, the more resources it is mobilizing. Regarding Component 2, related to the resource deployment side, the more a state engages in militarizing disputes, either involving other states or domestic groups, or the more it uses its resources to provide external support to other actors in conflictual situations, the more resources it is mobilizing. Therefore, as both components can be interpreted along the same

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[18] While using PCA, we consider that a component is made of the indicators which present a relatively high contribution (> 0.5) to it.

continuum, the final index is the sum of both, weighted by the proportion of the variance accounted for each of them since they can explain different percentages of this variance - it is to say 0.343*Component 1 + 0.308*Component 2. Results can be found in Figure 24 below.

A brief descriptive analysis of these results can show how it reflects real-life happenings. During the late 1970s and 1980s, we can see higher scores on Central American states, which are already expected due to the civil wars in the region, with some kind of American support to some of the actors. Nicaragua adopted one of the most aggressive postures in the region in order to face challenges against the survival of the *Sandinista* regime, considering hindrances imposed by the US, while also supporting the allies of its government in its neighborhood. Then, after the end of the Cold War and the resolution of conflicts in Central America - with subsequent democratization - resource mobilization decreased, being mostly related to MIDs regarding territorial disputes.

At the same time, Cuba also had the most aggressive posture in the region during the Cold War. As a key Soviet ally, which also means an anti-US policy, it was "fighting the Cold War" by involving itself and supporting several socialist-prone governments and non-state actors around the world. It mobilized fewer resources after the fall of the Soviet Union - although still remained one of the most aggressive states in the region, considering its highly anti-systemic policy.

During the military dictatorship in the late-1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, Argentina mobilized several resources and even got into a war with the United Kingdom. This behavior is well-shown by the indicator, together with the Argentinean trends towards peace after the authoritarian rule. A similar result is also shown for its neighbor, Chile, which also implemented a more aggressive behavior during Augusto Pinochet's authoritarian rule. More than having a military dictatorship, both Chile and Argentina had border disputes at the time, which raised concerns on both sides about each other's postures (Schenoni, Braniff, and Battaglino 2020).

Figure 24 - ISP Postures Index for each Latin American state (1975-2010)

Source: own elaboration

While interstate disputes are well represented by the index, we can also perceive higher resource mobilization by countries with domestic disputes. More than the Peruvian case, the increasingly aggressive policy adopted by Colombia in the context of the "War on Drugs" is also shown by the index - especially under Álvaro Uribe's rule. While receiving support from the US, Colombia engaged in fighting drug dealers and cartels during most of the analyzed period. And this more aggressive policy is clearly represented by the index, as well as the periods of intensification of its policy (Sikkink 2018; Echandía Castilla 2008; Dugas 2003).

Some peaceful cases are also shown by the index, such as Bolivia, Brasil, and Costa Rica - which had MIDs against its neighbors but kept a peaceful posture regarding preparation for conflicts by not having an army - Mexico, Paraguay, and Panama. In the case of the latter, it happened mostly after the end of the authoritarian rule and the dispute with the United States for the Panama Canal.

Considering all of that, it seems possible to say that we have a valid measure for ISP Postures in Latin America - further discussion about its validity can be found in Carvalho (forthcoming). It successfully captures trends over time and shows us states' resource mobilization in a given year, constituting a good dependent variable to be deployed in the statistical tests in the next chapter.

5.2 ISP Conceptualization

Measuring ISP conceptualization is a challenge. Saying that some issue was included in states' ISP means saying that it became a higher priority for that state - something close to the idea of securitization (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998). But how to capture these priorities in an objective, longitudinally, and cross-sectionally comparable way for a large-n analysis?

Baturo, Dasandi, and Mikhaylov (2017) offer us an alternative to capture states' foreign policy priorities: looking at speeches delivered by state representatives at the United Nations General Assembly during general debate sessions. These speeches consist of heads of state (or someone sent by these leaders) telling the world their foreign policy priorities in an unstructured way, making it an opportunity for them to share any issues they want. This is exactly why it is becoming a very used source for assessing foreign policy positions around

the world (Kentikelenis and Voeten 2021; Eckhard et al. 2021; Jenne, Schenoni, and Urdinez 2017; Carvalho, Schenoni, and Eckhard, forthcoming). Then, as foreign policy is a key component of implementing ISP, I use these speeches as *proxies* to assess how much states prioritize specific issues (crimes and anti-hegemonic matters) on the international stage. As I want to capture topics emphasized by Latin American states from 1975 to 2010, I use all speeches delivered by representatives from these states.

A second challenge emerges at this point: how to measure prioritization on these issues? Methods such as discourse analysis became common in the security literature and offer an alternative to this problem. However, they are not functional for my purposes since (1) they cannot capture these priorities in an objective way, and (2) they demand a huge amount of resources for building a large-n database, unavailable for this research (Buzan and Hansen 2013). A second option, more objective, could be a supervised dictionary-based content analysis (Krippendorff 1980; Drisko and Maschi 2016). However, building a dictionary also offers the challenge and the risk of introducing researcher-based bias by choosing (or not) certain words to assess some meanings. And one of the methodological objectives here is exactly to avoid this kind of bias.

Therefore, I choose a non-supervised technique to extract topics from these documents: a Structural Topic Model (STM). The method relies on the rationale behind the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) by assuming that each document d is a bag of words and then searching for the presence of topics t based on the correlations between mentions to each word w in each document (Blei, Ng, and Jordan 2003). It means that topics are basically sets of correlated words. Then, STM follows this logic while also allowing us to incorporate covariates into the model in order to help identify the topics we need (Roberts et al. 2013; Roberts et al. 2014). This is important to my purposes as it allows for including countries and temporal trends (basically years) as control variables to find the prevalence of topics I need to identify. Prevalence, in this case, is to say the proportion of a document occupied by each topic.

Before running STM (or any method to analyze text-as-data), it is important to pre-process the corpus of documents we are analyzing. I did it using a common procedure by removing numbers, punctuation, and stopwords (very common terms that do not contribute to identifying topics, such as prepositions and pronouns) and then decapitalizing and stemming words. Then, I also removed extremely rare words (terms that appear in less than 1% of total

documents) and very common ones (the ones present in more than 50% of the corpus), as they also tend not to contribute to identifying topics (Grimmer and Stewart 2013; Terman 2017). The resulting document-term matrix contains 679 speeches, 4636 terms (different words), and 286155 tokens (words, as a whole).

After pre-processing the corpus, I chose the best number of topics (K) for the model. I followed the procedure recommended by Roberts et al. (2014) and Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley (2016), by selecting K based on the better balance between semantic coherence (how much the most probable words from a topic occur together) and exclusivity (how much terms from a topic are exclusive to this topic). I did that by running models with different numbers of topics, ranging from 5 to 45 - results can be found in Figure 25 below.

Figure 25 - Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity according to the number of topics

Source: own elaboration

As we can see, the model with 9 topics outperforms the others in the balance between the two scores. Then, I checked for the topics related to crimes and anti-hegemonic issues based on their most frequent words and their FREX score - which weights terms that are both frequent and exclusive to each topic (Roberts et al. 2014). The three topics that attend to this criterion are available in Table 8 below, labeled by me. Then, I consider the measure of the priority attributed to crimes in states' foreign policies as being represented by the prevalence of the topic "Drug Trafficking". For the case of anti-hegemonic issues, this measure is a sum of the prevalences of both "Anti-imperialism" and "Anti-liberalism".

Table 8 - Topics related to crimes and anti-hegemonic issues

Label	Highest Probability Words	FREX
Anti-imperialism	canal, nonalign, aggress, africa, movement, coloni, regim, liber, african, imperialist, head, administr, attempt, puerto, namibia	canal, puerto, rico, imperialist, somoza, racist, nonalign, angola, reagan, interocean, patriot, imperi, havana, revolutionari, nam
Anti-liberalism	million, let, impo, billion, want, know, said, planet, attempt, defend, capit, blockad, never, poor, children	coup, blockad, neolib, die, media, bolivarian, détat, mother, kill, yesterday, manipul, trillion, disea, billion, save
Crimes	drug, traffick, want, children, citizen, know, educ, never, let, path, million, ask, land, speak, poor	drug, coca, traffick, crop, guerrilla, dream, young, tell, money, liberti, forest, corrupt, peasant, cocain, wall

Source: own elaboration

In Figure 26, in the next page, we can see the longitudinal distribution of the measure on crimes. While most states in the region attributed lower focus to these issues, some cases become more perceptible. Colombia, the usual suspect, confirmed the expectations as paying the greatest attention to these issues (Bagley 1988; 1989; Echandía Castilla 2008; Dugas 2003; Chernick 1999). Other cases, such as Peru and Bolivia, also attributed relatively closer attention to these issues, most during the 1990s, confirming what was discussed in Chapter 3 (Morales 1992; McClintock 1999; Lora Cam 1999).

Figure 26 - Priority attributed to "crimes" in Latin American states' foreign policies

Source: own elaboration

In Central America, we can see that, as soon as the civil wars approached their ends, crimes became more prioritized by these countries. In Venezuela, it was also perceived as a big problem until Chávez took office. A similar trend took place in Honduras after Chávez-friendly Manuel Zelaya took office. Overall, the indicator was capable of showing trends already discussed earlier in this dissertation and presented reasonable validity.

Then, in Figure 27 on the next page, I present the longitudinal distribution of the priority attributed to anti-hegemonic issues by Latin American states. Once again, the "usual suspects" played the expected role. Cuba paid a higher emphasis on these matters during the analyzed period, considering its role as either the Latin American ally of the Soviet Union during the Cold War or the *Chavista* ally during the 2000s, or even by (obviously) criticizing the blockade kept by the US after the end of the Cold War. Nicaragua emphasized anti-hegemonic matters under Daniel Ortega's rule both during the Cold War and the 2000s. Venezuela also joined the club during the 2000s, under Hugo Chávez, within his anti-hegemonic policy. The same happened to Bolivia under Morales (Corrales and Penfold-Becerra 2011; Carvalho and Belém Lopes 2022; LeoGrande 1986; Westad 2007; Wright 2001; Brienen 2015; Andrés Serbin and Serbin Pont 2014).

We can also perceive some anti-hegemonic component by some (but now all) left-wing leaders during the 2000s, such as the Argentinean Cristina Kirchner, Chile's Michelle Bachelet, and Paraguay's Fernando Lugo. Although it was also expected in the case of Ecuador under Rafael Correa, it was not possible to see such behavior. A manual check on Ecuadorian speeches at the time confirmed that, indeed, anti-hegemonic issues were not highly mentioned by its representatives.

In the case of Panama, the anti-hegemonic component in the late 1980s was also expected. At the time, the Panamanian leader, Manuel Noriega, who was once a US ally, became a US enemy. Then, within the context of US covert and overt operations to remove him from power, he also adopted such anti-hegemonic rhetoric (Gandasegui 1993; Calderon 2000; O'Rourke 2018).

Other states which were not supposed to present such a component, indeed, did not present it. Therefore, it is possible to say that the presented measures met the expectations presented in the last chapter. It means that they meet a whole literature on developments in Latin American ISP, telling us something about the validity of the proposed measures. Having seemingly valid measures for ISP conceptualization, it is now time to look at ISP cooperation.

Figure 27 - Priority attributed to "anti-hegemonic issues" in Latin American states' foreign policies

Source: own elaboration

5.3 ISP Cooperation

Measuring the last axis of my typology is easier, given the availability of data for the analyzed period. In order to assess intraregional cooperation in Latin America, I chose to use Brandon Kinne's (2020) database on Defense Cooperation Agreements (DCAs). The database provides us with DCAs signed by each country in the world - and, to our interests, Latin American states. Then, I count the number of DCAs signed by these countries with other partners from the same region. I provide the number of DCAs in force per country each year in Figure 28 on the next page.

Figure 28 confirms the cooperative behaviors discussed in Chapter 3. Defense cooperation only emerged in Latin America during the 1990s and was initially mostly restricted to Southern Cone states. This cooperation was disseminated during the 2000s, reaching other states. Within this context, Brazil and Argentina continued to be the states with most DCAs signed with other Latin American states. Chile and Peru also adopted such a cooperative behavior, to a lesser but still significant extent. At the same time, these agreements were not so common in Central America until the end of the 2000s. Therefore, if a cooperative policy were to be found in Latin America, at least until 2010, it would probably take place in South America. This discussion corroborates recent literature about cooperation in the region (Mares 2007; Carvalho 2021; Bragatti 2019; Mijares 2018; Fuccille and Rezende 2013; Vaz, Fuccille, and Rezende 2017; Oelsner 2009; Hurrell 1998; Franko and Herz 2018; Diamint 2017). Consequently, I use this as an indicator of defense cooperation in the region.

A note should be introduced here again on why using only DCAs, not multilateral initiatives in the region, to assess intraregional cooperation. If we think about regional at the Interamerican scope, the IADB exists since 1942 and OAS since 1948. Then, while they do not offer us a good indicator from an analytical point of view because, since then, it had different meanings - such as support for American initiatives and support for democracy - they do not do a good job from a statistical methodological point of view, as membership in these institutions does not present a huge variation. Then, regarding UNASUR, it only developed its instance for defense cooperation (SADC) in 2009. Although the meaning of SADC is exactly related to an increasing intraregional dialogue regarding defense policies, it

also offers very little variability. This is why I chose not to include it in my empirical analysis, consisting of a methodological choice, also due to its low variability.

5.4 ISP in numbers

In this chapter, I presented different ways to measure each of the ISP axes I proposed. Postures were measured by creating an index using five indicators related to states' resource mobilization towards international security. Conceptualization was measured using state representatives' speeches at the United Nations General Assembly and relying on a Structural Topic Model to extract mentions to crimes and anti-hegemonic in these speeches. Prevalences of these two matters in these speeches became the (two) indicators for this axis. Finally, ISP cooperation was measured by intraregional defense cooperation agreements signed by each Latin American state. Having measured these policies, in the next chapter, I proceed to test my theory in each of them separately. In Chapter 7, I aggregate these axes to classify policies implemented by Latin American states and provide further statistical tests.

Figure 28 - DCAs in force for each Latin American state (1975-2010)

Source: own elaboration

6 TESTING THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY THEORY IN THE DISAGGREGATED LEVEL

After having measured the ISP axes, I will now proceed to the empirical tests of my theory, in order to provide initial evidence on whether it can explain these policies. All tests will be made through panel data analysis using Maximum Likelihood Estimations (MLE). Panel data analysis is a well-suited strategy for my purposes since (1) I rely on observational data, with (2) repeated observations for the same units (countries) along different points in time - years (Angrist and Pischke 2009). Then, MLE is better suited than common regressions since (1) it allows for a better adaptation for probability distributions, considering the outcomes, and (2) it provides more robust estimators, considering its capacity to estimate population parameters (Ward and Ahlquist 2018; James et al. 2013).

As a methodological note, empirical tests presented in this chapter cannot be understood as proving causal relations by themselves, as they violate some assumptions behind quasi-experimental designs, such as isolating only one key independent variable to measure its average treatment effect. However, they are intended to provide quantitative evidence of associations between the proposed variables based on a large-n comparison. Causal claims will be complemented with causal process observations in chapter 8.

Having that said, in this chapter, I conduct separate analyses for each of the already presented ISP axes - the aggregation of the axes in the types discussed in Chapter 3, as well as empirical tests on how my theory fits these types, will be delivered in the next chapter. Instead of deploying the commonly used country and year-fixed effects, I chose to use random intercepts for both countries and years. This choice is justified by (1) results from Hausman Tests and (2) as I will mention, the fact that I am also deploying some variables with little within-country variance (e.g., the existence of territorial disputes). As indicators for ISP postures and conceptualization consist of continuous variables, they were also scaled, in order to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1, and models rely on a linear equation. In the case of ISP cooperation, as it consists of count data, I use a negative binomial formula. I also provide some illustrative (and non-exhaustive) cases to portray the arguments.

Let me recall that the main variables for my theory are: great power influence - is to say, in the case of Latin America, US influence over each country -, leaders - considering their

acceptance of the liberal order -, and domestic institutions - by looking at levels of democracy and civil-military relations. But how to access these variables?

As I discussed, according to my theory, the US was able to influence ISPs in Latin America by either providing support for a government to comply with its guidelines or hindrances to change policies in cases they were dissatisfied. If we want to understand whether a state was able to change others' policies through support, one of the main variables deployed by the literature is the provision of foreign aid. The idea is that the benefits provided by this aid, either economic, military, or other kinds, tend to convince other governments to support the provider in its objectives, in other to keep these benefits (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Carvalho and Belém Lopes 2022).

By agreeing with this conception and with the fact that this variable is a useful way to assess support to any ISP, I use the US foreign aid provided to each Latin American state in constant values as a first proxy to assess its attempt to influence ISP in the region, using data retrieved from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United States Department of State (2021). Also, in order to avoid my inferences from being affected by any kind of changes in the US foreign aid in a given year due to a state's ISP, I use the one-year lag of this variable. I also conduct robustness checks using the lags of foreign aid provided by the US as a percent of each state's GDP and the specific amount aimed at military and non-military issues separately, also in constant values.

On the other side, the US can impose hindrances in case it wants to undermine the policies of another country. The blockade on Cuba since Fidel Castro took office is a good example of it. Overt and covert operations to overthrow leaders and regimes in countries such as Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Panama is also an option. However, they do not allow for a proper assessment of their effects for the purposes of this dissertation. The embargo on Cuba, for example, has been kept for more than 60 years, in a way that this does not offer us a way to assess different stages in the US foreign policy. On the other side, covert and overt operations, often have effects on changing domestic regimes, which could configure an indirect effect in ISP, to be measured in the longer term. In this dissertation, I do not want to test the role of the US in affecting domestic regimes, as it is already very well approached by authors such as (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013; O'Rourke 2018). At the same time, the effects of domestic variables on these are already considered in the model.

Back to the US hindrances, I assess these events in a way that we can see whether they impacted or not these policies in a given year: the provision of external support, by the US, to non-state armed groups to fight governments in their countries. This is a direct way to create hindrances for other governments, leading them to face non-state groups raising arms to stop these governments' actions. Also, this variable can be objectively assessed by using data from Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér (2011). I use their database and attribute score 1 when there was this kind of support provided to actors in a state in a given year and 0 otherwise.

After having the proxies to assess the US attempts to influence ISP in Latin America, it is important to also propose alternatives to assess leaders' images. Considering that most proposed hypotheses related to leaders' roles are based on their views on the liberal order, I use the main variable to assess this kind of alignment at the international level: Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten's (2017) ideal points. The authors employ a widely used tool to assess foreign policy positions - is to say, voting at the United Nations General Assembly resolutions (Keohane 1967; Kim and Russett 1996; Hermann and Kegley 1995; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008; Amorim Neto and Malamud 2015; Carvalho and Belém Lopes 2022; among many others) to create an index to measure how aligned or not states were to the liberal order in a given year.

More than measuring just voting similarity between states, Voeten, Bailey, and Strezhnev (2017) propose a fine-grained measure that considers (1) changes and continuities in similar resolutions and (2) the higher relevance attributed by the United States to some resolutions. The result is a measure that calculates how close/far a country is to the US-led liberal order, considering also changes in voting on particular resolutions over time and the higher weight of some resolutions (for more information about the validity of the index, see Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017). Therefore, I use these ideal points as a proxy to assess leaders' change in states' alignment to the liberal order, using data from (Voeten, Strezhnev, and Bailey 2009). The higher the score, the more a leader accepts the liberal order.

It is also important to assess democratic institutions, specifically both levels of democracy and civil-military relations. In the case of democracy, I use scores from the Polity V project, consisting of a widely used source on classifying regimes. More than being a good measure, it also provides us with a clear threshold to differentiate democratic from non-democratic regimes: every state that scores less than 6 can be considered non-democratic. It helps in the transition between the quantitative to the qualitative analysis, providing a more

objective way to classify regimes, as I will discuss in Chapter 8. However, as I know the existence of alternative measures, I run robustness checks using the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index instead of Polity (Coppedge et al. 2021). This is also a comprehensive and widely used variable to assess regimes, together with Polity (Coppedge et al. 2016; Bjørnskov and Rode 2020).

Finally, as I propose that civil-military relations are important to understand these policies, it is also important to statistically assess these relations. The most obvious choice would be to look at Defense Ministers and check whether they are military or not. Although it does not necessarily mean huge civilian control over the armed forces (Bruneau 2013; Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux 2000), it means at least some control. However, I choose a more comprehensive way to assess these relations. Instead of focusing only on Ministries of Defense, I look at the whole governmental cabinet and check the proportion of positions occupied by militaries, using data from Nyrup and Bramwell (2020). It allows us to assess the militarization of a government to a broader extent by looking at military presence in all ministries. For the empirical tests, I assume that democracy often comes with greater civilian oversight over the military. Therefore, I will use the variable on democratic regimes most of the time. Then, I use this variable on civil-military relations in alternative tests to provide further evidence for it.

After assessing all the main variables of my theory, it is also necessary to look at the controls in order to increase the accuracy of my estimates while also testing for alternative hypotheses. First, in a region highly affected by territorial disputes (Mares 2001; 2012a), it is also necessary to look at the role of these disputes in models. Therefore, I assess the existence of these disputes by triangulating the Issues Correlates of War (ICOW) database (Hensel and Mitchell 2007) with Mares' (2001; 2012a) data on the existence and resolution of these controversies. I only consider disputes that (1) exist in both databases - in case they started before 2001, considering the range of Hensel and Mitchell's (2007) database - and (2) led to military disputes at any time. I do that because there are territorial claims that are peacefully conducted and do not necessarily consist of threats to state relations, e.g., the Uruguayan claims on Brazilian islands at the confluence of the Quarai River and the Uruguay River.

Considering that this variable can lead to diverging interpretations, in Table 9, I present the countries with border disputes considered for my analysis, aiming for transparency in my research. All the countries mentioned in Table 9 were coded as having existing

territorial disputes while these controversies lasted. In the case of Costa Rica, for example, it was coded as not having such disputes after 2009, considering the settlement of its dispute with Nicaragua.

Table 9 - Border Disputes considered in the analysis

Country A	Country(ies) B and Dispute(s)
Argentina	Chile (Beagle Channel, settled in 1985), United Kingdom (Falkland/Malvinas Island)
Bolivia	Chile (Outlet to Pacific)
Chile	Argentina (Beagle Channel, settled in 1985), Bolivia (Outlet to Pacific)
Colombia	Nicaragua (San Andrés and Providencia Islands), Venezuela (Several points in dispute)
Costa Rica	Nicaragua (Access over the San Juan River, settled in 2009)
Ecuador	Peru (Cordillera del Condor, settled in 1998)
El Salvador	Honduras and Nicaragua (Fonseca Gulf), Honduras (Conejo Island)
Guatemala	Belize (Guatemala claims most of Belizean Territory)
Honduras	El Salvador and Nicaragua (Fonseca Gulf), El Salvador (Conejo Island), Nicaragua (Maritime demarcation in the Caribbean Sea)
Nicaragua	Colombia (San Andrés and Providencia Islands), Costa Rica (Access over the San Juan River, settled in 2009), El Salvador and Honduras (Fonseca Gulf), Honduras (Maritime demarcation in the Caribbean Sea)
Panama	United States (Panama Canal, settled in 1995)
Peru	Ecuador (Cordillera del Condor, settled in 1998)
Venezuela	Colombia (Several points in dispute), Guyana (Essequibo), Trinidad and Tobago (Gulf of Paria)

Source: own elaboration, based on Hensel and Mitchell (2007) and Mares (2001; 2012a)

Another important set of alternative hypotheses that needs to be addressed here relates to leaders' socio-economic positions - i.e., left, center, or right-wing. Different sources emerge to assess these ideologies. One of the main works is done by Baker and Greene (2011). The authors rely on different sources to provide a useful continuous measure for Latin American leaders' ideologies. Their index, however, ranges only from 1993 to 2018, leaving almost twenty years uncovered in my analysis. This is the reason that led me not to use Baker and Greene's (2011) proposal. A similar reason leads me not to use party data from the V-Party Dataset (Coppedge et al. 2021): the number of missing data. This data source does not cover

115 cases in my sample (16.8% of total observations), reducing its applicability to my objectives.

Luckily, we still have a last (and very recent) option. The Global Leader Ideology dataset (Herre 2021) solves most of our problems in terms of coverage and (less) contradictory coding and will be used in this dissertation. Using multiple sources, including the aforementioned V-Party Dataset, Bastian Herre and his team coded the ideologies of several leaders around the world based on their political positions on economic issues. As this classification can lead to diverging interpretations, considering my compromise to transparency in research, I present which countries-year are coded as having left-wing governments in Figure 29 below.

Figure 29 - Left-wing governments in Latin America[19]

Source: own elaboration, based on Herre (2021)

I also include two variables to control for alternative hypotheses related to different periods regarding global security: the Cold War and post-9/11 attacks. These variables are

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[19] Colombia does not appear in Figure 37 because it did not have a left-wing government in the analyzed period.

important to consider the global context and understand how they may affect ISP in the region. Regarding the Cold War, the variable equals 1 for years before 1990 and 0 after that. For the post-9/11 attacks, it equals 1 from 2001 onwards. I also include one variable to control for the Cuban-Soviet relations during the Cold War, considering the very particular conditions this alignment meant to the model, as Cuba joined the USSR in several operations around the world. This variable equals 1 only for Cuba during the Cold War.

Finally, in order to observe the eventual role of economic development in changing these policies (see Gartzke 2007), I use GDP *per capita* in the main models. As an alternative, while testing for robustness, I also consider GDP in current values, allowing me to assess whether bigger states (at least in terms of economy) tend to present different behavior regarding ISP postures - e.g., if small states tend to engage in counterbalancing behavior (and consequently in more aggressive postures), as previously refuted by Schenoni (2015). Both data were retrieved from the World Bank, and, considering their distribution, I used their logarithms in constant values.

Having all the variables, it is now time to proceed to the statistical tests. In order to make the interpretation easier, *all the continuous variables were scaled in order to present a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1*. Dummy variables remained dichotomous, scoring 1 if present and 0 if absent.

6.1 ISP Postures

I begin by testing my theory on ISP Postures. I remind that it is based on four hypotheses:

H1.1 - Less democratic states tend to mobilize more resources.

H1.2 - The more resources the US spends to support a Latin American state, the more ISP resources this state tends to mobilize.

H2.2 - The more hindrances the US raises against a Latin American state, the more resources it tends to mobilize.

H2.3 - The more leaders reject the liberal order, the more resources they tend to mobilize.

It means that we should expect higher mobilization from states that present (1) lower scores on Polity, (2) non-state armed groups supported by the US, (3) lower ideal points, and (4) higher levels of foreign aid provided by the US.

Before proceeding to tests, it is important to mention the highly left-skewed distribution of my dependent variable (ISP Postures index), as we can see in Figure 30 below. It means that there are outliers that can trouble my analysis, as while 75% of the sample presents ISP posture scores lesser than 7.46, the highest value is 42.949, a huge gap between the 25% higher values. Therefore, I follow a standard statistical procedure by transforming my dependent variable to a logarithm to reduce the dispersion of my data. Also, as the lowest value for the ISP posture index is 0 - and log(0) does not exist - I sum a constant (c = 1) to all values in order to make it possible to obtain a logarithm. The resulting distribution is available in Figure 31. After doing this transformation, I scaled the variable, as I did with all the others, which presents a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

Having all of that said, I present the results in Figure 32. Models consist of Maximum Likelihood Estimations, with country and year-random intercepts, and include all covariates. Results are shown for the whole sample and a subsample excluding Cuba and Nicaragua in order to test whether their different dynamics during the Cold War affected results. As a note, the main results will always be presented using plots in order to make visualization easier. However, I also present tables in robustness checks sections for each ISP axis.

Figure 30 - Histogram of ISP postures index

Source: own elaboration

Figure 31 - Histogram of the log of ISP postures index

Source: own elaboration

Figure 32 - Estimates for ISP Postures[20]

Source: own elaboration

Results provide evidence for all the presented hypotheses. As we can see, when the US deployed mechanisms to influence ISP in the region, it tended to make states mobilize

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[20] Models include covariates.

more resources towards these policies. During the 1980s, the Nicaraguan *Sandinistas* faced a civil war against the *Contras*, supported by the US, and the Panamanian dictatorship led by Manuel Noriega tried to resist to rebel military factions, also supported by the United States. In both cases, governments had to raise resource mobilization in an attempt to resist to these groups (LeoGrande 1986; Hoekstra 2021; Gandasegui 1993; Gilboa 1995).

On the other hand, during the late 1980s and 1990s, the United States increased the foreign aid provided to Colombia, including the amount related to military issues, as its "War on Drugs" initiative advanced. This increase was even higher during the 1990s (Sikkink 2018). As a consequence, Colombia mobilized more ISP resources, as we can see in Figure 33, so it could comply with US guidelines to provide this support (Carpenter 2003; Bagley 1989). I will conduct a within-case analysis of this case in Chapter 8.

Figure 33 - US Military Aid provided to Colombia and the Colombian ISP Postures

Source: own elaboration, partially based on data from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United States Department of State (2021)

The War on Drugs is only one example of how higher US support leads to higher resource mobilization. Another example was the American support to Honduras during the 1980s in order to get support to face the Nicaraguan *Sandinistas.* The US sent support to the Honduran government, so it could improve its own armed forces and also support preparing the non-state group *Contras* to fight against the *Sandinistas.* As a consequence, the Honduran ISP became based on higher resource mobilization (LeoGrande 1986; Hoekstra 2021).

At this point, a keynote should be introduced. One could argue that, regarding the aforementioned cases of Colombia and Honduras, resource mobilization is automatic, considering the existence of criminal organizations and *guerrillas,* either in your own territory or in your neighbors'. One of my theory's claims is exactly the opposite - and I will discuss it better while presenting the robustness checks.

Regarding criminal organizations, for example, while some governments choose to militarize these fights, others prefer to coexist with them in an attempt to reduce levels of violence (Cruz and Durán-Martínez 2016; Cruz 2011). Regarding other armed groups, such as *guerrillas*, in some cases, there is the option to attempt to demobilize and reintegrate these groups as political parties instead of mobilizing a huge amount of resources toward fighting them (Humphreys and Weinstein 2007; Chernick 1999). It means that increasing resource mobilization is not an automatic choice: it is a political choice. Then, results show that increased US action to influence a state tends to induce such a political choice, as the Americans will provide this aid in exchange for these states pursuing some of the US interests, such as fighting left-wing *guerrillas* and the "War on Drugs."

When we look at leaders, results provide evidence to say that the higher critics they become regarding the liberal order, the more resources they tend to mobilize. While it is true that most Latin American countries tend to adopt lesser alignment with the US values at the UNGA[21], results show that a more intense (not to say radical) anti-liberal position often leads to a more aggressive ISP. This radical behavior is associated with a rebel attitude in the international arena (Escudé 2016; Schenoni and Escudé 2016), making it essential to mobilize more resources to defend state interests. Cuba, for example, supported groups in several states around the world in their attempts to implement socialist governments, considering the interests of the socialist bloc shared by the Cuban government. At the same time, the

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[21] The mean ideal point score in the region was -0.145, reasonably far from the US scores (around 3), on a scale ranging behind around -3 and 3.

Sandinista Nicaragua supported the Salvadorean group FMLN in fighting the civil war in the neighboring country, while also mobilizing resources to resist attempts to overthrow the regime in Managua (Wright 2001; LeoGrande 1986; Westad 2007).

While one could point out that this effect could take place due to the high mobilization by Cuba and Nicaragua during the Cold War, we can see that it keeps its statistical significance even after removing both countries from the sample. It means that this variable was also important in explaining the behavior of leaders such as Hugo Chávez (Venezuela), Rafael Correa (Ecuador), and Daniel Ortega (after taking office again in Nicaragua during the 2000s).

Think, for example, of the case of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. His "21st Century Socialism" required several resources to gather allies for his proposals, as well as to resist attempts by other states to undermine his project. In Carvalho and Belém Lopes (2022), for example, I show how Chávez used subsidized oil under the PetroCaribe initiative to acquire support from Central American and Caribbean states for his foreign policy. In terms of security, it also meant increasing military expenditure and personnel, acquiring military equipment, providing support to FARC in Colombia, and militarizing interstate disputes. More than claiming part of the Guyanan territory under nationalistic claims, Chávez also joined his Ecuadorean ally, Rafael Correa, in denouncing the Colombian border violation in 2008. It allowed the Venezuelan leader to include ideological proportions to a very complicated security crisis in the region by adding to the situation the fact that Colombia was a US ally (Abdul-Hak 2013; Trinkunas 2011; Corrales and Penfold-Becerra 2011; Villa, Chagas-Bastos, and Braga 2019).

Results also provide evidence of the role of democracy in reducing states' resource mobilization. It could be seen in cases such as Argentina, Chile, and Brazil reducing this mobilization within re-democratization processes, for example. By increasing the number of veto players, reducing military participation in ISP decision-making, and including the externalization of democratic values, these states changed a past attitude of confrontation for increased dialogues during the late 1980s and 1990s. It reflected, for example, in talks between post-democratization presidents of Brazil (José Sarney) and Argentina (Raul Alfonsín) in finding ways to make relations between both countries even more peaceful, resulting in the creation of institutions such as Mercosur and ABACC (Oelsner 2009; Hurrell 1998; Rojas Aravena 1998; Pion-Berlin 2016). On the other side, as Hugo Chávez was able to

undermine the Venezuelan democratic regime, he became increasingly able to mobilize more resources toward his objectives (Corrales and Penfold-Becerra 2011; Trinkunas 2011; Giacalone 2013).

All the main results are statistically significant and support my propositions. However, it is also important to test for robustness, as well as to discuss the role of covariates introduced in the model.

6.1.1 Robustness checks

In this section, more than presenting alternative models, I also show the tables with results for all models and discuss the role of covariates and alternative hypotheses. In Table 10 below, I show the results for the main models. We can see that all estimates for the main variables remained statistically significant in all models, corroborating all the proposed hypotheses. The same applies to Table 11, where I provide robustness checks using alternative specifications for variables. Estimations remain significant under these alternative specifications. Therefore, statistical evidence shows that my theory seems capable of explaining ISP Postures in Latin America.

First, Tables 10 and 11 confirmed that the foreign aid provided by the US changed these postures, whether considering the overall aid or just the amount aimed at military issues. Second, models also provided more evidence that the reduced military participation in cabinets led to lesser resource mobilization. It confirms the proposition that, more than democratic institutions and veto players, civil-military relations also play a role in changing a state's resource mobilization.

Then, while looking at the controls, we can see, first, that different global scenarios led to different ISP Postures in the region: states mobilized more resources during the Cold War, and reduced this mobilization within the "War on Terror." This finding was expected, considering literature that discusses both the incentives for Latin American states to mobilize more resources due to the bipolar order, and to become more peaceful as it received decreasing attention after the 9/11 attacks, with the shift of most of the world's attention to the Middle East (Loveman 1999; Halliday 1986; Westad 2007; Feierstein 2010; Buzan and Wæver 2003; Mares 2016; Andréani 2004; Domínguez and Fernández de Castro 2016; Rezende 2014; Rojas Aravena 2014).

Table 10 - Regression Results for ISP Postures

	Dependent variable:				
	Log Int. Sec. Postures				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
US foreign aid (Lag)	0.242***		0.243***	0.236***	0.246***
	(0.029)		(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.026)
US support to non-state armed groups	1.889***		1.615***	1.677***	2.576***
	(0.273)		(0.263)	(0.245)	(0.560)
Acceptance of liberal order		-0.177***	-0.177***	-0.153***	-0.189***
		(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.043)
Democracy (Polity)		-0.306***	-0.274***	-0.238***	-0.278***
		(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Cold War				0.208***	0.196**
				(0.079)	(0.077)
War on Terror				-0.510***	-0.514***
				(0.076)	(0.072)
Left-wing leader				0.066	0.063
				(0.057)	(0.056)
Existence of territorial disputes				0.224**	0.236**
				(0.108)	(0.110)
Soviet ally				1.834***	
				(0.197)	
log(GDP per capita)				-0.166	
				(0.133)	
Constant	-0.008	0.014	-0.002	1.181	-0.181
	(0.161)	(0.148)	(0.142)	(1.127)	(0.165)
Observations	677	675	675	639	610
Log Likelihood	-696.950	-709.171	-657.796	-550.182	-531.127
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,405.900	1,430.342	1,331.593	1,128.363	1,086.254
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	1,433.006	1,457.430	1,367.711	1,190.802	1,139.215

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by country. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 11 - Robustness checks using alternative specifications

	Dependent variable:					
	Log ISP Postures				ISP Postures	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
US mil. foreign aid (Lag)	0.201*** (0.026)				0.174*** (0.023)	
US non-mil. foreign aid (Lag)		0.213*** (0.025)	0.219*** (0.026)			
US foreign aid (Lag, % of GDP)				0.172*** (0.028)		0.145*** (0.024)
US support to non-state groups	1.561*** (0.249)	1.648*** (0.247)	1.678*** (0.256)	1.787*** (0.263)	3.008*** (0.215)	3.162*** (0.228)
Acceptance of liberal order	-0.106*** (0.040)	-0.134*** (0.039)	-0.145*** (0.041)	-0.129*** (0.041)	-0.107*** (0.034)	-0.142*** (0.034)
Electoral Democracy Index	-0.237*** (0.041)	-0.285*** (0.040)			-0.234*** (0.032)	
Militaries in Cabinet			0.097*** (0.029)	0.097*** (0.029)		0.130*** (0.025)
Cold War	0.137 (0.092)	0.136 (0.085)	0.368*** (0.079)	0.349*** (0.078)	0.156** (0.077)	0.321*** (0.068)
War on Terror	-0.517*** (0.083)	-0.511*** (0.075)	-0.516*** (0.077)	-0.445*** (0.075)	-0.209*** (0.071)	-0.135** (0.067)
Left-wing leader	0.101* (0.059)	0.077 (0.058)	0.037 (0.061)	0.027 (0.062)	-0.024 (0.049)	-0.071 (0.052)
Existence of territorial disputes	0.192* (0.110)	0.192* (0.110)	0.182 (0.113)	0.228** (0.116)	0.161* (0.090)	0.171* (0.094)
Soviet ally	1.832*** (0.201)	1.853*** (0.199)	1.685*** (0.204)	1.725*** (0.209)	4.052*** (0.171)	3.979*** (0.179)
Log(GDP)	-0.094 (0.079)	-0.019 (0.081)	-0.085 (0.081)	-0.059 (0.084)		
Constant	2.143 (1.969)	0.310 (1.999)	1.861 (2.009)	1.187 (2.085)	-0.224** (0.111)	-0.301*** (0.114)
Observations	639	639	639	639	675	675
Log Likelihood	-562.646	-556.110	-575.472	-590.144	-495.257	-525.811
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,153.293	1,140.220	1,178.944	1,208.288	1,016.513	1,077.622
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	1,215.731	1,202.659	1,241.382	1,270.727	1,075.205	1,136.313

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by country. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Then, while looking at the controls, we can see, first, that different global scenarios led to different ISP Postures in the region: states mobilized more resources during the Cold War and reduced this mobilization within the "War on Terror." This finding was expected, considering literature that discusses both the incentives for Latin American states to mobilize more resources due to the bipolar order and to become more peaceful as it received decreasing attention after the 9/11 attacks, with the shift of most of the world's attention to the Middle East (Loveman 1999; Halliday 1986; Westad 2007; Feierstein 2010; Buzan and Wæver 2003; Mares 2016; Andréani 2004; Domínguez and Fernández de Castro 2016; Rezende 2014; Rojas Aravena 2014).

At the same time, leaders' socio-economic ideologies proved not to be statistically significant in any of the models, as expected by my theory. It means that it is not the fact of being right or left-wing that changes leaders' willingness to mobilize resources but their views about foreign policy and the global order. It is true that leaders that tended to present higher rejection of this order until the 2010s were also left-wing, such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Fidel Castro in Cuba, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. However, there were also left-wing leaders that adopted low mobilization and focused on more peaceful policies, such as Cristina Kirchner in Argentina, Michelle Bachelet in Chile, and Fernando Lugo in Paraguay. It happens because being right or left-wing means basically having different views on the role of the state in acting toward social and economic issues. Views about international security are related to foreign policy conceptions, not social or economic domestic ideas.

Regarding territorial disputes, robustness checks proved to be significant in nearly all models, meeting what is said by a huge literature on interstate militarization in the region (Mares 2001; 2012a; 2012b; Domínguez et al. 2003; Schenoni et al. 2020; Buzan and Wæver 2003). The argument is quite simple: having an active territorial dispute against a neighbor leads to higher resource mobilization, as a state needs to prepare to either defend itself from others' attempts to militarize such a dispute or to proceed itself to such a militarization. Results, however, show that these disputes provide only part of the explanation about ISP Postures in the region. While it is true that states tend to get prepared to defend such interests, results show that resource mobilization is actually given by politics itself, as shown by the significance of my theory's variables.

Finally, the dummy variable of being a Soviet ally, which basically applied to Cuba during the Cold War, showed statistical significance, as expected. It happened because Cuba

was pulled to the center of the bipolar dispute and had to mobilize resources to help the socialist bloc to defend its interests worldwide (Wright 2001; Westad 2007).

6.2 ISP Conceptualization

It is now time to test whether my theory is capable of explaining the conceptualizations behind the ISP of each Latin American state. As I am analyzing two different contents, I conduct this analysis separately. Therefore, in the next subsection, I test my theory on including crimes in these policies. Then, I explore explanations for including anti-hegemonic issues.

6.2.1 Crimes

My theory proposes one hypothesis on what can lead states to increase their emphasis on the role of crimes:

H3.1: The more resources the US spends with a Latin American state, the more it tended to include crimes, especially drug trafficking, in its ISP.

Just to recall the discussion from the fourth chapter, I acknowledge that a necessary condition for governments to emphasize crimes on their ISP is to have active criminal organizations in their territories. However, my theory poses that the decision to include crimes as part of states' ISP is political: while some governments decide to coexist with criminal organizations, others decide to militarize the fight against them. Then, if my theory is true, the decision to include these matters on ISP is thus a result of the relations between a state and the United States, in a way that the provision of foreign aid will lead them to increase include crimes in their ISP, complying with the "War on Drugs" policy.

In Figure 34 below, we can see that, indeed, no other variable from my theory than the US foreign aid was associated with the priority attributed to crimes in Latin American states' ISP. These results are also corroborated by the results in Table 12. First, we can see that even when we change the way we assess US foreign aid (i.e., considering the aid received as a proportion of the GDP or using only the amount provided as military aid), estimates remain

statistically significant. Then, while looking at the control variables, the Cold War showed significance, which was already expected, considering that the "War on Drugs" only gained prominence in the US foreign policy amidst the decline of the bipolar order.

Figure 34 - Estimates for the priority attributed to crimes in ISP

Source: own elaboration

The Bolivian case provides a good illustration of these statistical results. Bolivia has historically been a producer of coca leaves. Eating these leaves or drinking coca leaf tea is a common practice in the country, as it improves people's capacity to face the high altitudes in the country. This production, however, increased during the early 1980s due to a perfect storm: as the Bolivian mining industry collapsed, making people unemployed and poorer in an already very impoverished country, the cocaine (illegal) market was fastly growing in the United States and Europe, offering Bolivians a way to make money. Within this context, coca cultivation increased in the country, from around 34,000 acres in 1977 to around 143,000 acres in 1983 (Brienen 2015).

Table 12 - Regression results for the attention attributed to crimes in ISP

	Dependent variable:						
	Priority attributed to crimes						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
US foreign aid (Lag, overall)	0.223*** (0.037)		0.225*** (0.037)				
US mil. foreign aid (Lag)				0.190*** (0.037)			
US non-mil. foreign aid (Lag)					0.201*** (0.037)	0.201*** (0.037)	
US foreign aid (Lag, % of GDP)							0.124*** (0.039)
US support to non-state groups	0.122 (0.301)		0.285 (0.308)	0.104 (0.306)	0.236 (0.307)	0.288 (0.309)	0.342 (0.318)
Acceptance of liberal order		-0.033 (0.051)	-0.004 (0.054)	-0.003 (0.056)	-0.040 (0.056)	-0.044 (0.056)	-0.032 (0.057)
Democracy (Polity)		0.035 (0.046)	-0.007 (0.048)				
Electoral Democracy Index				0.050 (0.057)	0.002 (0.057)		
Militaries in Cabinet						-0.052 (0.041)	-0.051 (0.041)
Cold War			-0.568*** (0.133)	-0.476*** (0.146)	-0.479*** (0.140)	-0.427*** (0.128)	-0.439*** (0.130)
War on Terror			-0.027 (0.132)	0.078 (0.139)	0.070 (0.133)	0.067 (0.131)	0.112 (0.133)
Left-wing leader			-0.058 (0.080)	-0.039 (0.084)	-0.068 (0.084)	-0.097 (0.085)	-0.106 (0.086)
Existence of territorial disputes			0.088 (0.135)	0.073 (0.134)	0.053 (0.139)	0.066 (0.138)	0.094 (0.146)
Soviet ally			0.297 (0.269)	0.247 (0.268)	0.261 (0.269)	0.230 (0.267)	0.269 (0.272)
Log (GDP per capita)				-0.304** (0.140)	-0.115 (0.153)	-0.104 (0.149)	
Log (GDP)							-0.003 (0.078)
Constant	-0.005 (0.111)	-0.004 (0.124)	0.190 (0.153)	2.661** (1.192)	1.102 (1.295)	0.996 (1.269)	0.179 (1.944)
Observations	679	677	677	641	641	641	641
Log Likelihood	-852.550	-867.535	-838.545	-790.542	-788.435	-787.620	-798.223
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,717.100	1,747.071	1,703.089	1,609.085	1,604.869	1,603.239	1,624.446
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	1,744.224	1,774.177	1,761.819	1,671.567	1,667.352	1,665.721	1,686.929

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by country. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

At the same time, the US "War on Drugs" policy gained momentum under Ronald Reagan, as the consumption of cocaine and, especially, crack cocaine increased in the country. This led Reagan to reinforce the role of combating drugs in the US foreign policy and to deploy means (including economic mechanisms) to convince other states to implement such policies. Bolivia, which on one side was one of the largest coca producers in the world and, on the other, "desperately needed economic assistance" (Brienen 2015, pp. 2008), offered a good target for the US policy.

It is true that some policy-makers tried to resist these policies. On the other side, the United States, under different presidents such as Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bill Clinton, provided aid to Bolivia in order for the country to fight drug trafficking. The result was that, from the 1980s to the middle of the 2000s, Bolivian presidents adopted, to a greater (such as under Hugo Banzer) to a lesser extent (such as under Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada), a higher emphasis on crimes on their ISP. More than being perceptible in foreign policy, this higher emphasis can also be observed in the mobilization of domestic resources toward facing drug dealers, such as the creation of the *Unidad Móvil de Patrullaje Rural* (UMOPAR) and the *Fuerza Especial de Lucha contra el Nacrotráfico* (FELCN), which consisted of special forces to fighting these criminals (Sikkink 2018; Brienen 2015; Carpenter 2003; Lehman 1999). Figure 35 below illustrates trends in both the US foreign aid received by Bolivia and its emphasis on crimes over time.

Bolivia provides one case in this sense. Other countries, such as Colombia (as I discuss in the case study in Chapter 8), Peru, Honduras, and Nicaragua also provided such a case. The mechanism, as I discussed, is quite simple: the US provides incentives to some Latin American states to comply with its "War on Drugs" policy, and as a result, these countries adopt a higher emphasis on crimes on their ISP, moving it beyond public security policies.

Figure 35 - US Military Aid provided to Bolivia and the Bolivian emphasis on crimes

Source: own elaboration, partially based on data from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United States Department of State (2021)

6.2.2 Anti-Hegemony

Regarding the Anti-Hegemonic content, my theory proposes two hypotheses on what can lead states to increase their emphasis on this content:

H2.2: The more hindrances the US raises against a Latin American state, the more this country will adopt an anti-hegemonic conceptualization in its ISP.
H2.3: The more leaders reject the liberal order, the more anti-imperialistic are their ISP.

Results are available in Figure 36 and Table 13 and provide evidence for both hypotheses. In Figure 27, in the last chapter, we could see that this component was higher in the following cases: Bolivia (under Evo Morales), Cuba (under Fidel and Raul Castro during

the whole period), Honduras (under Manuel Zelaya), Panama (under Manuel Noriega), Nicaragua (under Ortega both in the 1980s and the 2000s), and Venezuela (under Hugo Chávez). In common, all those leaders had a high refusal of the global liberal order, as measured by the ideal points. This rejection led them to also criticize this order and search for an alternative arrangement, as Hugo Chávez did by creating ALBA and PetroCaribe (Carvalho and Belém Lopes, 2022).

Figure 36 - Estimates for the priority attributed to anti-hegemony in ISP

Source: own elaboration

The former Honduran leader Manuel Zelaya provides us with an illustrative example for this point. Zelaya was himself a member of the traditional agricultural elite in the country, affiliated with the Liberal Party, one of the right-wing parties that have been in office for decades in the country. In 2005, he was elected for the presidency after presenting a liberal pro-US platform during the electoral campaign - as is usual in the country. Actually, if one had to guess any orientation on ISP conceptualization under Zelaya, he/she would probably say that he would probably adopt a high emphasis on crimes, considering his rhetoric during the electoral campaign, as well as the Honduras-US relations. Then, after taking office in

2006, he kept most of the pro-liberal order elements of Honduran foreign policy and ISP (Cunha Filho, Coelho, and Pérez Flores 2013; Rusiñol 2009).

However, it changed over Zelaya's term. Amidst a huge energy crisis in Honduras, president Zelaya decided to move closer to the Venezuelan anti-liberal leader, Hugo Chávez, who was leading initiatives for supporting Latin American states that needed aid on energy and social issues. It did not take long until the presidential diplomacy implemented by the Honduran president led his country to adhere to Venezuelan-led institutions aimed to counter the liberal order, such as PetroCaribe and ALBA, being also able to convince the national parliament to approve such requisitions. This approximation also changed Zelaya's conception of the liberal order in a way that, although being president of a country seen as historically aligned to the US, he started to criticize this order - and so he guided the Honduran policy as a whole (Cunha Filho, Coelho, and Pérez Flores 2013; Carvalho and Belém Lopes 2022; Rusiñol 2009; Garcia 2009; Cálix 2010; Moreno 2009).

Within this context, the anti-hegemonic component arrived in the country by the hands of the president. More than joining Venezuelan-led institutions, Zelaya started to support other anti-hegemonic governments, such as the Cuban (under Castro) and the Bolivian (under Evo Morales), in international fora. Zelaya also decided to transform an area with a US military base in Palmerola into a civilian international airport. The initiative caused huge dissatisfaction in Washington, as this military base was an important point from where us military aircraft departed for flights aimed at anti-narcotics surveillance. In the end, this anti-hegemonic component caused dissatisfaction among the national elites, who deposed him from the presidency in 2009, and the consequent removal of this component from the Honduran ISP (Cunha Filho, Coelho, and Pérez Flores 2013; Carvalho and Belém Lopes 2022; Rusiñol 2009; 2009; Cálix 2010; Moreno 2009).

Table 13 - Regression results for the attention attributed to anti-hegemony in ISP

	Dependent variable:						
	Priority attributed to anti-hegemony						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
US foreign aid (Lag, overall)	-0.029 (0.027)		-0.028 (0.023)				
US mil. foreign aid (Lag)				-0.072*** (0.022)			
US non-mil. foreign aid (Lag)					-0.015 (0.022)	-0.010 (0.022)	
US foreign aid (Lag, % of GDP)							-0.034 (0.023)
US support to non-state armed groups	1.414*** (0.217)		0.752*** (0.196)	0.852*** (0.179)	0.842*** (0.181)	0.923*** (0.186)	0.878*** (0.188)
Acceptance of liberal order		-0.434*** (0.034)	-0.342*** (0.035)	-0.248*** (0.033)	-0.246*** (0.034)	-0.256*** (0.035)	-0.256*** (0.035)
Democracy (Polity)		-0.196*** (0.030)	-0.221*** (0.031)				
Electoral Democracy Index				-0.231*** (0.035)	-0.210*** (0.034)		
Militaries in Cabinet						0.0001 (0.025)	0.001 (0.024)
Cold War			0.155** (0.079)	0.077 (0.079)	0.094 (0.079)	0.342*** (0.081)	0.320*** (0.084)
War on Terror			0.413*** (0.076)	0.306*** (0.075)	0.290*** (0.074)	0.295*** (0.086)	0.310*** (0.086)
Left-wing leader			0.299*** (0.051)	0.323*** (0.049)	0.326*** (0.050)	0.249*** (0.051)	0.258*** (0.051)
Existence of territorial disputes			0.413*** (0.097)	0.363*** (0.092)	0.362*** (0.093)	0.398*** (0.096)	0.380*** (0.097)
Soviet ally			0.390** (0.173)	0.343** (0.160)	0.321** (0.162)	0.134 (0.163)	0.155 (0.164)
Log (GDP per capita)				0.165 (0.116)	0.148 (0.120)	0.036 (0.126)	
Log (GDP)							-0.062 (0.083)
Constant	-0.019 (0.180)	0.002 (0.115)	-0.577*** (0.131)	-1.888* (0.982)	-1.747* (1.010)	-0.902 (1.069)	0.925 (2.056)
Observations	679	677	677	641	641	641	641
Log Likelihood	-640.231	-581.133	-531.973	-449.420	-454.539	-471.697	-470.643
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,292.462	1,174.266	1,089.947	926.840	937.079	971.394	969.286
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	1,319.585	1,201.372	1,148.676	989.322	999.561	1,033.876	1,031.768

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by country. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Models also corroborated the hypothesis that the imposition of hindrances to a government was key to raising this component in the case of Noriega's Panama and keeping it higher in the case of Ortega's Nicaragua after 1982. While the Nicaraguan case was highly mentioned in this dissertation - and will be further analyzed in Chapter 8 - it is good to observe how the Panamanian case illustrates this point. Manuel Noriega became the *de facto* leader in Panama in 1983. At the time, he was seen as a US ally, being trained at the School of the Americas and working together with intelligence officers from Washington, and also helping to undermine the Nicaraguan *Sandinista* regime. Then, despite several accusations of involvement in crimes, especially drug trafficking, the US government did what it could to ignore these accusations and have an ally in office in Panama - and consequently led the Panamanian leader to think he was untouchable (Gilboa 1995).

The honeymoon, however, ended in the late 1980s. After several crises, including the harassment and murdering of political enemies, manipulating elections, and the indictment in a tribunal in Miami because of drug trafficking, the US president, Ronald Reagan, changed his policy towards removing Noriega from the office. Washington tried different mechanisms, such as negotiations, sanctions, covert operations, demonstrations of force, and support to a rebel Panamanian military faction led by commander Moises Giroldi. In response, Noriega implemented an increasing anti-hegemonic component in the Panamanian ISP, criticizing the US liberal order and moving closer to the *Sandinista* Nicaragua and Fidel Castro's Cuba, which also provided weapons for the Panamanian Defense Forces (Calderon 2000; Gandasegui 1993; Gilboa 1995). Just as a spoiler about the end of the story, in 1989, the United States sent its own troops and overthrew Noriega's regime.

Regarding other variables, in Figure 36, we can also see that democracy proved to be significant for this component. It is not surprising since radical anti-liberal leaders either take office in non-democratic states (e.g., Ortega in Nicaragua during the 1980s, Castro in Cuba, and Noriega in Panama) or undermine democratic regimes - e.g., Chávez in Venezuela and Ortega in Nicaragua during the 2000s (Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013; Corrales and Penfold-Becerra 2011).

Then, regarding the control variables, we can see that both the Cold War and the War on Terror contexts showed statistical significance in models. In the case of the latter, it was expected as the anti-liberal leaders needed to express their antagonism to the capitalist side - which also explains the case of the "Soviet ally" variable. For the former, it was also expected,

considering the resurgence of anti-systemic leaders after the immediate post-Cold War decade, with the US dominance over the world. The role of left-wing leaders was also expected since they tend to disagree more with the United States (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017; Potrafke 2009; Carvalho and Belém Lopes 2022; Levitsky and Roberts 2011).

6.3 ISP Cooperation

The final tests on the disaggregated ISP components relate to the possible causes of cooperation on these policies. According to my theory:

H4.1 - Greater civilian oversight over the military tends to increase security-related cooperation.

Models presented in Figure 37 and Table 14 below provide evidence for this hypothesis, as we can see that having a democratic regime or greater civilian prominence over the military led to greater cooperation in the region. In other words, in democratic regimes, veto players, the externalization of democratic values, and civil-military relations tend to lead to increased cooperation. It meets a literature on the region, showing that defense cooperation emerges in order to (1) build confidence between neighbors, aiming to reduce mutual threat perception - thus reducing militaries' claims to adopt another kind of policy -, increase transparency, and (2) give the militaries tasks and ways to improve national capabilities without beginning an arms race in the region (Mares 2007; 1998; Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux 2000; Pion-Berlin 2016; 2005; Amorim-Neto 2019).

Think, for example, of the case of Chile. In 1990, the country saw a democratic turnover after army general Augusto Pinochet left the office he occupied for sixteen years. It also led to changing civil-military relations. In the 1990s, the country reduced (actually zeroed) military presence in the executive cabinet, as we can see in Figure 38 below. It was a key step toward the civilian oversight of the military, but not the decisive one, as the military still had great influence over Chilean defense policies. Just to give a notion on this point, Pinochet himself kept his prerogatives as commander-in-chief until 1998 (Matei and Robledo 2013).

Figure 37 - Estimates for DCAs in force

Source: own elaboration

Still, several reforms took place during the 1990s, most of them against the militaries' will, and civilian oversight increased under successive presidents. This oversight brought outcomes, such as the Truth Commission revealing human rights abuses under Pinochet. Another important outcome was a change in the relationship with an old rival, Argentina: from a threat perception until the 1980s to confidence-building and cooperation since the 1990s. It was key to democratic Chile, as it could help downplay the role of the military by reducing threat perception. After increasing dialogues, including yearly meetings between defense authorities from both states, Chile and Argentina signed a Memorandum in November 1995, in which they agreed to create a permanent committee as a bilateral mechanism to increase cooperation in defense and security issues - the first DCA signed by Chile with a Latin American partner. This cooperation increased as civilian oversight over the military in Chile (and Argentina) broadened, leading to initiatives such as a joint force for acting in UN peace operations - the so-called *Cruz del Sur* (Matei and Robledo 2013; Faundes 2009; Ferrada and Fuentes Vera 2021; "Memorandum de Entendimiento Entre La Republica Argentina y La Republica de Chile Para El Fortalecimiento de La Cooperación En Materia de Seguridad de Interés Mutuo" 1995; Freeman 2020).

Table 14 - Regression results for Defense Cooperation Agreements

	Dependent variable:						
	Defense Cooperation Agreements						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
US foreign aid (Lag, overall)	0.056 (0.110)		0.088*** (0.001)				
US mil. foreign aid (Lag)				0.259* (0.154)			
US non-mil. foreign aid (Lag)					0.068 (0.104)	0.071 (0.099)	
US foreign aid (Lag, % of GDP)							0.018 (0.226)
Acceptance of liberal order		0.120 (0.221)	0.248*** (0.001)	0.367 (0.235)	0.369 (0.232)	0.464** (0.229)	0.450** (0.224)
Democracy (Polity)		0.328 (0.280)	0.300*** (0.001)				
Electoral Democracy Index				1.453*** (0.362)	1.376*** (0.367)		
Militaries in Cabinet						-2.477*** (0.595)	-2.635*** (0.649)
War on Terror			3.927*** (0.001)	2.862*** (0.592)	2.866*** (0.588)	2.483*** (0.566)	2.107*** (0.490)
Left-wing leader			0.449*** (0.001)	0.459** (0.189)	0.426** (0.190)	0.478** (0.192)	0.470** (0.192)
Existence of territorial disputes			-0.507*** (0.001)	-0.464 (0.638)	-0.462 (0.589)	-0.267 (0.588)	0.064 (0.547)
Log (GDP per capita)				-0.198 (0.184)	-0.121 (0.154)	0.606*** (0.180)	
Log (GDP)							0.814*** (0.063)
Constant	-4.880*** (0.915)	-4.685*** (0.777)	-4.860*** (0.001)	-2.974** (1.392)	-3.545*** (1.063)	-9.945*** (1.343)	-24.912*** (1.418)
Observations	684	682	682	646	646	646	646
Log Likelihood	-315.065	-314.056	-298.741	-274.861	-276.042	-272.847	-269.565
Akaike Inf. Crit.	640.129	640.111	617.483	571.722	574.085	567.694	561.130
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	662.769	667.261	662.733	620.901	623.263	616.873	610.309

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by country. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Figure 38 - Militaries in cabinet and DCAs in force involving Chile

Source: own elaboration, based on Kinne (2020) and Nyrup and Bramwell (2020)

As civilian oversight over the military increased in Chile, the democratic government would also change its relations towards cooperating with another old rival: Peru. Both states went close to a war in the 1970s while ruled by military dictatorships. However, after redemocratization, dialogues successively increased. Then, in 2001, both governments signed a memorandum in which they committed to increase cooperation and improve transparency regarding defense expenditure (Gatica-Bórquez and Harvey-Valdés 2021; "Memorandum de Entendimiento Entre La Republica Del Perú y La Republica de Chile Para El Fortalecimiento de La Cooperación En Materia de Seguridad y Defensa de Interés Mutuo" 2001). Together with building cooperative relations with former rivals, the Chilean democratic government would also sign agreements with Brazil and Guatemala, and engage in multilateral

arrangements, such as SADC, being one of the most proactive members (Kinne 2020; Carvalho 2021).

Regarding control variables, it is important to say first that the US support for non-state armed groups and the Cold War was not included in the model since there was no covariance between this variable and the outcome: there was no DCA in force in their presence. Then, we can see that, indeed, the War on Terror provided favorable incentives toward defense cooperation, meeting the existing literature (Fuccille and Rezende 2013; Rezende 2014; Vaz, Fuccille, and Rezende 2017; Mijares 2018). Left-wing leaders also showed statistical significance, but the role of these leaders still needs further exploration, which will not be provided in this dissertation. Some possible explanations include, more than socio-economic views, their views on regional integration, and the role of previous contacts between these leaders in the 2000s, such as the membership in the so-called *Foro de São Paulo*.

6.4 The ISP Theory at the disaggregated level

In this chapter, I empirically showed how my theory fits the disaggregated axes of the international security policies implemented by Latin American states. Statistical tests showed, first, that the US influence, leaders, and domestic institutions are statistically associated, either separately or together, with the components of these policies, such as their postures, conceptualizations, and cooperation. I also used some illustrative cases to provide some supportive evidence for the findings and also to give the first illustration of mechanisms. These cases were more superficial and non-exhaustive, as proper within-case analysis will be conducted in Chapter 8 in order to show causal mechanisms. After having demonstrated how my theory applies at the disaggregated level, in the next chapter, I discuss its applicability at the aggregate level, i.e., in the policy types I proposed in Chapter 3.

7 EXPLORING ASSOCIATIONS AND PREDICTING THE ISP TYPES IMPLEMENTED BY LATIN AMERICAN STATES

After testing my theory at the disaggregated level (i.e., for each separate component), in this chapter, I test it at the aggregated level, showing whether the proposed variables are statistically associated with the five ISP types that took place in Latin America from 1975 to 2010, while also being able to predict them. I agree with Waltz (1979) that a good theory must have the capacity to both explain and predict outputs, understanding the former as providing comprehension of how the proposed independent variable(s) relate to the output and the latter as using the existing knowledge to predict unobserved manifestations of the dependent variable (James et al. 2013). In this chapter, I provide evidence on both points using the five ISP types as the dependent variable - i.e., conducting an analysis on the aggregated level.

In order to aggregate the components and classify the policies implemented by each state along the five types presented in chapter 3, I use a K-Means Cluster Analysis. The K-Means algorithm distributes observations along two axes based on an (unrotated) Principal Component Analysis. Then, it partitions the observations into a pre-determined number of clusters (in this case, five clusters, considering the number of types of policies) and assigns each observation to a cluster. The algorithm determines clusters in a way that minimizes the variation between the euclidean distances within each cluster (James et al. 2013). Putting it simply: it clusters the observations based on their positions along the two axes returned by PCA. If the discussion from chapter 3 is correct, then we should be able to see the five clusters, one contemplating each type of policy.

After clustering (in this case, classifying) Latin American states' ISP, I proceed to provide evidence on whether my theory is capable of explaining the adoption of these different types by providing evidence of the statistical associations between my theory and each ISP type. I do that by using a multinomial logistic regression, which consists of an appropriate model when the dependent variable is based on categorical and non-hierarchical variables. Simply put, it applies the logistic equation, adapted to more than one possible outcome, in order to estimate the odds ratios for each possible outcome in a variable - in this case, to estimate the probabilities of each independent variable in my theory to lead to each possible ISP type. Then, I rely on Maximum Likelihood Estimations for these models, using country and year random intercepts.

Finally, I use a random forest to assess my theory's predictive capacity. It consists of a "black box" tool to predict outcomes - is to say, it provides good predictions of the outcomes, but it does not provide us with a way to interpret how it made these predictions (e.g., the coefficients). The model runs a number of regression trees, with different combinations of predictors, in an attempt to reduce the error and find the best fit for the data. In order to do that, it ignores the linearity assumption, finding non-linear relationships between variables. It is a very useful tool for understanding the predictive power of each predictor and covariate in the model by reporting how much predictive power each variable adds (or removes) to the model (Hill and Jones 2014; James et al. 2013). It can help us comprehend how my theory helps to predict these policies. Then, I will randomly split the data into two subsamples: the first containing 70% of all observations to train the model, and the second, with the remaining 30% of all observations, to test the capacity of the trained random forest model in predicting the ISP types of the test set. It means training a random forest algorithm in a set of observed data and observing how it works in predicting outcomes in another set of data.

Therefore, this chapter is organized into four sections. In the following one, I present and discuss the results of the cluster analysis. In the second section, I present and discuss the results of the multinomial logistic regression, using some illustrative (but also non-exhaustive) cases to provide further evidence for the findings. Then, I introduce the outcomes from the random forest. Finally, I introduce some conclusions from this analysis.

7.1 Clustering ISP Types

Before running the K-Means cluster analysis, I scaled all four variables (the log of the ISP Postures index, the prevalences of crimes and anti-hegemonic issues, and active Defense Cooperation Agreements), so all of them had mean of 0 and standard deviation 1. Then I ran the model. Results can be found in Figure 39 below. Cases (dots) are positioned according to their scores on the first two components of a PCA. Then, we can see that, for the vertical axis, cases got an upper position when they increased mentions to crimes and a lower position when they were more cooperative. Regarding the horizontal axis, the more resources they mobilized and the more anti-hegemonic they were, the more to the right they are positioned. In order to classify each cluster, I used the positions of their centers (centroids), considering the scores for each variable. These scores can be found in Figure 40.

Figure 39 - Clusters of ISP Types

Source: own elaboration

Figure 40 - Clusters' centroids

Source: own elaboration

What we can see is, first, that the five types proposed in Chapter 3 reflect the five clusters in the exact ways I proposed - such a notion is corroborated by Figure 40:

- The Coexistence policy is based on low scores in all components;
- The Pro-Democracy Security Cooperation policy consists of high cooperation and smaller scores in the other components;
- The Balance of Power policy consists of higher resource mobilization and lower scores in the other components;
- The Rebel Policy consists of higher resource mobilization and focus on anti-hegemonic issues;
- and the Transnational Threats policy is based on higher resource mobilization and focus on crimes.

The classification itself also showed some validity when compared with the existing literature, as discussed in Chapter 3. Cases such as Hugo Chávez's Venezuela, Fidel Castro's Cuba, and Daniel Ortega's Nicaragua were included in the Rebel Policy cluster (Wright 2001; Corrales and Penfold-Becerra 2011; LeoGrande 1986). Lula da Silva's Brazil, Michelle Bachelet's Chile, and Cristina Kirchner's Argentina were considered within the Pro-Democracy Security Cooperation cluster (Vaz, Fuccille, and Rezende 2017; Mijares 2018; Frenkel and Comini 2017; Carvalho 2021), while Pinochet's Chile and Galtieri's Argentina, as well as El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras during the civil wars in Central America were coded as Balance of Power policies (Schenoni, Braniff, and Battaglino 2020; Gatica-Bórquez and Harvey-Valdés 2021; Rojas Aravena 1998; Hoekstra 2021; Westad 2007; Child 1992).

Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic, as well as post-1990 Panama, and some South American states immediately after re-democratization, such as Argentina (under Alfonsín) and Brazil (under Sarney), appeared within the Coexistence Policy during most of the time (Hartlyn 1991; Metz and Library of Congress 2001; Lincoln and Lauderdale 1985; Carasales 1995; Hurrell 1998; Rojas Aravena 1998). Finally, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, in the late 1980s and 1990s, appeared within the Transnational Threats cluster and were joined by Central American states, such as Nicaragua and Guatemala, after the end of the civil wars

in their territories (Bagley 1988; Brienen 2015; Echandía Castilla 2008; Morales 1992; Carpenter 2003; White 2019).

In order to provide some cross-validation on this clustering, I manually coded each policy for each country-year, based on the data and the existing literature. Then, I compared results from the K-Means Cluster Analysis with the manually coded classification. The similarity between both classifications was 71.8%, which I considered encouraging. Then, for both the multinomial and the random forest models, I will use both the automated and the manual classifications in order to double-check estimates and make them more robust.

7.2 Evidence on explaining ISP Types

Having classified the ISP types of each Latin American state, I now use multinomial logistic regressions to test hypotheses on the aggregate level. The proposed hypotheses are:

H1: Balance of Power policies are implemented by less democratic states and governments that receive support from the US.

H2: Rebel Policies are implemented by governments that strongly oppose the liberal order and are intensified by US hindrances to a government.

H3: Transnational Threats policies are implemented by countries that are influenced by the United States.

H4: Pro-Democracy Security Cooperation policies are implemented by more democratic countries, with greater civilian oversight over the military.

Multinomial logistic regressions use one category as a reference and estimate coefficients related to the odds ratio for each variable to lead observations to implement another ISP type than the reference category. The reference category in my analysis is Coexistence, as it consists of the less complex policy (i.e., low scores in all axes). Then, if a state adopted any other policy than Coexistence, it means that variables may have led this state to raise scores on one (or more) axis. Suppose that democracy presents a negative and statistically significant coefficient regarding Balance of Power policies. A possible interpretation for it would be: "Democracy tends to reduce the probability that a state adopts a Balance of Power policy, instead of a Coexistence one."

Results using the outcomes from the K-Means Cluster Analysis as the dependent variable are available in Table 15. Then, as a robustness check, I also ran a model using the hand-coded classification - available in Table 16. All models include country and year random intercepts, as in the last chapter. Considering that some combinations of categorical variables do not exist (e.g., there was no Pro-Democracy Security Cooperation policy during the Cold War), I had to remove the following variables from the model: Cold War and the US support to non-state actors. I also excluded data on GDP and GDP *per capita* in order not to exclude Venezuela from the analysis.

Table 15 - Multinomial logistic regression results, using results from Cluster Analysis as the dependent variable

| | Policy | | | |
	Balance of Power	Rebel Policy	Transnat. Threats	Pro-Dem. Sec. Coop.
(Intercept)	0.281 (1.022)	-9.153*** (2.480)	-2.006** (0.961)	-8.265*** (2.236)
US foreign aid (Lag)	0.767*** (0.226)	0.098 (1.091)	0.931*** (0.246)	-0.783 (1.086)
Democracy (Polity)	-1.067*** (0.237)	-2.559*** (0.694)	-0.376 (0.370)	2.599 (2.702)
Accept. of liberal order	-0.360 (0.267)	-3.423*** (0.844)	-0.492 (0.400)	1.570** (0.641)
War on Terror	-2.119** (0.946)	2.228 (1.505)	1.019 (0.984)	3.453*** (1.213)
Left-wing leaders	0.555* (0.337)	2.216* (1.290)	0.170 (0.432)	3.264*** (0.873)
Exist. Territorial Disputes	0.166 (0.755)	3.702* (2.053)	0.329 (0.702)	-0.467 (1.261)
Log-likelihood	802.9	802.9	802.9	802.9
N	651	651	651	651
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01				

Table 16 - Multinomial logistic regression results, using the hand-coded classification as the dependent variable

| | Policy | | | |
	Balance of Power	Rebel Policy	Transnat. Threats	Pro-Dem. Sec. Coop.
(Intercept)	-4.152** (1.728)	-17.379*** (4.525)	-4.226*** (1.476)	-14.908*** (4.829)
US foreign aid (Lag)	1.013*** (0.335)	0.352 (1.256)	0.628** (0.312)	-0.916 (1.759)
Democracy (Polity)	-1.299*** (0.329)	-2.376** (1.080)	-0.091 (0.408)	5.105 (6.196)
Accept. of liberal order	-0.095 (0.382)	-6.425*** (2.002)	-0.161 (0.491)	2.088* (1.095)
War on Terror	-5.204** (2.275)	7.083*** (2.272)	1.989 (1.577)	7.124*** (2.128)
Left-wing leaders	0.271 (0.540)	4.775** (2.002)	-0.789 (0.512)	2.788** (1.369)
Exist. Territorial Disputes	4.858*** (1.532)	6.571** (2.981)	3.334*** (0.877)	1.593 (2.304)
Log-likelihood	598.0	598.0	598.0	598.0
N	670	670	670	670
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01				

Results from both models provide evidence for nearly all the aforementioned hypotheses. First, results show that Balance of Power policies tended to take place in countries with less democratic regimes than those that implement Coexistence policies. These policies were mostly implemented by military dictatorships that were in office in most of the region at the time. Militaries often identified threats in other states, either because of border disputes or any other reason, which provided them with incentives to raise resource mobilization in order to defend sovereignty. The nationalist component of military rulers also led them to increase this mobilization in order to be prepared to use military means to pursue their national interests. This mobilization sometimes was also induced by the US influence, as Washington was able to deploy resources to convince states to comply with their policies, e.g., facing the *Sandinistas* and their allies in Central America.

This military preponderance, together with increased US influence, also tended to reduce the probability of cooperation, as neighbors were seen as threats, not friends, and relations were often influenced by Washington. Some degree of cooperation only took place in order to hunt and prosecute enemies of these regimes (Mares 1998; Pion-Berlin 1989; 2016; Loveman 1999; McSherry 2005). At the same time, most of these dictatorships (1) were not high critics of the liberal order, and (2) took place during the Cold War, when the "War on Drugs" was still being developed. This is why they tended not to present either the crimes or the anti-hegemonic content. These policies nearly disappeared during the 2000s due to a lack of contextual incentives to adopt them, which explains the statistically significant negative coefficient in the case of the "War on Terror" variable. Let me illustrate the point on democracy and US foreign aid, respectively, with two examples: Peru (1975), regarding democracy, and Honduras (1982), to mention the US aid. Their policies can be graphically observed in Figure 41 below, and as we can see, they are definitely Balance of Power policies.

Peru had historic border disputes with Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador - but the use of these disputes changed over its history. Then, since the 1968 military coup, the Peruvian nationalist dictatorship made a huge effort towards improving its armed forces - is to say, it decided to increase resource mobilization - aiming to increase its capabilities towards defending Peruvian national interests, which also included these territorial claims. It acquired a huge number of weapons from the Soviet Union, which became a key partner in Peruvian capability improvement at the time. Peru also received training (mostly from the Soviet Union), did military exercises on its borders with other states, and militarized disputes against

Chile and Ecuador. This resource mobilization, together with very reduced defense cooperation and emphasis on crimes, and a not-so-high anti-hegemonic component, configurated in a Balance of Power policy, adopted by the initiative of the authoritarian regime (Berríos 1989; Freeman 2020; Meneses 1982). After the end of the military regime, Peru adopted a Transnational Threats policy, reducing its intentions towards interstate claims and focusing on fighting *Sendero Luminoso* and the MRTA inside its own territory (Basombrío 1999; De La Pedraja Tomán 2013; Lora Cam 1999).

Figure 41 - The ISP of Honduras (1982) and Peru (1975)

Source: own elaboration

On the other hand, if we want to look at the role of US foreign aid in changing a state's ISP, Honduras provides us with a very illustrative case. After taking office at the beginning of the 1980s, the US president, Ronald Reagan, decided to change Jimmy Carter's approach to the Nicaraguan *Sandinistas*. It meant an escalation by militarizing the dispute against Managua. After deciding that this escalation would take place by providing external support to a non-state group - the *Contras* - to fight a civil war against the *Sandinistas*, the US decided that Honduras should serve as the headquarters for this group. It also decided to provide

foreign aid to the Honduran government, so it could improve its own armed forces, help provide training and weapons to the *Contras* and, eventually, militarize disputes against the Nicaraguan forces. Being Honduras a historical US ally and also very dependent on American aid, it accepted Reagan's proposal, abandoned its Coexistence policy, and started adopting a Balance of Power one toward militarizing the contention of the *Sandinistas* (Westad 2007; LeoGrande 1986; Bagley et al. 1985; Child 1992; Hoekstra 2021).

Then, when we look at Rebel Policies, we can see that rejecting the liberal order is strongly associated with these policies - the other variable, the US support for non-state groups, could not be tested due to its zero covariance with other types of policies. This was already expected to be the main predictor of these policies, as they needed anti-liberal leaders, such as Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez, to take place. These leaders are often seen by their supporters as leaders of revolutions and conduct the ISP of their nations in a search for changing the current order. They are always left-wing oriented, which also explains the statistically significant coefficient in models. And they usually either take office in non-democratic regimes, as happened with Castro in Cuba (1959) and Ortega in Nicaragua (1979), or undermine these regimes, such as Chávez in Venezuela (1999) and Ortega in his second time in Nicaragua (2007), which explains the coefficients for democracy in the models (Wright 2001; Carvalho and Belém Lopes 2022; Corrales and Penfold-Becerra 2011; LeoGrande 1986; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013).

The cases of Cuba and Venezuela, which were already mentioned in this dissertation, provide a good illustration of these policies. Both can be graphically observed in Figure 42 below. Cuba has had anti-hegemonic leaders in office since 1959. Since then, it has criticized the liberal order and proposed alternatives to it, including ISP. One representative sample of this policy was implemented in 1984. The Cuban leader, Fidel Castro, had close relations with the Soviet Union, getting support from the socialist superpower and helping the socialist bloc in their initiatives around the world. As a consequence, as Cold War tensions increased during the 1980s, Castro decided to support left-wing governments and *guerrillas* in different parts of the world, such as Nicaragua, Angola, and South Africa. It meant a huge resource mobilization, both by preparing to use the force in such different places and also by deploying it. At the same time, Castro always emphasized the anti-hegemonic component of his policy, either in his long speeches at international fora or by providing guidelines for such diplomacy

in other arenas, such as the Non-Aligned Movement (Wright 2001; Westad 2007; Halliday 1986).

Venezuela under Chávez also provides such a case. After taking office, he gradually changed the Transnational Threats policy implemented by his predecessor towards a Rebel one. Chávez started getting allies for his anti-liberal policies by using an oil-based diplomacy to build a clientelistic network of supporters to act on international fora. By doing it, he was able to increase his leverage in forums such as the Organization of the American States and the UN, being able to disturb US policies in these places. He also gathered non-state partners by providing some support to the Colombian FARC. Then in 2008, after Colombia bypassed the Ecuadorian border to attack a FARC settlement, Chávez tried to attribute an imperialistic image to the act and helped escalate the crisis to something close to war (Carvalho and Belém Lopes 2022; Corrales and Penfold-Becerra 2011; Giacalone 2013; Abdul-Hak 2013; Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér 2011).

Figure 42 - The ISP of Cuba (1984) and Venezuela (2010)

Source: own elaboration

Statistical results also provide evidence that the Transnational Threats policy holds a strong association with the US support to some Latin American states. It happened because

this support seems to have led some states to both mobilize more resources and increase their emphasis on crimes within ISP to comply with the US guidelines to provide such aid. Then, they adopted this policy in order to engage in the US-led "War on Drugs." Let's examine two representative cases of Transnational Threats policies to understand this relationship: Bolivia (1989) and Guatemala (1996). Their policies can be graphically visualized in Figure 43 below.

Figure 43 - The ISP of Bolivia (1989) and Guatemala (1996)

Source: own elaboration

In Bolivia, as I discussed in section 6.2.1, a perfect storm took place and favored the US influence over the country. First, the decline of the mining industry led people to find other sources of wealth. Then, amidst an increasing market for cocaine worldwide, several Bolivians decided to plant coca, which was a traditional crop in the country. At the same time, the US reinforced its "War on Drugs" policy under Ronald Reagan and decided to use aid to convince other governments to adhere to this policy. As Bolivia was a very poor and dependent country, it seemed a good idea to accept US aid in exchange for complying with the "War on Drugs," fighting drug dealers and some *cocaleros* in its territory by creating

special forces to do it. The result was a Transnational Threats policy during most of the 1980s and 1990s (Brienen 2015; Carpenter 2003; Lehman 1999).

At this point, one could ask: wasn't this variable supposed to lead to a Balance of Power policy? It is thus important to recall what I said in section 4.1: the US influence over the region varies in terms of its objectives, which reflects in Latin American ISP. In the case of Central America during the civil wars, for example, the US provided aid for states such as (aforementioned) Honduras and El Salvador in order to face the *Sandinistas* and left-wing *guerrillas* (Child 1992; Hoekstra 2021). It led them to increase resource mobilization but not to change other axes, considering the objectives of this aid. However, the situation was different in other cases.

Guatemala provides us with a good opportunity to assess it. During its civil war against URNG and EGP, it received support from the United States in order to fight the left-wing insurgent groups. Then, in the 1990s, as the war reached its end, this support towards facing insurgents was converted into aid to fight drug dealers. Amidst the civil war, the poverty, and considering Guatemala's strategic geographic positioning to transport drugs from South to North America, it became an important part of the drug transportation logistics. It led the US to underscore the need for the Guatemalan government to engage in the "War on Drugs." The result was a higher emphasis on crimes in Guatemalan ISP. After taking office in 1996, Álvaro Arzu declared, for example, that the armed forces should be "more effective and efficient in fighting narcotics." It was accompanied by changes in the local legislation and several actions and operations towards combating drug cartels, aiming to comply with the North American friends (Darling 2000; Feilding and Ochoa 2016; Bagley 2013).

Finally, we can discuss Pro-Democracy Security Cooperation policies. As you can see, my hypothesis was not necessarily corroborated by models, as democracy did not present statistical significance. Does it mean that my hypothesis was refuted? Not at all. Results show that non-democratic regimes tend to favor Balance of Power policies and when coupled with a high rejection of the liberal order, the Rebel Policies. Then, what results showed is that both the Transnational Threats and the Pro-Democracy Security Cooperation policy do not necessarily take place in countries that are more democratic than those that implement the Coexistence ones. It means that the hypothesis was not completely right but also not completely wrong. Still, I must confess it was not expected.

The fact is that results show that domestic institutions are not the key determinant for states to adopt such a policy, as being democratic still gives states three options. The model, however, gave us two answers on what leads states to implement Pro-Democracy Security Cooperation policies instead of Coexistence ones - and it is worthy to say that the two hypotheses corroborate part of the existing literature. First, it shows that the context during the "War on Terror" favored these policies, meeting the argument that reduced US and global attention over the region made it easier for Latin American states to increase cooperation (Mijares 2018; Fuccille and Rezende 2013; Vaz, Fuccille, and Rezende 2017). Second, it shows the role of leaders in a way that demands further explanation.

Coefficients show, first, that left-wing leaders increase the probability of adopting such a policy. However, it also shows that higher acceptance of the liberal order does it. At first glance, it seems contradictory, as left-wing leaders tend to present lower acceptance of such an order (Potrafke 2009; Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017; Carvalho and Belém Lopes 2022). Nevertheless, another way to interpret it is that left-wing leaders present a higher probability of implementing such a policy when they are not radical critics of the liberal order. It meets an entire literature on how these leaders were able to increase Latin American cooperation and integration during the 2000s, which also included security and defense (Riggirozzi and Grugel 2015; Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012; Nolte 2018; Weiffen, Wehner, and Nolte 2013; Sanahuja 2012; Carvalho 2021; Frenkel and Comini 2017; Fuccille and Rezende 2013).

Think, for example, of the cases of Brazil under Lula da Silva, Chile under Bachelet, and Argentina under Kirchner - I illustrate their policies in Figure 44 below. The three of them were among the most cooperative policies in the region so far (Vaz, Fuccille, and Rezende 2017; Frenkel and Comini 2017; Carvalho 2021). At the same time, all of them attended to the criterion shown by the models, making sense of the results. On the other side, in Figure 45, I show three cases that also took place during the War on Terror and were also democratic (Costa Rica, Paraguay, and the Dominican Republic) but did not have left-wing governments in the reported years. As we can see, all of them implemented Coexistence policies instead of a more cooperative one.

Figure 44 - The ISP of Argentina (2006), Brazil (2007), and Chile (2009)

Source: own elaboration

Figure 45 - The ISP of Costa Rica (1981), the Dominican Republic (2007), and Paraguay (2009)

Source: own elaboration

What I am doing regarding Pro-Democracy Security Cooperation Policies is, first, trying to make it clear what the models show. Second, providing further avenues for research, as these results deserve further analyses, which will not be provided in this dissertation. There is something in moderate left-wing governments that led to these policies during the 2000s. As it seems related to leaders, the mechanisms were probably the ones pointed out by my theory. The reason, however, deserves further explanation.

The fact is that, in this section, I showed how my theory's variables showed robust statistical association with four out of five ISP types in the region in the way my theory expected. I complemented statistical models with illustrative evidence from cases. Further evidence on mechanisms will be further provided in within-case analysis in Chapter 8.

7.3 Predicting ISP

I now examine my theory's role in predicting ISP using a random forest. A quick check confirmed that both train and test subsets contain all the analyzed countries. Then, I included all the variables presented in the previous empirical tests, either in the main models or in robustness checks. Random forests allow us to do it, as they will run a number of models with different subsets of these covariates in order to find the best predictions and predictors of the outcomes. Models below consist of forests containing 1,000 trees, each of them using three variables. The number of values was chosen based on running forests with different numbers of variables and aiming for the minimization of the out-of-bag error estimate.

As I did in the last subsection, I ran models using both the K-Means and the hand-coded classification of policy types. The random forests were able to correctly predict 75% of ISP types implemented in Latin America, based on the K-Means classification, and 84% of the hand-coded classification, which means quite good applicability to real life. In Figures 46 and 47, I assess the predictive capacity of these models by using a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve in both the K-Means and the hand-coded classification, respectively. These curves compare models' performance in predicting true positive cases with the ratio of false positives. The more true positives and the fewer false positives a model has, the better it is - which means that the more up and left a curve is, the better the model is. Results show that the model presented a good performance, presenting more true than false positives while predicting both the K-Means and the hand-coded outcomes.

Figure 46 - ROC Curve with models using the K-Means ISP classification

Source: own elaboration

Figure 47 - ROC Curve with models using the hand-coded ISP classification

Source: own elaboration

Then, regarding the predictors, Figure 48 shows their marginal importance in predicting outcomes from the K-Means cluster analysis, and Figure 49 shows the same for the hand-coded classification. Results show that my theory's variables are important for predicting these policies. My theory provided the three main variables for these predictions, whether using the K-Means or the hand-coded classification: leaders' acceptance of the liberal order, democracy, and US foreign aid. Other variables, such as territorial disputes and the War on Terror, also showed some predictive capacity. Therefore, these results provide evidence for one of this dissertation's central claims: although several factors, such as territorial disputes, can explain ISP in Latin America, politics is crucial to (understanding and) predicting these policies. Different ISP problems can exist. However, policies are not necessarily a result of the existing problems but are mainly a result of politics.

Figure 48 - The marginal importance of variables in predicting ISP Types, based on the K-Means classification

Source: own elaboration

Figure 49 - The marginal importance of variables in predicting ISP Types, based on the hand-coded classification

Source: own elaboration

7.4 Latin American ISP explained and predicted

In this chapter, I ran statistical analyses that provided evidence that my theory seems capable of explaining[22] and predicting international security policies implemented by Latin American states from 1975 to 2010. Overall, its three key variables did well in both efforts, elucidating the role of politics in producing ISP in the region. It is thus possible to say that my theory provides a good theoretical framework to comprehend and forecast these policies in the region. While statistical tests were decisive in providing support for my theory, it is now time to assess how its mechanisms worked by looking at case studies in the next chapter.

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[22] Although models are not enough to infer causality, the presented provides support towards advancing with causal claims, which will be made in the next chapter.

8 THE MECHANISMS BEHIND THE ISP THEORY

Statistical tests presented evidence for my theory by showing a statistically robust association between the proposed variables and outcomes. The presented models, however, do not allow us to make any clear causal inference due to violations of the potential outcomes framework - i.e., they did not follow a quasi-experimental approach by isolating variables and investigating average treatment effects (Angrist and Pischke 2009; Imbens and Rubin 2015). In this chapter, I advance towards confirming that the associations found in the previous chapters consist of causal relations.

I do it by moving from dataset to causal-process observations, conducting within-case analyses that allow us to unveil causal chains connecting variables. This procedure leverages my theory since, at the same time, (1) it increases the validity of the statistical findings and (2) it shows causal processes behind those connections. Illustrating causal mechanisms also help build a more complete theory, showing how variables connect to outcomes. Chapter 4 already gave us the mechanisms, so it makes it easier for the mission of this chapter, which becomes based on searching for evidence on the proposed outcomes and mechanisms (Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2004; Mahoney and Goertz 2006; Goertz and Mahoney 2012).

Considering the existence of three variables, I rely on three case studies in this chapter - one to show the causal role of each variable. In order to leverage causal inferences in each case study, I also provide synthetic counterfactuals by using the synthetic control method (SCM). This technique uses data on dependent and independent variables for existing cases (i.e., data on all Latin American states) to create a counterfactual (synthetic) case to be contrasted with the actual observation. It produces a weighted combination of all cases to predict what should happen if a unit had not been treated. Then, we can compare both the actual and the synthetic observations to observe how the analyzed independent variable affected that unit (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2010). Simply put, it allows us to have a picture of "what if" a variable was absent in that case. Therefore, for each case, I provide a synthetic control for each ISP axis for that observation.

As I mentioned, I will conduct one case study to explore the mechanisms connecting each independent variable of my theory to ISP, resulting in three case studies. In order to select cases, I searched for critical junctures in which both the dependent and the independent variable of interest changed while the others were kept constant. The idea is to trace how

states' ISP changed along the critical junctures, searching for evidence of causal mechanisms within these contexts. As the main idea is to trace causal mechanisms, it allows me to focus on typical cases to unveil mechanisms and causal chains (Seawright 2016; Goertz and Mahoney 2012). In the table below, I summarize cases that attend to these criteria.

Table 17 - Cases matching case-selection criteria

Variable	Cases	Years	Critical Juncture
US Influence	Bolivia	1975-1990	Reagan's renewed emphasis on the "War on Drugs" (1982)
	Colombia	1986-1994	Increasing US foreign aid under Bush (1990)
	Colombia	1998-2010	*Plan Colombia* (2000)
Leaders	Nicaragua	1974-1985	The onset of the *Sandinista* regime (1979)
	Venezuela	1994-2003	Hugo Chávez took office (1999)
Democracy	Argentina	1976-1989	Re-Democratization (1983)
	Peru	1990-2006	Re-Democratization (2001)

Within this list, selected cases are, respectively, Colombia (1998-2010), Nicaragua (1974-1985), and Argentina (1976-1989). They will be respectively approached in the following sections.

8.1 The "War on Drugs" meets the "War on Terror": The US and "*Plan Colombia*"

The first case study is thus aimed to unveil the mechanisms that connected the United States' influence to ISP. Colombia (1998-2010) provides a good case study by tracing how the US affected these policies during Andrés Pastrana's and Álvaro Uribe's presidencies, allowing us to assess the role of the increase in foreign aid provided by Washington under *Plan Colombia* and the intensification of the "War on Drugs" within the "War on Terror" in shaping ISP. As Figure 50 shows, the only independent variable that presented a huge variation during the analyzed time period was the US foreign aid provided to Colombia. On the other hand, we can see some increase in mentions to crimes and ISP postures during the 2000s, in a context when the rest of the region was reducing such a mobilization, as we can see in Figure 51. The

result was the intensification of the Transnational Threats policy implemented by Colombia, which, as I claim in this section, was caused by the US influence. If the proposed mechanisms are correct, we should see evidence that this influence took place through either political contacts, military training and support, foreign aid, or any kind of hindrances raised against the Colombian government.

Figure 50 - Key variables' scores for Colombia (1994-2010)

Source: own elaboration

In order to understand the Colombian ISP from 1998 to 2010, we need to go back in time. In June 1971, US president Richard Nixon declared a "war" on drugs due to the increasing consumption and resulting health problems in his country. However, it was during the 1980s, under Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, that this "war" intensified. Within

this context, Colombia emerged as a natural partner to the US policy, considering that (1) it was one of the main drug suppliers worldwide, and (2) it already had close relations with Washington. The US government thus started providing support for Colombia to be part of the War on Drugs, and, as a result, the country inaugurated a Transnational Threats policy during the 1980s (Sikkink 2018; Carpenter 2003; Tickner 2000; Bagley 1988).

Figure 51 - ISP Postures in Colombia and the Latin American average during the 1990s and 2000s

Source: own elaboration

Since then, although Colombia has been complying with the US and implementing the Transnational Threats policy, this compliance has been varying - and so has been Washington's support to the country. When Andrés Pastrana Arango took office in 1998, the US support was among its lowest levels since the "War on Drugs" arrived in the country due to dissatisfaction with the Colombian action against drugs, especially after denounces that Pastrana's predecessor, Ernesto Samper, had ties with the Cali Cartel - the one that the Samper administration defeated (Tickner 2000; Tokatlian 2000). Washington thus decertified the country as a partner in the "War on Drugs," which led to reduced foreign aid, trade, and investment flows to Colombia (Bagley 2005; Villa and Ostos 2005; Tokatlian 2008).

As a result of decreased government capacity due to reduced US support and some vacuum in drug cartels after the dismantlement of both the Medellin and the Cali Cartels,

guerrillas such as FARC, ELN, and paramilitary groups that emerged to fight these *guerrillas*, such as the *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (AUC) were stronger in 1998, especially due to their increasing involvement in drug trafficking (Bagley 2005; Villa and Ostos 2005; Guizado 2005; Tokatlian 2008). It was within this challenging context that Andrés Pastrana took office in 1998. One of the few good news for him was that the US decided once again to certify Colombia as a partner in fighting drugs, thus resuming its aid flows to Bogota.

Before taking office, Pastrana manifested his strategy towards the "War on Drugs": it was an international and multidimensional problem that needed more resources, including something similar to a "Marshall Plan" to be resolved. The solution demanded a combination of a negotiated dismantlement of the organizations and socio-economic incentives for the former criminals and *guerrilleros* to restart their lives. Meanwhile, some confrontations would also exist in order not to stop fighting drugs. Then, as a president-elect, he started working towards this strategy by meeting the US president, Bill Clinton, to ask for help implementing this idea (Tickner 2000; Bagley 2005).

The US-Colombia relations saw a considerable improvement during Pastrana's presidency, as he wanted to change the image the world had about his country after the turbulence under Samper. He took only two months in office to make his first state visit to Washington when US president Bill Clinton confirmed his intention to support Bogota's policies. Just to mention some examples, the Clinton administration sent emissaries to meet FARC members in Costa Rica in late 1998, increased the US foreign aid to Colombia from US\$ 21 million during the 1996 fiscal year to US\$ 325 million in 1999, and supported its South American partner to get a US\$ 3.5 billion credit from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Washington also increased training on Colombian military and police personnel and started sharing intelligence information (Tickner 2000; Bagley 2005; US Agency for International Development (USAID) and US Department of State 2021).

Pastrana's government responded to the US support by keeping the Transnational Threats policy in 1999, as we can see in Figure 52. While intensifying anti-drug actions, it is hard to talk about an increasing militarization of these policies, as he also negotiated with FARC. In one gesture of "good faith" to the left-wing *guerrilla*, for example, Pastrana demilitarized 42,000 square kilometers of Colombian territory. At the same time, the Colombian president insisted on the need for a "Marshall Plan" to solve the conflict and

proposed an ambitious two-year US$ 7.5 billion[23] plan to the Clinton administration, as well as to other patterns such as the IMF and the European Union: the so-called "Plan Colombia." It consisted of a comprehensive plan to reinforce Colombian institutional, social, and economic capacities while also improving the military capacity towards fighting drug organizations (Tickner 2007; Colombia 1999; Bagley 2005; Rojas and Meltzer 2005; Chernick 1999).

Figure 52 - Colombian ISP (1999 and 2006)

Source: own elaboration

Some partners, such as the European Union, were not so excited about the plan, especially due to the military component. On the other hand, the Clinton administration introduced some changes in the initial proposal aiming to increase the focus on this component, considering its skepticism of the possibility of a negotiated end to the drug situation in Colombia[24]. In 2000, the US congress approved the aid package to *Plan Colombia* while also including an important caveat: the aid was aimed at fighting drug organizations,

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[23] It represents the plan's initial price tag. According to Pastrana's proposal, the Colombian government would pay most of this amount (US$ 4 million), while the US would contribute around US$ 1.5-2 billion. The remainder was expected to come from institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the European Union (Bagley 2005)

[24] To provide a picture of it: *Plan Colombia*'s final version assigned 80 percent of its funds to the armed forces and the national police (Restrepo 2015)

not *guerrillas*, as American politicians wanted to limit the US involvement in Colombia as they feared it could give place to a new "Vietnam." However, it represented a problem because of two key reasons. First, it was obvious that the military hardware acquired by the Colombian armed forces through *Plan Colombia* would also be used against FARC and ELN, which, as I mentioned, became key actors in drug trafficking after the dismantlement of both the Medellin and the Cali drug cartels - the so-called *narcoguerrillas* (Isacson 2015b; Restrepo 2015; Tickner and Cepeda 2015; DeShazo, Forman, and McLean 2009; Guizado 2005).

Still, after approving the package, the US immediately started providing the South American country with increased aid. Between 2000 and 2001 (before 9/11), Washington "helped expand the Army Counter-Narcotics Battalion into a full brigade, create a new counter-drug riverine brigade in Colombia's Navy, and equip these and other military units with helicopters, patrol boats, and other items" (Isacson 2015b, pp. 285), while also providing weapons such as 16 black hawk transfer helicopters. At the same time, more than sending a limited number of militaries to help the Colombian armed forces fight drug organizations, Washington also hired private military companies, such as DynCorp, to conduct such actions. Within this context, Colombia surpassed Turkey and became the largest recipient of US military and police assistance (Carpenter 2003; Chomsky 2001; DeShazo, Forman, and McLean 2009).

In practice, it also represented a key step towards internationalizing the Colombian conflict, giving place to what Tickner (2007) calls "intervention by invitation," as the US, after being invited by Pastrana, increased its participation in Colombian security dynamics. The US responded by using its political contacts to help formulate the Colombian ISP (e.g., by influencing *Plan Colombia*), to ask for increasing militarization of these policies, and by providing support for implementing such policies. In exchange, the Pastrana government complied with the US guidelines, with some intensification in the Transnational Threats policy. It happened considering that negotiations with *guerrillas* did not advance, and both FARC and ELN became even stronger (Carpenter 2003; Bagley 2005).

The US participation in these dynamics intensified even more after George W. Bush took office. At the time, there was an increasing agreement that separating the "War on Drugs" from fighting *guerrillas* in Colombia was impossible. Then, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the onset of the "War on Terror," it became a practice, as the *narcoguerrillas*, such

as FARC and ELN, were also on the US list of terrorist organizations: in March 2002, the Bush government asked the congress to remove restrictions in foreign aid to Colombia, which in practice allowed its aid under *Plan Colombia* to be used in fighting *guerrillas*. If the 9/11 attacks increased the "supply" for the US intervention, Álvaro Uribe's presidential term, initiated in 2002, maintained a "demand" for this intervention, assuring the continuity of the "intervention by invitation" (Carpenter 2003; Isacson 2015b; Tickner 2007; Miller 2001; Tickner and Cepeda 2015).

The result was an intensification of the Transnational Threats in the country, as we can see in Figure 52. During his eight-year tenure, Álvaro Uribe implemented his "*Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática*" and the *Plan Patriota*[25] - both of them elaborated together with US representatives. In practice, more than a higher emphasis on crimes in foreign policy, both plans consisted in raising militarization within the Colombian ISP. Uribe declared a state-of-siege and increased the military budget and personnel[26]. While relying on traditional practices, such as increasing fumigation areas, the Uribe administration also innovated by leading the military to spend more time out of the barracks by either fighting their enemies or building closer ties with the population. Such militarization also came together with increasing human rights violations, which were partly underscored due to the relative success of Uribe's policies in fighting *narcoguerrillas* (Dugas 2003; 2005; Restrepo 2015; Colombia 2003; Tickner and Cepeda 2015).

The higher militarization can also be assessed through the resource deployment side: during Uribe's tenure, the Colombian armed forces participated in ten MIDs, all related to either border trespassing while fighting drug organizations or neighbors reinforcing borders for being afraid of the consequences of such militarization. As a comparison, there were only two MIDs under Pastrana's four-year term. In 2008, one of these border trespassing brought Colombia closer to a war against Ecuador and Venezuela as Anti-Hegemonic governments found it hard to accept such a violation by the US-supported government. Uribe's compliance with Washington also led Colombia to support the US-led coalition that invaded Iraq in 2003 (Abdul-Hak 2013; Maoz et al. 2019; Ramírez 2015; Restrepo 2015; Tickner 2007).

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[25] Although mostly aimed to counterinsurgency, *Plan Patriota* was also part of the "War on Drugs" effort, as *guerrillas* was also involved in drug trafficking.
[26] The military expenditure increased from 3% of the Colombian GDP in 2000 to around 4% in 2009. The military personnel also increased, from 0.36% of the Colombian population in 2000 to 0.61% in 2010.

One could claim that such a policy was a result of a hard-line president taking office in 2002. However, Uribe's hard-line policy would hardly take place with such intensity if it was not for US support. First, Washington used closer political contacts with Colombian representatives to reinforce its guidelines in *Plan Colombia*, *Plan Patriota*, and the *Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática*, which were focused on increased militarization. Second, the US used foreign aid and military training and support to provide the hardware for such policies. Colombia received from its Northern neighbor at least 95 transport helicopters together with boats, cargo planes, and several weapons, and training for more than 75,000 people from the military and national police, which also included creating new counternarcotics brigades in both the army and the navy. The US also helped implement these policies by sending troops and hiring private military companies to fight drug traffickers and help conduct the fumigation of 3.5 million acres, together with providing intelligence for protecting oil pipelines. Uribe himself delivered several requests for aid to his country in order to implement his policy - Colombia received nearly US$ 5 million during Uribe's tenure (Isacson 2015a; DeShazo, Forman, and McLean 2009; Tickner 2007; US Agency for International Development (USAID) and US Department of State 2021). As a consequence, the initially two-year *Plan Colombia* gave place to years of increased American support to the country, which gave shape to Colombian ISP. Had Uribe not been contemplated by the Bush administration, Colombia would probably not be able to intensify its Transnational Threats policy as it did.

It does not mean that Uribe would not be able to increase resource mobilization on the preparation side. This was actually done with Colombia's own resources, as Uribe taxed wealthy people - under the so-called "Democratic Security Tax" - in order to fund improvements in the police and armed forces, together with increasing military personnel (Robinson 2013; Flores-Macías 2014; Dugas 2003). However, part of the mobilization on the deployment side could be avoided. As I mentioned, between 2001 and 2010, Colombia participated in a high number of militarized interstate disputes. All of them were related to trespassing on Venezuelan and Ecuadoran borders. Then, it is possible first to question whether these incidents would happen if Colombia did not receive US help. Second, some of these incidents were intensified because left-wing radical neighbors, i.e., Hugo Chávez and Rafael Correa, included an ideological component in some of these border trespassing activities by using a narrative that a US ally invaded their territories.

This qualitative finding is also supported by quantitative evidence, as we can see in the plots below, using SCM. Synthetic controls start in 1994 due to methodological issues in order to have more years of pre-treatment, allowing for an increased validation by showing that synthetic Colombia is indeed similar to actual Colombia before *Plan Colombia*. First, as we can see in Figure 53, there was a clear trend for Colombia to reduce resource mobilization after 1999 if it was not for *Plan Colombia*. At the time, it was happening to nearly all states in the region, considering reasons such as re-democratization and reduced US influence over most of them. However, as Washington kept its influence over Colombia, the country raised such mobilization in order to comply with the US guidelines towards facing drug organizations.

The same happened regarding the emphasis on crimes in Colombian foreign policy. As Figure 54 shows, there was a trend that Colombia would, indeed, emphasize these issues at the same level as the regional average or a little bit more in some years. However, after *Plan Colombia*, the country attributed the highest emphasis to these issues seen in the region. As the US-Colombia relations were mostly based on the "War on Drugs," - which later became bolstered by the "War on Terror" - it became the key foreign policy topic for the country, as it allowed the country to receive support by complying with the US guidelines.

Figure 53 - Synthetic Control for ISP Postures within the Colombian ISP[27]

Source: own elaboration

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[27] Synthetic Colombia here is combination of Peru (72.4%) and Venezuela (27.6%).

Figure 54 - Synthetic Control for mentions to crimes within the Colombian ISP[28]

Source: own elaboration

On the other hand, the Anti-Hegemonic component did not appear in the Colombian policy, as expected. Being closer to the US, as well as highly supported by Washington, it was not expected that the country would start criticizing the global order led by its main ally. Then, as Figure 55 shows, the expectations met reality.

Therefore, in this section, I discussed how the US influence over Colombia shaped the Colombian ISP. The mechanisms, as expected, included the use of political contacts, foreign aid, and military training. In Table 18 below, I summarize the mechanisms, evidence, and outcomes discussed in this section.

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[28] Synthetic Colombia here is combination of Guatemala (54%), Mexico (0.7%), and Venezuela (45.3%).

Figure 55 - Synthetic Control for mentions to Anti-Hegemony within the Colombian ISP[29]

Source: own elaboration

Table 18 - Causal Mechanisms between the US Influence and Changes in Colombian ISP

Years	US Policy	Mechanism	Evidence on mechanism	Outcome
1998-1999	Support to the Colombian ISP	Political Contacts	The Clinton Administration accepted Pastrana's requests for support and, in exchange, Pastrana accepted Washington's guidelines	= ISP Posture = Emphasis on crimes
		Foreign aid	Recertification of Colombia as a partner in fighting drugs. Foreign aid increased from US$ 21 million in 1996 to US$ 325 million in 1999 + support for Colombia to get a US$ 3.5 billion credit from the IMF.	
2000-2010	(Much) increased support to the Colombian ISP	Political Contacts	US Representatives helped elaborate Plan Colombia, Plan Patriota, and *Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática.*	+ ISP Posture + Emphasis on crimes
		Foreign Aid	US$ 5 billion under Álvaro Uribe	
		Military Training and Support	Provision of boats, cargo planes, weapons, and 95 transport helicopters. Training for more than 75,000 militaries and members of the national police. New counternarcotics brigades in the army and the navy. Provision of personnel both from the US armed forces and from private military companies.	

Source: own elaboration

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[29] Synthetic Colombia here is combination of Cuba (9.3%) and El Salvador (90.7%).

8.2 *Por la revolución*: Daniel Ortega and the *Sandinista* Nicaragua

In this second case study, I discuss the mechanisms connecting leaders' acceptance of the liberal order and ISP. Nicaragua provides a good case study, as we can assess a critical juncture in 1979 when a leader who was in favor of the liberal order (Anastasio Somoza Debayle) was substituted by leaders who rejected this order (Daniel Ortega and the *Sandinistas*). At the same time, other relevant covariates presented nearly no variation, as we can see in Figure 56[30], making this case even more attractive for this qualitative assessment.

Therefore, I rely on a case study about Nicaragua from 1975 to 1985[31]. If the proposed mechanisms are correct, we should be able to identify that leaders' positions on the liberal order were connected to ISP through either (1) their meetings and relations with other leaders, (2) their capacity to determine changes in policy agendas, and (3) their control over bureaucracies (the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the armed forces). Considering the Nicaraguan ISP at the time (as I will show in the chapter), this section focuses on two ISP components: postures and Anti-Hegemony.

Nicaragua was governed by the Somoza family from the late 1930s to the late 1970s. The Somoza family was aligned with the United States and the liberal order due to both their personal ties with US policy-makers and the foreign aid provided by Washington. This was also the scenario during the 1970s when the third Somoza leader - Anastasio Somoza Debayle - ruled the country. Somoza Debayle had formal control over ISP, being constitutionally responsible for choosing agendas and policy-makers. In informal terms, more than handling the country's diplomacy, he controlled the armed forces through a system in which its members should have fidelity ties with his family in order to have successful careers and obtain benefits. These benefits included large amounts of money obtained through corruption and a social status within the Nicaraguan society (Bacchetta 1986; Millett 1977; Méndez 1978; Nicaragua 1974; Grossman 2005).

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[30] Although we can see some increase in levels of democracy, it was not enough to make Nicaragua properly a democratic state in a way that a non-democratic regime remained in the country.
[31] The time period was determined by data availability.

Figure 56 - Key variables' scores for Nicaragua (1975-1985)

Source: own elaboration

By the initial year of this case study (1975), Somoza Debayle used these mechanisms to respond to a changing political context. At the international level, increasing domestic pressure led the United States, under the Ford (and later the Carter) administration, to reduce the foreign aid provided to Nicaragua, contrary to most of the Somoza Dynasty's history. At the time, the US congress adopted an increasingly rigid attitude towards human rights abuses, even by Washington-friendly regimes, and pressured presidents to move away from authoritarian leaders (Morley 2002; Sikkink 2018; Grossman 2005).

Domestically, a political turmoil was taking place in Nicaragua. In 1972, an earthquake killed 10,000 people and left thousands homeless in an already poor and unequal country. It led to increased dissatisfaction against Somoza's regime, which was not able to properly address the consequences of the natural disaster, and made opposition movements stronger, such as the *Unión Democrática de Liberación* (UDEL) and the *Frente Sandinista de*

Liberación Nacional (FSLN). While the former consisted of a center-left wing group that wanted to use politics to change the Nicaraguan situation, the latter was closer to socialist trends and, although presenting some democratic claims, also had a *guerrilla* faction among its members. Then, in 1974, while perceiving some decrease in Somoza Debayle's popularity, the *Sandinistas* decided to act by raiding the house of the former Nicaraguan Agriculture Minister, José María Castillo, and also attacking some parts of the territory (Francois 2019; Méndez 1978; Bacchetta 1986; Millett 1977; Black 1981).

Although the 1974 *Sandinista* attacks failed, the Nicaraguan ISP between 1975 and 1976 was a response to this context. First, regarding the Anti-Hegemonic component, Somoza Debayle preferred to keep it off this policy, considering his alignment with the US-led liberal order, as well as his anti-communist ideals. Then, when we look at the ISP postures, he did not increase resource mobilization on the deployment side. Somoza increased the repression against the Nicaraguan people, but it is not possible to say that he did not militarize domestic disputes, as the *Sandinistas* could not sustain the 1974 offensive. There was also no MID at the time, as the government was focused on solving domestic instability (Morley 2002; Millett 1977; Bacchetta 1986).

When we look at the preparation side within the resource mobilization component, despite the *Sandinista* offensive, Somoza Debayle decided to keep both the military expenditure and personnel at lower levels. First, his alignment with the liberal order made it less necessary to increase this mobilization, as he would probably not suffer hindrances from its members. Second, he usually preferred to keep this component at lower levels because he believed that keeping the *Guardia Nacional* (the Nicaraguan army at the time) poorly equipped made it easier for him to control the military. Even when Nicaraguan allies (such as Israel and the US) provided the country with equipment, Somoza Debayle did not make a huge effort towards incorporating them into the *Guardia Nacional* (Francois 2019; Millett 1977; Bacchetta 1986). Within this context, Nicaragua implemented a Coexistence policy, as we can see in Figure 57 below.

Figure 57 - Nicaraguan ISP (1978 and 1981)

Source: own elaboration

This scenario changed in 1977 when FSLN launched a more organized offensive against the government. Somoza Debayle responded by changing the Nicaraguan ISP towards increasing resource mobilization, leading to a Balance of Power policy, as we can see in Figure 57 above. Somoza knew that (1) he could increase this mobilization without suffering hindrances from the liberal order supporters because he was part of it, and (2) this increase did not need to be too high exactly because he would not face many international obstacles. The biggest international obstacle he faced was reducing US support - but no sanctions took place against the country. Therefore, on the preparation side, he decided to increase both the military expenditure and personnel because the *Guardia Nacional* was not prepared to face the then well-organized *Sandinistas* (Francois 2019; Méndez 1978; Millett 1977; Grossman 2005; Morley 2002; Bacchetta 1986; Black 1981).

Somoza Debayle also gave a higher emphasis on using the equipment he received from his international allies (mostly Israel) and tried to increase the technical level of the Nicaraguan armed forces by creating the *Escuela de Entreinamiento Básico de Infantería* (EEBI). EEBI's objective was to train elite troops with better techniques and to use better equipment. It was directed by Somoza's son, Anastasio Somoza Portocarrero, and also had

mercenaries as tutors in an attempt to get some foreign expertise. As a complementary incentive for the elite troops to implement the anti-communist and counterinsurgency tactics taught within EEBI, Somoza provided these troops with better working conditions and higher wages (Francois 2019; Bacchetta 1986; Black 1981).

This mobilization on the preparation side converted into resource deployment, as Somoza needed to face FSLN. Between 1977 and 1979, Nicaragua saw a civil war with several people being tortured and killed both on the *Sandinista* and on the government side. Militarized interstate disputes also took place between Nicaragua and Costa Rica due to border trespassing within the domestic conflict. Amidst successive wins on the battlefronts, FSLN received increasing support from the Nicaraguan population - while also having international partners, such as Cuba. As a result, although Somoza Debayle was confident that existing resources were enough to beat the rebels, in 1979, the Nicaraguan dictator had to flee the country as the *Sandinistas* won the civil war (Francois 2019; Grossman 2005).

The key point so far is to understand how Somoza Debayle influenced the Nicaraguan ISP in the late 1970s. It was based on a Coexistence policy until 1976, as the leader decided to keep mobilization at a lower level because of (1) his alignment to the liberal order, which did not demand him to resist international hindrances from this order, (2) his relative control of the domestic situation due to the repressive regime, and (3) his belief that improving the armed forces should threat the continuity of his regime. In 1977, Somoza Debayle used his control over the armed forces to change this policy towards a Balance of Power one by increasing resource mobilization to fight the *Sandinistas*. Still, this mobilization was lower than it should be if the regime presented a high Anti-Hegemonic component. How do we know that? Short answer: because he knew he only needed to increase such mobilization in order to face his *Sandinistas* enemies, not hindrances from the liberal order. For a longer and more appropriate answer, let us now continue the story and see what happened when an Anti-Hegemonic regime took office.

In July 1979, after the fall of the Somoza regime, the *Junta de Gobierno de Recconstrución Nacional* (JGRN) took office in the country. Although being officially composed of people from different political orientations, the fact is that the *junta* had the FSLN leader, Daniel Ortega, as its coordinator, and in practice, it was ruled by the *Sandinistas*. Then, one of the first *Sandinista* steps was to change government agendas and structures, allowing the revolutionaries to have greater control over governmental policies,

which also included ISP. Being an old-time critic of the US interventions over the world and, of course, in its own country, FSLN changed the Nicaraguan foreign policy agenda towards eliminating the US influence over the country and publicly rejecting the liberal order (Sholk 1984; Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional 1989; Sánchez-Barba 1992).

The new government also changed the defense policy structures in the country. A month after taking office, the *Sandinistas* dissolved the *Guardia Nacional* and created the *Ejército Popular Sandinista* (EPS), the new Nicaraguan army. It drew from FSLN military doctrine by combining professional army elements with *guerrilla* tactics. Its members were former FSLN soldiers and members of the old *Guardia* who did not comply with Somoza's repressive policies. In practice, it represented the *Sandinista* control over the Nicaraguan armed forces, having Daniel Ortega's brother, Humberto Ortega, as its commander. During 1979 and 1980, three structures would also be incorporated into the EPS: the air force, the navy, and the *Milicias Populares Sandinistas* (MPS) consisting of paramilitary forces and reservists to be mobilized in case of necessity (Borge et al. 1982; Perla 2016; Prevost 1997; Sánchez-Barba 1992; Yañez 2013; Barbosa Miranda 2007; Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional 1989; Robinson and Norsworthy 1987; Black 1981).

From 1979 to 1981, the *Sandinistas* used these mechanisms to implement their Anti-Hegemonic ISP - as we can see in Figure 57. The FSLN rejection of the liberal order led to an increased Anti-Hegemonic component, in a way that the Nicaraguan ISP aimed to reinforce the revolution and to move away from the US interests (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional 1989; Borge et al. 1982; Barbosa Miranda 2007; Black 1981). Regarding the ISP Postures, the *Sandinista* policy at the time kept resource mobilization levels from Somoza's Balance of Power policy, as we can see in Figure 57. However, they promoted a key change in how this mobilization took place.

The Nicaraguan ISP Postures during 1980 and most of 1981 were one of reduced resource mobilization on the deployment side, as the EPS was not fighting a civil war at the time. Of course, it does not mean the Nicaraguan domestic situation was easy, but there was no organized group to be fought. The government used non-military policies, such as health and education policies, together with agrarian reform, in an attempt to gather support from the Nicaraguan population and reduce the use of the military component inside its borders (Perla 2016; Black 1981).

At the interstate level, deployments took place in response to Honduran attempts to undermine the new regime - and, in 1980, due to territorial issues with Colombia. Notwithstanding, the *Sandinistas* also started providing support for the Salvadorean left-wing *guerrilla Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional* (FMLN). They did it because, more than sharing a common ideology, they knew they could need regional support and, in case FMLN took office in El Salvador, it would be an important regional partner for the Anti-Hegemonic project. The *Sandinistas* also tried to gather allies (or, at least, friends) to their project by using diplomatic efforts to construct friendly relations with other countries, either socialist or not (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996; Perla 2016; Black 1981).

Despite the reduction on the deployment side, the *Sandinistas* used their control over the armed forces to increase mobilization on the preparation side, as we can see in Figure 58 below. Although the US kept cordial relations with Nicaragua under the Jimmy Carter administration, the FSLN rulers knew that it could change at any time, considering the Republican dissatisfaction with the situation in the Central American country. They also knew that their neighbors could try to undermine the regime at any time - actually, they were already facing resistance from Honduras. As they knew that implementing such an Anti-Hegemonic policy would bring hindrances, they decided to incorporate a "Revolutionary Deterrence" (Perla 2016) into their ISP. They increased the military personnel within the EPS and also the military expenditure in an attempt to provide the Nicaraguan military with better training, equipment, and conditions to resist the hindrances other countries could impose on the country (Perla 2016; Black 1981; Sánchez-Barba 1992; Borge et al. 1982; Ortega 1986).

The *Sandinistas* were correct in believing that they would face hindrances because of their Anti-Hegemonic policies. In 1981, the Republican president Ronald Reagan took office in the United States and had among his main agendas to undermine the Nicaraguan government. During his first year in office, Reagan tried to make Nicaragua stop its military buildup process and cease its support for FMLN. The negotiations did not advance, and the US decided to support non-state armed groups - the *Contras,* consisting of several groups against the *Sandinista* leadership - to invade Nicaragua and undermine the FSLN regime. More than providing weapons and training, Washington convinced the Honduran government to allow the group to use part of its territory as headquarters. Offensives began in 1981, and in 1982, the *Contras* invaded the Central American state. During the 1980s, the American policy

towards Nicaragua would also include other measures, such as sanctions and further diplomatic efforts (Ryan 1995; LeoGrande 1986; Robinson and Norsworthy 1987).

Figure 58 - ISP Postures' components in Nicaragua (1975-1985)

Source: own elaboration

As a response, the *Sandinistas* used their diplomatic resources (and friends, such as the Non-Aligned Movement), together with public opinion, to denounce the US and the *Contras*. They also knew that diplomacy was not enough and increased ISP resource mobilization in order to resist the US-led hindrances. On the preparation side, the Daniel Ortega-led government used its control over the armed forces to increase both the military personnel and expenditure, reaching the highest military budget (as % of GDP) seen in the region in the analyzed time period. It also incorporated weapons provided by states such as Cuba and the Soviet Union and incorporated changes in the military doctrine (Nicaragua 1983; Yañez 2013; Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional 1989; Robinson and Norsworthy 1987; Perla 2016).

One of the key changes was the inclusion of irregular units into the army within the *Batallónes de Lucha Irregular* (BLIs). The BLIs were created within a context in which the *Sandinista* government was not sure whether its regular army could handle the *Contras* and became stronger after 1983 when the JGRN created the *Servicio Militar Patriótico* (SMP). The SMP changed the volunteer assumption behind the *Milicias Populares Sandinistas* by implementing mandatory military service for all Nicaraguan men between 18 and 40 years old, aiming to increase the military personnel to fight the *Contras*. Women could also join it voluntarily if they wanted (Nicaragua 1983; Yañez 2013; Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional 1989; Robinson and Norsworthy 1987; Perla 2016). As a result, the EPS military personnel (both active and reserve) increased from 20,000 in 1983 to 134,000 in 1986 (Barbosa Miranda 2007).

These troops were deployed in three different ways. Domestically, the EPS fought a bloody civil war against the *Contras* during the 1980s, with a huge cost in economic, social, military, and political terms and also in lives lost. Internationally, while the *Contras* received support from other states such as the US and Nicaragua, the *Sandinistas* kept their support to FMLN, which was fighting another bloody civil war in El Salvador. At the same time, the EPS also faced militarized disputes against troops from Nicaraguan neighbors - specifically Honduras - which was trying to undermine the FSLN regime - and Costa Rica - mostly related to border trespassing - as well as the United States (Perla 2016; Ryan 1995; Hill and Jones 2014; Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér 2011; Pettersson et al. 2021).

As a result, Nicaragua intensified its Anti-Hegemonic policy at the time, as shown in Figure 57, and implemented one of the highest levels of resource mobilization seen in the region during the analyzed time. The civil war continued until the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. However, this case study finishes in 1985 due to data (in)availability. Spoiler: at the end of the day, the United States and the *Contras* would not be able to beat the EPS on the battlefield.

This qualitative evidence shows that the *Sandinistas* had mechanisms to change ISP, as they controlled agendas and bureaucracies behind these policies. It also shows that they used these mechanisms to implement their Anti-Hegemonic ISP, according to their anti-American agenda, and that hindrances from the liberal order supporters were (a key) part of their calculations in raising ISP resource mobilization. Would all of these happen if it was not for a leadership that emphatically rejected the liberal order to take office in the country?

Evidence from synthetic controls shows that the answer is no. In Figure 59, we can see that had not the *Sandinistas* won the civil war, Nicaragua tended to reduce its resource mobilization in 1980. Also, when we compare (1) Somoza's years without a civil war (1975-1976) with the *Sandinista*'s year without a civil war (1980), as well as (2) the years under both leaders in which civil wars existed, we can see that mobilization under the FSLN rule was higher. More than resisting domestic disputes, they had to resist hindrances from the liberal order supporters, leading them to increase such a mobilization, exactly as proposed by my theory.

Figure 59 - Synthetic Control for ISP Postures within the Nicaraguan ISP[32]

Source: own elaboration

The second point is more intuitive: if it was not for the *Sandinistas*, the Anti-Hegemonic component would probably not be incorporated into the Nicaraguan ISP, as we can see in Figure 60. In other words, it means saying that if it was not for an Anti-Hegemonic leadership taking office, there would be no Anti-Hegemonic component. As FSLN took office, it decided to implement its own foreign policy agenda, leading to the inclusion of this component. In other scenarios, the most likely outcome would be for this component to remain out of the Nicaraguan ISP.

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[32] Synthetic Nicaragua here is a combination of Chile (43.5%), Costa Rica (56.3%), and Uruguay (0.2%).

Figure 60 - Synthetic Control for mentions to Anti-Hegemony within the Nicaraguan ISP[33]

Source: own elaboration

Finally, we can see that the crimes component was not included in the Nicaraguan ISP at the time as it was not supposed to be. The "War on Drugs" did not arrive in Nicaragua during the 1980s, as there is no reason to expect leaders that reject the liberal order to change states' emphasis on the topic. As I discussed earlier in this dissertation, what changes states' emphasis on crimes within ISP is the US support to these countries. Then, while the US provided support to other countries (e.g., Colombia and Peru) to comply with such a plan, it was doing the opposite regarding Nicaragua: cutting its support and providing hindrances to the government. As a consequence, the crimes component was not seen in the Central American state during the analyzed time period.

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[33] Synthetic Nicaragua here is a combination of Bolivia (77%), Chile (9.2%), and Uruguay (13.7%).

Figure 61 - Synthetic Control for mentions to Crimes within the Nicaraguan ISP[34]

Source: own elaboration

I summarize the qualitative argument presented in this section by presenting mechanisms and outcomes in Table 19 on the next page. As a final note on this case, of course, I acknowledge that the story of the conflict in Nicaragua during the 1980s includes other actors (e.g., the *Contadora* group), battles, and happenings. However, this section was not aimed at telling the whole story behind this conflict. It was only focused on showing how a single variable - leaders' acceptance (or rejection) of the liberal order - accounted for most changes in these policies at the time. The conflict itself was a result of the hindrances to an anti-liberal order government taking office in Nicaragua. Therefore, this case showed how leaders' alignment with the liberal order could change ISP.

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[34] Synthetic Nicaragua here is a combination of Brazil (3.4%), Chile (0.3%), Colombia (0.2%), Costa Rica (0.9%), Guatemala (0.3%), El Salvador (34.7%), and Uruguay (13.7%).

Table 19 - Causal Mechanisms between leaders' acceptance of the liberal order and Changes in Nicaraguan ISP

Years	Leaders' alig. to the lib. order	Mechanism	Evidence on mechanism	Outcome
1975-1976	Low	Agenda-setting	Somoza, who had constitutional prominence over the Nicaraguan foreign policy, set a pro-US agenda for this policy due to its close (and even personal) relations with the US.	= ISP Posture = Emphasis on Anti-Hegemony
		Bureaucracy-control	Somoza, who controlled the armed forces using both institutional and personal ties, decided not to increase resource mobilization as he feared that stronger armed forces could threaten his government.	
1977-1978	Low	Agenda-setting	Somoza kept a pro-US agenda for this policy due to its close (and even personal) relations with the US.	+ ISP Posture = Emphasis on Anti-Hegemony
		Bureaucracy-control	Somoza decided to increase resource mobilization to fight the civil war against the *Sandinistas*. He created EEBI and attributed its leadership to his son, incorporated weapons provided by allies to the *Guardia Nacional,* and provided its members with higher wages.	
1979-1981	High	Agenda-setting	The *Sandinistas* used their institutional capacity to determine Nicaraguan ISP to include the Anti-Hegemonic component.	= ISP Posture + Emphasis on Anti-Hegemony
		Bureaucracy-control	The *Sandinistas* changed the military bureaucracies in order to control them. Then, they kept resource mobilization at higher levels despite the end of the civil war. They started supporting FMLN in El Salvador, raised the military personnel by including former *guerrilleros* in the reformed armed forces, and expanded the military expenditure in order to get prepared for hindrances from its neighbors and the US.	
1982-1985	High	Agenda-setting	The *Sandinistas* kept the Anti-Hegemonic component.	+ ISP Posture = Emphasis on Anti-Hegemony
		Bureaucracy-control	The *Sandinistas* used their control over the armed forces to increase both the military personnel and expenditure by acquiring weapons and creating new mechanisms and unities - such as the BLIs and the SMP - as well as to engage in a civil war to resist the *Contras* and their supporters such as the US and Honduras.	

Source: own elaboration

8.3 From Balancing to Coexisting: Re-democratization in Argentina

Finally, in order to assess the mechanisms connecting democracy and ISP, I delve into the case of Argentina. Considering the existence of a critical juncture (democratization) in 1983, as well as nearly no variation in the other relevant covariates, as we can see in Figure 62, I rely on a case study about the country from 1976 to 1989. This period allows us to assess how different regimes led to different ISPs, by analyzing the military regime (1976-1983) and Raúl Alfonsín's democratic government (1983-1989). If the proposed mechanisms are correct, we should be able to identify that either (1) the lack of veto players, (2) the military prominence within decision-making processes, or both led to an ISP based on a higher level of resource mobilization, leading to a Balance of Power policy. On the other hand, we should see a role of either (1) veto players, (2) civilian prominence in decision-making, or both in leading Argentina to reduce resource mobilization towards a Coexistence policy.

Figure 62 - Key variables' scores for Argentina (1976-1989)

Source: own elaboration

More than being trained to identify and fight threats, three key traits existed in the Argentinean military education and doctrine in the late 20th century. First, there was a territorial nationalistic component claiming areas, such as the British-ruled Malvinas/Falkland Islands in the Atlantic Ocean and the Picton, Lennox, and Nueva islands in the Beagle Channel, which belonged to Chile. The idea was that these lands were stolen from Argentina and should be recovered as soon as possible. This component was connected with a second trait: a belief in Argentinean superiority in all terms, including economy, culture, institutions, morality, and military. The military believed in manifest destiny, in which Argentina would obtain everything it deserved, including the aforementioned territories. These traits joined a third element: a perceived need to fight left-wing *guerrillas* and groups as a whole within the context of the Cold War by seeing them as threats to Argentinean superiority, together with some intensive training in counterinsurgency techniques (Lacoste 2003; Escudé 1989; 2010; Pion-Berlin 1988; García 1995).

Then, in March 1976, the military-led *coup d'État* overthrew the government led by Isabel Perón and drove Argentina into a new dictatorship - the previous military rule in the country had finished only five years before. The regime, which became known as *Proceso de Reorganización Nacional* (PRN), gave the armed forces a high level of insulation in policy decision-making processes and left almost no constraints on their decisions, especially in those related to ISP. Even the Ministers for Foreign Affairs within the PRN were militaries. In this scenario, the military had a clear path to implement international security policies based on what they were trained to do (Fernando de Santibañes 2007; Schenoni, Braniff, and Battaglino 2020; Huser 2002; Russell and Hirst 2011; Russell 1984).

It did not take long until this combination of militaries' beliefs and lack of constraints gave place to increased resource mobilization by the country. On the preparation side, the military *junta*[35] knew Argentina needed better capabilities to achieve its manifest destiny. Having that in mind, the PRN increased the Argentinean military expenditure in a way that "by 1980, the military's share in the national budget grew by over 200 percent from the 1972 level" (Paul 1994, pp. 156). This increase had a clear focus on improving the available equipment so that the country became the largest arms purchaser in Latin America at the time. At the beginning of the 1980s, the Argentinean armed forces were among the best equipped in

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[35] The executive power within PRN was conducted by a military *junta* composed of one member of each force, is to say, one representative from the army, one from the navy, and one from the air force.

the region with very advanced weapons compared to its peers, such as an aircraft carrier capable of carrying fighters, state-of-art submarines and planes, and the then-powerful Exocet missiles (Schenoni, Braniff, and Battaglino 2020; Paul 1994).

On the deployment side, the armed forces were employed both inside and outside the Argentinean borders. At the domestic level, the *junta* decided to mobilize its resources against left-wing groups. In 1976, immediately after taking office, the military raised the militarization against the *Montoneros*, a left-wing *guerrilla* group. Although being able to hugely dismantle the *Montoneros'* fighting capacity in the late 1970s, the PRN kept fighting non-armed left-wing groups, such as labor unions. The *junta* would be responsible for thousands of people who were exiled, tortured, or killed while the military tried to accomplish its objectives. It also contributed to other military governments in the region within the so-called Condor Operation (Gasparini 1988; McSherry 2005; Pion-Berlin 1988; 1989).

The domestic anti-communist component would also reach the Argentinean foreign policy. An example was the *junta*'s decision to recognize García Meza's government in Bolivia instead of the elected coalition led by Hernán Siles Suazo. Then, within the context of the civil wars in Central America, it decided to support the US positions against the *Sandinista* regime and in favor of repressive regimes in El Salvador and Guatemala (Russell 1984; Armony 2004).

Considering its territorial nationalistic objectives, the military changed a regional integration-oriented approach under Juan and Isabel Peron to the deployment of its ISP resources focused on its territorial claims against Chile and the United Kingdom. Regarding the former, the *junta* decided to refuse the result of an arbitration by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1977 that awarded the islands in the Beagle Channel to Chile. At this point, distributional issues also contributed to this decision, as Admiral Emilio Massera, who represented the navy in the *junta*, saw the conflictual relations with Chile as a way to gather more resources for his force (Villar 2016; Russell 2011; Mares 2001).

After the 1977 ICJ decision, both states had a year to decide whether they would accept it or not, which led them to an intense year of negotiations. While Chile decided to adopt a legal path to the negotiation - by relying on the ICJ decision - Argentina adopted a political approach by presenting different proposals, such as leaving three islands under Chilean sovereignty but including a binational administration over a fourth one. At the same time, Chilean diplomatic and military actions, such as the implementation of its right to rule

the region, as well as a declaration by Jose Miguel Barros, a diplomat, who said that "Colo Colo has won 3-0 against River Plate", made the Argentinean nationalist militaries increasingly prone to escalate the dispute. Then, in January 1978, the PRN declared the arbitration nullified with the support of hardline generals, intensifying tensions in the relations with its Western neighbors (Villar 2016; Mares 2001).

Tense negotiations continued during 1978, with clashes between both countries' armed forces over the disputed region, as Chile refused to cede the islands, using the ICJ decision as a key justification. On the other side, the Argentinean military government increased tensions in a way that, by the end of 1978, they planned a military operation for the imminent conflict. However, a few days before the scheduled operation, the PRN leader, Jorge Videla, decided to accept the mediation of Pope John Paul II, especially after Admiral Massera was replaced by Admiral Armando Lambruschini, who disagreed with his predecessor regarding the need for a more belligerent approach towards the islands. Although it did not resolve the dispute, this mediation led both states to freeze it for some years, avoiding a war between Chile and Argentina (Villar 2016; Mares 2001; Russell 1984).

This case shows us how the prominence of nationalistic militaries with no veto players at the Argentinean ISP decision-making led to the deployment of national resources. MIDs took place amidst clashes between the armed forces of both states resulting from increasing tensions. The *junta* simply refused to follow a legal determination from the ICJ, and if it was not for the Pope, the government would implement the planned military operation, leading to a war between both states.

The same holy intervention did not happen in 1982 regarding the Malvinas/Falkland islands. Considering the relevance they received in the Argentinean foreign policy, different governments used diplomacy over most of the 20th century in an attempt to recover the islands occupied by the United Kingdom since 1833. Although diplomacy was the most common instrument, militarizing the dispute was always an option considered by these governments. Then, after taking office in 1976, the military *junta* considered the islands one of its top foreign policy priorities and made the military option increasingly real by adopting a coercive diplomatic effort (Arquilla and Moyano Rasmussen 2001).

Representatives from the United Kingdom perceived the increasing possibility of conflict and decided to negotiate with the Argentinean *junta*. While some representatives considered ceding some level of sovereignty to Argentina, most of the UK parliament

preferred to keep the *status quo*. It led Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to implement an approach that merged an apparent proneness to negotiate with no real disposition to change the current situation. At the same time, the PRN was becoming tired of negotiating and preparing plans to invade the islands (Arquilla and Moyano Rasmussen 2001; Paul 1994).

Within this context, an incident that occurred in March 1982 triggered the imminent conflict. Argentinean marines arrived at the South Georgia island to collect scrap metal from an abandoned whale station under the authorization of the British Embassy in Buenos Aires. It became a problem when the scavengers hoisted the Argentinean flag on the island, which was perceived by the British as an attempt to proclaim sovereignty over the territory. London responded by asking the *junta* to evacuate the marines, and after a refusal from Buenos Aires, it sent boats from its navy to forcefully evacuate the then-considered invaders. The incident provided the PRN with an ideal timing for finally invading the claimed territories (Paul 1994; Fernando de Santibañes 2007; Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur 1983).

After years of increased military spending, the military *junta* believed Argentina had enough capabilities to achieve its interests. In the *junta*'s perception, the British would respond to the invasion by recurring to other options, such as the United Nations. The strategy was thus to use its capabilities to conduct a quick operation to take the island and then negotiate with the UK while holding the territories. Considering these calculations, the already planned operation, the diplomatic incident over the South Georgia island, and the lack of civilian veto players capable of blocking its belligerent intentions, the Argentinean military decided to invade the Malvinas/Falkland Islands in April 1982 (Paul 1994; Schenoni, Braniff, and Battaglino 2020; Fernando de Santibañes 2007; Arquilla and Moyano Rasmussen 2001; Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur 1983).

Real life showed that the *junta*'s decision was based on a misperception of reality - and that maybe if it was less insulated, some civilian advice could change it (Schenoni, Braniff, and Battaglino 2020). The UK promptly responded with large-scale military means (while also recurring to the UN), and the Argentineans presented a low capacity to resist the British war effort. After two months, the United Kingdom won the war for the Malvinas/Falkland Islands. The loss summed up an already high popular dissatisfaction regarding the PRN, either because of the bad economic performance or the abuses within the "dirty war" inside

the borders. As a consequence, the authoritarian rule did not resist the pressures. In July 1982, the then-president general Leopoldo Galtieri was shown the door, being replaced by the retired army general Reynaldo Bignone, who was entitled to conduct a transition to democratic rule in the country (Cardoso, Kirschbaum, and Kooy 1985; Huser 2002; Munck 1985).

So far, the story I told in this section illustrated how the Argentinean military government implemented a Balance of Power policy - its policy can be graphically assessed in Figure 63. Being trained to implement such a nationalistic approach as an attempt to "make Argentina great again" and a high level of insulation within ISP decision-making processes, the military decided to increase ISP resource mobilization - while no other axis was deployed at the time. Okay, the proposed mechanisms were corroborated here, and Figure 63 also shows us that, under democratic rule, Argentina changed the Balance of Power policy for a Coexistence one. But how did it happen?

Figure 63 - Argentinean ISP (1982 and 1989)

Source: own elaboration

Let's start by getting back to Reynaldo Bignone's rule. The then-president called for elections, allowed political parties to be part of it, and tried to leave the military as far as

possible from the government that would succeed the PRN. While veto players emerged within the Argentinean institutional set, including the role of political parties and the parliament, fair elections took place in 1983. The winner, Raúl Alfonsín, took office in the same year and had among his promises an increasing civilian oversight over the military, supported by the people and institutional actors (Huser 2002).

During Alfonsín's five and a half years in the presidency, several reforms took place to increase civilian oversight over the military, as well as to provide the civilian representatives with the necessary authority over ISP. A month after Alfonsín took office, a reform changed the chain of command within the armed forces, subordinating them to the Ministry of Defense and, thus, to the president. The civilian government gradually reduced military functions and prerogatives. It reduced promotions to higher ranks and attributed civilians with higher prominence in the formerly military instances, such as the Border Patrol and the Coast Guard, together with the defense industry, just to mention some examples (Huser 2002; Pion-Berlin 2001; Battaglino 2013).

Changes also took place in military missions. Under the democratic rule and in the absence of leaders' belligerent intentions, institutional actors that were expected to block aggressive attitudes acted to change the legal framework in order to avoid future problems. The most remarkable case happened in 1988, when the civilian government, together with the parliament, approved a new National Defense Law. One of its key changes consisted of stipulating that the military force could only be deployed against external threats. In practice, it reduced the military capacity to overthrow regimes and fight other "dirty wars" by using the argument of protecting the state from domestic threats. The parliamentary role was not restricted to this law, as congresspeople also approved several guidelines, such as redefining the concept of defense. At the same time, just to mention other actors, political parties also acted within this context, as Alfonsín's party, the *Unión Cívica Radical* (UCR), tried to avoid some military nominations by the president (Huser 2002; Pion-Berlin 2001; Battaglino 2013).

Of course, this process was not easy. While civilian oversight increased, the country did not have enough skilled civilians to exercise all the necessary functions. The government itself did not know what exactly the military institution should look like after the reforms. At the same time, part of the military resisted the process, and some uprisings took place. Still, it is possible to say that the civilian government achieved some relevant level of oversight and authority over the military (Pion-Berlin 2001; Huser 2002; Battaglino 2013; Zagorski 1994).

The result of democratic institutions and increased civilian control over ISP was reduced resource mobilization in the country. On the preparation side, Alfonsín reduced both the military expenditure and personnel. While needing to reduce the national expenditure due to an economic crisis, the civilian government attributed higher priority to other areas than military matters. At the same time, such a measure allowed the democratic regime to reduce the military presence within the government, thus increasing civilian oversight over the military (Huser 2002).

A reduced resource mobilization also took place at the deployment level. The predecessor strategy of militarizing disputes to achieve nationalistic objectives gave place to a higher emphasis on diplomacy and reducing mutual threat perception regarding Argentina's neighbors (Russell and Hirst 2011). Argentina stopped supporting the US and its anti-*Sandinista* strategy and joined the *Contadora* group in the search for a diplomatic end to the Nicaraguan civil war (Frohmann 1989). In South America, it worked towards building a more peaceful environment in an attempt to reduce the role of the military in Argentinean ISP, as they would become less necessary in a more peaceful scenario (Pion-Berlin 2016; Mares 1998). Two episodes can illustrate this point.

Regarding Chile, although the Papal mediation reduced the probability of conflict in 1978, Argentina maintained tense relations with the country until 1983. There was even the caution that, during the Malvinas/Falkland War, Chile could also decide to attack the country through either the Western or the Southern border. Then, as soon as the war finished and the democratic transition began, the Argentinean position towards the islands in the Beagle Channel gradually changed. During the late 1982 and early 1983, (civilian) diplomats gained prominence in Argentinean foreign policy as the military lost its dominance. Although Buenos Aires' decision-making became slower amidst the institutional turmoil due to the democratic transition, the diplomats left increased room for resolving the dispute (Villar 2016).

This disposition became clearer in late 1983. As Argentina got its first president-elect after the PRN, it became clear that resolving the dispute with Chile was in the order of the day. In the view of the Alfonsín government, this resolution was key to increasing its capacity to control the military. It also found support within the Argentinean society which, with the exception of a few extremely nationalistic groups (which included the military), was tired of violence and war. Then, by the end of the year, Argentina sent its chancellor, Dante Caputo, to

negotiate the dispute. While negotiations advanced, Alfonsín gathered increasing support from the people and institutional actors for an agreement. As a result, the dispute was settled in 1984, with the support of 82% of the Argentinean people in a plebiscite, and a Declaration of Peace and Friendship was signed in an attempt to transform the Chilean-Argentinean relations from conflictual to cooperative one (Mares 2001; Villar 2016; Russell 2008). It was only the beginning of a good relationship that remains up to the current days.

Argentinean relations with Brazil also saw a shift at the time. It is true that the *junta* did not militarize disputes against its Northern neighbor. The tensest period in these relations during the military rule took place in the late 1970s when the PRN decided to contest the construction of the Itaipu Dam, which could affect the Argentinean construction of the Corpus Dam, as both would take place over the course of the Parana River. The issue was solved through diplomacy, and the Corpus Dam would never be built. The *junta* tried to improve the relations in a way that Brazil would not be one of the primary security concerns of a government that had problems with Chile and the UK. Still, Argentina-Brazil relations have been marked by a notable rivalry since the 19th century. It was only during the late 1980s that the recently democratized Argentinean government decided to change it towards a more cooperative pattern (Ricupero 2017; Russell 2008; Russell and Tokatlian 2002; Battaglino 2013).

This rapprochement became easier with the Brazilian re-democratization, which culminated in José Sarney taking office in March 1985. Both countries increased bilateral dialogues and signed agreements with the intention to cooperate in different areas, including security matters. In terms of ISP, more than reducing mutual threat perception due to their old rivalry, this process led to two important achievements. First, Argentina embraced the Brazilian initiative to create the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS). It signalized an intention to develop more peaceful relations not only regarding Brazil but also with Uruguay and, of course, African states within the Atlantic zone (Ricupero 2017).

However, the most important outcome of this rapprochement on ISP was probably related to their nuclear policies. Both states carried out nuclear programs during most of the Cold War, which also included attempts to develop nuclear weapons. One of the justifications for these programs was exactly the fear that the other side could develop these weapons. Then, as the Argentinean (and also the Brazilian) democratic government wanted to reduce

mutual threat perception, a key path was to build confidence regarding both nuclear programs, which Alfonsín started doing during his term. The process would continue even after the end of Alfonsín's tenure, with the creation of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), in 1991, aiming to verify whether both countries were developing nuclear programs with pacific objectives and the signature of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by both countries during the 1990s (Ricupero 2017; Russell and Tokatlian 2002; Spektor 2020; Redick, Carasales, and Wrobel 1995; Carasales 1995; Zagorski 1994).

Actually, the whole Coexistence policy implemented by Alfonsin (as we can see in Figure 63) would remain under his successor, Carlos Menem, also under the democratic regime. He expanded confidence-building measures beyond nuclear issues and deepened regional integration. Together with leaders from Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, he would create the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), leading to a very peaceful environment within the Southern Cone (Hurrell 1998; Oelsner 2009). Cooperation would also flourish in the democratic Argentinean relations with its neighbors over the late 1990s and 2000s - but this is a discussion for a future paper.

Would the Argentinean policy change from a Balance of Power to a Coexistence policy if it was not for the democratization process? According to the aforementioned qualitative evidence, together with evidence from the synthetic control available in Figure 64, the answer is no. On the contrary, the trend was that Argentina kept its higher levels of ISP resource mobilization towards accomplishing the *junta*'s nationalistic objectives. However, the democratization during the 1980s brought a different kind of political regime which, due to the increasing veto players and civilian control over ISP, chose to adopt a more peaceful policy. This policy would allow the government to focus more on other domestic issues while also increasing its capacity to control the military.

Figure 64 - Synthetic Control for ISP Postures within the Argentinean ISP[36]

Source: own elaboration

But why a Coexistence policy? First, as discussed in the previous chapters, democratization was expected to lead to reduced resource mobilization - as it did. Second, variables that could lead other axes to increase did not present huge variation at the time. The US foreign aid to Argentina remained low during the democratic government, reducing incentives for a significant inclusion of crimes in its ISP. Such change was also not expected to happen in synthetic Argentina, as shown in Figure 65. Also, Alfonsín did not present a very different view regarding the liberal order than the military *junta*. As a result, Argentina was not expected to implement a more Anti-Hegemonic ISP, as we can see in Figure 66. Finally, as democracy was still incipient and other covariates that could increase cooperation were absent, such as the post-9/11 global environment, it did not take place[37].

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[36] Synthetic Argentina here is a combination of Chile (24%), Cuba (43.7%), Guatemala (7.9%), and Venezuela (24.5%).

[37] A synthetic control could not be ran as intraregional DCAs did not exist in Latin America at the time.

Figure 65 - Synthetic Control for mentions to Crimes within the Argentinean ISP[38]

Source: own elaboration

Figure 66 - Synthetic Control for mentions to Anti-Hegemony within the Argentinean ISP

Source: own elaboration

Therefore, in this section, we saw that democratization led to reduced resource mobilization. It happened because, while during the military dictatorship this mobilization

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[38] Synthetic Argentina here is a combination of Brazil (2.8%) and Colombia (97.2%).

increased due to military prominence in the ISP decision-making without veto players, the contrary happened after democratization. I summarize this discussion in Table 20 below.

Table 20 - Causal mechanisms between political regimes and changes in Argentinean ISP

Years	Regime	Mechanism	Evidence on mechanism	Outcome
1976-1982	Autocratic	Civil-Military Relations	The military had prominence over ISP, being insulated in its elaboration. They were themselves, the government. Considering their nationalistic training, they decided to raise resources in terms of both money and personnel attributed to their own bureaucracy and used their increased capabilities to claim territories that belonged to Chile and the United Kingdom. They also engaged in a "Dirty War" against communism in their own country.	+ ISP Posture
		Veto Players	No veto players on ISP could avoid such a policy.	
1983-1989	Democratic	Civil-Military Relations	The civilian government also included civilian control over the military, which expanded during Alfonsín's tenure. Then, this government searched for more peaceful relations with neighbors and lesser resource mobilization towards ISP by also considering it as a complementary tool to consolidate the civilian oversight over the military.	- ISP Posture
		Veto Players	Amidst a multiplication of veto players, such as the legislative and judiciary branches, all of them supported the increasing civilian control over the military and the reduction in the Argentinean resource mobilization and approved Alfonsín's proposals. Political parties even acted to avoid some militaries being nominated to some positions by the Argentinean president. The Argentinean society, which was tired of war, also supported a reducing resource mobilization: 82% of the Argentinean electors voted "Yes" to settle the dispute with Chile.	

Source: own elaboration

8.4 The mechanisms behind the ISP Theory

In this chapter, I combined three within-case analyses with the synthetic control method to corroborate the causal claims supported by quantitative analyses and unveil the causal mechanisms connecting variables. The Colombian case showed us that, using political contacts, foreign aid, and military training and support, the US was able to change ISP by producing an intensification of the Transnational Threats policy implemented by the country. Then, the Nicaraguan case was illustrative of how anti-hegemonic leaders can guide the country towards an Anti-Hegemonic ISP by using their capacity to control agendas and bureaucracies related to these policies. Finally, the analysis of the Argentinean case corroborated the claim that political regimes can indeed change these policies towards reducing resource mobilization, as increased civilian oversight over the military and veto players are key to producing such outcomes.

9 CONCLUSION

In this doctoral dissertation, I offered conceptual, methodological, and theoretical contributions to the literature on international security and Latin America. My intention was, first, to dig deeper into the understanding of the Latin American security environment by discussing and testing some propositions widely discussed by this literature while also adding a new point of view about it in an attempt to elaborate a novel theory, as well as a typology of the ISP implemented in the region. Second, to provide a framework that, although crafted based on the Latin American case, can also be replicated to other peripheral regions in the near future. And third, to discuss and provide operationalization and measurement to some key issues for international security studies.

One of the key innovations in this dissertation was to show that, more than looking at separate indicators, such as states' involvement in wars, or defense expenditure, emphasis on particular contents, it is possible to analyze ISP to a broader extent. If these policies are multidimensional, then a simultaneous analysis of these multiple dimensions can bring some developments in understanding these policies. Before answering *why* I will answer *how* I did it.

The attempt to provide such a multidimensional understanding led to the first key contribution I presented in this dissertation, which is conceptual. Scholars of International Relations have long studied public policies related to international security. The debate about "what can be considered an international security policy" is far from a resolution. Then, in this dissertation, I did not resolve it. However, in Chapter 2, I proposed a definition for international security policies: *a public policy implemented to protect states and, eventually, its institutions, territory, individuals, or communities, related to the employment or the control of military force to deal with issues capable of transcending state borders*. My intention was not to solve a still ongoing debate but to provide an analytically useful definition.

The proposed definition is analytically useful for two main reasons. First, it can be used in future research on ISP to show why something is included in the analysis or not. According to this concept, scholars can include under the ISP umbrella any military measures targeting transnational threats, as well as any other issues considered to be an international security problem by a state. Second, such a definition paves the road for us to consider states' actions towards international security on a more aggregated level, meeting the

multidimensionality I emphasized. Providing limits on what can be considered an ISP informs us what can be included in a typology of these policies, thus allowing for such a multidimensional analysis. Let me illustrate this point.

If one studies ISP in Europe at the beginning of the 20th century, organized crime is probably not part of these policies. Although organizations, such as mafias, already existed at the time, there was limited military deployment in facing these groups in a way that it was not a dimension of these policies at the time. If it was not part of these policies, it could not be included in a multidimensional analysis. Then, if one uses my definition to study ISP in Europe at the time, this scholar should probably incorporate fewer dimensions in their typology. On the other hand, crimes is surely a dimension of Latin American ISP since the beginning of the 1980s, as some Latin American governments increasingly emphasized it as an international security problem. Thus, based on my definition, a comparative multidimensional analysis of Latin American ISP should include it.

But how do we assess these different dimensions? In the same Chapter, after defining ISP, I also operationalized my definitions by showing how we can observe these policies on different axes. An axis is not necessarily made by one indicator but by a set of indicators that are often correlated and theoretically connected. Let me make it more clear. In Chapter 2, I proposed three axes to assess these policies: postures, conceptualization, and cooperation. Of course, these are not the only existing possibilities to assess these policies. One could also include other dimensions, such as participation in peace operations. However, considering that the more dimensions I include in this analysis, the more complex it becomes, I decided to keep only these three indicators, as they already allowed me to have a reasonable picture of the use of military resources by a state by assessing (1) resource mobilization, (2) the reasons (beyond defending from external threats) for mobilizing these resources, and (3) the use of the military component in developing cooperative ties with neighbors. Hence, I defined each axis and discussed how to empirically assess them.

The first axis I used in my analysis is ISP Postures, which consists of *how intensively a state mobilizes its resources to contain threats and defend its interests in terms of international security* - focusing on military resources. It means that ISP Postures can be assessed by a set of indicators that gives us a picture of such intensity of resource mobilization, such as military expenditure and involvement in militarized interstate disputes. The second axis is ISP conceptualization, which *reflects the number and intensity of issues*

included in states' conceptions about ISP. It can be assessed by capturing different dimensions included in states' ISP. In practical terms, we can assess it by observing, for example, mentions to topics such as democracy, environment, drug trafficking, and Anti-Hegemony in speeches, defense documents, and other documents showing states' ISP guidelines. Finally, the last axis is ISP cooperation, which *identifies the cooperative relations a state is building in terms of defense policy*. It can be assessed by looking at multi and bilateral defense agreements between states.

After defining and operationalizing the ISP concept in Chapter 2, I offered ways to measure each ISP axis in Chapter 5. Using different techniques, such as a Principal Component Analysis and a Structural Topic Model, I measured each of these axes and presented the results. Then, more than a conceptual contribution, by showing how the conceptual contribution can be empirically observed, it also represented a methodological contribution by offering ways to measure different ISP dimensions.

This conceptual framework allowed me to create an ISP typology to conduct the proposed multidimensional analysis. In Chapter 3, I proposed such a typology for the ISP implemented by Latin American states from 1975 to 2010, which is the time period I analyzed in this dissertation. First, I discussed which conceptualizations are useful for classifying policies in the region, being analyzed together with postures and cooperation: crimes and anti-hegemony. More than being associated with the other axes, they help us understand why states wanted to use military force, which is a necessary condition for any policy to be considered an ISP.

Having discussed the axes to classify these policies, the conceptual framework I proposed showed that existing ISP types (e.g., the National Security Doctrine and the Democratic Security) could not be clearly distinguished along the proposed axes, making it hard to distinguish what makes them particular types. Then, in Chapter 3, I introduced a contribution to the literature on Latin American security by proposing five types to classify ISP in the region: Coexistence (low scores in all axes), Pro-Democracy Security Cooperation (high scores only in the cooperation axis), Balance of Power (higher scores only in ISP Postures), Transnational Threats (higher scores in postures and an emphasis on crimes), and Rebel Policies (higher scores in postures and an emphasis on Anti-Hegemony). Finally, I discussed how this typology applies in empirical cases, discussing Latin American states from 1975 to 2010 by relying on a literature review, descriptive statistics, and network analysis.

Such a typology is, of course, limited by the empirically observable cases in the sample. Still, it allows for a comprehensive assessment of ISP types in the region.

In Chapter 7, section 7.1, I used a K-Means Cluster Analysis to aggregate the measures for all axis, as discussed in Chapter 5, to check whether the five ISP types proposed in Chapter 3 could be obtained through statistical analysis. I also used a handcoded classification based on the existing literature to cross-validate the results from the cluster analysis. Results show that, indeed, the proposed typology is empirically observable not only through qualitative but also using quantitative tools.

Having a clearly defined dependent variable, which can be assessed through either a disaggregated way - by looking at the ISP axes separately - or a multidimensional form - by observing the five ISP types, based on an aggregation of the ISP axes - in Chapter 4 I introduced my theory on what explains these policies. By relying on an analytically eclectic perspective, I combined elements from different theories to produce my own. According to my theory, considering that we are talking about a peripheral region, three variables can explain these policies: great powers' influence, leaders, and political regimes.

In Chapter 4, I also proposed the hypotheses and mechanisms through which these variables can change ISP in Latin America. Great powers - in the case of Latin America, the US - can change these policies because they can provide either support (through foreign aid, military support, or contacting policy-makers) or hindrances (e.g., sanctions, overt and covert operations, and support for non-state groups) for a country to implement an ISP. In these cases, peripheral states tend to change their policies. First, they will raise resource mobilization in order to either comply with the great power or resist hindrances. Second, in the Latin American case, depending on the US purposes, it can lead states to increase their emphasis on fighting crimes to comply with the "War on Drugs" policy, for example, or to increase their emphasis on Anti-Hegemony, by resisting hindrances imposed by Washington. Consequently, my theory predicts that higher great power influence over Latin American states can lead them to implement Balance of Power, Anti-Hegemonic, or Transnational Threats policies, depending on the US's purposes.

Great powers, however, cannot often define peripheral states' ISP alone. Most of the time, these states are concerned with domestic and, at maximum, regional issues. Then, it is necessary to look at the domestic level. In the case of Latin America, all countries have presidential regimes. Then, my theory points out that presidents, of course, can change these

policies. More than being themselves diplomats, having the capacity to negotiate international security issues with other leaders, presidents can set the foreign and defense policies' agendas and guidelines and choose the bureaucrats who will be ahead of these policies. Having that in mind, I proposed that the more critical to the liberal order a leader is, the more resources they will mobilize and the more Anti-Hegemonic their ISP will be. It happens because these leaders will use their mechanisms to change foreign and defense policies in order to resist hegemonic great powers and the international order they lead, as well as try to gather allies for their initiatives. These leaders also tend to lead their countries to implement Anti-Hegemonic policies, meeting their foreign policy ideologies.

At the same time, leaders cannot define these policies alone. Domestic institutions determine the limits they have, as well as how many actors can influence these policies, and thus must be considered in this model. It happens because of two mechanisms. First, in democratic regimes, veto players can prevent leaders' belligerent intentions from taking place in an ISP. Second, in these regimes, there is often increased civilian oversight over the military. It is important because, while the military tends to increase resource mobilization towards defending what they consider the national interest, civilians often prefer more peaceful policies because it (1) allows them to increase their control over the military, as well as (2) enables the government to spend more resources in other areas than ISP. Therefore, when civilians have prominence over the military in international security policy-making, they tend to block military attempts to increase resource mobilization towards ISP. As a consequence, my theory predicts that democratic regimes lead to decreased resource mobilization and, to some extent, cooperation, as these countries will use this instrument to build more peaceful relations with their neighbors. At the aggregated level, it thus predicts that Coexistence or Pro-Democracy Security Cooperation policies tend to take place under these regimes.

Having that said, in Chapters 6, 7, and 8, I tested my theory. These chapters also represented a methodological contribution to studies on Latin American security, showing the feasibility of using quantitative and mixed-methods designs to improve the understanding of the Latin American security environment. In Chapter 6, using a panel data analysis, I confirmed all hypotheses for each separate ISP axis. Then, in Chapter 7, after using the K-Means Cluster analysis to aggregate these axes, I corroborated nearly all hypotheses at the aggregated level. The only caveat relates to the Pro-Democracy Security Cooperation policy:

it is true that it takes place under more democratic regimes, but democracy is not what leads states to change from a Coexistence to a more cooperative policy. Models suggested that moderate left-wing leaders can do it, but such a finding deserves further research before making any causal claim. Finally, I also used a random forest to show that, more than being able to explain ISP outcomes, my theory also does well in predicting these policies.

Finally, in Chapter 8, I moved from dataset to causal-process observations in order to leverage the causal claims from my theory. I delved into three case studies, aiming to confirm causal relations and the mechanisms proposed by my theory. The Colombian case showed that, indeed, from 1994 to 2010, the US made Colombia increase both its resource mobilization and emphasis on crimes, giving place to a more intense Transnational Threats policy. It happened because, under *Plan Colombia*, the US provided the South American country with billions of dollars, military training, and equipment and sent representatives from Washington to be part of the elaboration of the Colombian ISP.

Second, the Nicaraguan case confirmed the role of leaders in shaping ISP. As soon as they took office (1979), the *Sandinistas* used their capacity to control agendas and bureaucracies to change the Nicaraguan policy from a Balance of Power to a Rebel Policy. More than including the Anti-Hegemonic content, they increased resource mobilization in an attempt to resist hindrances they believed would be provided by the US and its allies to the socialist government. They were right, as, from 1981 onwards, the US and its allies started supporting non-state groups - the *Contras* - to undermine the *Sandinista* regime, leading to an intensification of the Rebel Policy

Finally, Argentina was illustrative of how democracy can make states change from a Balance of Power to a Coexistence policy. While the military dictatorship mobilized more resources to defend its nationalistic interests, after the re-democratization, Argentina started building more peaceful relations with its neighbors and reducing military expenditure. More than creating a more peaceful environment, it allowed for easier civilian control over the military. Such a measure also received support from several veto players that emerged in the country at the time, such as the judiciary and the legislative branches, as well as political parties.

Therefore, all the tests confirmed my theory. This is, to my knowledge, the first theoretical contribution in an attempt to understand ISP in Latin America. Of course, it has some key limitations. First, although it is still restricted to Latin America. Although its

assumptions hold for other peripheral regions, we still need empirical tests in order to be sure that it can be generalized - which is now part of a future research agenda. Second, due to data availability, it can only explain the period 1975-2010. Still, it is capable of explaining 35 years of these policies in the region. Also, as results from the predictive analysis using random forest shows, my theory presents predictive capacity, being applicable to understanding current and predicting future trends.

Considering what was presented here, my theory allows for some predictions for the next few years. First, it is possible to say that if the US decides to respond to the increasing Chinese influence over the region by also increasing its influence, through the provision of foreign aid or increasing political contacts, for example, we can expect increased resource mobilization in the region. It will likely lead to, at least, Balance of Power policies.

An empirical out-of-sample manifestation of the argument that the US influence can lead to less friendly approaches in the region was provided by Brazil under Bolsonaro. Under high levels of influence from the US president, Donald Trump, due to political contacts, Brazil changed its historical diplomatic and mediative approach in regional crises for a less friendly one. The Bolsonaro government recognized Juan Guaidó as the Venezuelan president, expelled Venezuelan diplomats, and joined Trump's threats to invade the South American country.

Balance of Power policies also tends to take place if the current democratic backsliding wave disseminates across the region. Such backsliding is already taking in El Salvador and Brazil. Just to provide another quick out-of-sample example of such a prediction, in the Salvadorean case, while undermining the democratic regime, Nayib Bukele increased the defense expenditure from 1.1% of the GDP in 2018 to 1.5% in 2020 and increasingly militarized the fight against drug organizations.

Bukele and Bolsonaro also bring up another challenge to my theory: could it explain the ISP under the far-right populist leaders that became increasingly electorally competitive in several countries over the last decade? The answer is relatively simple: only to the extent that they undermine democratic regimes and, in the Bolsonaro case, had the opportunity to ally with another far-right leader in the US. Is it enough? Hard to say! These two anecdotal examples show that maybe yes. However, both are only anecdotes and need further analyses over the following years.

The fact is that, in this dissertation, I introduced a new theory to understand and predict international security policies implemented by Latin American states. During its more than 200 pages, I presented tests to it and showed its applicability. Still, I acknowledge that future efforts are necessary to expand its validity beyond the sample used in this analysis. As a natural consequence, more than providing such a theoretical contribution, this dissertation also produces a future research agenda to be pursued by its author over the following years. Theories are made to be tested and improved, and this is what I will do during the following years of my career.

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