

UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE MINAS GERAIS
Faculdade de Letras
Programa de Pós-Graduação em Estudos Literários

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THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY DOUBLES: a reading of *Frankenstein, Wuthering Heights, Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* and *The Picture of Dorian Gray*

Belo Horizonte

2024

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Dissertação apresentada ao Programa de Pós-Graduação em Estudos Literários da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais como requisito parcial para obtenção de título de Mestra em Estudos Literários.

Orientadora: Prof. Dra. Miriam Piedade Andrade Mansur

Belo Horizonte

2024

R696n Rodrigues, Luísa Almeida Alvarez.
The nineteenth-century doubles [manuscrito] : a reading of *Frankenstein*, *Wuthering Heights*, *Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* and *The Picture of Dorian Gray* / Luísa Almeida Alvarez Rodrigues. – 2024.
1 recurso online (129 f.) : pdf.
Orientadora: Miriam Piedade Mansur Andrade.
Área de concentração: Literaturas de Língua Inglesa.
Linha de pesquisa: Poéticas da Modernidade.
Dissertação (mestrado) – Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Faculdade de Letras.
Bibliografia: f. 120-129.

Exigências do sistema: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

1. Shelley, Mary Wollstonecraft, 1797-1851. – *Frankenstein* – Crítica e interpretação – Teses. 2. Bronte, Emily, 1818-1848. – *Wuthering Heights* – Crítica e interpretação – Teses. 3. Stevenson, Robert Louis, 1850-1894. – *Strange case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* – Crítica e interpretação – Teses. 4. Wilde, Oscar, 1854-1900. – *Picture of Dorian Gray* – Crítica e interpretação – Teses. 5. Histórias de fantasmas – Teses. 6. Sobrenatural na literatura – Teses. 7. Literatura fantástica – História e crítica – Teses. 8. Terror na literatura – Teses. 9. Monstros na literatura – Teses. I. Andrade, Miriam Piedade Mansur. II. Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais. Faculdade de Letras. III. Título.

CDD: 809.93375



UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE MINAS GERAIS
FACULDADE DE LETRAS
PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM LETRAS: ESTUDOS LITERÁRIOS

FOLHA DE APROVAÇÃO

Dissertação intitulada *THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY DOUBLES: a reading of Frankenstein, Wuthering Heights, Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde and The Picture of Dorian Gray*, de autoria da Mestranda LUÍSA ALMEIDA ALVAREZ RODRIGUES, apresentada ao Programa de Pós-Graduação em Letras: Estudos Literários da Faculdade de Letras da UFMG, como requisito parcial à obtenção do título de Mestre em Letras: Estudos Literários.

Área de Concentração: Literaturas de Língua Inglesa/Mestrado

Linha de Pesquisa: Poéticas da Modernidade

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Belo Horizonte, 24 de junho de 2024.



Documento assinado eletronicamente por **Romulo Monte Alto, Coordenador(a) de curso de pós-graduação**, em 24/02/2025, às 15:58, conforme horário oficial de Brasília, com fundamento no art. 5º do [Decreto nº 10.543, de 13 de novembro de 2020](#).



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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

With all my heart, I thank:

André, for being “the eternal rocks beneath” me and never allowing me to doubt myself;

Jerusa and Lenisson, for giving me life, education and all I could ever need;

Lorena, for cheering for me since day one;

Miriam, for guiding me and believing in my words;

FAPEMIG, for funding this thesis.

ABSTRACT

The nineteenth-century was an era of development, conflicts and new discoveries which shaped England, Europe and the world into new molds. Amid the scenario of change, discussions regarding the human mind and the conflicting relationship between individual and society resulted in a rising interest in the figure of the *doppelgänger*. Also known as the double, the term refers to the appearance of a second self, identical or not to the subject, that personifies the shadows, the secrets that one tries to keep hidden from the outside world. The emergence of fascination on such a theme directly influenced novels such as *Frankenstein*, *Wuthering Heights*, *Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* and *The Picture of Dorian Gray*, which will be the objects of analysis in this study. In addition, the present thesis will analyze the development of the *doppelgänger* motif throughout the nineteenth-century utilizing psychoanalytical theories to provide a thorough understanding of the circumstances that might have culminated in the emergence of the double in each case.

Keywords: double; *doppelgänger*; the uncanny; *frankenstein*; *wuthering heights*; *strange case of dr. jekyll and mr. hyde*; *the picture of dorian gray*.

RESUMO

O século dezenove foi uma era de desenvolvimento, conflitos e novas descobertas que moldaram a Inglaterra, a Europa e o mundo. Em meio ao cenário de mudanças, discussões sobre a mente humana e a relação conflituosa entre indivíduo e sociedade resultaram em um crescente interesse pela figura do *doppelgänger*. Também conhecido como duplo, o termo refere-se ao surgimento de um segundo eu, idêntico ou não ao sujeito, que personifica as sombras, os segredos que o indivíduo tenta manter escondidos do mundo exterior. O surgimento do fascínio por tal tema influenciou diretamente romances como *Frankenstein*, *O Morro dos Ventos Uivantes*, *O Médico e o Monstro* e *O Retrato de Dorian Gray*, que serão os objetos de análise neste estudo. Para além disso, a presente tese pretende analisar o desenvolvimento das representações do *doppelgänger* ao longo do século dezenove utilizando teorias da psicanálise para proporcionar uma melhor compreensão das circunstâncias que podem ter culminado no aparecimento do duplo em cada caso.

Palavras-chave: duplo; *doppelgänger*; o estranho; *frankenstein*; o *morro dos ventos*; *uivantes*; o *médico e o monstro*; o *retrato de dorian gray*.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The 1900s was a century marked by change. The previous century had brought new forms of thinking and organizing society, and its effects were spreading rapidly into the new century. Some of the changes included “industrialization and scientific progress, the colonization of new territories, the dissipating influence of religion, the ascension of the middle class, and a massive population explosion as people traveled from the English countryside to seek urban areas or went abroad” (Romero 1). Such new developments exerted an unprecedented effect on all aspects of people’s lives for the best and for the worst, which resulted in a general sense of anxiety and mistrust that lingered throughout the century. John Herdman explains that the “contact with the native cultures of newly explored or colonised lands was forcing upon the collective attention” (11) of English society the idea of moral evil being “associated with the primitive, the savage and the untamed in the human spirit” (11), which raised new discussions on the duality of man. With the changes in lifestyles, moral codes and social organization, people felt removed from their common grounds resulting in a search for new forms of understanding society as well as understanding the individual that was inserted in it. Thus, questions regarding the dualism present in every man and woman began to take new forms and grow as a common interest till it became a recurring theme in works of literature, frequently taking form in the figure of the double.

According to Herdman, “the double as a literary device has its roots in human experience, natural, religious, psychological and parapsychological, and in the reflections of such experience in legend and folklore” (2). A popular motif during the nineteenth-century, it explores the human condition in face of repression and denial of one’s self. The figure of the *doppelgänger*, as Macías and Núñez suggest, “places the human being in front of [a] mirror”, metaphorizing the dual and reflective nature of the human experience (262). Its power

consists precisely of that: ambiguity (Herdman 14), which invites the reader to reflect on his/her own ambiguous essence. Therefore, narratives that portray the encounter of its characters with their other selves commonly entice the readers to confront their own insecurities, secrets and mistakes. As a result, works that explore the motif in their narratives, intentionally or unintentionally, bring to light inevitable discussions on the complexities of the human mind and the struggles to accept and integrate all aspects of personality that are common to all individuals.

Also known as *doppelgänger*, the doubling of a character can be seen in works of renowned authors such as Victor Hugo, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Jean Paul Richter, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Edgar Allan Poe and E. T. A. Hoffmann. The concept, according to Ralph Tymms and Otto Rank, first appeared in old folk-lore and primitive beliefs of the human soul and, although it cannot be pointed exactly how or when it emerged in ancient cultures, its roots are associated with the observation of ancient civilizations on the dualities present in nature, the cycle of life and death or even an imbalance between the creative and destructive forces that generate life. As Herdman observes, since the beginning of time, the human race “sees in nature and the world, either objectively or subjectively, a proliferation of dualities: light and darkness, sun and moon, night and day, sleeping and waking, conscious and unconscious, positive and negative, mind and matter, body and soul, spirit and flesh, man and woman, good and evil, Heaven and Hell, God and the Devil” (1). Therefore, the sense of dual essence, or even presence, is connected to humanity since immemorial times.

Herdman suggests that the “experience of duality can be described as the foundation stone of human consciousness” (1). That, he continues, encapsulates the human experience, which is based upon the “recognition of the distinction between the ‘I’ and the ‘not-I’” (1). To reflect on oneself, “implies becoming objective, seeing oneself as different” (Macías and Núñez 258), as an *other*, or a double, and that realization is “vital for the birth of the

experience of identity” (Macías and Núñez 258). In a further development of the I-*other* exchange, Rank(1919), in his psychoanalytical research on duality and the figure of the double, argues that “the most prominent symptom” (76) that generates a double is “a powerful consciousness of guilt that forces the hero no longer to accept the responsibility for certain actions of his ego, but to place it upon another ego, a double” (76). In this perspective, the *doppelgänger* assumes the role of mirror to the subject’s shadows that cannot remain repressed and must be externalized before being integrated (or not) again. In “The Uncanny”, by Sigmund Freud, he relates the apparition of a double to the uncanny effect which takes place “when repressed infantile complexes have been revived by some impression, or when the primitive beliefs we have surmounted seem once more to be confirmed” (17). His argument reflects similar ideas to those proposed by Rank, pointing to the formation of a double as an externalization of what cannot be repressed anymore (Rank, *The Double* 76). Adding to that, Freud argues that “the uncanny is nothing else than a hidden, familiar thing that has undergone repression and then emerged from it, and that everything that is uncanny fulfills this condition” (15). Therefore, when choosing to analyze narratives exploring the double motif, to understand the mental state of the characters and the influence the exterior exerts on them proves to be essential.

Since the motif was popular during the nineteenth-century, it seems appropriate to choose works from the period in question, when the discussions about divided personalities and struggles of the ego were frequent. Hence, to properly understand how the theme of the divided self emerged and portrayed the general feeling of England during the 1900s, novels that were published in the early, mid and late century were selected. They are: *Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus*, *Wuthering Heights*, *Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* and *The Picture of Dorian Gray*. As stated by Linda Dryden, the “literature of duality is, at its most obvious level, a literature about identity, or even lack of [it]” (39), thus, although the

form in which each manifestation of the *doppelgänger* acts, comes into existence or relates to their respective subjects may vary, ultimately, all reveal the struggle of its characters with their identity. The differences between equals are useful to provide a wider understanding of how Victorian society's mentality evolved from the beginning to the end of the century and how that influenced the development of the motif throughout the years. In all its variations, the central aspect of such novels is the duality that "arises out of and gives form to the tension between division and unity [,] ... contradiction within unity, and for unity in spite of division[;] the likeness expressing the unity of the individual, the doubleness or complementarity expressing division within the personality" (Herdman 2). Hence, to understand the figure of the double is to understand that there is difference within similarity and similarity within difference; what is familiar may prove to be unfamiliar and the other might be simply a reflection on one's self.

Starting from the beginning of the century, the first novel to be analyzed will be Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus*. First published in 1818, the story of Doctor Victor Frankenstein and his unnamed creature remains significant to this day as its eerie plot and characters became part of popular culture, being adapted to films, television and other types of media. For Aija Ozolins, it is precisely the presence of a divided, second self that "constitutes the chief source of the novel's latent power" (104). One aspect, however, that arises confusion to many is the fact that the creature has no name. This certainly does not go unnoticed by attentive readers or critics. According to Rosemary Jackson, it is not a coincidence that the monster is nameless or that it is commonly confused with his creator ("Narcissism and Beyond")¹. That is, in fact, an anticipated reaction, for the creature is the

¹ All references to Jackson's "Narcissism and Beyond" are from Jackson, Rosemary. "Narcissism and Beyond: A Psychoanalytic Reading of *Frankenstein* and Fantasies of the Double". *Aspects of Fantasy: Selected Essays from the Second International Conference on the Fantastic in Literature and Film*, edited by William Coyle, Greenwood Press, 1986. *KNARF English*, <http://knarf.english.upenn.edu/Articles/jackson.html>. Accessed 10 August 2023, and will be referenced with no page number.

doctor's "grotesque reflection, his unnamed, unformed sel[f]" (Jackson, "Narcissism and Beyond"). To name it would mean to give it an identity and recognition, but Victor, from the very beginning, rejected its existence and what it represented: the immoral part of himself that should have remained hidden. This is the fundamental aspect of the *doppelgänger* motif developed in the novel, that sets the foundation to all the unfolding events: the negation and rejection of one's own shadows and the repercussions of it.

Emily Brontë's *Wuthering Heights*, on the other hand, provides a very different relationship between the subject and the double. Published in 1847, the novel presents Heathcliff as Catherine's double, but instead of rejecting him, she longs for him. They are so intricately connected that it is impossible to think of one without the other. She deliberately recognizes the importance of their union, but as a woman and member of the upper class, she is forced to reject the unwanted (by social standards) part of herself in order to be accepted by the rules of which she is a subject. Throughout the novel, there are clear indications of Catherine's wild and free nature being repressed by the social expectations of her title, family and gender. As a form of counterbalance, the more she approaches the fields of civilization, the more Heathcliff manifests his ferocity and deviates from social acceptance. In consequence, in an unconscious effort to regain the lost state of unity, the main pair — and surrounding characters by a matter of influence — engage in a cycle of repetitions, recreating the same patterns in an attempt to master the past traumas and find closure, that means, union. In Catherine and Heathcliff's case, however, to be one again seems to be impossible on the land of the living, thus it is in their death that they shall seek reunification.

The third novel to be discussed, *Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*, was first published in 1886, by Robert Louis Stevenson. Following the investigations of the character Utterson, the reader is presented to the good Henry Jekyll and the wicked Edward Hyde. As Masao Miyoshi explains in "Dr. Jekyll and the Emergence of Mr. Hyde", "*Dr Jekyll and Mr*

Hyde may be read and studied as a story of ideas, that it will by this means yield insights into certain aspects of the late Victorian society that was its milieu” (471), emphasizing not only the novel’s depiction of the double but also the importance of its contextualization and commentary on the social institutions of the period. Due to the strict values that were expected and imposed by the moral standards of the time, the individual, represented by the always proper Jekyll, finds no other choice than to abide by the rules and repress the aspects of his personality that did not fit the norm, which later emerged as Hyde. Like the other *doppelgänger* narratives, this story can be read as a representation of one’s struggle to face and integrate the part of their identity that is neither welcomed nor claimed, but is either way real, therefore should be acknowledged before it gets out of control.

In the last novel to be analyzed, *The Picture of Dorian Gray*, first published in 1890 by Oscar Wilde, the double is presented as an object, specifically, a painting. The novel begins with Dorian’s hasty vow and follows through his loss of innocence that culminates in his death. The vow, made frivolously, was the beginning of his fall, slowly becoming visible not on the character’s living figure but on his portrait, the material evidence of his transgressions. The representation of the double as an ideal image of the subject adds to the *doppelgänger* literary tradition new possibilities, focusing not much on the figure of the double itself but the individual’s *response* to it. Although at first the beautiful painting is well received by Dorian, after it starts to display the signs of his shadows, he comes to reject it. Similar to Victor’s and Jekyll’s reactions, the inevitable confrontation with his faults becomes too much for him, as he did not find — or maybe did not want — a path for unification, which resulted in his tragic end. Dorian’s identification with his portrait very much resembles Jacques Lacan’s proposals in “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience”. In his essay, the psychoanalyst suggests that the individual, as an infant, when placed in front of a mirror, recognizes what s/he sees as part of her/his self and that process

exerts great influence on the child's maturation and perception of the world throughout his/her whole life. This phenomenon echoes the first encounters of tribal peoples with their doubles: they found their selves looking back at them on the surface of still water (a natural mirror) and such a meeting generated the idea of their selves as being an *other* as much as they were them.

As stated in "Self as Other: The *Doppelgänger*", by Gry Faurholt, the means of identity formation, identification and othering, are taken to the extreme² when in presence of a double. Dryden adds that "[i]f the traditional tale of Gothic horror tends to explore and expose our fear of agents outside ourselves and their capacity to harm us, then the fiction of duality usually reverses that anxiety, turning it in upon ourselves to explore our horror at what we may be capable of" (38). The process of identifying and integrating all facets of one's essence, is a dangerous, although inherent, pursuit, common to all individuals. Thus, the mere existence of a double and its counterpart is a form of resistance against the social norms and molds that are imposed by the civilized world on the subject for it reveals the fact that there is no light that casts no shadow and no 'I' without the 'other'. Along these lines, it is appropriate to suggest that double narratives can be read as defiant representatives against the process of socialization (Faurholt) and the discussion of such themes is relevant not only to literature itself but to one's discernment over the human mind and the social systems that govern all individuals.

To facilitate the comprehension, the present study was divided into nine chapters plus the Works Cited section. The second chapter will develop the discussion on the *doppelgänger* motif as well as its influence on works of literature while also presenting some of the most recognized theories regarding the origins of the concept which can be found in old folk-lore and early traditions of several cultures. This first contextualization is important to understand

² All the references to Faurholt are from Faurholt, Gry. "Self as Other: The *Doppelgänger*", *Double Dialogues* 10, 2009. *Double Dialogues*, doubledialogues.com/article/self-as-other-the-doppelganger. Accessed 9 July 2023, and will be referenced without page number.

the rise of the concept till its peak in popularity during the nineteenth-century. The third chapter will present the definition of the word uncanny based on the findings presented by Freud in “The Uncanny” with additional perspectives from other authors such as Ernst Jentsch and Nicholas Royle. The objective of the section will be to analyze the German word *unheimlich* (uncanny) and its counterpart *heimlich* and how they trace back to concepts that can be related to the double, such as repression and the repetition-compulsion. The fourth chapter will present and explain Lacan’s theory of the Mirror Stage, which will be essential to the analysis of Wilde’s novel. Many of the theories proposed by the psychoanalyst in question are considered developments of ideas previously discussed by Freud, thus bringing more contemporary ideas to the analysis will enrich the debate regarding using psychoanalytic perspectives on literary research. The following chapters will be assigned to the analysis, one to each novel. They are, respectively: *Frankenstein*, *Wuthering Heights*, *Strange Case of DrJekyll and Mr Hyde* and *The Picture of Dorian Gray*, followed by the final chapter in which final considerations will be brought to light.

2. THE *DOPPELGÄNGER*

The word *doppelgänger* first appeared in literature in the German novel *Siebenkäs*, published in 1796 by Jean Paul. It was used to describe a double, a being identical to another character that provoked fear and misfortune to those around it. The motif became notably popular during the nineteenth-century, yet it still remains relevant to contemporary writers concerned with the fragmentation of the self and society in the postmodern era (Pennington 204), as it brings to light inevitable discussions on the complexities of the human mind and its struggles with identity. Discussions on the *doppelgänger* commonly explore the human condition in face of repression and denial of one's self and the narratives that choose to explore it offer to the readers a journey of confrontation with one's own insecurities, sins and secrets. According to Rank and Tymms, the term cannot be defined into a concise set of characteristics for it "takes the form of various types" (Rank, *The Double* 29) and has proved itself "capable of almost infinite variations" (Tymms 15) for its large range of developments and forms. The doubling of a character can be seen in a vast variety of examples in literature, such as in the guardian angel of Poe's "William Wilson"; the evil monster as in Bram Stoker's *Dracula*; the split personality of Dostoevski's *Crime and Punishment* or the identical, evil counterpart in *The Double* and all the different forms explored in E.T.A Hoffmann's works. Regardless of the representation, the Double novel — and subsequent forms of art exploring the theme — "is an expression of man's allegorizing nature [as] it reveals his need to externalize and concretize interior conflict in order to understand it" (Moglen 391-2). Its presence in works of literature, thus, can be read as more than an aspect of the narrative, but an evidence of human's search for him/herself.

The universality of the theme and the relatability of the horrors of facing your own shadow-self have also attracted the attention of critics, although it is impossible to assume all

the different reasons one may have when choosing a subject of study. As Jackson mentions in “Narcissism and Beyond: A Psychoanalytic Reading of *Frankenstein* and Fantasies of the Double”, the shift that occurred during the Romantic period from the supernatural aspect into the “self-conscious psychological function” of the motif is acknowledged by a vast number of scholars to this day. Therefore, it is not unexpected to observe that the recurrence of the double and its psychological aspect in literary works has been explored in a variety of studies as vast as the number of examples of the theme. Tymms’s work, *Doubles in Literary Psychology*, for example, is a meaningful research which focuses on the figure of the double and how it is explored in several works of fiction. Rank is likewise a critic who devotes his attention to the representations of the dual self in literature; his writings such as *The Double: a Psychoanalytic Study* and “The Double as the Immortal Self” in *Beyond Psychology*, not only discuss the *doppelgänger*, but also the history of the concept, showing how the idea has developed over the centuries till it obtained the forms currently known. Concerning focused analysis of works of fiction, the article “Edgar Allan Poe and E. T. A. Hoffmann: The Double in ‘William Wilson’ and *The Devil’s Elixirs*”, by Patrick Labriola, “traces the developmental stages of the double ... according to a reading of Freud’s essay ‘The Uncanny’” (para. 1) in the works of Poe and Hoffmann. Similarly, the essay by Gary Saul Morson, named “Me and My Double: Selfhood, Consciousness, and Empathy in *The Double*”, proposes a discussion on the duplication and division of the self by taking Dostoievski’s work as an example while analyzing the mystery of consciousness, which implicitly permeates all discussions regarding the divided mind. As mentioned, the close connection the theme has with humans’ denial or acceptance of him/herself offers a powerful source of insight for both readers and critics and has established a solid background for further studies and analysis.

Although an intense production of fiction exploring the theme happened during the nineteenth-century, “[d]oubling in narratives can be traced back at least as far as Genesis: the

fall of Satan is frequently regarded as the story of an evil double, a theme picked up in Milton's *Paradise Lost*" (Dryden 38). The idea of a second self, however, already permeated the imagination of ancient civilization, and the first grasps of the double can be found far back, as exemplified by Claude Lecouteux. Some examples are the Ka of ancient Egyptian religion, the daimon of the Greeks, the Romans' genius and Iuno, the Christians' guardian angel and the ancient Scandinavians' *fylgja* (Lecouteux qtd. in Bispo 43). Jéssica Bispo, in her doctorate's dissertation, offers an extensive range of representations of the *doppelgänger* found in different beliefs around the world:

Irish and Scottish folklore have a common reference to a mythical figure called the *fetch*, a double conceived in the form of an aura belonging to each individual, with an appearance exactly similar and capable of distancing itself. Scandinavian folklore, meanwhile, mentions the *vardøger*, the personification of foreshadowing which explains the sensation of *déjà vu*: the *vardøger* would be the spirit that had previously visited the places that the individual would visit in the future. The well-known werewolf, from Proto-Indo-European mythology onwards, often takes on the role of a double with ideals of supernatural strength, lycanthropy being a state that allows indulgence in the most primal and savage instincts of the human being (43).³

Tymms, in his research, explains that the roots of the double can be found in the mere phenomenon of individuals resembling each other, either by chance or by family bond, and "in the earliest speculations on the nature of the soul" (Tymms 15). Rank, in agreement,

³ Original: "Os folclores irlandês e escocês apresentam uma referência comum a uma figura mítica denominada por *fetch*, um duplo concebido sob a forma de uma aura pertencente a cada indivíduo, com uma aparência exatamente igual a este e sendo capaz de se afastar do mesmo. O folclore escandinavo, por sua vez, menciona o *vardøger*, personificação do prenúncio e explicação atribuída à sensação de *déjà vu*: o *vardøger* seria o espírito que visitou, previamente, os espaços que a pessoa iria visitar no futuro. Também o muito reconhecido lobisomem, desde a mitologia protoindo-europeia, assume frequentemente o papel de um duplo que enverga ideais de força sobrenatural, sendo a licantria um estado que permite uma indulgência pelos instintos mais primordiais e selvagens do ser humano". (Bispo 43). My translation.

explores, in his work, the first concepts of what came to be the faith in the human soul and relates it to the realization of an individual's shadow or reflection on water.

In his study, Rank states: “the belief of primitive peoples all over the world in the human soul as being an exact copy of the body, first perceivable in the shadow, was also the original soul-concept of ancient civilized peoples” (*The Double* 59). The shadow, perceived as identical to the real body, represented the doubling of the individual into a form that was beyond material comprehension, culminating into the idea of the soul. By seeing the doubled self that never stopped, never missed a step, ancient cultures, Rank explains, came to consider “[the] mysterious double, [the] shadow, to be an actual spiritual being” (*Beyond Psychology* 58). For its supernatural capability of always reappearing after darkness and faithfully accompanying — even guarding — the person, the shadow became to the eyes of many now lost civilizations the embodiment of a higher being which responded to a sphere beyond the mundane. For this reason, the idea of guardian angels is also considered to be a development of the first conceptions of the human soul, thus, the double. In such development, the eternal presence stays with the individual throughout his/her life and guarantees his/her survival even after death, attesting the immortality of the self.

Claire Rosenfield notices that Edgar Allan Poe's “William Wilson” is one of the few examples in Romantic literature in which the double plays the role of a guardian angel, who seeks to prevent the evil doings of the narrator (334). In the short story, the portrayal of the protagonist's double is just as the old beliefs related to the shadow and its guarding role: the double is exactly as the original, William Wilson, and accompanies him in several moments throughout his life, protects him from evil and his death reflects on the protagonist's own death. By injuring his double, William Wilson injures himself, similar to ancient superstition that considered it possible to kill a man by hurting his shadow or reflection on the water.

Guardian angels and the human soul are not the only strains of the roots of the double, however, since the likeness or contrast between people have also been a recurrent subject of discussion. According to Milica Živković, there are “various forms of the mythical double[:] twins, firstborn parents, rival brothers, metamorphic twinning, scapegoat and sacrifice, lovers and soul-mates” (123) and all of them “are special and limited cases of the larger category of the archetype of universal duality” (123). The archetype, she explains, “reflects pagan beliefs in the primacy of dyadic structure and in the plurality of the Sacred” (123). It represents the creative and destructive facets of nature, life and death, ambiguity and contradiction, and it is “the ambivalence of spiritual power” (123) contained in the Sacred force of nature that “allows it to operate, alternately, as a wounding and a healing influence, as that which generates order or disorder as if by caprice” (123). It can happen sometimes, however, an imbalance between the exchanges between men and nature, which might appear in the form of a double. To resolve the imbalance, the “energy” should “be returned to the tribe or the group” (Živković 123) and although it represented a fracture in the harmony of nature, it was perceived as part of the natural cycle of life, where imbalance was also an aspect of balance.

Along the passage of time, the theme started to take new forms and allow other possibilities of reading. Rank, in “The Double as the Immortal Self”, explains: “originally conceived of as a guardian angel, assuring immortal survival to the self, the double eventually appears as precisely the opposite, a reminder of the individual’s mortality, indeed, the announcer of death itself” (76). This change in view, he suggests, was heavily influenced by Christian doctrine and its “permeation of the whole subject of immortality with the idea of evil” (Rank, “The Double as the Immortal Self” 76). Therefore, “from a symbol of eternal life in the primitive, the double developed into an omen of death in the self-conscious individual of modern civilization” (Rank, “The Double as the Immortal Self” 76). It was this latter

development that was explored in Jean Paul's *Siebenkäs* which influenced the following works of literature till it reached its peak of popularity in the nineteenth-century.

With the change in social structures due to industrialization, the Romantic views on the double changed the focus from the supernatural forces and religious undertones to the duality each person holds within him/herself. Ultimately, Rank notices, the double “became an opposing self, appearing in the form of evil which represents the perishable and mortal part of the personality repudiated by the social self” (*Beyond Psychology* 82). The double in that case functions as the shadow self, the part of the personality that the subject wants to hide so s/he may keep her/his place in society. Following such variety, *doppelgänger* narratives of the nineteenth-century tend to focus on the duality of the self and the “internal origin of the double[; in which the] demonic is not supernatural, but is an aspect of personal and interpersonal life, a manifestation of unconscious desire” (Živković 125). Živković explains:

The appearance of the demonic double as opposed to and irreconcilable with the guardian angel marks the moment in the history of western civilization when the archaic belief in the continuum of life and death and the exchange between man and nature was replaced by a sense of man as discontinuity leading to death and madness — a sense of man ultimately alienated from his own wishes, desires and fears, embodied in the figure of the double (124).

In that context, the double becomes an entity much more substantial and palpable to the modern man, portraying the materialization of one's duality, “an externalization of part of the self” (Živković 125). For this reason, scholars seem to agree with the idea that to understand the modern depiction of the double in literature, the psychological elements should also be considered. If one wants to understand the double, and if the double is none other than a hidden part of the original character, then the key to understanding how the doubling took place is to unfold the secrets hidden in the character's mind.

3. THE UNCANNY

Royle explains the uncanny as “an experience of being *after oneself*” (16). According to the author, it “has been a focus of critical, literary, philosophical and political reflection from at least the mid nineteenth-century to the present — from Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche to Sigmund Freud, Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Jacques Derrida” (4-5). The uncanny is tied with “the history of the Enlightenment and with European and North American Romanticism” (Royle 8), while also being related to a specific approach on the “ancient, archaic, immemorial” (Royle 8). Jentsch claims that “if one wants to come closer to the essence of the uncanny, it is better not to ask what it is, but rather to investigate how the affective excitement of the uncanny arises in psychological terms, how the psychical conditions must be constituted so that the ‘uncanny’ sensation emerges” (217). Although its definition is indeed rather slippery, the present chapter will try to unveil possible readings of the word uncanny, while also presenting its connection to the motif of the *doppelgänger*.

A relevant essay that focuses on the matter of the double and its connection to the individual’s psyche is Freud’s “The Uncanny”, which Royle defines as “of enormous importance to literary criticism because it is the only major contribution that the twentieth century has made to the aesthetics of the Sublime” (14). In his text, Freud analyzes the presence of the double in works of literature by taking as object of analysis E.T.A Hoffmann’s *The Sandman* and proposing a psychological explanation for its appearance in the narrative. The presence of a double, though, is not the only aspect that should be noted and analyzed in a work that explores this theme, but also the feeling of uncanniness it provokes. Freud notes that the existence of a double is by itself uncanny, and the two concepts, the psychological double and the uncanny feeling, seem to be closely connected and appear in similar circumstances.

Before progressing into the psychoanalytic reading of the double and the feeling its presence instigates during the narrative, the meaning of the word uncanny must be analyzed, as it sets a foundation to understanding the concept as a whole. The English form of the word was initially associated with the supernatural and “dates back to the late eighteenth century: the OED⁴ cites Robert Fergusson’s *Poems* (1773) as its earliest instance” (Royle 11). Jentsch was one of the first (if not *the* first)⁵ to discuss the word and its effects. “On the Psychology of the Uncanny”, he states that the word uncanny “appears to express that someone to whom something ‘uncanny’ happens is not quite ‘at home’ or ‘at ease’ in the situation concerned, that the thing is or at least seems to be foreign to him. In brief, the word suggests that a lack of orientation is bound up with the impression of the uncanniness of a thing or incident” (Jentsch 217). Cambridge Dictionary defines uncanny as “strange or mysterious; difficult or impossible to explain”, which is very appropriate considering the myriads of meanings and interpretations this word conveys while, at the same time, being impossible to be precisely described. Its original form, the German *unheimlich*, is a direct opposition to *heimlich*, which finds definition in the English words ‘familiar’, ‘not strange’, ‘belonging to the home’ and ‘homelike’ (Freud 2). In addition, *heimlich* can also mean ‘concealed’, ‘kept from sight’, which Freud observes: “among its different shades of meaning the word *heimlich* exhibits one which is identical with its opposite, *unheimlich*. What is *heimlich* thus comes to be *unheimlich*” (4), hence, *unheimlich* can be understood as “a sub-species of *heimlich*” and a “secret that has become visible” (Freud 4). In the words of Jentsch, “[i]t is thus comprehensible if a correlation ‘new/foreign/hostile’ corresponds to the psychical association of ‘old/known/familiar’” (219). Taking that into consideration, the two words appear to be more than mere opposites, although one, to an extent, negates the other. To correctly

⁴ OED: Oxford English Dictionary.

⁵ While Freud’s “The Uncanny” (1919) is probably the most known essay that discusses the uncanny, Jentsch’s “On the Psychology of the Uncanny” (1906) offers valuable insights to the discussion as well.

understand *unheimlich* it is necessary to understand *heimlich*, as much as it is necessary to understand what is familiar before identifying what is unfamiliar. *Unheimlich*, thus, is contained in *heimlich*, and to comprehend the meaning of uncanny, both words have to be taken into consideration.

Freud's passage in the first pages of his essay implies how the content of *unheimlich* is contained in *heimlich* as he claims that the uncanny feeling is "that class of the terrifying which leads back to something long known to us, once very familiar" (1-2). In accordance, Royle defines the uncanny as:

... a peculiar commingling of the familiar and unfamiliar. It can take the form of something familiar unexpectedly arising in a strange and unfamiliar context, or of something strange and unfamiliar unexpectedly arising in a familiar context. It can consist in a sense of homeliness uprooted, the revelation of something unhomely at the heart of hearth and home (1).

Also relevant is the definition given by the philosopher F. W. J. Schelling, in which the uncanny is something that should remain concealed yet came to light (Schelling qtd. in Freud 4). That directly relates, according to Freud, to the process of repression and emergence of the double: the "birth" of the *doppelgänger* would come as a feeling, a trait of personality or desire that did not comply with societal conformity and had to be repressed by the individual throughout his/her life. Incapable of maintaining such a restraint, in a self-protection reflex, the ego would project the content formerly repressed onto "something foreign to itself" (Freud 10), or a double that emerged from the shadows to the life of the external world. Rank, in consonance, explains that "the most prominent symptom" (*The Double* 76) of the psychological formation of the double is "a powerful consciousness of guilt which forces the hero no longer to accept the responsibility for certain actions of his ego, but to place it upon another ego, a double" (76). In the face of the shadow of his/her own self, the individual,

incapable of containing it inside himself/herself any longer, has no alternative but to free or project what has been repressed onto the same world that has demanded its repression.

Živković reads the double motif “as an attempt to depict a reversal of the subject’s cultural formation” (127) — the repressor of his/her true desires. In desiring what is not accepted by the subject or the social order, dualism emerges, a consequence of desiring what is forbidden (Živković 127). In accordance with Živković, Royle defines the uncanny as “a crisis of the proper: ... a disturbance of the very idea of personal or private property including the properness of proper names, one’s so-called ‘own’ name, but also the proper names of others, of places, institutions and events” (1). Through this perspective, another layer of the uncanny is uncovered, as it reveals itself as “not merely an ‘aesthetic’ or ‘psychological’ matter” but a “critical elaboration ... necessarily bound up with analyzing, questioning and even transforming what is called ‘everyday life’” (Royle 23). This critical elaboration, Royle explains, “applies not only in relation to issues of sexuality, class, race, age, imperialism and colonialism — so many issues of potentially uncanny ‘otherness’ already evident in the nineteenth century — but also, for example, in relation to notions of automation, technology and programming” (23). Royle grants the most thorough rendition of what the word entails:

The uncanny has to do with the sense of a secret encounter: it is perhaps inseparable from an apprehension, however fleeting, of something that should have remained secret and hidden but has come to light. But it is not ‘out there’, in any simple sense: as a crisis of the proper and natural, it disturbs any straightforward sense of what is inside and what is outside. The uncanny has to do with a strangeness of framing and borders, an experience of liminality. It may be that the uncanny is a feeling that happens only to oneself, within oneself, but it is never one’s ‘own’: its meaning or significance may have to do, most of all, with what is not oneself, with others, with the world ‘itself’. It may thus be construed as a foreign body within oneself, even the

experience of oneself *as* a foreign body, the very estrangement of inner silence and solitude” (2).

It is apparent, thus, how the uncanny and the double are intrinsically related, as both are representatives of nonconformity to the social, physical and proper norms while at the same time meaning so much more. Not only that but the close connection to concepts such as repression and otherness, the reluctance in a satisfactory definition (if this is a task that is possible at all) and the insistence in the realm of the in-between, neither one nor the other result in difficult effort to differentiate what belongs to the realm of the uncanny and what belongs to the realm of the double.

Regarding the occurrence of repression that is present in both doubling and uncanny events, Freud explains that it is a “necessary condition for enabling a primitive feeling to recur in the shape of an uncanny effect” (14) as much as it is to the appearance of the double. Hence, the *unheimlich* is what was previously *heimlich*, the prefix -un being an indication of the repression that has emerged and brought to light (Freud 15). The return of what was repressed, which Dimitris Vardoulakis paraphrases as the “the return of negation”, results in the imminent confrontation of “what the unconscious cannot deny” (41). According to Royle, the uncanny is “indissociably bound up with a sense of repetition or ‘coming back’— the return of the repressed, the constant or eternal recurrence of the same thing, a compulsion to repeat” (2). This return may be portrayed as the repetition of structures, characters or events, like a subconscious impulse to promote the necessary confrontation that the characters insist on avoiding. Repetition, however, “is different (yet strangely the same) every time: its happening is always a kind of un-happening. Its ‘un-’ unsettles time and space, order and sense” (Royle 2). Thus, repetition in *doppelgänger* novels might be read as a consequence of the doubling that occurs, or even, the *doppelgänger* as a consequence of the uncanny. That structure of repetition, or repetition-compulsion, is likewise discussed by Freud, who states

that “whatever reminds us of this inner repetition-compulsion is perceived as uncanny” (12). According to the American Psychological Association Dictionary of Psychology⁶, the repetition-compulsion is a condition perceived by psychoanalytic theory in which the individual tends to unconsciously reenact traumas from childhood in new situations throughout his/her life, in pursuit of overcoming or having control over them. The condition directly relates to the repression of trauma which reveals itself through the repetition of the same pattern.

In *doppelgänger* novels the very state of doubling or division generates an intrinsic “sense that there must at some time have been an original state of unity” (Miller 99) that comes “as a haunting insight” (Miller 99), hidden from the eyes but perceived where light fails to reach. Likewise, the impression of uncanniness “involves feelings of uncertainty, in particular regarding the reality of who one is and what is being experienced” (Royle 1). The sense of lost familiarity — *heimlich* —, although uncertain (since all that it was experienced was division), generates the feeling that what is being witnessed is something unnatural and unfamiliar (Miller 99) — *unheimlich*. In an effort to regain the lost state of unity and union, the subject engages into a cycle of repetitions, recreating the same patterns in an attempt to master them and find closure. The constant state of disequilibrium prolongs and repeats itself in the form of names, themes, relationships and events, and refuses to offer a rational explanation or settle in a satisfactory way (Miller 94, 99). It is in this perpetual anxiety where dwells the key to the strong impression left on the readers of the novels selected in this study. It is precisely in the lack of a reasonable explanatory principle that “lies [the] power to produce inexhaustible repetitions of ever-hopeful, ever-unsuccessful attempts to account for

⁶ “Repetition Compulsion: in psychoanalytic theory, an unconscious need to reenact early traumas in the attempt to overcome or master them. Such traumas are repeated in a new situation symbolic of the repressed prototype”. *American Psychological Association Dictionary of Psychology*, 2014. APA, dictionary.apa.org/repetition-compulsion. Accessed 15 Aug. 2021.

it” (94), J. Hillis Miller affirms. However, it is not the repetition of objects that explains the feeling of displacement, but the acknowledgement of the pattern of repetition. It is in fact the “becoming aware of the process [that] is felt as eerie, not the becoming aware of some particular item in the unconscious” (Hertz qtd. in Vardoulakis 43). In essence, it is not the acknowledgment of repetition that causes the sense of *unheimlich*, but the reminding of repetition itself.

The psychological double, borne out of repression, emerges from the psyche of the subject, who projects onto the world what could not remain restrained — it is an externalization of the shadow-self and the duality existent in every individual. As Dryden states, to “be haunted by another, by a spectre, is uncanny enough, but to be haunted by yourself strikes at the foundations of identity” (41), for it generates the unsettling “sense of ourselves as double, split, at odds with ourselves” (Royle 6). Suddenly, “one’s sense of oneself ... seems strangely questionable” (Royle 1), which is the central conflict of the main characters of *Frankenstein*, *Wuthering Heights*, *Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* and *The Picture of Dorian Gray*. The power of the motif lies precisely on the ambiguity it creates as it stands not only by contrast, but likeness as well (Živković 122). Regardless of how it is portrayed, the *doppelgänger* “arises out of and gives form to the tension between division and unity” while it “stands for contradiction within unity, and for unity in spite of division” (Živković 122). The tension, constantly present and felt throughout the novels, grows so strong that the characters and events depicted there become symbols, almost supernatural-like, representatives of the opposing and complementing forces of nature and society as it is. By negating a part of one’s self, this part that is repressed is bound to emerge at some point for it was never fully suppressed as it is still a part of that identity. Thus, the *unheimlich* is bound to emerge out of the *heimlich* for one cannot be truly one without all the parts; and when the

aspects that were once repressed are exposed to light, there will be either death or transformation, reaffirming its presence till one of the two ends is reached.

4. THE MIRROR STAGE

In his theory of the Mirror Stage, Lacan argues that the moment in which an individual, as an infant, first acquires a sense of self is when it recognizes her/himself through a reflective surface. It is the first time the “newly born human ... experiences itself as a unity through experiencing some kind of reflection of itself” (Muller and Richardson 29), which results in a double identification that will “in-form ... the subject and guide ... its development” (Muller and Richardson 29) throughout her/his life. According to Lionel Bailly, “before the Mirror Stage, a conception of Subject is already present and based almost entirely on the gaze of the mother upon the baby” (ch. 2). Thus, before an actual mirror, the process of recognition of the self usually starts with the mother: “[t]he mother’s gaze is the child’s first mirror; the child’s identity or notion of itself as a whole being is first formed in that gaze; it is a narcissistic manoeuvre that underpins the development of identity” (Bailly ch. 2). Later, as the infant develops her/his vision and perception of what is around, it will acquire the capacity to identify its own image in objects. Certainly, that is not a conscious observation as the infant is still at its first stages of mental development, but this stage, the Mirror Stage, is the first step to “establish a relation between the organism and the reality (Lacan 443) which is likely to happen between six and eighteen months of age.

Lacan argues that, at first, there is no sense of a body that is whole since the infant is yet to develop its motor coordination and perception of connection between limbs. In fact, s/he has a sense of what Lacan calls a dismembered body, in which legs, arms, feet and hands appear in the field of vision as incidentally as playthings and those, as much as toys, are objects to be explored. After identifying “itself as ‘I’ in relationship with an image” (Karamchandani 433), for the first time “the baby discovers [her/himself] as a unitary being and thus attains the first realization of his bodily autonomy” (Karamchandani 433). Lois

Tyson explains:

In its early months, Lacan maintains, the infant experiences both itself and its environment as a random, fragmented, formless mass. Indeed, the infant doesn't even differentiate itself from its environment and doesn't know that parts of its own body are, in fact, parts of its own body because it doesn't have a sense of itself that is capable of such an understanding. For example, its own toes are objects to be explored, placed in the mouth, and so forth, just like its rattle or other objects in its environment (27).

Hence, the baby first "experiences itself wholly as a unified being through the unreality of the image that contrasts with [its] immobility" (Karamchandani 433). And as the development of this "sense of itself as a whole rather than a formless and fragmented mass" (Tyson 27) progresses, the image reflected on the mirror becomes a representation of an ideal: the whole, autonomous body that the infant is yet to achieve. That creates the image of what Lacan calls the 'Ideal-I'. That results in a dual process: identification and alienation.

Alienation happens because the infant identifies itself both as an object and outside of itself. In the words of Lacan:

... the total form of the body ... is given to [the infant] only as *Gestalt*, that is to say, in an exteriority in which this form is certainly more constituent than constituted, but in which it appears to him above all in a contrasting size ... that fixes it and in a symmetry that inverts it, in contrast with the turbulent movements that the subject feels are animating him. Thus, this *Gestalt* ... by these two aspects of its appearance, symbolizes the mental permanence of the I, at the same time as it prefigures its alienating destination This form would have to be called the Ideal-I ... [and] it will also be the source of secondary identifications (442).

In other words, the young individual identifies itself *outside* of itself and through an object

that inverts what is being seen, resulting in a relationship between subject and object that is “experienced in an inverted way and, to that extent, awry” (Muller and Richardson 31). And since the exchange between the baby and what is being reflected back to it “is filtered through a prism of inversion, there is a primitive distortion in the ego’s experience of reality” (Muller and Richardson 31). The process, although inevitable, is further emphasized by the adults around the child. The reflection on the mirror is presented as the infant itself instead of a visual representation of it (“*this is you in the mirror!*”) and as it “sees in the mirror the object that is itself, and hears its mother name it ... it affixes it[self] to the image in the mirror” (Bailly ch. 2). The reflection of reality thus becomes *the* reality: “the image in the mirror [becomes] a double, another baby, [and] reinforces the baby’s own perception of itself as an object” (Bailly ch. 2). Self-realization, thus, occurs through the infant’s identification of itself from which it is separated; “it is as an ‘other’ that the subject first identifies and experiences itself” (Karamchandani 433) and that results in the alienation of the subject in relation to its sense of self.

Bailly concludes then that the “founding act of identity is therefore not just emotional and intellectual, it is also schismatic, separating the Subject from itself into an object” (ch. 2), which leads one to believe that the self “is not the real self” (Karamchandani 433). Identification thus is both a process of merging — with the image being reflected — and splitting — of the individual and the self; the subject is both itself and its objectified image, while at the same time never entirely. The realization, as expected, generates a sense of lack that will be felt even after the maturation of the infant into adulthood (Karamchandani 433). To make sense of the lack, according to Lacan’s ideas, the ego is formulated:

Lacan thus through the Mirror Stage concludes that human beings are largely oblivious of their subject and it is the ego that they are aware of. The function of the ego ... is misrecognition, of refusing to accept the truth of fragmentation and

alienation. Lacan insists that ego provides a fictitious coherence to one's identity and the real 'I' is the subject that is hidden by conscious thought about itself (Karamchandani 433).

According to that perspective, it is the ego that fabricates the connection between self and objectified self (the mirror image), which is, however, a false, or rather lacking, assumption. The misconception is responsible for the illusion of wholeness that despite being deceitful, is necessary for the subject's capacity of comprehending some indispensable concepts like "the abilities to grasp the totality of something, to effect syntheses, and to believe in dualities such as subject/object, exterior/ interior" (Bailly ch. 6) and so on. Such an illusion is also the foundation of what Lacan names the Imaginary Order. Bailey believes it develops "almost as soon as [the infant] is born" (ch. 8), while Tyson understands it as dependent on the Mirror Stage (27). Since the exact moment in which the child is initiated into the world of images is not relevant to this study, the focus should be on its relevance to the construction of the infant's grasp of its identity and its influence on the subject's psyche.

First, it is important to understand that the world of images, as it might be called, is not equivalent to imagination, fiction or creativity as the common sense of the word may suggest (Tyson, Bailly)⁷. Instead, it is the realm of perception in which "the child experiences through images rather than through words[,] ... a world of fullness, completeness, and delight because with the child's sense of itself as a whole comes the illusion of control over its environment" (Tyson 27). In accordance with Tyson, Bailly argues that "[i]n building conceptions upon something that is both inherently false and powerful – an image – the Imaginary is programmed from the start to be a realm of illusion, and to have a force of Fascination and seduction" (ch. 6). Thus, the Imaginary Order is the realm in which the infant

⁷ "This is not the world of the imagination" (Tyson 27); "For an understanding of the Imaginary, we must avoid thinking of the word in its commonplace sense of *unreal* or *fictitious* ... We must not be seduced by the 'creative' or 'imaginative' connotations that may attach to the word" (Bailly ch. 6).

can experience its Ideal-I with all the (false) sense of wholeness and contentment that it provides; that is also when “the individual’s narcissism and self-image” (Bailly ch. 6), which support the development of the ego, are established. As discussed, however, it is all based on deceitful, or at least incomplete, perceptions of reality: the world of the Imaginary is where the subject simultaneously perceives and hides (from) reality.

There are several dangers in “identifying a center of unity outside itself, by taking an-other to be itself” (10), Ellie Ragland-Sullivan reminds. One of the dangers, she explains, is that because the perception of difference processed through the subject’s mind is founded on a false idea, or what she calls, “a disjunction or asymmetry” (10), consequences such as “the production of a double as in the *Doppelgänger* phenomenon” (10) might emerge in the future. Another danger is the fragmentation of identification (that is bound to happen to some degree) as the infant believes in its perpetual state of unity, which is only possible in the realm of the Imaginary. It is worth saying that Lacanian scholars and Lacan himself usually point to the mother as the central figure of the ‘state of unity’ the subject feels inserted in, but for the purpose of distancing this analysis from a gendered perspective, Ragland-Sullivan’s proposal on the expression ‘(m)Other’ will be used instead.

After its first months of life and immersed in the Imaginary Order, the infant is introduced to a second realm that is the Symbolic. It happens when the infant starts to acquire language, which is also when it starts to become aware (not in a conscious way) of what it lacks. Bailly explains that the figure of the (m)Other “introduces anew the dialectic of presence/absence” (ch. 6), for when the baby learns to recognize the “appearance-disappearance” of the (m)Other, it also “becomes aware of her as an entity and not just a part of the environment” (ch. 6), meaning, *itself*. That, Bailly argues, results in the formation of the first signifier (ch. 6). Thus, when the infant “begins to [forcefully] perceive its own separateness from the (m)Other” (Ragland-Sullivan 8) which is reinforced by

language — “I am a separate being (‘I’ am ‘me,’ not ‘you’)” (Tyson 28) —, the transition from the Imaginary Order into the Symbolic Order begins. Language is a relevant instrument of initiation into the new realm for it is “first and foremost a symbolic system of signification” (Tyson 28), which “designates what has been lost or is missing” (Bailly ch. 6). The Symbolic Order thus is only “accessed through the experience of lack” (Bailly ch. 6) and the process of differentiation is so striking to the psyche of the infant that Lacan describes it as an experience of Castration. As Ragland-Sullivan remarks, “one must not take this term literally. No incest wish is being punished here by fear of organ loss. The fear is more global; fear of loss of ‘self’ continuity” (8). Castration, thus, relates to the fracture in the subject’s identification of itself, the unmasking of the reality that the Imaginary Order concealed: there was never real union but division. According to Lacan, that is the most significant experience of loss an individual undergoes in life. The pain of the separation/realization is later repressed but leaves a residue which Lacan identifies as Desire (Ragland-Sullivan 8). Desire, thus, is “a structural inadequacy in the human subject which drives individuals to strive forever, to seek new ways to compensate for the elemental loss” (Ragland-Sullivan 8) that will haunt the individual till the end of its days. As Tyson affirms, “the kind of fulfillment we seek, though we don’t realize that we’re seeking it, is that feeling of completeness, plenitude, and union” (Tyson 28), the sense of wholeness experienced in the Imaginary Order which is impossible to have back once initiated into the Symbolic Order.

Then, when initiating into the Symbolic realm, the subject is set to abandon — although never entirely — the illusions of the Imaginary and learn to “inhabit a world in which others have needs, desires, and fears that limit the ways in which and the extent to which [one] can attend to our [its] needs, desires, and fears” (Tyson 30). Unlike the world of illusory wholeness, the Symbolic “consists of society’s ideologies: its beliefs, values, and biases; its system of government, laws, educational practices, religious tenets, and the like”

(Tyson 31) in which “there are rules [one] must obey and restrictions by which [one] must abide” (Tyson 30). It is important to understand that what Lacan refers to as the world of the Symbolic is not a specific social construction of the time nor a consciously created one. It is also not an option of whether to be initiated into the realm or not: the choice is but an illusion for there is none. To exist as a human being entails, in Lacan’s formulations, being inserted in the Symbolic Order. Bailly explains:

... even the most ‘primitive’ societies have a symbolic order that regulates kinship, exchanges of goods, and marriages. This order works as a constraint and can be found in pacts of alliance, religious rituals, prohibitions, and taboos; it is also universal to all human society. Lacan extended this concept to embrace all human activity: the Symbolic is manifest in language, laws, and social structures. This is why it is wrong to think of these things as human ‘inventions’, as if we consciously invented them; rather, for Lacan, they are inherent in our nature ... the Symbolic order is that of the laws of the *unconscious organisation* of human society (ch. 6).

In his perspective, the Symbolic and the Imaginary are equally natural to the human experience, interconnected to one another as much as the newborn individual is connected to the cultural context it is born into. Entering the Symbolic is to realize that one “is part of an order which predates its birth and is exterior to the self” (Bailly ch. 4); it is to become aware of the center not as the (m)Other, the mirror or even the infant, but as something external, outside of oneself in which the subject is only a part of, an *other*.

The third realm that composes the triad that constitutes the human experience is the Real. Its influence on the child or even on society as a whole is not direct — most of the time it is veiled and ignored. However, according to Lacan, one of the functions (if not *the* function) of the Symbolic and the Imaginary Orders is to “attempt to control or avoid” (Tyson 32) the Real. To define it correctly is not an easy, if not impossible, task, as this realm lies

precisely in what is undefinable: it is the “uninterpretable dimension of existence; it is existence without the filters and buffers of our signifying ... systems” (Tyson 32). Since language is a construction of the Symbolic Order and images are connected to the Imaginary, hence the Real must exist in a realm that is “beyond all our meaning-making systems” (Tyson 32), external to the ideologies that human race has conceived to explain its existence. One cannot fully access this Order, although glimpses of it are felt by some: when, for a moment, one has the “realization that the reality hidden beneath the ideologies society has created is a reality beyond [one’s] capacity to know and explain and therefore certainly beyond [one’s] capacity to control” (Tyson 32). The Real shows that ideologies are just ideologies, offsprings of the Symbolic Order that try to make sense of what is, in fact, meaningless.

In conclusion, Lacan’s Mirror Stage is an investigation on the process of development of human’s psyche and signifiers, which support and determine how one relates to others and inserts him/herself in society. The theory does not speak only on a singular, personal level but on a universal: it is the same to all individuals and influences humanity as a whole. His propositions on the identification with the *other* are useful to understand the complexities of identity formation as well as its process of misrecognition, which can result in occurrences such as the emergence of a double. The complicated relationship between assimilation and dissociation with the *other* is pertinent to general discussions about the *doppelgänger* and will be especially relevant to the fourth analysis of this study (chapter 8) in which Wilde’s *The Picture of Dorian Gray* will be discussed.

5. *FRANKENSTEIN*

The first novel analyzed, *Frankenstein; or, the Modern Prometheus*, is a product of its time. England's first years into the nineteenth-century staged a series of changes in all aspects of society: social, scientific, religion, philosophical and economical, that would later mold the foundations of the contemporary era. Industrialization was changing the social structures and landscapes, urban areas were receiving an unprecedented number of people coming from the countryside, the economic power was progressing to the hands of the bourgeois, discourses of freedom and revolution were everywhere coming from the French, new scientific discoveries and experiments such as galvanism and Giovanni Aldini's public demonstrations on deceased bodies⁸ were challenging the notions of life and death. In this turmoil of thoughts, insecurities and changes, Frankenstein's monster emerges, an embodiment of the century's fears and struggles.

Creator and creature, one born out of a womb, the other out of a tomb; two characters that are so entangled with each other that one's name is commonly mistaken for the others. The confusion is not coincidental, but a consequence of the connection they share, the monster is the doctor's double, however, its existence is "so repellent to his creator that Frankenstein does not bother to give [it] ... a proper name, perhaps out of impotence in face of the total other" (Sá and Paiva 271). Thus, the creature has no name because to name it would be to give it recognition, which Victor is incapable of doing for *it* embodies the side of himself he is not willing to confront. Frankenstein's internal conflict, however, is common to all individuals, as it displays the duplicity (or multiplicity) of the individual's mind and its struggles in facing the external world. Victor's secret sheds light to the shadows of human

⁸ Luigi Galvani, also known as the father of electrophysiology, discovered the effects of electricity on muscle tissue by experimenting on frog's legs between the 1780s and 1790s. His findings later motivated his nephew, Giovanni Aldini, to conduct public demonstrations of the electro-stimulation technique on the bodies of criminals killed by hanging in the early 1900s.

nature and its enduring quest to achieve unity among self/selves; therefore, Shelley's characters can be read as representatives of the search for wholeness that is innate to the human condition. Jackson expands that notion in the following:

Frankenstein provides a tense dramatization of the problematic nature of identity, its cost, its alienation of "self" from potential selves, from others, from the world

Mary Shelley's version of dualism, which is, in effect, more of a fantasy of pre-Oedipal multiplicity, opposes itself to the idealism and the universals of Romantic and transcendental art, ultimately putting into question the very premises on which our materialistic, rational culture is based and exposing its promises of fulfillment ("Narcissism and Beyond").

Hence the significance of investigating the present novel, for it provides a solid starting point to the prevalent state of mind in the beginning of the nineteenth-century, which is crucial to later understand the development of the motif throughout the following decades.

The "motif of a second self constitutes the chief source of the novel's latent power" (Ozolins 104) and has been a source of terror and wonder, however, as M. A. Goldberg suggests, "[t]o examine the novel for the terror it evokes, without perceiving its relationship to the moral context of early nineteenth-century England, is, in reality, to distort the essence of the tale" (29). Victor's endeavors are a portrayal of the desires and anxieties that were circulating in Europe during the time. The "temptation of knowledge and the punishment of estrangement, is echoed with consistency and clarity" (Goldberg 30), as an author's cautionary tale against the irresponsible and egotistical search for knowledge. To take the divine power from God and put it in human hands was too drastic of a change for most Victorians. In that sense, Victor's monstrous creature can be seen as a portrayal of the general fear of the average nineteenth-century individual regarding the dangers of technological and scientific advancement. In "Moral and Myth in Mrs. Shelley's 'Frankenstein'", Goldberg

defends that ultimately, “Frankenstein’s sin, as much as Walton’s, is social” (Goldberg 33). Their endeavors not only defy God and Nature but the moral and social order as well:

Though both begin their pursuit with benevolent intentions, each discovers his error in assuming that knowledge is a higher good than love or sympathy, and that it can be independent of the fellow-feeling afforded by a compassionate society. As a result, what had appeared initially as a benevolent intention becomes in the final analysis misguided pride, a selfish pursuit aimed at self-glory, because it evades the fulfillment of higher duties toward the social community, the brotherhood of man which forms the highest good (Goldberg 33).

Paul Sherwin believes that the doctor’s sin is, in fact, not particular to him for it is inherent in all humankind (33), however, he was part of the few who ignored the unspoken law and walked forward into forbidden paths. Creating the monster, going as far as he went into his personal quest, was a direct opposition to the fragile order that Victorian society tried to maintain. Internally, there was fear, insecurity and anxiety for all the changes happening all over the world, but externally, there was a proper, patronizing culture, set to be an example to others. Frankenstein’s monster is the hidden facet, freed from its hiding in the shadows. It sees, feels and embodies what the so-called civilized world refuses to shed a light on: the ugly, miserable, grotesque, uncivilized, violent, dangerous. By creating a new species, one that is irrevocably stronger than the current dominant one, the doctor goes against the universal law of survival of his own species, the most fundamental trait that constitutes society. To materialize such a threat to the human race and leave it free, “fail[ing] to take the responsibility of looking after it” (Sá and Paiva 269), even if done unconsciously, is a direct act of rebellion of the creator against his own kind.

Frankenstein’s defiance, however, seems to be far from accidental. In “The Monstrous Body of Knowledge in Mary Shelley’s ‘Frankenstein’”, Alan Rauch defends the notion that

the doctor “cannot help but use his science to create something that is as repugnant to society as society is to him” (236). Victor is as disconnected from the community around him as his creature. Although inserted in the social circles, he is not truly a part of it for he never found like-minded individuals, the objects of his admiration were unintelligible to his family and dismissed by his academic peers. When, for the first time, he laid hands in one of Cornelius Agrippa’s book (which would mold his future interests in natural science), his father reacted by saying to “not waste [his] time upon this; it is sad trash” (Shelley 23)⁹, but as the young Victor noticed, “the cursory glance [his] father had taken of [his] volume by no means assured [him] that he was acquainted with its contents; and [he] continued to read with the greatest avidity” (23). There was no room for the grand quests for knowledge in his idyllic family home. While the ideas of Agrippa, Paracelsus and Magnus “appeared to [him] treasures known to few beside [him]self” (23), there was no one for him to share them. Frankenstein himself recognized his isolation: “although I have often wished to communicate these secret stores of knowledge to my father, yet his indefinite censure of my favourite Agrippa always withheld me. I disclosed my discoveries to Elizabeth ... but she did not interest herself in the subject, and I was left by her to pursue my studies alone” (23). As soon as he gets to college, hoping to “enter the world, and take [his] station among other human beings” (28), his longing for communication was once more frustrated. “Have you... really spent your time in studying such nonsense?” (29), he is asked by the first academic authority he talks to when he gets there. His interests, which by that point had become a solid part of Victor’s interpretation of the world, were once again dismissed. For the young student, however, filled with promises of grandeur by his first masters, what college has to offer him was too mediocre: “the masters of the science sought immortality and power; such views, although futile, were grand: but

⁹ All the references to *Frankenstein* in this chapter are from Shelley, Mary. *Frankenstein, or, The modern Prometheus: The 1818 Text*, edited by Marilyn Butler, Oxford University Press, 1998, and will be cited parenthetically with the page number.

now the scene was changed. ... [he] was required to exchange chimeras of boundless grandeur for realities of little worth” (29-30). Isolated once again, he sets his path into a lonely quest, instilled with a new sense of authority and with no distraction coming from the frivolities of mundane life.

Although the doctor first excuses his experiments as purely for the benefit of humankind, he soon realizes and even admits that his real intention is in fact rooted in selfish reasons: “the more fully I entered into the science, the more exclusively I pursued it for its own sake” (32). As Rauch states, the “creation of life is thus, for Frankenstein, a purely intellectual challenge that is completely disconnected from the academic and the worlds in which he exists” (236). Mary Poovey also develops the idea by explaining that “the vanity that convinces the scientist of the benevolence and power of his imagination is one expression of the essential, egotistical drive to assert and extend the self — to deny not only one’s own mortality but also, to use Kant’s phrase, the otherness of others” (Poovey 334). By achieving something that no man has ever been able to do, he manages to initiate the process of self-consciousness while also perpetuating his alienation (Poovey 335) in relation to everything he was familiar with, for no one else has ever achieved what he achieved.

The monster is thus the materialization of Frankenstein’s egoistic, inconsequential desires, his wish to be above everyone and everything else, not only in the sphere of man but of nature as well. In that reasoning, his transgression acquires a new layer: by sinning against the very foundation of what constitutes the human experience, he sins against the laws of nature as well. In *Making Monstrous: Frankenstein, Criticism, Theory*, Fred Botting explains this perfectly:

His Promethean theft of the secret of life from nature has endowed him with the power to create life and, at the same time, rendered nature and woman obsolete: having exceeded the limits of nature and the human body, he has dispensed with the need for

all differences — natural, sexual or familial. Able to unite all oppositions, to occupy every different position, Frankenstein ultimately desires to transcend all polarity and difference: the consummation he achieves is an idealised self-consummation in which he is imaginarily reborn to possess a truly whole and self-sufficient authorial identity. But the actual ‘birth’ made possible by his discovery is far from the imagined ideal: the fragmented figure of the monster reflects darkly upon visions of total selfhood (133-2).

To surpass life and death might seem to the doctor to transcend the restraints of duality and achieve wholeness, but a fallen, dual creature like himself, cannot do such a thing. By inverting the natural order of things, a dead-alive corpse conceived by a man, is to disrupt the balance where nature lies upon, and as previously seen in the chapter 2, when imbalance in the exchanges between men and nature occurs, a double emerges to demand unification till natural order is restored. As a result, nature always seems to accompany the monster. His encounters with Victor are either foreshadowed by climatic restlessness, as in nature attempting to caution and remind the doctor of his misdeeds — “rain pattered dismally against the panes” (38), “air was cold, and the rain again began to descend” (79), “[t]he storm appeared to approach rapidly ... the heavens were clouded, ... rain coming slowly in large drops ... the darkness and storm increased every minute, and the thunder burst with a terrific crash ... vivid flashes of lightning dazzled” (55-6) —, or by the natural environment itself such as mountains or the glaciers of the North Pole.

On the other hand, the creature, after being born in the city, leaves for the forest and finds solace far from civilization, among animals and trees. However, as the “Monster comes into existence a product of nature — his ingredients are one hundred per cent natural — yet by the fact and process of his creation he is unnatural” (Brooks 600), he is destined, or cursed, to always be an outsider in both realms. Frankenstein’s creation is “human yet inhuman,

sociable yet shunned” and “can only occupy marginal positions ... and sustain fleeting moments of identity in this relationship of difference” (Botting 135). While his maker faces a crisis in realizing the othering in his identity, the creature’s whole identity is based on being an *other* in relation to everything else. Different from the process of awakening to self-consciousness of its creator — which was never fully achieved —, for the monster it “comes with brutal speed, for recognition depends not on an act of transgression but only on literal self-perception” (Poovey 337). Made of familiar parts to men, which is, severed parts of human bodies, everything else about the creature, even its own existence, is unfamiliar; it is the embodiment of what Freud defines as uncanny, the *unheimlich* borne out of *heimlich*. Peter Brooks agrees, arguing that “the Monster perfectly illustrates the *Unheimliche*, a monstrous potentiality so close to us — so close to home — that we have repressed its possibility and assigned an *un* as the mark of censorship on what is indeed too *heimisch* for comfort” (602). “Literally constructed from disintegrated selves” (Jackson, *Fantasy* 98), excluded from any social sphere and unable to recognize nor be recognized as a whole by its alike (for it is the only one of its species), the anonymous creature “given identity only as Frankenstein’s other, his grotesque reflection” (98), and has no choice but to seek identification through him, its creator, the only one who shares the burden of its life. Brooks argues that “Frankenstein and his Monster are in fact... engaged in an exacerbated dialectic of desire, where each needs the other because the other represents for each the lack or gap within himself” (599). In that sense, the quest to fill the gaps in their selves is wrongfully understood by them to be achieved through the pursuit of mundane desire. The roots of their sense of lack, however, go beyond that; both assume their needs to be objective, yet they are subjective.

While the monster’s journey is mainly about it coming in terms with life, its maker’s is about being constantly plagued by death: he “scavenges from the dead to create life, and the

creature, in retribution, attacks the living to ‘create’ death ... [yet] Frankenstein’s fascination with the concept of life is wholly dependent on a parasitic devotion to death” (Rauch 238). Again, imbalance seems to find its way to balance in an endless pendular motion between extremes. As the monster processes his dreams of manhood, Victor faces his (failed) dreams of godhood. Through his experiments, the doctor aimed to surpass the universal law of nature and overcome death, trying to surpass the human condition, by solving the biggest weakness of men and ascending to a position closer to the divine. As God created Adam, he would create a new species of men. He intended to “pour a torrent of light into our dark world” (36), and by doing so, create a “new species [that] would bless [him] as its creator and source” (36). But just like Icarus¹⁰ who flew too close to the sun and plummeted down into the sea, Victor’s dreams of grandeur collapsed as he laid eyes on his creation for the first time: “the beauty of the dream vanished, and breathless horror and disgust filled [his] heart” (39). Instead of seeing the face of a god reflected on those white, watery eyes (39), he saw a monster, complete darkness instead of light. That was likely to happen: as man was made in God’s image, Victor would “attempt the creation of a being like [him]self” (35) and ‘birth’ a creature made to his image. The physical ugliness of the monster thus was only a reflection of the internal ugliness of the creator who had “lost all soul” (36) “dabbl[ing] among the unhallowed damps of the grave, or tortur[ing] the living animal to animate the lifeless clay” (36). By facing his “own spirit let loose from the grave” (56), as he calls, the soulless body of Victor Frankenstein was frightened not only for the ugliness of his creation but because it was the living testament of his own wickedness that, until then, he had managed to keep hidden from the outside world and, to some degree, from himself. Andrew Griffin claims that what

¹⁰Icarus is a figure of Greek mythology. He was the son of Daedalus, who used birds’ feathers and glue (or wax depending on the version) to create false wings so they could escape their imprisonment. His father warned him about not going too close to the sun nor to the sea, for the heat and moisture would spoil the wings. Disregarding his father’s instructions, Icarus kept flying higher resulting in the glue of his wings melting and falling into the sea, causing his death (Apollodorus 140-1).

terrorizes Victor is not what he created, strictly speaking, but what he saw (64). In consonance, Eleanor Salotto adds that “the gaze of the creature permits a leakage in Frankenstein’s identity, something that he cannot abide. What is so frightening about the creature is that he returns the look” (Salotto 194). That is why instead of destroying the monster on site, Victor decides to run away, because he “cannot stand looking at the horrendous monster” (Sá and Paiva 268) and feels the need to hide from its sight. To see the materialized result of his obsession and have it look back at him meant that his wickedness was now out in the world, visible to anyone to see, and his ghoul, by looking back at him, recognized him for what he was, for his doings. In that sense, it seems pertinent to assume that Victor’s despair was not exactly for the existence of his shadow, his double, but for the imposition to accept it that occurred the moment it laid eyes on him.

As discussed, that is one of the fundamental aspects of the double as a motif which sets the foundation to all the unfolding events in the novel. As Ozolins notices, the “last and most important point regarding the double is the necessity to confront and recognize the dark aspect of one’s personality in order to transform it by an act of conscious choice” (104). The doctor, however, is not willing nor ready to do any of that and keeps running away without realizing that it is precisely the cause of his ruin — “[l]ocked into an interminable pursuit of the shadow he has become, Frankenstein emerges as the man who cannot emerge” (Sherwin 898). By awakening his creature, he “no longer can control the other in the ‘I’” (Salotto 191) and in consequence there is a drastic change in both characters: as the monster educates himself and becomes civilized in language and manners, the doctor descends into the depths of his own darkness, “wander[ing] like an evil spirit” (69), “shunn[ing] the face of man” in “deep, dark, death-like solitude” (69), gnashing his teeth, eyes inflamed, and harboring violent wishes of murder (71), more like a monster than a man. As Victor’s life is immersed in the shadows that he tries to run away from, their connection becomes even more apparent, in such

ways that he starts to recognize, in a sense, the bloody hands of his creature as his own: “I, not in deed, but in effect, was the true murderer” (72), “I, the true murderer” (68), “I called myself the murderer of William, of Justine, and of Clerval” (148), “I had been author of unalterable evils” (70). Holly-Mary Romero argues that, contrary to the frequent idea that the *doppelgänger* is necessarily evil, as a true “simulacrum of humanity” (3), its evil or good disposition depends entirely on the human it reflects upon (3-4). The motif, although commonly used in literature to shed light onto “man’s innate propensity toward evil” (104), only reveals such an aspect if the character being doubled already has it in him/her, which is the case with Frankenstein. Despite his efforts to prove the contrary, all the events that follow the awakening of his monster are a result of something already innate in him, thus, his insistent refusal to acknowledge reality only intensifies his losses and changes him into someone *other* to himself, neither a monster nor a man.

Although Victor’s first instinctive act is to flee from the presence of his monster, he always returns to it. Jackson comments on this apparent incongruence of the doctor by saying that “unlike other tales of the double, where the shadow side is murdered, or reabsorbed, or seen as illusory, *Frankenstein* insists on the creature’s constant presence. ... their mutual haunting and obsession with each other in a complex symbiotic relationship never really ends” (“Narcissism and Beyond”). That can be explained by what Veronica McDonald calls *Frankenstein’s mitosis*¹¹. Taking by example the self division of a cell, the moment it goes through mitosis, it generates a new cell, identical to the original one but not quite: the natural process gives birth to two new units, each sharing half of the genetic material of the first one. Reading the concept to *Frankenstein*, similarly, “the birth of the monster precipitates the rebirth of the creator” (Botting 134) and the result is not an identical copy of the original but

¹¹ McDonald, Veronica. “Human Mitosis in ‘Frankenstein’ and ‘The Double:’ Reanalyzing the Doubled Protagonist in Fantastic Myth”, 2023. *Owlcation*, owlcation.com/humanities/Human-Mitosis-in-Frankenstein-and-The-Double-Reanalyzing-the-Doubled-Protagonist-in-Fantastic-Myth. Accessed 15 March 2024.

two new individuals, each containing half of what was once one. Consequently, there is a force that pulls them together, a reminder of their original state of being.

The constant return to each other can also be related to the repetition-compulsion, a recurring symptom of the double effect which can be materialized as the recurrence of names, situations, relationships, roles, and more. In *Frankenstein*, repetition comes in many of these possibilities. In *Madwoman in the Attic*, Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar identify the repetition-compulsion in Frankenstein's and the creature's interchangeable roles for both of them "enact the story of Prometheus, each is at one time or another like God (Victor as creator, the monster as his creator's 'Master'), like Adam (Victor as innocent child, the monster as primordial 'creature'), and like Satan (Victor as tormented overreacher, the monster as vengeful fiend)" (230). Considering that they are equal expressions of the same self, it is not a coincidence that they experience duality in the same way, as one. "One is always another" (Salotto 196) and in an attempt to achieve balance, or unity, the divided selves go through opposite yet similar states of mind, always complementing one another.

An additional and significant case of repetition in the novel is the recurrence of the theme of death. Victor is always surrounded by death, either directly or indirectly. Outsiders only seem to be a part of his family through the advent of death, like an initiation: his mother, Elizabeth, Justine and maybe Henry, who is never mentioned to have a living mother. As a coincidence or not, young Frankenstein showed a great interest in the secrets of life, death and the readings of alchemy and archaic science, whose main quest was to achieve eternal life, or in other words, avoid death. At the age of thirteen, his obsession with the theme showed its first (known) signs: "wealth was an inferior object; but what glory would attend the discovery, if I could banish disease from the human frame, and render man invulnerable to any but a violent death!" (23). Hence, it seems plausible that the finitude of life had already or was to become a turning point in Frankenstein's life and his psyche. His creation of a being that is

the “living image of death” (Sherwin 897) confirms the theory that to face the creature is to relive the reality of death, and by doing so, as the repetition-compulsion suggests, Victor could attempt, consciously or unconsciously, to conquer the trauma, the root of his obsession at last.

It is important to notice here that several critics indicate the passing of his mother as the trigger to Frankenstein’s obsession with death. Surely, it is undeniable the effect that this event took on his psyche and life in general, however, some seem to pay more attention to the *mother* aspect than to the aspect of her death itself. The search for the mother, as some may call it, seems to focus more on the gender and biological expressions of Caroline, Victor’s mother, than to her significance as bearer and giver of Victor’s life. Theories such as Victor’s repressed sexuality, the son aiming to assume the place of his own mother by “birthing” the creature or even to reunite with the lost mother through the monster all try one way or another to either explain the absence of significant female characters in the novel or to offer a justification as big as the quest for creating life from the dead. However, the answer might be exactly what is given to us: to “banish disease from the human frame, and render man invulnerable to any but a violent death” (23). Sherwin effectively furthers the discussion in the following:

Presumably [Victor’s mother’s] death reactivates an original anxiety of deprivation associated with the departure of the maternal body, and the irrevocable loss of the mother, the primary focus of the child’s reality bondings, could help to explain the intensification of Frankenstein’s temperamental dualism. But while psychoanalytic theory is suggestive here, it is too restrictively bound to a particular mythic version of the past, too fetishistically centered on one of many possible mythic representations of loss. ... Confronted by the fact of death, he is overtaken by a primordial anxiety, not an anxiety-provoking repressed wish (894).

In “Frankenstein: Creation as Catastrophe”, Sherwin argues that there are several readings and analysis trying to explain what the monster truly represents and why Victor created such a being, but, in reality, none is more correct than the other. Instead, the most assertive approach is to choose a delimitation because the quest for Frankenstein’s raw reason is endless and can be multiple or inexistent. Even if one tries to look for the “beginning of the end” in his journey, as a matter of fact, not sufficient is given to assume such nor are the narrators reliable enough.

As discussed, Victor’s curiosity towards the idea of transcending death emerges years before his mother’s death, so the tragedy cannot be precisely attributed as the reason for the doctor’s fall, for that was something rooted in his identity long before. Whether Caroline’s passing resulted in the urge to create life from death or might not be as relevant as it may seem at first. Similarly, understanding the monster’s longing for his creator’s affection and recognition has nothing to do with assuming that the doctor metaphorically represents a mother-figure to the creature, for it has no pre-concept of the idea of what a mother should be. It is precisely because Frankenstein is its *creator*, the only one capable of “infus[ing] a spark of being into the lifeless thing” (38), unbound in terms of gender and human biology, that the monster seeks him: its identification relies strictly on him. In her novel, “Shelley tackles the most important literary question of the nineteenth century: the question of origins” (Salotto 196), hence, instead of calling the doctor’s quest as the search for the mother or for sexuality or for the female body, the search for the *source*, in other words, *wholeness*, seems to be more fitting.

Victor and his creature’s story seems to be a response, a distorted reflection, or even, an adaptation, as Luiz Fernando Ferreira Sá and Talita Cassemiro Paiva argue in “Living on or textual afterlife: Frankenstein and Paradise Lost” to *Paradise Lost*. Similar to John Milton’s work, the central struggles that move the plot of *Frankenstein* are that of origins, purpose, and

ultimately, creator and creature. There is a clear suggestion of such a connection between works already in the epigraph of Shelley's novel: it is a passage of *Paradise Lost* referring "to the creation of a new being, [in which] we understand that the relationship between the maker and his creature is unstable. It also shows the creature's rebellion against his maker" (Sá and Paiva). The clues to what to look for and where to focus on are already given to both critic and reader from the very first page. Therefore, to analyze Frankenstein and his creature's story without acknowledging (or even avoiding) its fundamental motive proves to lead to a dead end for both question and answer rest in the same place: in the beginning, in the creation, in the separation between creator and creature.

Although discussions on the *doppelgänger* in Shelley's novel are usually centered towards Victor and his monster, Captain Walton, the first character to be introduced and the last to depart, shares undeniable similarities to Frankenstein's crusade: the interest that started in childhood — "this expedition has been thee favourite dream of my early years" (6) —, the medium through which he got in contact with such ideas — "I have read with ardour ... These volumes were my study day and night" (6) —, his quest for eternity as the first in doing something — to "tread a land never before imprinted by the foot of man" (6) —, the lack of interest in material possessions — "I preferred glory to every enticement that wealth placed in my path" (7) —, the isolation from society in consequence for his selfish endeavors (to sail to the remote depths of the North Pole) and the desire to unravel the secrets of nature (to discover the mystery of magnetism). Just like Frankenstein (and his monster), Walton abhors society and finds himself in an in-between state: the natural world and "the outer periphery of the civilized world, the boundary between the known and the unknown" (Ellis 124). Victor recognizes the resemblance and warns him: "[y]ou seek for knowledge and wisdom, as I once did" (17), "[l]earn from me, if not by my precepts, at least by my example, how dangerous is the acquirement of knowledge, and how much happier that man is who believes his native

town to be the world, than he who aspires to become greater than his nature will allow” (35). The moment Walton finds the doctor, “on the brink of destruction” (13), marks a pivotal moment between the captain’s downfall or salvation, once more in a position in-between, in which whether he will listen to Frankenstein’s words or not will settle his fate. If the captain ignores the warnings, like the doctor ignored his creature’s, it is likely that he will follow Victor’s steps and face only tragedy ahead. Throughout the narrative he is given a choice to make, like Frankenstein was given before, and the fate of descending into the depths of his own shadows like the mad doctor did lies entirely on his hands.

Walton is to Frankenstein the reflection of himself right before shedding the light of life to his shadow. Since the monster is Victor’s double and Victor is a late-stage of Walton’s egotism, the captain and the monster must share a connection of the same degree. Jackson notices that “the monster’s tormented quest for identity is but a vast echo of the searchings of Walton — the first narrator — and Frankenstein, the second” (“Narcissism and Beyond”); the three of them portray the different stages of the decay of an individual in the search for wholeness via selfish means. Each one adds a perspective coming from a different stage, or layer, of self-identification and each is touched by the other’s story differently, intertwining and untangling throughout the pages yet remaining interdependent since each tells the story of the other. That makes the novel not a story of an individual, but of multiple ones. On this perspective, Salotto comments: “[t]his diffusion of the narrative voice indicates that the narrative body is not whole, incapable of reproducing a sutured narrative about the origins of one’s life. ... The frame narrative thus disturbs the notion of unitary identity, on which the notion of autobiography has rested” (190). Overlooking the title, there is no certainty in naming whose story is being told for it is the same story for many names, or there are many names for the same story.

Botting suggests that “the writing of self ... depends on its relation to the writing of

others” (44), hence the abundance of voices that compose the body of the text: the novel “refuses to posit a unified story; rather, continual reworkings and repiecing of stories assemble and then divide the origins of selfhood. ... Challenging the ‘I’ as the center of identity” (Salotto 198). As a consequence, Shelley “presents a narrative body in pieces, rather than a sewn-up one” (Salotto 198) as each of the main narrators, Walton, Frankenstein and the creature, tell the story according to their own desires, adding and omitting details as they choose to. As Botting notices, “[t]he quest to uncover the secret of the text’s nature, to unfold once and for all its living presence, its principle of life, does not reveal the unequivocal or authorised voice, but discloses only monstrous doubles, different and distant from any unifying figure” (3). Like the doctor gathering severed pieces of former human beings and modifying them to produce a new creature, the three of them cannot conceive from a singular source. The final product thus emerges as a “text-monster” (Botting 28), different from the original yet whole in its own way.

As the presence of Walton proves to be equally important as Frankenstein’s and his creatures’, it is safe to assume that they must share a similar connection. Although critics have already pointed to the fact that Walton is Frankenstein’s double, I argue that it is the monster, in fact, that is the double of both. Considering the structure of the text, it goes: Walton’s narrative, Frankenstein’s, the monster’s, Frankenstein’s, then Walton’s again. The narrative opens and closes with the captain, while the creature remains in the center, in the depths of the story, hidden between the other two accounts, reached only by those who are willing to go through all the stages of the characters’ psyche. In *Frankenstein*, the “circle does not close, the play of doubles is not restricted to mere duality but produces a spiralling movement which returns differently upon itself” (Botting 2-3). Like Dante who guides us from the outer circles of hell towards its center, Shelley presents a journey inward that goes through the different layers of the human psyche. Walton’s narrative is the external one for he is the closest to the

surface, to the outside world. His quest is still innocent and relatively acceptable by social terms; he claims to be ready to lose everything in spite of his desire yet he is not aware of what *everything* might imply. Frankenstein, who perpetually stays in the middle, intermediates the access between the outside and the inside, the outer and inner stages. He is long past Walton's stage, he has done and seen enough to be able to ever go back to his past self and knows the actual meaning of losing everything. He still remembers the light of the surface yet his awareness of the darkness — the shadow within — makes it impossible to enjoy, much less return to blissful ignorance. In the inner circle, hidden from inexperienced eyes, lies the monster. It is guarded by the other two who (should) prevent his access to the surface. It is a permanent creature of the darkness, its place eternally at the depths of the psyche; the one who should never emerge to the surface. It embodies the bare, the raw, the core of one's self, the essence which cannot be fully molded, regulated or civilized, therefore, must remain as an other to society, apart from the outer world. Therefore, the three narrators are not individual beings but specific layers of a singular self.

The movement of the narrative goes from the outside to the inside and to the outside again. By doing so, Shelley presents the mental and physical stages of the quest for truth by those who are searching for the wrong reasons, and revealing the decay it might cause to the body and the soul. She guides the readers through the shadows but does not leave them there; she leaves them exactly as they started, in the safety of the surface. By providing the gift of knowledge, she offers the power to go inside or remain outside in the same way the monster offered Frankenstein and Frankenstein offered to Walton. While the answer is individual to each person, the right to know is universal: when going in there is no way out.

6. WUTHERING HEIGHTS

In Emily Brontë's work, dualism is manifested in the form of physical and psychological doubles as a result of repression and dissociation in face of reality and their true selves. In the advent of the appearance of a double, who emerges out of its repressed condition, the structural norms which are the roots of the repression are confronted by the characters. In this perspective, as Faurholt suggests, the protagonists of double narratives can be considered defiant representatives against the process of socialization, which is the precise case of the two main characters of *Wuthering Heights*. Catherine's¹² protest against the molding of her own character for the sake of socialization is manifested in her connection to Heathcliff and subsequent escape (with her death) from the moralizing Thrushcross Grange. Their extraordinary affinity that refuses a rational explanation and defies the general understanding of life and death externalizes their essences, their shadows and transgressions. The force of their connection is so extreme that it seems to influence the doubling effect on the characters and on the environment that surrounds them. For this reason, not only Catherine and Heathcliff's doubling, but also other instances that occur between the Heights and the Grange should be considered and analyzed.

6.1 Wuthering Heights and Thrushcross Grange

The world of *Wuthering Heights* is mainly divided into two locations: Wuthering Heights and Thrushcross Grange. They are not to be read as physical places only, but also representations of society and nature. Like the universal duality suggested by Živković, they are two extremes that contrast but also complement each other: the wild and the brute side of

¹² To avoid confusion, in this study Catherine, the mother, will be referenced as Catherine, while her daughter will be referenced as Cathy.

nature and the sophistication of social norms. One does not contradict the other, as humans are inherently part of nature, but in order to survive, they need to create ways of organizing themselves, as individuals and as society. Thus, although the manors are not human characters, they assume the role of the greater forces that act on the narrative, establishing the foundation to all the conflicts that take place in the moors.

Their opposing aspects are seen at first glance in their names. Mr. Lockwood, in the first pages of the novel, comments on the choice of the word ‘wuthering’ to be appropriate, as it is “descriptive of the atmospheric tumult to which its station is exposed in stormy weather” (Brontë 4)¹³; it transmits the idea of a harsh, turbulent environment. Steven Vine adds that ‘wuther’:

... can also mean ‘to tremble, shake, quiver,’ so that ‘wuthering’ names ‘a quivering movement’ or ‘a tremble’ that convulses from within rather than attacks from without. In this sense, the house’s wuthering is taken inside instead of remaining on the outside, and the Heights wuthers internally; the remorseless buffering that threatens the house’s exterior structure is found to condition its inside, too. The house’s wuthering itself wuthers between the internal and external (340).

As the outside wuthers in, the separation between exterior and interior becomes unstable and “the within comes to share the properties of the without”, thus, “wuthering becomes a movement of *othering*: a passing of boundaries that takes the outside in and the inside out, where the familiar is made strange ... and the strange comes to inhabit the familiar” (Vine 340). In contrast, ‘thrush’ of Thrushcross Grange is defined by “any of a large family of singing birds” (‘Thrush’, Cambridge Dictionary), generating the idea of beauty and harmony. It is a place of idyllic nature in which the inside has the power of influencing the outside for

¹³ All the references to *Wuthering Heights* are from Brontë, Emily. *Wuthering Heights: The 1847 Text, Backgrounds and Criticism*, edited by Richard J. Dunn, 4th ed., W. W. Norton & Co., 2003., and will be referenced parenthetically with the page number.

its own desire. Its word 'cross', on the other hand, relates to a passage, from childhood to adulthood, wild to civilized, life to death; or even, in a reference to the Christian cross, a trial to be faced or hardships to be overcome. Thus, the Grange is a place of idealized nature, but its wonders are not available without a cost. Different from the chaotic nature that exerts influence over man in *Wuthering Heights*, in *Thrushcross Grange* it is man that has ultimate power over nature (if paid the price to do so). While the first is unruly, subjected to the casualties of the outside, the other is peaceful for it is tamed: the hand of man acts upon nature, not the contrary.

Heathcliff goes as far as to compare the Grange to heaven (38), a "beautiful [and] a splendid place" (38), "carpeted with crimson, and crimson-covered chairs and tables, and a pure white ceiling bordered by gold, a shower of glass-drops hanging in silver chains from the centre and shimmering with little soft tapers" (38). The Heights, in opposition, portrays an unwelcoming image with its "narrow windows [that] are deeply set in the wall", a "quantity of grotesque carving" and "a wilderness of crumbling griffins and shameless little boys" (4). This manor is defined by extremities: "an architectural torsion wuthering between stability and instability" (Vine 340). Opposite from the splendor and grandiosity of the Grange, the Heights is portrayed as inhospitable and eerie.

The contrast is not only noticed by the manors' characteristics, but also by their residents who are influenced by their natural/unnatural conditions. The atmosphere in the Heights feels unwelcoming and its people seem more like enemies than family. There are few living there, which reflects on the poor state of the property. There is always tension in their interactions with the inside or outside world. *Thrushcross Grange*, on the other hand, has all the attributes of a proper household and is suggested as housing several people who seem to be familiar and friendly with each other. The manor and those who live there are warm and caring. The emptiness of one antagonizes the livelihood of the other, and while one rejects

life, the other seems to rejoice with it.

Young Heathcliff is the character who seems to be the most impressed by the differences between the manors. He and Catherine go to the Grange to see “whether the Lintons passed their Sunday evenings standing shivering in corners, while their father and mother sat eating and drinking, and singing and laughing” (37) or “reading sermons, and being catechised by their man-servant” (37). When they arrive, he realizes how wrong he was. Instead of what he expected, which was probably influenced by his own experience in the Heights, he rather witnesses children living in perfect comfort, worrying about little and petty things. Unlike him, they did not show signals of being mistreated or chastised by severe means. His confusion is natural, for he never experienced a life like that. The cruel treatment he received on his side of the moors was the only way he has ever been treated and it is understandable of him to expect it to be the same everywhere. Even worse, the children, the siblings Edgar and Isabella, were not like Heathcliff and Catherine. Unlike the pair from the Heights, who were as close as one is to himself/herself, those were the opposite, “yelling, and sobbing, and rolling on the ground, divided by the whole room” (38). A puzzling place Thrushcross Grange was: while it offered the ideal grounds for harmony, its children were surprisingly disconnected from each other. At the “amoral landscape of Wuthering Heights” (Rosenfield 330), however, where life was not as comfortable and peaceful, the bond between Heathcliff and Catherine was as strong as the foundations of the property.

In a broader analysis, the harmonious and cultured environment of the Grange portrays the moral attributes promoted by the conventional social norms at the time. It is organized, luxurious and proper; it abides by the rules of society and sets an example of what is to be aspired. Wuthering Heights, on the contrary, is messy, unorganized, the disposition of rooms is unexpected; its undisciplined qualities represent its disruptiveness towards social order. There are in fact two characters who embody the characteristics of each house and all that

they represent: Heathcliff and Edgar Linton. One seems to project all the barbaric, unruly aspects of the Heights while the other lives by the morals of the Grange. They are “two men demonstrating two different worlds” (Božoki 17), as Nelly notices when she describes Edgar: “The contrast resembled what you see in exchanging a bleak, hilly, coal country for a beautiful fertile valley; ... He had a sweet, low manner of speaking, and pronounced his words ... [with] less gruff than we talk here, and softer” (55). Her use of the word ‘fertile’ is interesting to this comparison. Thrushcross Grange’s idyllic landscape is frequently evoked by its gardens filled with “hazels”, “oaks”, “multitude of blue-bells” (177), “wild rose trees”, “rosebushes” and “stones ... smooth and neatly cemented” (178). The constant reminder of the land’s graceful and abundant nature implies its fertile soil. Furthermore, the manor’s soil is not only fruitful for flowers as it is also suitable for the cultivation of character, shown by its residents. Culture, manners and obedience to the social norms all flourish there. Wuthering Heights’ soil, however, is neither favorable for the cultivation of the land nor of the self. In the unforgiving moors the “earth was hard with a black frost” (7), there were “rises and depressions in the ground [with] many pits”, “deep swamps” (25) and a “range of gaunt thorns all stretching their limbs one way, as if craving alms of the sun” (4). As the land shows signs of little to no fertility for beauty in its soil, its residents seem equally unlikely to prosper in such an environment.

It might be relevant to take into consideration that Wuthering Heights was not as harsh and cruel from the beginning. In Catherine and Heathcliff’s early years, the residents of the manor seemed to have much more order and a sense of home than in the subsequent years. While old Mr. Earnshaw was alive, the manor functioned more or less how it was expected to the status of its residents: there were tutors to educate the children, they all went to church on Sundays and there were workers to take care of the land. From the descriptions given by the housekeeper, the residence seemed to have some harmony of its own, and although

discrepancies in what would be considered proper were already present — the landscape, Heathcliff's presence, Joseph's and old Mr. Earnshaw's tempers, Catherine's naughtiness —, it was not in the same state of degradation, both material and moral, as that which Lockwood finds decades later. There are even suggestions of the place being delightful, with its "white floor and huge glowing fireplace", "pewter dishes and delf-case", "dog-kennel" and "wide space" (36). The real or maybe most abrupt decadence of the Heights started after Hindley Earnshaw became the master of the property.

After years of being overlooked by his father who did not bother to hide his preference for Heathcliff, he now had no impediment to taking revenge. And as "Hindley became tyrannical" (36), Heathcliff started to walk the path towards the degradation of his body, mind and soul. He who was once the favorite, was once again the outsider, ordered to stay with the servants, deprived of education and instructed to work in the fields (36). And with "the young master being entirely negligent how they behaved, and what they did" (36), Catherine and Heathcliff grew up in the shadows of his animosity. After regularly being ordered to be flogged or to fast (36), the children became used to such treatment and responded to it with even more intention to be wicked, as "[t]hey both promised fair to grow up as rude as savage" (36). Thus, they began to embrace even more the desire to be wild, which, for their young and simple minds at the time, seemed to be the key to their freedom. If Hindley, the heir and owner of the land, represented the laws of man, then they would want none of that and would choose instead the laws of nature, where they could be together and free.

This opposition, in fact, is the main conflict of Catherine's narrative. Her inability to coexist between that wild child and a well-behaved lady is fundamental to the course of the unfolding events in the novel. While the Heights represents the unruly, childlike world of her childhood, the Grange is the world of luxury and maturity. However, as she grows to be a young adult, she realizes that this choice is ultimately about power. Older and more aware of

the world around her, she has to face the fact that, before anything, she is a woman living in a world of men. For this reason, she is denied any source of power of her own if not with a man by her side. Richard Dellamora discusses that in “Earnshaw’s Neighbor/Catherine’s Friend: Ethical Contingencies in ‘*Wuthering Heights*’”, explaining that although Catherine was of higher status, “the route to economic self-improvement open to Heathcliff by virtue of his gender is closed to her” (540). The fact that she has no legal rights to *Wuthering Heights* prevents her of the freedom and autonomy she aspired as a child (Dellamora 540) and the only possibility of attaining it is to marry Edgar Linton. Even though her real feelings towards Edgar were not based on affection, her decision on marrying him is purely for moral and monetary security. The reality of her condition as a woman in a patriarchal society is that “she can access property and power only through marriage and even then, only indirectly by exercising influence over her husband” (Dellamora 543). In choosing Edgar over Heathcliff, she succumbs to the world that she never felt a part of — but was expected to — and is forced to repress her nature in order to comply with the constricting values of the civilized world.

Catherine’s transition between worlds commenced even before marriage; her first contact with the reality of the Grange was a turning event. After she, together with Heathcliff, spies through the window of the manor, she is bitten by a dog and taken inside. Heathcliff is prevented from entry; he has to remain outside and is ordered to go back to *Wuthering Heights*. This moment is symbolic to the position each one occupies in society. Catherine is welcomed into the cultured and civilized world, yet Heathcliff is not. He effectively belongs to the barbaric and uncultivated domains of the Heights and is unwelcomed in Thrushcross Grange; he remains an outsider to that world. Catherine’s wound, it is noticed, signifies “her transition from a wild child into ‘adult female sexuality’ while simultaneously being ‘castrated’, deprived of her true self and Heathcliff” (Božoki 16). During her stay at the manor, “she is treated like a doll and imprisoned in the house, Thrushcross Grange, but also in

her own body, unable to escape becoming a woman and [eventually] a mother” (Božoki 16). Her conversion from a child into a woman, ultimately from a wild thing into a lady, is completely imposed on her. After her forced stay, she goes back to the Heights and signs of her transition are visible: instead of a “wild, hatless little savage jumping into the house there ‘lighted ... a very dignified person, with brown ringlets falling from the cover of a feathered beaver, and a long cloth habit, which she was obliged to hold up with both hands” (41). The physical restriction imposed by the attire binds her body as much as her spirit. Her core belongs to the Heights, but her duty is directed to the Grange. The constricting clothes foreshadow the repression of her own self if she was to choose Thrushcross Grange. Her dilemma is visible to the eyes: “while her eyes sparkled joyfully when the dogs came bounding up to welcome her, she dared hardly touch them lest they should fawn upon her splendid garments” (41). At the time, while she tries to assimilate the values of both houses, she ends up not fully inserted in any.

Helene Moglen notices that as Catherine “becomes superficially identified with the values of Thrushcross Grange, that part of herself which is Heathcliff is repressed” (395) and by consequence, “Heathcliff himself necessarily begins to deteriorate, becoming rude in appearance and anti-social in behavior” (395). She adds, “because Catherine succumbs to the temptations of the second, Heathcliff is doomed to deliver himself into the hostile power of the first” (395). However, by condemning Heathcliff, she also condemns herself. Later, by becoming the lady of Thrushcross Grange, Catherine trades the moors for “a fertile valley” (Duckworth 406), but to cross between worlds there is a price to be paid, a cross to be carried. It is not until later that Catherine understands that the fare is too high and the Grange’s offer of power is circumstantial: she could only have it through Edgar. She still remains in a vulnerable position, her dream of freedom more distant than ever. Disposed of its dazzling but shallow promises, Linton’s world comes to be nothing but a moral and physical barrier

between what she truly identifies with. She “had been wrenched from the Heights,” her “all in all, as Heathcliff was at that time, and been converted at a stroke into Mrs. Linton, the lady of Thrushcross Grange, and the wife of a stranger: an exile, and outcast, thenceforth, from what had been [her] world” (98). Hence, she starts to resent the manor and everything it represents.

Catherine finds herself torn between two domains: that of freedom and identification (the Heights) and that of social and material ascension (the Grange), though none is enough as none can fully provide what she needs. The impasse is impossible to be satisfactory for “although the threat represented by Wuthering Heights seems quite different from the threat of Thrushcross Grange, both are equally destructive of the ‘health’ of the self” (Moglen 395). At the end of her life, she seems to learn that there is no place among the living where she can satisfy her spiritual and material ambitions, for she cannot conciliate both within herself. The answer is neither Thrushcross Grange nor Wuthering Heights: the first did not grant her the power of higher status to be financially free, while the other, with its violent and cruel means, did not offer any sense of security. What Catherine was really searching for was not a physical place, but a person: Heathcliff. In her final stages of madness, she recalls the agony of being separated from him (98) and defines it as the starting of her misery. Catherine, with the little power she had of her own, found no hope of being fulfilled no matter if in the Heights or in the Grange, for in neither could she be entirely with Heathcliff. The only alternative left was to transcend both the worlds of nature and of men, ultimately the world of the living, in an attempt to find a place without the restraints of being an Earnshaw or Linton, but Catherine.

In essence, the significance of the manors and specially the significance of their opposing forces, is fundamental to the main and all subsequent conflicts in the narrative. The duality they represent sets ground to the upcoming duals and events that are generated by the characters inability to balance both worlds. Wuthering Heights and Thrushcross Grange, emphasize the qualities and flaws each one presents to the self, and the choice between the

two is demonstrated as not such an unchallenging task as it may seem at first. One might be preferred and the other rejected, but choosing one and repressing the other is equally harmful to the identity of the individual. Like forces of nature, they represent unity if considered combined, and although conflicting, they are also complementary. Choosing one means to suppress the latent potential of the other and perhaps a choice is not meant to be made at all. Similar to Živković's explanation about the archetype of Universal Duality, both worlds — the world of nature and the world of men — are meant to coexist, and when an imbalance in the exchanges between men and nature happen, a double or doubles come to existence, to expose the necessity of seeking equilibrium again.

6.2 Catherine and Heathcliff

In terms of doubles, Catherine and Heathcliff share the most apparent condition of self-division in the narrative. Miller states that their relationship functions as “an ellipse around which all the rest of the novel, in its various persons and story lines, orbits” (13). The connection they share goes beyond what some may call love, neither can it be reduced to utter obsession. What Heathcliff represents to Catherine, and consequently, what she represents to him, is the personification of each other's selves. In accordance, Graham Price comments that “both of them are doubles of one another even as they are separate physical beings. Terry Eagleton has asserted that ‘we cannot talk about the relationship between Catherine and Heathcliff because they refuse such alterity’. In other words, there is no such thing as self and other when it comes to them. He is her and vice versa” (19). The complete identification with one another is so strong that both rationally comprehend the bond they share and express it in their words. Catherine's confession “I am Heathcliff” (64) translates to her understanding that Heathcliff is “the existence of hers beyond her” (Miller 96) and that “if she is Heathcliff, what

she is is to be perpetually divided from herself” (Miller 96-7). Similarly, when Heathcliff exclaims after Catherine’s death “I cannot live without my life! I cannot live without my soul!” (130), he is demonstrating that he is also aware that “she is the self outside of himself which he can never possess” (Miller 97). Their main conflict, in this sense, is not in fact the division in itself, but the impossibility to remain together, as two parts of one.

One may wonder, then, what the issue in their doubleness is, as they were raised together and never showed wishes to be separated. Their real conflict lies in the fact that Catherine, a woman inserted in a patriarchal society, cannot fulfill the role imposed on her if she stays with Heathcliff. As it was discussed in the previous section, as the daughter of the Earnshaw household, she has no means of financial or social independence if not through marriage. Heathcliff, on the other hand, is allowed to seek material security, but by the time that Catherine has to choose a husband, he is yet poor, uncultured and with no predicament of changing his status. The main obstacle to their relationship is power, what Susan McKinsty attributes as the initial problem common to all children (142). Because of her gender, Catherine has no authority in relation to the masculine figures of her childhood: her father and Hindley (and to some extent Joseph). They set the rules in the house, and they are the effective owners of Wuthering Heights. Her tendency for disobedience as a child is already a suggestion of her rebellion against the impotent position consequent to her gender and age. Equally helpless, Heathcliff is subjugated for other reasons: although he is a man, he is uncultured and miserable and has no biological ties who could offer prospects of wealth.

Heathcliff was named after the deceased first son of the Earnshaws and, maybe, in an act of compensation was taken “as a gift of God” (29) by old Mr. Earnshaw. His presence, however, is ambiguous; he is neither an outsider nor an insider in the Heights, neither a member of the family nor a part of the working force. He embodies two conflicting aspects, the familiar and the unfamiliar. He carries the name of the first born but is also “a

dark-skinned gypsy” (5), with no ties to any person in *Wuthering Heights*. Like a ghost trapped in the world of the living, Heathcliff is raised as an outsider, continually taking the place of others, for he does not belong anywhere. Vine explains:

... his entire history in the novel is framed in terms of *taking the place* of others: his history, as Nelly Dean puts it, is ‘a cuckoo’s’. ... he is christened ‘Heathcliff’ because it is the name of a son who died in childhood in the Earnshaw household; installed at the Heights, he takes the place of Hindley in old Earnshaw’s affections; later, he takes Hindley’s place as the master of the Heights; and finally, he takes Edgar Linton’s place (and Isabella’s and Cathy Linton’s) as the master of Thrushcross Grange (342).

With no clear answer regarding the position he occupies in the world, he has no choice other than to learn how to live in a gray zone. Catherine, however, presents to him a place to belong. By her side, he is not the memory of a dead son or an orphan, just Heathcliff. He is welcomed by her for she is the same: “as an outsider, Heathcliff metaphorizes Cathy’s otherness to the patriarchal world of the Heights” (Vine 345). In a silent compromise between children, they naively find a place (or person) to belong.

After old Mr. Earnshaw’s death, Hindley, the only living son and heir, “had learned to regard his father as an oppressor rather than a friend, and Heathcliff as a usurper of his parent’s affections and his privileges” (31) and converts his frustrations into cruelty and mistreatment towards the younger ones. In this environment, McKinstry explains, Heathcliff and Catherine learn to “imitate the adults who control them” (143) in order to overcome their powerless position. However, because of the immoral examples they have, “both carry into maturity an energy and violence which normally is pushed into the buried self by conventional society” (Rosenfield 329), thus, incorporating what said society tries to repress: nature in its ruthless and untamed form, violence, insubordination and, fundamentally, danger.

Despite their similar ambition to attain power, the ways to pursue it differ drastically.

While Heathcliff achieves it by making a fortune in the outside world, Catherine does it through marriage, the only option offered to women at the time. Catherine's search for power, in fact, is expressed in two forms, or specifically, two people: Heathcliff and Edgar. The first is presented as such in his first appearance in the novel. As a child, for a gift from her father's trip, she asks for a whip, but instead, receives Heathcliff. This small, sometimes unnoticed event is considered by critics to indicate Heathcliff as "a representation of the masculine power which she craves for herself" (Moglen 394). However, at the time, the uncultured outsider only held the authority granted by his gender, nothing else. Later, Catherine's representative is replaced by Edgar, who fulfills both gender and financial requirements. From the moment the masculine power of one becomes insufficient to provide for both of them, Catherine and Heathcliff's relationship and consequently identities start to deteriorate.

Dellamora identifies Catherine's betrayal of Heathcliff by marrying Edgar as a denial of his and her humanity (544). She is believed as the only responsible for their separation, because "misery, and degradation, and death, and nothing that God or Satan" could inflict (126) Heathcliff tells her, "would have parted [them]," yet "[*she*], of [her] own will, did it" (126). By betraying his heart, she is also betraying hers (126), and, as he suggests, she did it out of her own will. Choosing between her heart (and soul) and her ambition, however, was not entirely a choice. Catherine's "initial unwillingness to choose her husband, to choose between two polar opposites, Heathcliff and Edgar, caused to somewhat develop 'a double standard to accommodate her feelings for both men'" (Mahapatra qtd. in Božoki 17). Her choice was, as discussed, not an alternative, but an obligation. Her declaration that marrying Heathcliff would degrade her, Price comments, "was not her talking but rather the social norms of the day talking through her" (21). By denying "herself, her whip, her devilishly rebellious alter ego to accommodate the personality and marry[ing] Edgar" (Božoki 17), the split in her personality becomes inevitable. Moglen, in accordance, points that the necessity to

make a choice between the two men — between the two worlds — provoked the fragmentation of her identity (395) and “led her to adopt a double character without exactly intending to deceive any one” (52). She then finds herself with “two parts of herself: one, a reality; the other, an aspiration” (Moglen 395); the two worlds of the Heights and the Grange.

In this sense, one can say that “in turning away from Heathcliff, Catherine commits as great a crime against herself as Frankenstein commits in denying his creation” (Moglen 396). As soon as she is “forced to choose between Heathcliff (being outside of society) and Edgar (leaving Heathcliff yet fitting in society)” (Hirtle 41), her psyche begins to deteriorate, and she starts to show signs of her internal conflict through her sickness. Price suggests that the fact that she becomes sick after Heathcliff leaves *Wuthering Heights* shows the moment in which she loses a part of her self (20). Even though Edgar offers her comfort and a socially higher position, “Catherine’s fundamental identification remains with Heathcliff” (Moglen 395), and she is well aware of that: while she believes that “whatever our souls are made of” (63), hers and Heathcliff’s are the same, she declares that she and Linton are “as different as a moonbeam from lightning, or frost from fire” (63). She recognizes Heathcliff as part of her own and Edgar as an outsider, an ‘other’ (Hirtle 41), one who does not belong to the same world she belongs to.

Price notices that “what might seem heavenly to a patriarchal worldview could easily be regarded as hellish from the point of view of the women who existed in subservient and limiting roles in those ‘heavens’” (19). Catherine, indeed, even before moving to Thrushcross Grange, realizes that through a dream: she tells Nelly that if she was in heaven, she would be “extremely miserable” (63). The standard model of heaven for Catherine “did not seem to be [her] home” (63); it was *Wuthering Heights*, in fact, where she envisioned it as the ideal place for her, because it was the place where Heathcliff was. Edgar’s manor and values are unfamiliar to her, and she seems incapable of identifying herself with the parks and flowers of

the Grange. The earthly representative of heaven was *unheimlich* to Catherine as much as she was to it: she moves into the property as an outsider and remains one till the end due to her inability to accommodate her identity in that world.

Moglen suggests that, although Catherine's first years at the Grange were peaceful, her conflict was always there (396-7), yet dormant. Right before Heathcliff's return, Catherine was with Edgar admiring the view: Wuthering Heights was in the scenery, "beyond the garden trees, and the wild green park" (98), but the house was invisible to the eye. The "wondrously peaceful" (74) moment is also a description of Catherine's state of mind; its seemingly harmonious front was, in fact, hiding, or repressing, the internal turmoil about to come to surface. The quiet environment of Thrushcross Grange, which symbolizes Catherine's conformation to that world, is all that can be seen, but although not visible, Wuthering Heights, her real nature and self, is still there, repressed by the heavenly view. Heathcliff, just like the moors, is at the scene described by Nelly, but he was not to be perceived by the eyes, implying the forthcoming moment in which the *unheimlich* would emerge from the *heimlich*. His presence is invisible to her, but as Catherine states, "he's always, always in [her] mind: not as a pleasure, ... but as [her] own being" (64). When he returns, all the aspects of Catherine's self that he embodies also return to her conscious mind (Moglen 396-7) and become impossible to be ignored or repressed once again.

Heathcliff's reappearance in the narrative, similar to the depiction of the double in modern literature, is "a symbol not of eternal life but of death" which "anticipates the division of the personality into two opposing forces, and a subsequent loss of a sense of identity and continuity in time" (Rosenfield 327). Back to her conflicting double life, Catherine has no alternative but to attempt to unite her fragmented personality (Gold 70). She tries to combine both the Grange's Catherine and the Heights' one, respectively represented by Edgar and Heathcliff; she seizes "Linton's reluctant fingers and crushe[s] them into [Heathcliff's]" (75).

But her vain hopes of becoming one and integrating her divided self “is as futile as her effort to crush the two hands into one” (Gold 70). Edgar is adamant: she cannot have both worlds. Linda Gold explains that “because Catherine has split apart her personality through her identification with these two men, no synthesis is possible” (70). When she finally understands the impossibility of conciliation between her free and socialized self, and that the carefree moors of her childhood are beyond her grasp, she becomes ill. The “discrepancy between her inner and outer realities” (Hirtle 37) is too harmful to the self and her sanity is torn apart. Because Heathcliff is the “eternal rocks beneath” (64) her, the permanent separation from him translates to the removal of her own ground. She is “a ‘part’ of the universe only if Heathcliff is within it” (Miller 98) and when her condition to feel grounded to reality is denied, she becomes a complete stranger (Miller 98) to that universe, intensifying her feelings of otherness towards that world. Truthfully, Catherine has no more business to Edgar than she has to be in heaven (63), what is supposed to be paradise is in fact her personal hell. Thrushcross Grange, “the world of the inside, which is meant warm, safe and familiar, is stifling for her and she demands nothing more than to feel some release from these constricting, claustrophobic conditions” (Price 20). She has no interest in remaining on earth if she is denied her grounds and separated from her true self.

Due to the detachment of herself from reality, her mind wanders back to her heaven: the moors, the representation of freedom, openness and, ultimately, Heathcliff. Her mental state is in pieces, similar to the pillow that she tears with her teeth. The “feathers of the wild birds” (Gold 70), just like Catherine, “is the wildness that lies beneath every thin covering of civilization” (Gold 70). The negation of what Catherine truly is in order to fit into the molds of the heavenly civilization of the Grange is precisely what drives her into madness and subsequent death. The dissolution of her personality is such that she does not recognize neither her nor Heathcliff: her persona of Thrushcross Grange’s lady is not who she truly is,

yet the wild Catherine from *Wuthering Heights* is not who she sees reflected on the mirror. It is in her death, thus, that she shall seek unity again. She will take Heathcliff with her, for he is in her soul (127), suggesting that he is not only contained in her, but also is her, emphasizing, once again, their condition of doubles of one another. By voicing statements of this kind, Price explains, “all we are meant to believe is that they have some bond and connection that transcends human and is uncanny in nature” (20) and fully understanding it is beyond rational comprehension.

After Catherine’s death, Heathcliff is permanently left alone, without his soul, for “each is the ground of the other, but each dissolves as ground when it is considered in itself” (Miller 98). Because of their connection as doubles, just as she was detached in life from her true self, “in the same way, Heathcliff, after Cathy’s death, lives separated from his deepest self by the abyss of her absence” (Miller 97). At this point, the narrative opens in a new arc, now focused on life after Catherine. Miller suggests that “the early part of the novel focuses on Catherine and on her experience of separation from Heathcliff” (97), and after her death, it focuses on Heathcliff’s experience of separation from her. For him, however, she does not leave entirely, for she haunts him tirelessly. Catherine is, as he calls it, his immortal love (341), and what Rosenfield reads as “his immortal soul” (330). This, she explains, “brings back the concept of double in folk lore, as people’s immortal selves that will remain after the body’s death” (330). Catherine remains even after the death of her physical body, because her connection with Heathcliff surpasses life and death. Just as the primitive concepts of the human shadow, she follows Heathcliff and attests for the immortality of their soul. When Heathcliff dies, eighteen years after Catherine, the process of degradation of his body is the same as hers. Both seem to lose their sense of reality and starve themselves to death. Similar to the shadow doubles, they die by the same cause. It is simply adequate: as they were the same in life, they should be the same in death.

6.3 Hareton and Cathy

After Catherine's death, the second part of the novel starts. She has transcended the constraints of the world of the living, but her union with Heathcliff is yet impossible for he still walks in the land of men. Thus, their separation is still a reality, they have not achieved the unity they sought, and for this reason new doubles emerge, in an attempt to succeed where the first failed. They come in the forms of Hareton and Cathy, the new generation that is suggested to be able to achieve what their predecessors could not: find synthesis between the two worlds of Thrushcross Grange and Wuthering Heights. Each one seems to assimilate in their trajectories the traumas their predecessor doubles failed to come to terms with. In this sense, "the first half of the story becomes a condition of the second, presupposed by it and contained within it" (Moglen 398): Hareton, Hindley's son, embodies in him both Heathcliff's childhood of abuse and Hindley's presence, while Cathy, Catherine and Edgar's daughter, is born with the two forces of civility and rebellion already in her core. They come from the original doubles, metaphorically or physically, and more than projections, they are products of what Catherine and Heathcliff could not accomplish in life, thus starting the cycle once again.

Although the destination is similar to both, Cathy's and Hareton's process of development and integration is different from the very start. Raised in an environment opposite to the one her mother was born into, Cathy grew up in the calm, civilized and beautiful world of Thrushcross Grange. Her father, Edgar, "took her education entirely on himself, and made it an amusement" (146); he devoted all his affection towards his daughter, not a surprise regarding his kind nature. She was unfamiliar with his father's rejection as he never did "speak a harsh word to her" (146). This is the first striking difference between the child and mother, as Catherine did not grow up with as many displays of paternal love. Old Mr. Earnshaw who "had always been strict and grave" (33) would put his affections towards

Heathcliff above his children, for he was quiet and submissive to the master of the household. Cathy, on the other hand, “was too mischievous and wayward for a favourite” (30) and grew accustomed to the rejection of her father. He would say to young Catherine: “I cannot love thee; thou’rt worse than thy brother. Go, say thy prayers, child, and ask God’s pardon. I doubt thy mother and I must rue that we ever reared thee!” (34). As Nelly explains, this type of rejection saddened her at first, but “being repulsed continually hardened her” (34) and she started to take pleasure in such.

Another point to notice is how the power dynamics of each Catherine is different from the very start. While the mother had none, the daughter had it ensured since birth. Catherine became the lady of Thrushcross Grange through marriage, Cathy was raised as its rightful heir. While the mother was forced to assimilate the world of the Grange (and failed), Cathy had already done it by birth. The first could only ask for a whip, the second had one to defend herself. What was impossible to Catherine, came naturally to her daughter and this difference exerted a direct influence on the dynamics of their interpersonal relationships as well. The first one grew up with Heathcliff as if they were siblings. With the years, their fraternal relationship was replaced by romantic and obsessive love, but marriage was never an option as Heathcliff was poor and powerless. Her will of becoming one, Catherine Heathcliff, was denied from the start so she married Edgar Linton instead. Her daughter, Cathy, on the contrary, was a Linton from the start and married Linton Heathcliff for different reasons. At first, her love for her cousin was like how a sister would love a brother. Later, it converted into some sort of romantic love which (partly) led her to marriage and she becoming a Heathcliff. Amid all the circumstances that culminated in her forced marriage, the need for power was never in question.

For instance, Cathy was set to carry on Catherine’s journey from where she had left. When Cathy was born, she already had Linton and (undeveloped) Earnshaw in her, Wuthering

Heights and Thrushcross Grange. She had “the Earnshaws’ handsome dark eyes, but the Lintons’ fair skin and small features, and yellow curling hair” (146). Her temperament also implied both of her parents’ natures: her capacity for “intense attachments” (146) reminded of Catherine, but “still she did not resemble her: for she could be soft and mild as a dove, and she had a gentle voice and pensive expression: her anger was never furious; her love never fierce: it was deep and tender” (146). Here, Cathy seems to be a successful version of the process of civilization, a docile and manageable Catherine Linton, however, Cathy’s Catherine is being repressed by ignorance. Till the age of thirteen, she had never left the grounds of her home; “Wuthering Heights and Mr. Heathcliff did not exist for her: she was a perfect recluse; and, apparently, perfectly contented” (146). Her years of exile were counted, though, for as a double of her mother, Cathy had yet to assimilate parts of herself, which are, in her case, regarding Wuthering Heights.

As Moglen notices, the crisis of Cathy’s identification starts when she reaches puberty, just like her mother (400), but in the opposite direction. By the time she meets her cousins, “Hareton and Linton become the means of Cathy’s self-definition, holding the same relationship to her as Heathcliff and Edgar had held to Catherine” (Moglen 401), renewing, or resuming, the cycle all over again. However, the daughter “who bears Catherine within, has been prepared for conflict as Catherine was not. She has already progressed beyond the narcissism of her infancy, to a love that is more than identification” (Moglen 400). Cathy shows signs of a mature sense of love and responsibility throughout many occasions in the novel, which end up being crucial to the unfolding of events that mark her trajectory: her selfless love for his father, the friendship she develops with Hareton and her dedication to caring for Linton. Her altruism is a contrast to her mother’s selfishness: “I’ll try to break their hearts by breaking my own” (92), Catherine said. While “Catherine belongs [to] the passionate, irrational aspiration of childhood”, Cathy “is the bitter-sweet compromise of

adulthood” (Moglen 405). Where one Catherine failed, the other would succeed.

According to Moglen, “in *Wuthering Heights* we are presented with the female ego, as it functions in a masculine universe and progresses from the narcissism of childhood to the compromises of womanhood” (393). Catherine’s journey starts with her but ends with her daughter, both physical and metaphorically. Her narrative, as Gold explains:

... begins with Catherine Earnshaw and ends with Catherine Linton Heathcliff Earnshaw, or a Catherine Earnshaw who has incorporated and reconciled those elements represented by Linton ... and Heathcliff What Catherine cannot achieve — freedom from tension, reconciliation of the opposing forces in her nature — is finally achieved by the daughter. For, in one sense, Catherine does not die at all, for shortly before her death, she gives birth to another Catherine, Catherine Linton, a partial synthesis of the opposing forces within her personality. ... Catherine’s conflict is both reborn and transformed in the infant who possesses Catherine’s vitality and spirit tempered by the Lintons’ gentleness (71).

The uncanny repetition of names and events is, thus, an effort to achieve the integration of personality which Catherine, the mother, was not able to. As a symptom of the repetition-compulsion, the recurrence of situations and names is no other than an attempt to overcome the early trauma resulting from the repression of Catherine’s self. Hence, Cathy, who carries both Edgar’s and Catherine’s natures within herself, carries the promise of synthesis for she belongs to both the Grange and the Heights. The wildness that is subdued and repressed in the mother, is naturally balanced and docile in the daughter; the name Heathcliff that is denied to the first, is finally granted to the second. By experiencing all the personality stages as Catherine Linton, Catherine Heathcliff and Catherine Earnshaw, Cathy is able to integrate all the Catherines in one entity, herself. What was impossible to the mother is finally achieved by the daughter as she overcomes the repetition-compulsion of traumas (in

form of names and events) and finds a route to the synthesis of her personality as Catherine Earnshaw. In this sense, despite the seemingly recurrence of scenarios, it is appropriate to read the movement of the novel as “cohesive and linear, not cyclical” (Brown qtd. in Moglen 405). The fragmented mind of the mother, caused by the denial of her own self — or selves — becomes complete in the daughter, who has the opportunity to reconcile the divided identity and find an answer to achieve unity.

It is interesting to notice that Linton Heathcliff, Heathcliff’s son with Isabella Linton, was not the one to carry on Heathcliff’s legacy as the new generation, like Cathy did for Catherine, but Hareton, the son of his main oppressor. However, as it was suggested at the start of this section, the new doubles assimilated in their essence the internal and external struggles that the main pair could not resolve in their lifetimes. It is not a surprise, thus, that Hareton was the one to continue where Heathcliff failed on his path to integration. The civilized world, represented by Thrushcross Grange and the Lintons, was never Heathcliff’s conflict. He was never a part of that world and seemed to have come to terms with it from a young age, for he could obtain power on his own terms — like he did — so it was never a necessity for him to have the status of a surname.

Thus, the union between Heathcliff and Isabella Linton, Linton Heathcliff, was too big of a tragedy from the start. The figure of Linton was the culmination of his parents’ worst. While Hareton and Cathy had the seeds to succeed this time, Linton was set to fail. His character portrays in an exacerbated way the negative parts of the civilized and the natural world: his body was frail, his mind was easily manipulated, he was arrogant and selfish. He acknowledges it to Cathy: “believe that if I might be as sweet, and as kind, and as good as you are, I would be; as willingly, and more so, than as happy and as healthy ... and though I couldn’t, and cannot help showing my nature to you” (194). This can be explained by the fact that his father was never to become a Linton, it was but a part of his plans of vengeance. His

internal battle was in fact related to Hindley, who used his power to punish him for taking old Mr. Earnshaw's affection from him. That was the beginning of Heathcliff's fall and ultimate separation from Catherine, which he could never recover from even decades later. The world of the Grange was never meant to him, nor the Heights. Heathcliff was in-between, never an Earnshaw and never a Linton, always an outsider in both worlds. So, it is adequate that his son, born out of an act of revenge, was also an outsider; too frail for Wuthering Heights, too wicked for Thrushcross Grange. Similar to Catherine, Heathcliff belonged not to a physical location, but to a person. He resorted to Wuthering Heights as his home because that was the only place where he and Catherine were once together. In this sense, it seems fitting that the weight of Heathcliff's quest for unity was projected onto Hareton, instead of Linton; Heathcliff's and the Lintons' world were never meant to be the same, thus they could not fully achieve integration to become one.

Heathcliff and Hareton's circumstance is similar to the one seen in Dostoevski's *The Double*, although not completely the same. The likeness between the representations of doubles in the two novels takes place in the physical sameness shared between the doubles and their morally opposite personalities. Similar to Golyadkin Jr. and Golyadkin Sr., in Heathcliff and Hareton's relationship, one entity of the duo is meant to usurp the role of the other. Their similarity to their circumstances, growing up are also responsible for evoking the sense of duplication and repetition of an unspoken pattern, which adds to the feeling of uncanniness that the pair represents.

Gilbert and Gubar resume well the duality of their circumstance by pointing the peculiarity of their names:

... the ambiguities of Hareton's name summarize in another way Heathcliff's problem with this most puzzling Earnshaw. On the one hand, Hare/ton is a nature name, like Heathcliff. But on the other hand, Hare/ton, suggesting Heir/ton (Heir/town?) is a

punning indicator of the young man's legitimacy (301).

Duckworth adds to this comparison that "unlike Heathcliff, which combines two extrasocial terms (heath and cliff), Hareton is a mixture of the wild (hare) and the social (ton or town)" (406). In the novel, Lockwood suggests that the young man shows "evidence of a wealthy soil, that might yield luxuriant crops under other and favourable circumstances" (152), and the fact that his name holds both nature's (associated with Wuthering Heights) and civilization's aspects (associated with Thrushcross Grange), demonstrates his condition of sameness, yet opposition to Heathcliff. Hareton is equally the same as Heathcliff — both belonging to the wildness of the Heights — and the antithesis of him — the social norms of the civilized.

While Hareton is described as exhibiting an aspect of "spirit and nobility" (246) despite his neglected upbringings and lack of manner, Heathcliff is depicted in a vampiresque imagery with his "deep black eyes" (251), and "sharp, white teeth" (256). This choice of words to describe the two characters, Ma Ming Yan claims, "foregrounds the notion of Hareton and Heathcliff as two oppositional entities" (2). This contrast, however, refers more to their contrary personalities. The young Earnshaw, in terms of external portrayal and upbringing, resembles a young Heathcliff, for both grew up wild and uneducated, covered in the dirt of the moors and in the shadows of society. Heathcliff recognizes this likeness: "Hareton seemed a personification of my youth, not a human being" (247), and doubts "whether Hareton is a symptom of his own 'frenzy' or an actual paranormal presence, ... 'not a human being' but a 'ghost' from time past" (Ma 2). According to Faurholt, "the *doppelgänger* poses a threat to [the subject's] existence, because [the subject's] unique identity is imperiled either by the indistinguishable sameness of the identical alter ego or by the antithesis of the split personality". This uncanny realization of simultaneous likeness and contrast, familiarity within unfamiliarity, causes in Heathcliff apparent agitation in his last days of life, as he sees before him everything that he was, but at the same time was not. The

familiarity, or *heimlich*, Heathcliff felt towards a portrayal of his own young self, was also contradicted by the unfamiliarity, or *unheimlich*, of Hareton's own self.

Also, important to notice is the physical appearance Hareton shares with his aunt, Catherine. This occurrence, which to the reader might not cause surprise for they are close relatives, generates a strong impression on Heathcliff. He expresses that Hareton's "startling likeness to Catherine connected him fearfully with her" (247). This likeness, by consequence, connects, once again, Hareton to him, "for what is not connected with her to me?" (247), Heathcliff claims. In this passage he shows, once again, his understanding of the type of connection shared with Catherine and recognizes to have a similar one with the boy. This realization, in consequence, generates the feeling of uncanniness (Ma 2) on both the reader and on Heathcliff, for Heathcliff's identification of himself lies outside of himself.

Hareton's existence by itself, the rightful heir of Wuthering Heights, is an obstacle to its current owner, Heathcliff. As Gilbert and Gubar pointed, Hareton can be read as Heir-ton, indicating the legitimacy of his claim to the property since birth. Interestingly enough, the boy has the same name as the first owner and founder of Wuthering Heights, pointed by Lockwood in the first pages of the novel: "among a wilderness of crumbling griffins and shameless little boys, I detected the date '1500,' and the name 'Hareton Earnshaw'" (4). This seemingly irrelevant detail, in fact, foreshadows the series of repetitions that will occur in the moors. Ma even suggests that Heathcliff's neglect of Hareton's education to be generated by the threat that the double represents (3). Hareton, she explains, "poses a threat of usurpation to Heathcliff the way Heathcliff has threatened Hindley. Having taken over the name of old Mr. Earnshaw's lost son, Heathcliff has usurped the right to old Mr. Earnshaw's fatherly affections" (3). The degradation caused by Heathcliff on the younger, thus, is moved by the fear of Hareton usurping his position, just as Heathcliff had done in the past with Hareton's father. In addition to fear, there is also Heathcliff's intent on avenging his own degradation

and humiliating Hindley through his son: “My old enemies have not beaten me; now would be the precise time to revenge myself on their representatives” (247). Hindley was the main source of trauma for Heathcliff, both moral and physical. In an attempt to take control of his own abuse, he chooses to abuse the son of his abuser. He admits it himself:

“I’ve a pleasure in him,” he continued reflecting aloud. “He has satisfied my expectations. If he were a born fool I should not enjoy it half so much. But he’s no fool; and I can sympathise with all his feelings, having felt them myself. I know what he suffers now, for instance, exactly — it is merely a beginning of what he shall suffer, though. And he’ll never be able to emerge from his bathos of coarseness and ignorance. I’ve got him faster than his scoundrel of a father secured me, and lower; for he takes a pride in his brutishness. I’ve taught him to scorn everything extra-animal as silly and weak” (169).

There is a pattern of repetition in this disposition: the same pain that Hindley imposed on Heathcliff, Heathcliff, later, imposed on Hindley’s son. In a sense, in his calculated revenge, he tries to make Hareton his replacement as the brute, uncultured child of the Heights. Denied of his title and education and raised to be as unwanted in the civilized world as Heathcliff was, Hareton’s potential and identity as true master of the Heights was repressed by the harsh environment of his home and the abusive adult figures he had growing up. However, by doing this to the young Earnshaw, Heathcliff only perpetuates his own misery: by projecting his revenge on Hareton, the cycle of his pain was not only renewed, but also aggravated to a point in which Heathcliff lost control of it.

Against all odds, Heathcliff could not hate Hareton and even wishes he was his own: “[n]ow, if it had been Hareton! — Do you know that, twenty times a day, I covet Hareton, with all his degradation? I’d have loved the lad had he been some one else” (167). And despite all of the older’s attempts in breaking him, the young Earnshaw saw him as a father

figure. He defended Heathcliff and referred to him as a son would do. In a conversation between him and Cathy about Heathcliff, he tells her “he wouldn’t suffer a word to be uttered to him, in his disparagement; if he were the devil, it didn’t signify; he would stand by him; ... how she would like *him* to speak ill of her father?” (245). At that, Cathy “comprehended that Earnshaw took the master’s reputation home to himself and was attached by ties stronger than reason could break — chains, forged by habit, which it would be cruel to attempt to loosen” (245). Just like Cathy’s selfless sentiment towards her father, in which she “would rather be miserable than that he should be” (178), Hareton preferred Cathy to “abuse him ... than ... Mr. Heathcliff” (245). Despite all of the man’s attempts in breaking him, the young Earnshaw still saw him with affection. For Hareton there was no enemy or usurper, just the man who had raised him.

With the boy’s encounter and, further on, relationship with Cathy, the old pattern starts to repeat itself and transcend beyond Heathcliff’s grasp. The dynamics of the new pair resembles the original one. Like young Catherine and young Heathcliff, Cathy “became incapable of letting [Hareton] alone” (237). Similar to her mother, who used to challenge old Mr. Earnshaw’s authority by proving that she “had more power over Heathcliff than his kindness” (34), Cathy would later do the same to Heathcliff: “If you strike me, Hareton will strike you” (244). Heathcliff recognizes the familiarity; seeing the boy each day closer to Cathy, planting her flowers and learning how to read seems just like him and Catherine many years before. The past was repeating itself, but maybe in a more hopeful outlook: Hareton had his social status from the moment he was born and Cathy was to inherit Thrushcross Grange; there was nothing preventing them from being together this time. Weakened by sickness and close to his death bed, there is a hint of Heathcliff’s soft spot for the boy’s nature and his likeness to himself as a child. Hareton represents all the good and all the bad left in Heathcliff: he is the ghost of his “immortal love” (247), his degradation and anguish but also

his happiness and pride (247). Moglen explains:

It is inevitable also that as Cathy's relationship with Hareton is strengthened, Heathcliff declines. ... Recognizing at last his kinship with Hareton, his paternal love for the boy, he is absorbed into him and, through him, into Cathy. Thus, when he looks at the dark haired boy reading with the fair-haired girl, he sees himself and Catherine; and when he looks into their eyes, it is Catherine's eyes that he sees (404).

Heathcliff had already taken his revenge and failed at last: Hareton loved him. The cycle of repetitions between Heathcliff and the male Earnshaws seemed to be bound to end. Rosenfield suggests that Heathcliff's death is unavoidable after he understands that both children "combine within [themselves] those qualities which could not join within the psychological Doubles" (330), Catherine and him. Unlike the first generation, "young Cathy does possess sweetness to tame her mother's wildness, [and] Hareton cannot be entirely brutalized" (Rosenfield 330). There was nothing left for Heathcliff, the new doubles were to take his and Catherine's roles and succeed where they could not. The time to reunite with his soul, Catherine, had finally come.

Heathcliff's death marks the moment in which the repression of Cathy's and Hareton's selves is uplifted and the union between the second generation of doubles becomes possible. Until then, Hareton was only "good things lost amid a wilderness of weeds, ... whose rankness far over-topped their neglected growth" (152), but with Heathcliff's death, he permanently usurps the former usuper's position by inheriting both Wuthering Heights and Thrushcross Grange. He "fulfills his role as the usurping *doppelgänger* by displacing Heathcliff from his property as well as his identity" (Ma 4). With the true outsider incapable of meddling in the affairs of the living, Hareton, together with Cathy, can finally perform his role as master of Wuthering Heights and a man of civilization. He begins his transformation from an uncultured savage from the Heights to a man of society of the Grange, however, his transition is different

from that of his late aunt, for instead of repressing his true self, he is, in fact, freeing it. His gentle and kind nature was mainly oppressed by *Wuthering Heights*' harsh environment and residents; by becoming the master of the property, his noble self, freed from the alienating influences over him, was allowed to emerge, now in an environment that offered fertile grounds for self-improvement.

As Hareton learns to be a man of society, yet still a result of the moors' nurture, there is an insinuation of a point of balance between the wild Heights and the overly civilized Grange. The new master Earnshaw, "just as the garden at *Wuthering Heights*, until now the home of wild currant and gooseberry bushes, may at the end of the novel be planted with stocks and wallflowers imported from Thrushcross Grange" (Duckworth 406). As Moglen suggests, their union brings resolution to the conflict. The children had become adults. "Hareton, the social outcast — shadow of Heathcliff and rightful heir of Hindley — is educated and assimilated into the world of Thrushcross Grange. Morality controls instinct as Cathy's flowers replace the wild undergrowth of the heath" (Moglen 403); the daughter accomplishes the unification of her personality and appeases the will of Catherine Earnshaw in becoming free. In further evaluation, "Hareton is to Catherine and Heathcliff what young Catherine is to the elder Catherine and Edgar Linton: a harmonious synthesis of opposing forces" (Gold 72). In order to seek a resolution where their predecessors have failed, the younger generation had to experience the repetition of the elders' conflicts till the pattern could be finally integrated and surpassed. On the sterile and uncivilized soil of the Heights flowers had finally begun to sprout.

In a final analysis, it is evident the significance of the psychological aspects of the characters to understand the process of maturation and identification that occur in *Wuthering Heights*. The duality expressed in many forms throughout the narrative — the opposing worlds of the Heights and the Grange, the aggressive Heathcliff and the gentle Edgar, the

contrast between nature and civilization, the feminine expression and the patriarchal regulation of it — is all part of a broader representation of the self in face of the repression imposed by the social norms. Jackson comments, dualism has “more to do with a quest for wholeness and integration than with mere moral division. They are driven by a desire to reverse the process of alienation which occurs in the earliest stages of human development, and their quest is focused upon an ideal beyond or before the formation of the ego” (*Fantasy* 45). The manifestation of the doubles in Brontë’s novel, thus, is more than adequate to express the internal conflict common to all individuals, as it evidences the duplicity (or plurality) of the human mind and its struggles in face of the external world. By negating a part of one’s self, this part that is repressed is bound to emerge at some point, for one cannot be truly one without all its parts.

The novel, thus, with its mysterious repetition of patterns and antagonistic forces, brings to surface the face of reality that is denied to every individual, who is forced to repress it in order to adapt to the social structure of the time. However, the object of repression is never fully suppressed for it is still a part of that identity, and the *unheimlich* is bound to emerge out of the *heimlich*. This results in the appearance of a double, who might come in many forms and variations, as a manifestation of the denied self who could no longer be restrained. The emergence of this secret, the aspect of personality, which is unwelcomed by the individual and social acceptance, exposes the shadows of all of those around, who are likely forced to face their own secrets. In this process resides the uncanny nature of *Wuthering Heights* and its characters: when the aspects that were repressed are exposed to light, they bring either death or transformation, and in the struggle for integration, they will haunt the individual till it reaches one of the two ends. By presenting characters who are conflicted due to the complexity of their own selves, Emily Brontë offers perspective over identity and the process of socialization. If read carefully, the conflicts that the characters of *Wuthering*

Heights face can be recognized as to be common to all individuals, on a smaller or larger scale. By facing the shadows of the inhabitants of the Heights, the reader and the critics are reminded of their own duality, and the shadows that were once concealed, might eventually return to light.

7. *STRANGE CASE OF DR. JEKYLL AND MR. HYDE*

Strange Case is probably the novel that uses the *doppelgänger* to explore the dichotomy in human nature most explicitly between the four selected works for this thesis. In contrast to *Frankenstein* and *Wuthering Heights*, published in the beginning and middle of the century respectively, Stevenson's experiment on the double is much more straightforward regarding the portrayal of the splitting in identity (and body). Natasha L. Rebry, in her doctorate thesis *Disintegrated Subjects: Gothic Fiction, Mental Science and the fin-de-siècle Discourse of Dissociation*, explains that "[w]hile the notion of double or divided consciousness and the nature of the secondary self ... had been topics of interest for the preceding 100 years, there was a surge of renewed interest in the 1870s and 1880s, largely due to the 'sanctioned' scientific interest of researchers like Jean Martin Charcot¹⁴" (68). In the last decades of the nineteenth-century, reports on real-life events of individuals who exhibited signs of dual or multiple personalities induced the peak of the population's interest in the discussion about the division of self (Rebry 70). In addition to that, as the "late-Victorian era saw an ever-changing social landscape [and] the typical markers of identity – gender, sexuality, class, race, nationality – seemed to be unstable" (Rebry 127), works of literature that proposed discussions on themes such as man/woman in face of late-Victorian moral codes became as urgent as ever.

It is in this social context which the story of the doctor Henry Jekyll and his other self, Edward Hyde, come to existence. Jackson indicates that "[t]heir names signify their functions: Jekyll means I kill — pointing to the murderous side concealed within his respectable role and

¹⁴ Jean-Martin Charcot (1825-1893) is considered the "father" of modern neurology. He was professor to names such as Freud, Babinski and Tourette. "His contributions range from the diagnosis and understanding of certain aspects of hysteria, which influenced psychoanalysis, to insights into the psychopathology of trauma that foreshadow modern concepts of post-traumatic stress disorder and somatoform disorders" (White 254).

projected onto Hyde, all that is hidden” (“Narcissism and Beyond”). In the novel the double is undoubtedly, even to the inattentive reader, the protagonist’s *other*, and makes the point quite literally that “man is not truly one, but truly two” (Stevenson 55)¹⁵. Jekyll “embodies the 19th-century ambitions and illusions (Czyżewska and Głąb 24); he represents the “Ideal I, censoring and judging those aspects of himself which are socially unacceptable and projected onto Hyde” (Jackson, “Narcissism and Beyond”). Similar to Victor Frankenstein, he is a doctor who is inclined to “scientific heresies” (19) and chooses to “manipulate ... science to fulfill narcissistic purposes” (Romero 33), eventually uncovering his shadow self. In both cases, the scientists naively interfere with “the laws of nature and the attempt ... to change human personality lead[ing] to unleashing forces which [they] cannot control” (Czyżewska and Głąb 25). There is also the fact that the ‘birth’ of Jekyll’s monster is accomplished with no feminine intervention, the role of creator being attributed exclusively to the male body, which predicts a scientific failure (Bispo 46)¹⁶ and a violation of the natural law. There is one central point, however, that differentiate Victor and Jekyll greatly, which is the fact that the older doctor is well aware of the evil side of his nature since the beginning and releases it deliberately, unlike the young doctor, who is ignorant to what he was about to unleash by making his creature. The seemingly minor detail turns out to be fundamental to the distinction between the course of their narratives. Nonetheless, “[u]ltimately Jekyll’s experiment, like Frankenstein’s, goes tragically wrong” (Dryden 105), leading to both tales converging again at the same end: death.

Irving S. Saposnik states that although *Strange Case* was originally “written as a fable

¹⁵ All the references to *The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* in this chapter are from Stevenson, Robert Louis. *The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde and Other Tales of Terror*, edited by Robert Mighall, Penguin Classics, 2003, and will be cited parenthetically with the page number.

¹⁶ Original: “Verifica-se também que o papel de criador é assumido exclusivamente por Jekyll, não existindo intervenção feminina, o que prediz igualmente um fracasso científico, sendo esta perspectiva frequentemente debatida em análises de Frankenstein de Mary Shelley” (Bispo 46). My translation.

of Victorian anxieties, it has been distorted into a myth of good-evil antithesis, a simplistic dichotomy rather than an imaginative exploration of social and moral dualism” (715). This common confusion might be for Jekyll’s insistent claims on the opposing moral dispositions between himself and his *other* self: “Edward Hyde, alone in the ranks of mankind, was pure evil” (58); “one was wholly evil, and the other was still the old Henry Jekyll” (59). Although the scientist’s awareness of the fact that “all human beings ... are commingled out of good and evil” (58), he naively believes that these aspects inherent to all man and woman could be separated, distilled, so one would be completely good or completely bad. Jekyll sees his moral dilemma as a choice between being good or being bad, no questions in between, thus, the common misconception about the novel’s central theme. In reality, what the doctor fails to realize is that “Hyde is but the consequence of [the man’s] experiments in forbidden science; he exists only by the will of *Jekyll*; he has no independent being. Hyde is not *other* than Jekyll; he *is* Jekyll” (Wright 255). It seems, then, that “Jekyll is but the public persona of a man who is much more — and other — than he appears to be” (Wright 254), and his superficial understanding of his own character is but a refusal, or even getaway, to compromise with his rather complex nature.

To understand the significance of the doctor’s doing, it is crucial to understand the moral constraints that he was subjected to. His early “impatient gaiety of disposition” (55) was irreconcilable with his “imperious desire to carry [his] head high, and wear a more than commonly grave countenance before the public” (55). As Saposnik comments, Jekyll’s “central issue is the necessity for moral and social flexibility in a society which dictates rigidity. [His] experiment to free himself from the burden of duality results in failure because of his moral myopia, because he is a victim of society’s standards even while he would be free of them” (715). In the macrocosm of his life — English culture —, if one wished to be part of society, accepted as a member of that community, any problematic tendencies should be

hidden accordingly; in consequence, the *je*, the individual's I, had to be invariably suppressed (Miyoshi, *The Divided Self* 299). Hence, Jekyll finds no other choice than to conceal his real dispositions, as he later gets to explain: "it came about that I concealed my pleasures" and "regarded and hid them with an almost morbid sense of shame. It was ... rather the ... nature of my aspirations than any particular degradation in my faults, that made me what I was and ... severed in me those provinces of good and ill which divide and compound man's dual nature" (55). Because he was aware from a young age of the sacrifices he would have to make to get to where he intended, to where he was expected, his commitment "to a profound duplicity of life" (55) also started at an early age.

It seems, thus, that the discourse between good and evil, insistently articulated by Dr. Henry has more to do with the allegorical representation of the duality that rules the world of civilization than to an oversimplified Manichean perspective that reduces and divides all elements of the story into two opposing sects. As a result, duality finds its way in every corner of the narrative: day and night, inside and outside, light and darkness, moral and immoral, gentleman and savage, wealth and poverty, man and animal, pleasure and sorrow, success and failure, hidden and exposed, truth and lie, and life and death. It is certain that the great forces of man and of nature always come in two and that could be no different in Stevenson's novel, however, because Jekyll challenges this natural order and tries to tame it for the sake of his own gratification, he has to face repercussions that will take form in the aggravation of how duality is expressed in the story.

Rebry comments that the answer to what the doctor has repressed since youth, the reason for his quest for separation in the early stages of his experiment, "has been taken up by critics and has resulted in a seemingly endless array of possibilities" (64). On that, Nancy K. Gish observes that despite the doctor's "gaiety of disposition" (55) from his early years of age being often read as "demonstrating a sexual origin to his developed evil behavior[,] ... they

are not definitively so; children can also be prone to selfishness and malice and cruelty and cowardice of other kinds, even brutality and killing”, thus, “the suggestiveness of the text is indeterminate, not directed exclusively or primarily to sexuality in itself” (3). Perhaps the true essence of Henry’s shame is irrelevant to the reader and to the critic. It is not about *what* but *how* he represses it, acknowledges it, frees it and, ultimately, how the doctor processes his sense of selfhood while othering a part of himself, which is a topic of particular relevance to the present analysis.

Despite Jekyll (and maybe his colleagues) considering his mysterious dispositions the worst of his transgressions, hypocrisy is, in fact, his greatest crime. As Miyoshi states, in the world of *Strange Case*, “hypocrisy, the lie at the very core of life, is still moralistically conceived” (*The Divided Self* 290). Like Frankenstein, Stevenson’s doctor hides behind claims of introducing a revolutionary discovery that would benefit the human race, when, in reality, his scientific endeavors are purely for self-centered reasons. Whitney S. May summarizes it well:

What at first appears as a philanthropic desire to use science to improve the seemingly primitive dual situation of man turns out to have a more selfish motivation: separating his own, conflicting personalities would allow the good doctor the anonymity to oppose the social constraints placed upon him by his Victorian contemporaries and to commit the crimes he desires while suffering no consequences himself. He could indulge in public and private pleasures with impunity, thereby exempting himself from the traditional mores of Victorian society (“Through the Cheval-Glass” 127).

What Henry Jekyll fears, in fact, is the “disclosure of the Hyde who is his ‘true’ identity ... not for reason primarily of shame but for fear of losing forever the pleasure of that second life” (Miyoshi, *The Divided Self* 290). As long as he is to have his *other*, his not-Jekyll self, he is certain to get away with any morally dubious act that he might commit. Despite all his

allegations of acting towards a greater good, to free all man and woman of the duality inherent to human nature, in fact, he was only concerned in freeing himself.

For many critics, though, such flaw in the doctor's character speaks not only about him, but about Victorian society as a whole. According to Saposnik, he is a realistic and "complex example of his age of anxiety: woefully weighed down by self-deception, cruelly a slave to his own weakness, sadly a disciple of a severe discipline, his is a voice out of 'De Profundis,' a cry of Victorian man from the depths of his self-imposed under-ground" (721). In such a reading, one may perceive him as both an innocent and guilty man. Like all men and women, he is bound to the expectations and impositions that uphold the cultural and moral standards of the current period. As a consequence, part of what he recognizes as himself is inevitably repressed or, at least, hidden to some degree. However, as this is clearly harmful to both the mind and the soul, his own pain turns into pain towards the world. In allowing that to happen, or unable to stop it, Jekyll feeds his shadow and is fed by it. He is aware of the consequences, aware of the improper, even criminal acts done by the hands of Edward Hyde, yet he insists on his endeavors. As much as the *doppelgänger's* tendencies for violence increase, the pleasure Henry Jekyll feels in rebelling, not as himself but as his *other-self*, intensifies.

Jekyll's "lust of evil" and "love of life" (64) rejoice in the freedom offered by Hyde to a point that Jekyll finds himself unable to renounce to Hyde as his appreciation for indulgence in forbidden pursuits only grows with each transformation; he secretly "welcomes his double's arrival, and privately marvels at his existence" (May, "Through the Cheval-Glass" 128). Daniel L. Wright suggests that the doctor's actions are that of an addict. He blames, however, the drug that enables the "lower elements in [the doctor's] soul" (57) to emerge as the object of addiction, while it seems more accurate to be Hyde, in fact, that generates such reaction. The potion is simply the means to "bring to light divisions that were already within:

the action tendencies elicited in Hyde ... always [laid] dormant within Jekyll” (Gish 7). The drug was “neither diabolical nor divine” (59) and “rather than creating a second personality”, only “weaken[ed] the integrative mechanisms by which the gaping cracks [of his] personality [were] papered over and normally hidden from view” (Woody and Bowers qtd. in Gish 7). What Jekyll was truly addicted to was the unreserved freedom that he experienced when under the effect of the concoction which enabled the emergence of Hyde.

The shadow-self of Dr. Henry is everything he is afraid of and also everything he wishes for. As Saposnik notices, he is “not the antithetical evil to Jekyll’s good nor is he evil at all. His cruelty derives from his association with Jekyll, not from any inherent motivation toward destruction” (728), meaning that Hyde’s nature is in fact Henry’s nature. Until then, he was only “a creature ever present but submerged; not the evil opponent of a contentious good but the shadow self of a half-man” (Saposnik 717), a (half-)existence “unable to exist on the surface” (Saposnik 731) by his own. It is only through the doctor’s decision to bring him to light that he is able to wander as his own person. His dispositions are not truly his but Jekyll’s, for he is a part of him after all. Hyde is the “brutal embodiment of the moral, social, political, and economic threats which shook the uncertain Victorian world. In his moral role he exemplifies the impossibility of any successful separation of man’s natural being” (Saposnik 279), for there are no separate beings but one. As mentioned, however, the scientist refuses to accept his shadow-self as an indivisible part of him, which Dryden speculates is because the man-monster “reveals the potential atavistic nature” (84) in the morally unspotted Jekyll. That explains the fact that Hyde is repeatedly described as inhuman: “ghost” (17), “devil” (63), “ape-like” (22), “hardly human” (26), “troglydytic” (26), “monkey” (42), “pale and dwarfish” (16). At the same time expressions like those that distance the man from the monster-man and “disavows any responsibility for what Hyde does” (Gish 2), it also functions as a “reminder of the barbarism which underlies civilization, ... a necessary component of human psychology

which most would prefer to leave unrealized” (Saposnik 728). Hyde is thus a portrayal of the animalistic, uncivilized parcel of human nature that remains dormant inside every person, and “to catch sight of [him] is to be reminded of the hidden ‘je’ in each of us ... that lies in wait for the moment of release” (Miyoshi, *Divided Self* 298). Therefore, to reject him is more than predictable, especially during the time in which the novel was published, considering the rising apprehension, up to a point of fear, regarding atavism¹⁷ among Victorian society in consequence for the rise of evolutionary theories such as Darwin’s *On Origin of Species*.

Edward Hyde is not only associated with the animalistic trait contained within every human but also with darkness. It is only appropriate: as a shadow-self, he should also walk through the shadows. Bispo develops this idea by saying that his “identification with the shadow is further emphasized by the places where he appears throughout the novel” (44)¹⁸: the dark, obscure parts of the city. It is only appropriate considering he is the part of Jekyll’s psyche that he wished (while also did not) to keep in the darkness. As Urszula Czyżewska and Grzegorz Głąb notice, “the dark corners of urban descriptions correlate with the equally dark recesses of the human psyche” (21). Not only that, but the fact that Edward is commonly let loose during the night is also significant to his characterization as a *doppelgänger* — Dryden notices that nighttime “is the domain of the ‘other’, camouflaging identity and criminal activity. At night the Gothic ‘monster’ penetrates ‘safe’ domestic environments” (89). Hence, it is legitimate to read Hyde as a portrayal of not only Jekyll’s, or even men’s, shadow, but also the metropolis’. May explains:

Hyde becomes, in this sense, a nightmare figure of the burgeoning modern metropolis:

he is untraceable, uncontainable, and unknowable. In his resistance to meaningful

¹⁷ According to Dryden, “The fear of the ‘beast within’ was the late nineteenth-century’s fear of itself. Degeneracy could lead to atavism, which must be purged in order that the race evolves beyond its animal instincts” (76).

¹⁸ Original: “A identificação de Hyde com a sombra é, ainda, enfatizada pelos locais em que este surge ao longo da obra” (Bispo 44). My translation.

description, Hyde upsets the boundaries between subject and object. What's more, the absence of any recognizable identity of his own makes him a metropolitan monster, a characterization of anonymous street crime, and a fascinating prediction of the real-life urban predator that would emerge a few years later in the form of Jack the Ripper ("Through the Cheval-Glass" 128).

Hyde embodies not only the threat to Victorian morality but to its safety as well. He is just a product, though, of what the urban environment does to the individual: it is in fact the metropolis that "breeds criminals, [and] also has the capacity to conceal them from view, as if providing sanctuary to the criminals it creates" (Dryden 88). By embodying the consequences of the dangers of the night, he unintentionally exposes the roots of the problem likewise.

Hyde's presence and his relation to the city also highlights the duality of the city's life. The locations are "a reflector rather than a maker of Victorian period. ... The descriptions of well-maintained and safe city streets are contrasted with those of dirty, neglected and hostile areas of the city" (Czyżewska and Głąb 20). A constant reminder of what is good and what is bad is perceived throughout the novel: the wealthy and the poor, the beautiful and the ugly, day and night, human and animal-like, truth and secrecy, peace and violence, safety and danger, inside and outside. The last pair, inside and outside, is especially significant considering its close relation to the double motif and the uncanny effect. Even, it is in a higher or lower degree, present in most expressions of duality developed in the narrative. As Saposnik observes, the structure of the novel itself is grounded on the contrast of inside and outside, exterior and interior (725). He continues:

The actions that occur in each represent an intriguing paradox: in the exterior, social ambles and foul crimes; in the interior, elegant drawing rooms and secreted laboratories. Each division contains two opposing elements which combine to characterize the individual locale, while both locations in their necessary union

represent the social cosmos. The result is a social bond no less indivisible than the moral bond which Jekyll attempts unsuccessfully to sever (725-6).

Saposnik's suggestion of the duality *inside* the duality demonstrates the complexity of the theme and foreshadows the failure of Jekyll's experiment in separating what he considered his two opposing natures. By trying to preserve his portrayal of the perfect gentleman at the expense of his true inclinations, he ruins both parts of himself.

The doctor's performance is in fact just like his house: the door, "which wore a great air of wealth and comfort, ... was now plunged in darkness" (16). That, Dryden explains, "is an early indication that all is not as morally sound as it appears behind the elegant façade of Jekyll's home, or even behind the doctor's own comely exterior" (103). The line that delimitates what is the outside and what is the inside thins till it becomes indistinguishable and the two concepts are entangled till a point where Jekyll himself is unable to define "where one ends and another begins" (9). Is Hyde the outsider, the *other* to Jekyll's self, or the part of the scientist that should remain *inside* of him? Jarold E. Hogle claims that "any establishment of a distinctive 'I,' ... depends on setting up a subject over against an 'other' with only one of the two being regarded as a figure" (187). Then should the doctor's other-self remain as a shadow, following closely his footsteps, or far away, on the dark alleys of the city? As the "stranger in [Jekyll's] own house" (58), Hyde is the *unheimlich* in Jekyll's *heimlich*. To define who is purely Jekyll and who is purely Hyde is useless because Hyde is but a part of Jekyll: the "two hands are in many points identical: only differently sloped" (29). The doctor's "insistence on absolute otherness" (Gish 2) is completely vain considering that later, he himself admits that "[t]his, too, was myself ... [and] it seemed more express and single, than the imperfect and divided countenance I had been hitherto accustomed to call mine" (58).

As Stevenson leads the readers to the end of the text, a movement of going inside can be perceived by the observant eyes. The action of the narrative "leads further and further into

the interior of Jekyll's house" (Saposnik 726), to the interior of his psyche. The reader is led through the streets, then to the front door, then the hall, the study and finally the laboratory, where the secrets are properly dissected. As the last door to the doctor's secret is metaphorically and literally destroyed, all "fortifications erected by Jekyll to prevent detection" (Dryden 107) are gone and this action not only represents his darkest secret coming to light but also the eradication of the line that distinguishes Henry Jekyll and Edward Hyde. As Dryden states, *The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* "is a story about doors and the secrets they conceal and reveal" (102); they solidify the duality present in the novel but equally dissolve them.

The more the scientist tries to distance himself from his *other*-self, the more they become confused with each other. He recognizes Hyde at first as a part of himself, providing a false sense of acceptance, union even. However, as he is given space to put into action all his immoral desires, he vacillates and his convictions wavers. His shadow then becomes an *other*, a "[h]e, I say — I cannot say, I" (67), an it. However, as Reby notices, "when one might expect Jekyll to distance himself the most from Hyde — that is in his description of the murder of Carew — Jekyll narrates the event from the first-person" (110). At this point there is no point of return, what Jekyll once believed as being his good self becomes irrevocably corrupted. The point was never what Hyde had done but what *Jekyll* let him to do. Even if by the hands of Hyde, it was ultimately Jekyll's body who committed such a crime and from that point forward there is no other to hide behind anymore. There are "no longer any marks to distinguish the two. The hideous face is forever joined to the social mask. The joining, however, is in no sense a reconciliation of the Jekyll-Hyde duality. Rather, it signals a return to the starting point of Jekyll's whole experience" (Miyoshi, *Divided Self* 300). Jekyll, at last, does not learn a thing. His journey for freedom finishes the same way he started, but at the end, he has done "irreparable damage to his own identity by traveling so completely between

his and Hyde's personalities rather than attempting to find harmony in both" (May, "Through the Cheval-Glass" 132). His failure was set to happen since the beginning, for he never really had an understanding of his identity and his comprehension of good and evil was but a frail concept subjected to the influence of socio-cultural standards, ethical, moral and religious rules of his time (Bispo 47)¹⁹. There was never evil and there was never good: there was only Henry Jekyll.

The main conflict of the novel comes down to this realization: that there is no Jekyll without Hyde, and no Hyde if not as a part of Jekyll. Although the doctor tries till the end to deny the "inescapable conclusion that man must dwell in uncomfortable but necessary harmony with his multiple selves" (Saposnik 725), once he starts walking the path to self-division, the encounter with unity becomes inevitable. His suffering, thus, is not due to duality but to union (Massey 57), the reality he tries to escape from is the reality of being one, not two. Unlike Catherine Earnshaw whom hell is separation, for Henry Jekyll hell is the idea of union. His/their end, thus, is more than fitting: "though the hand that administers the poison is Edward Hyde's, it is Henry Jekyll who forces the action. Never before have they been so much one" (Saposnik 725). Their final act as Jekyll-Hyde is a joint effort towards freedom, their first and last act as one.

¹⁹ Original: "Esta tentativa de divisão é já em si problemática, uma vez que Jekyll pretende dividir a sua identidade baseando-se na muito relativa dicotomia entre Bem e Mal. Ambos os conceitos são extremamente subjetivos, estando sujeitos à influência dos padrões socioculturais e regras éticas, morais e religiosas de uma determinada sociedade" (40). My translation.

8. THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY

In the last novel analyzed, the *doppelgänger* emerges as an object, or an objectified image, which is a fresh development of the psychological double as presented in the 1900s, emerging just a decade prior to the end of the century. In *The Picture of Dorian Gray*, the story of Dorian, who is haunted by his double, an uncanny portrait of himself, can be read through Lacan's theory of the Mirror Stage. To recapitulate what was discussed in chapter 4, Lacan argues that:

The *mirror stage* is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation and which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality ... and, lastly, to the assumption of the armor of an alienating identity which will mark with its rigid structure the subject's entire mental development (444).

There is a Dorian before seeing the portrait and another after seeing it. Before his introduction to Lord Henry, "Dorian is what the artist Basil holds as the aesthetic ideal, totally unconscious of his youth and beauty, equivalent to a newborn baby or infant in the mirror stage that has no idea of this outside world" (Lu 89). He is presented "as pure as a piece of white paper" (Zhang 378), "a tabula rasa unaware of all the pitfalls of human existence, of sin and temptation" (Šubertová 60); he is described as "unspotted from the world" (17)²⁰, with a "face that made one trust him at once" (17), carrying all "candour of youth" and "all youth's passionate purity" (17). It is through his portrait that he "recognise[s] himself for the first time" (24) — similar to Dr. Jekyll's "leap of welcome" (Stevenson 58) — and "acquires an

²⁰ All the references to *The Picture of Dorian Gray* in this chapter are from Wilde, Oscar. *The Picture of Dorian Gray*. Oxford University Press, 1998, and will be cited parenthetically with the page number.

identity” (Zhang 378), or, starts to develop one.

His process of identification, however, does not follow the correct order suggested by Lacan. Before the start of his maturation, Dorian is introduced to Lord Henry’s sense of the Real and warned about the finitude of his youth which causes in the younger the fragmentation of his sense of self (May, *William Wilson’s Echoes* 38). It is interesting to notice here how similar the descriptions of that reality are to Lacan’s conception of the Real. The description of a “new emotion for which we cannot find expression” or “some thought that terrifies us [which] sudden[ly] siege[s] to the brain and calls on us to yield” (23) seem close enough to the psychoanalyst’s interpretations of the Real as an “object of anxiety” (Bailly ch. 6). It is under that “traumatic strain” (May, *William Wilson’s Echoes* 38), afflicted by such frightening ideas, that Dorian “stood gazing at the shadow of his own loveliness [that] the full reality of [Henry’s] description flashed across him” (25). For the first time “the sense of his own beauty came on him like a revelation” (24), what he was so praised for by others was not acknowledged by himself up until that point (Šubertová 60). Such a strong impression causes Dorian to “confuse ... his replicated image” (May, *William Wilson’s Echoes* 38) as his own self for he is just becoming acquainted with the reality of his own being, like an infant who starts to make sense of itself. Since he was enlightened on the fact that the “true mystery of the world is the visible, not the invisible” (22), his portrait, the material testimony of his youth, should be, in accordance, the testimony of the real, or even, ideal Dorian.

His portrait, as many critics have noticed, is assimilated by the young man as his ideal-I. Dorian is both “in love with it” (27) and “jealous of the portrait” (26), which is the expected dual relationship one establishes with the idealized-I for it assumes the role of both rival and what one aspires to be (Karamchandani 434). Either way, his identification with the painting is so immediate and intense that he admits it as being part of himself (27) and that destroying it “would be murder” (26). Dorian, however, “fails to understand the fact that he is

actually identifying the [o]ther rather than himself” (Lu 95), which is one of the dangers of the identification with the ideal-I, as Lacan explains. The moment of recognition of himself through the portrait was also one of misrecognition for he is assigned (or assigns himself) an imaginary position: that of immaculate beauty. Hence, he becomes aware of both his identity and his finitude: being beautiful becomes the condition of his being²¹ (Fonseca 70). Christopher Craft argues that a “viewing subject replicated in a mirror may be said to return to where he started, but not as she started. For she starts as a human being replete with such presence as persons may claim, yet returns to himself as an image-being devoid of precisely this presence” (109-10), meaning that Dorian, in believing that the portrait is but a reflection of who he is, fails to understand that the object, like a mirror, returns to him an inverted, objectified reality which is not the real world. The portrait, Craft adds, is a literal presence that marks an objectal absence (120): it reveals to him the distance between his actual living being and his ideal-I. The moment he acquires his (perfect) body image is also when he realizes that such ideal is lost in him²² (Fonseca 72). To identify himself through the portrait and *as* the portrait, is to perceive “himself as something outside his own self” (Svensson 11), thus, to become different from that reflection of him, to change, to grow old, is also to become an *other*, a not-Dorian. According to Daniela Cârstea, “Dorian’s acknowledgement of the incompleteness of his being ... is defined by Lacan as ‘a lack-in-being’” (3) and it is the urgency to “fill the gap in his being” (3) that leads him to plead for the exchange of his soul for the portrait’s eternal youth; he wishes to *become* the “real” Dorian, the one untouched by time that he sees on canvas instead of the aging one that every minute passed drifts further from his ideal.

²¹ Original: “Foi um momento de alegria e júbilo ... mas também de alienação, no qual um lugar imaginário lhe era designado — lugar da beleza sem defeitos. Dorian adquire a consciência de sua identidade mas também de sua finitude ... Ser belo se tornou para ele a condição de ser” (Fonseca 70). My translation.

²² Original: “No momento da aquisição de sua imagem corporal ... ele ganhou alguma coisa que já lhe veio perdida” (Fonseca 72). My translation.

The young man's will to have what he lacks, the painting's eternal youth (and consequently eternal beauty) while the object grows old in his place, is equivalent to what Joyce Carol Oates calls a Faustian pact (424). His ambition to live in the illusory world of images is the same as the infant who wishes to remain in the Imaginary Order, the world of wholeness and false promises. Linda Šubertová comments:

The system of the Imaginary order as understood by Lacan is nevertheless disrupted due to an inexplicable supernatural element, a Faustian bargain which allows Dorian to exchange his soul for eternal youth and become the imaginary ideal ego, while the portrait is from now on destined to bear all of his sins and age. The roles have reversed, as if the infant became perfectly unified upon seeing their ideal ego, whereas the specular image would be scattered, defective, and helpless (61).

Unlike Faustus who needs Mephistopheles to bargain with, Dorian's transaction is made among only himself (the real one and the painted one), "the devil himself is absent" (Oates 424), which, according to Oates, locates Dorian's or even men's "Fall within the human psyche alone" (424). The quote is interesting because it assumes the young man's narcissistic impulse as something inherent to humankind and spots its roots in the matters of the mind. Dorian's ambition to embody the portrait of Dorian is a natural one during the mirror stage for, to become the ideal-I, would mean to become whole in Lacanian terms. To identify oneself through the other would always leave some empty space between the subject and the other, but to *become* the other would be to achieve complete wholeness.

Bailly explains that the Mirror Stage marks "the fundamental place of narcissism in the creation of identity/Subject – the seeing oneself *as* an image, and the love of the image that *is* oneself" (ch. 2). As discussed, however, such narcissism eventually "proves fatal because it provides at once an image of the self and all that the self is not; it distorts as it reflects" (Manganiello 31). Dorian's experience echoes Narcissus's who "falls, that is, not for

‘him-self’ but rather for a seeming-other over there, a shimmering dream-figure who springs from a mimetic event that Narcissus does not yet recognize as such” (Craft 111). His first encounter with himself, meaning his reflection, even, seems to be reflected on Wilde’s antihero; just as Dorian “drew back, and his cheeks flushed for a moment with pleasure. A look of joy came into his eyes, as if he had recognized himself for the first time” (24), when Narcissus sees his face on the water:

... he’s overcome
by the beauty of the image that he sees;
he falls in love with an immaterial hope,
a shadow that he wrongly takes for substance (Ovid 534-37).

The event that “divides Narcissus’s experience of being into a radically dissociated before and after” (Craft 111) is the same that alienates Dorian from himself and from reality, resulting in the fragmentation and subsequent moral descent (Karamchandani 434) of his being. From the beginning they occupy similar positions, standing “somewhere between man and boy, presence and absence, being and specter” (Craft 110), hero and villain, *self* and *other*. Ultimately, they are “at once neither/nor and either/both” (Craft 110), hence their disorientation in making a distinction between what is Dorian/Narcissus and what is not.

Regarding the (mis)identification with the other, John P. Muller and William J. Richardson comment that “[g]iven the fact that the infant subject first discovers himself in an external image, it is easy to understand how he confuses this external image of himself with the images of other subjects among whom he finds himself” (31). Hence, it is correct to assume that Dorian “experiences [him]self only inasmuch as ... e constructs an ideal image of his ... ‘self’ and seduces others into recognizing it” (Cârstea 2), which leads him to be extremely dependent on other people’s gaze towards him for he can only perceive himself through the reflection of others’ recognition (Cârstea 2) of him. Since his state of wholeness is

in fact unsustainable, a fabrication of the illusory realm of the Imaginary, Dorian seeks other people to validate his so-called perfect self which maintains the fictional sense of union previously experimented (Cârstea 2) during the first phase of the Mirror Stage. Such mindless search for validation, however, “also leads to a desperate sense of alienation that requires a constant resuming of this recognition” (Cârstea 2). It is under the other’s admiration that he “commences his pursuit of self-identity to satisfy his excessive desire, which actually is the desire of the [o]ther” (Lu 89). According to Lacan, “man’s desire is always ‘the desire of the other’” (Šubertová 35), meaning that what the subject desires, in fact, is what s/he imagines the *other(s)* desire(s). As seen in chapter 4, however, to *know* what one or others desire is a fruitless quest because desire is not a matter of the tangible world, but a state of being that precedes physicality. Desire, in lacanian terms, is fundamentally based on lack, thus Dorian’s realization of his youth and beauty as the presumed objects of desire of many — if not of all — encourages his idealized sense of wholeness: if others desire what he has then he lacks nothing and is a self-sufficient being in himself.

There are two central figures that facilitate and ground Dorian’s awakening and subsequent deterioration of the self: Basil Hallward and Lord Henry Wotton. Craft argues that “Dorian literally incorporates the desires of both Basil and Lord Henry for the unspoiled youth” (122), which confirms the suggestion that Dorian’s sense of identity and desire is completely dependent on the identification of and desire of others toward himself. The distorted coming-of-age tale renders the story of “Dorian’s-becoming-Dorian as Dorian’s-coming-to-desire-Dorian’s-own-desirability” (Craft 122), which is primarily influenced by Basil and Henry’s gaze upon him. Prompted by the two, as Lu Shiting states, the young man “alienates from his former self and remolds himself into an entity that is guided by [o]thers” (93). Regarding the influence they exert on Dorian, Andreas Svensson comments: “[i]f Basil, the painter, has the function of providing Dorian with an Imaginary

mirror, where Dorian sees his image and his ideal I, Henry complements Basil's portrait by providing Dorian with a Symbolic mirror" (13). Basil, the painter of Dorian's portrait, can be read as the initiator of the young man's Imaginary realm as he portrays an idealized, perfect image of Dorian, which he assumes to convey his real self. In a sense, Basil "inhabits the role of a Frankensteinian creator who, by virtue of creating the idealized image of Dorian, initiates Dorian's obsessive identification of outward identity with beauty and longevity" (Walker 97). His piece of art, however, not only provides Dorian with a sense of self but also creates "a mental prison to Dorian, as it restricts and later shows him his inner decline" (Hedlund 13). As a product of the painter's imaginary ideal, the portrait is not a true depiction of what Dorian is but what Basil *imagines* he is. The painting is no less alienating to the artist than the idea of perfection it ingrains in Dorian's psyche. Similarly, Lord Henry paints Dorian's perception of himself, not with strokes but with words, leading the young man to believe that his youth is the full scope of his identity and entices him to seek realization only through the means of senses, which later becomes the cause of his downfall.

Herdman states that "characters may testify to duality without in the least being doubles" (15), which is the case with the two men: they represent opposing realms, the Imaginary and the Symbolic Orders, which are equally fundamental to Dorian's process of identification. "Suspended between the interests of Basil and Lord Henry, Dorian ... becomes a blank canvas both men seek to fill with their separate imaginings of reality" (May, *William Wilson's Echoes* 36-7), just like the infant who is yet to make sense of the world. While Basil shows Dorian who he is — "'Am I really like that?' 'Yes; you are just like that'" (28) —, Lord Henry explains who he is — "[y]ou have explained me to myself, Harry" (89). The words and gaze of the other(s) trap him into narcissism; Basil teaches Dorian to love his own beauty, meanwhile Henry seduces him into worshipping the philosophy of unrestrained

pleasure (Madeiro 5)²³. The mirrors that are provided to Dorian, however, are from the beginning deceptive for they are misread portrayals all the same: to Basil, he is the epitome of a lost purity only attained in the Imaginary world; to Henry, he is the potentiality of a new hedonism, located in but also repressed by the world of the Symbolic.

Thus, Lord Henry is seen as the responsible for initiating Dorian into the Symbolic because it is through his discourse that he unveils “the external world and everything that it has to offer” (Šubertová 63) to the younger man. Yet, instead of rendering the castrating factor, essential to separate Dorian (the infant) from the illusions of the Imaginary and facilitate his transition into the second Order, he “leads Dorian to believe that anything is possible no matter what society expects, causing him to disregard any law or values established by the Other²⁴” (Šubertová 65). Such disruption to both Imaginary and Symbolic Orders leaves Dorian with no orientation on how to transition between the two realms which makes of him a subject lost in the in-between: he is neither fully inserted in the world of culture, laws and society nor in the world of illusion, wholeness and unity. Lord Henry’s actions, Sheldon W. Liebman argues, are due to the fact that Dorian is to him a desire that he cannot satisfy himself: the young man “represents a new life of sensation, emotion, and thought that Henry can experience vicariously and therefore safely” (302). He uses Dorian to “see his own unfulfilled dreams come to fruition” (Šubertová 69) while teaching the young man to desire what he desires. That leads to an inversion in Dorian’s process of maturation, as Šubertová explains:

From the moment of Dorian’s troubled entrance into the Symbolic order ... his identity

²³ Original: “A voz e o olhar do Outro, endereçados ao sujeito, o constituíram assim aprisionado ao seu narcisismo. Basil havia ensinado a Dorian a amar sua própria beleza. Henry, por sua vez, o fez idolatrar a filosofia dos prazeres da vida” (Madeiro 5). My translation.

²⁴ The capitalized Other in this quote refers to Lacan’s distinction between other and Other, in which other influences the subject in an individual, private manner, while “Other with a capital O, in contrast, influences everyone” (Tyson 28). Examples of the Other are “Society [and] Law, [which are] the set of hypotheses within which the Subject is constituted” (Bailly ch. 6).

as well as his desire are from now on bound to be closely tied to the Imaginary, as the Symbolic is defective and incomplete. Even though he necessarily has to exist among other subjects in society, he will mostly construct his reality by means of the Imaginary order and become more and more alienated from the self (68-9).

In Dorian's process of self-identification, the collision between Imaginary and Symbolic generates, as Lu states, "a divided sense of self" (98). Torn between worlds, he emerges as both "an imaginary individual and a subject of legal responsibility and social expectation" (Lu 96). Rather than introducing and offering means to an appropriate transition into the external world, Lord Henry insists on and solidifies Dorian's experience of the Imaginary, holding him stuck in the Mirror Stage, resulting in a perpetual state of alienation from both Imaginary and Symbolic realms.

Another character who marks Dorian's early life and plays a decisive part in his process of (des)humanization is his first and last love, the actress Sybil Vane. Before meeting her, he "has an unrealized potential for good or evil" (6), but his relationship with her marks the beginning of the man's moral and psychological descent. As stated by Donald R. Dickson, in Wilde's novel "the mirror imagery highlights the confusion between the imagined and the real, between mask and mirror" (6). Throughout the narrative, according to Yan Zhang, "Dorian recognizes himself through two mirrors" (378): the first being Basil's portrait and the second Sybil. Their first encounters are only between spectator and performer, he watches her "multipl[y] her personality through the medium of the stage" (Dickson 6): she was "all the heroines of romance — ... she was Desdemona one night, and Ophelia the other" (88), "[o]ne evening she is Rosalind, and the next evening she is Imogen (45), "I have seen her in every age and in every costume" (46). To Dorian, she is apart from everything else, for ordinary women "never appeal to one's imagination" (46), unlike the actress, who embodies the world of images through her art. In such a play of illusions "Dorian mistakes her assumed image for

the real Sybil” (Lu 95) and recognizes her as a unity in herself, a portrait of ideal beauty, just like himself. He sees reflected on her performance his own ideal-I, his gaze validates her state of bliss as much as her grace reflects his own. Like a mirror that reflects itself, to recognize her was to recognize himself.

All is lost, however, when one night she fails to perform beautifully; all the “imaginary visions that he built around Sibyl suddenly shatter into pieces and he is for the first time faced with Sibyl’s true self” (Šubertová 75). The actress, who was supposed to be one with her Art, reveals the farce to Dorian who thus realizes that woman and Art were in fact separate entities. Her poor performance unmasks the reality Dorian was trying to avoid, that is, the fact that such union was absurd; the incomplete fusion between woman and Art (performance) meant that the complete integration between man and Art (portrait) was equally lacking. The illusion sustained by Sybil on stage revealed to Dorian that his act was just the same, an illusion. He discovers, as Cârstea claims, Sybil to be mundane, to be vain (3), which is a reality “he tries to ignore, or rather to deny about himself” (3). His reaction to such revelation, nonetheless, is to escape: escape reality, escape her subsequent death, escape his own finitude. He decides to avoid “the suffering of life” (94) by becoming “a spectator to her tragedy” (Dickson 6), even if by doing so he ends becoming “the spectator of [his] own life” (94) along the way.

From the moment he hears about Sybil’s death, Dorian steps into a new stage of his life. With the discovery of the woman’s death, he also discovers a subtle change on the portrait of himself. At first, he dismisses the idea, surely “a painted canvas could not alter[,] [such] thing was absurd” (81), however, the more he felt a “dreadful state of doubt” (82), the more he felt the feeling of unfamiliarity towards the portrait and “begins to suspect that the figure in the portrait has agency of its own” (May, *William Wilson’s Echoes* 44). The episode is an example of what Jentsch identifies as uncanny in “On the Psychology of the Uncanny”:

“[a]mong all the psychical uncertainties that can become a cause for the uncanny feeling to arise, there is one in particular that is able to develop a fairly regular, powerful and very general effect: ... doubt as to whether a lifeless object may not in fact be animate – and more precisely, when this doubt only makes itself felt obscurely in one’s consciousness” (221).

By facing “himself face to face” (82), he finally realizes that it was “perfectly true[;] the portrait had altered” (82). His prayers had been heard; the portrait, instead of himself, had become “the mask of his shame” (82). Such realization, as well as the delusion caused by the failed relationship with the actress, “leads him to a life of sin and hedonism but with a lack of satisfaction because it is impossible to measure up to [his] ideal-I” (Karamchandani 434). He decides to drown himself in the world of the senses, “[e]ternal youth, infinite passion, pleasures subtle and secret, wild joys and wilder sins — he was to have all these things” (90). The portrait, his double, in turn, would bear the weight of change for him:

He would be able to follow his mind into its secret places. This portrait would be to him the most magical of mirrors. As it had revealed to him his own body, so it would reveal to him his own soul. ... Not one blossom of his loveliness would ever fade. Not one pulse of his life would ever weaken. Like the gods of the Greeks, he would be strong, and fleet, and joyous. What did it matter what happened to the coloured image on the canvas? He would be safe (91).

Granted with the blissfulness of perpetual youth, Dorian is free to wander without fearing the marks of time, the marks of ugliness. He is at last allowed to live his dream of wholeness, embodying in his being his imaginary, idealized self.

The role of receptacle of transgressions assumed by the young man’s double is similar to Dr. Jekyll’s, Hyde. As “Henry Jekyll found Victorian ‘respectability’ too constraining of his inner passions and sought his own release through his vicarious enjoyment of Hyde’s

activities” (Dryden 122), so did Dorian, who enjoys an unrestrained lifestyle with no sense of remorse for his portrait is the one to receive the scars, the evidence of his wrongdoings. Their selfishness, however, is equally “destructive of others and of the self” (Dryden 122) which is evident by the mental decline both characters go through their trajectories and the pernicious, even dangerous influence they exercise on the people around them. Šubertová affirms that even though Dorian seems “to function perfectly in the Symbolic order, what he is doing is merely projecting his numerous imaginary selves in order to preserve the imaginary self and to eliminate all the suspicion” (87), which is similar to the way Dr. Jekyll hides the identity of his shadow-self to conceal his secret and keep a respectable place in London’s society. According to May:

While Dorian is still very much himself, he is also, to some degree, the painting, and the painting is, to some degree, Dorian. Whereas Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde occupied the same body, epitomizing the interiority of the self in modern crisis, Dorian and his painting complicate the relationship by illustrating the identity seeking to reject itself, ultimately splitting itself entirely as a means to be rid of its past (*William Wilson’s Echoes* 39).

The fixation of both Dorian and Jekyll with their doubles — as *doppelgänger* stories of the nineteenth-century commonly are — is, ultimately, an exploration into their true selves. Such personal journeys, however, are not isolated from the social sphere for discussions on duality also revealed “the social divisions and self-delusions inherent in late-Victorian society” (Dryden 123). Richard J. Walker notices that, in fact, while in Stevenson’s novel the repression of the self turns to be destructive, in Wilde’s, to indulge and embrace transgression is similarly harmful (102). Thus, Dorian and his portrait do not only prove to be an “appropriate mirror image” (Walker 102) to Jekyll and Hyde — considering that the image is inverted before being reflected back — but also demonstrate that there is no success if not in

equilibrium between the inner and outer selves.

That leads to another point of interest in Dorian's relationship with his object-double, which is the depiction of the internal and external realms and their influence on Dorian's tale. As discussed in previous chapters, the appearance of the *doppelgänger* is likely to emerge when the division between the concepts of *inside* and *outside* become too conflicting. In earlier novels of the century, such as *Frankenstein* and *Wuthering Heights*, the double belonged to the realm of the outside — it was the monster, the foreigner —, however, the doubles that are 'born' during the *fin de siècle* are intrinsically connected to the dimension of the inside. Hyde emerges inside Jekyll's home, 'out' of Jekyll's body, and although he is free to wander the streets, his safe place, where he returns to hide or to *come to be* Hyde, is always inside. Likewise, Dorian's portrait comes to life inside Basil's home and is later taken even *insider*, to Dorian's old "play-room when he was a child" (103), being kept there till the end. In fact, Wilde's novel offers more than that: on contrary to the other examples just mentioned, in Dorian's case, *he* is the one to assume the role of the outsider, not his double. The portrait, according to Walker, emerges as the "authentic self, metaphorizing Dorian's integrated sense of internal and external selves and also highlighting the inability to apply such terms to Dorian himself. As this 'authentic' self remains hidden, Dorian becomes the performative and disidentical self" (105). Truly, the line that separates subject and double, self and other is the most blurred one when analyzing Dorian's case. In a paradoxical circumstance, "to look inwards for Dorian is therefore to also look outwards, at the external and visible portrait, yet this outward sign of internal as well as external decay is buried in an attic, remaining hidden and invisible" (105). Dorian inhabits both the inside and the outside, as much as he transitions between the Imaginary and Symbolic Orders. The portrait, thus, reveals to be a reflection of that: it portrays the unfamiliar that emerges from *inside* the familiar, the *unheimlich* out of the *heimlich*, that are actually two parts of one.

The gradual change that occurs between Dorian and his portrait, that is, the self that becomes the other while the other becomes the self, starts to take place and soon as he realizes the change in the painting. The more the young man surrenders himself to the illusory world of the senses, the more the object becomes Dorian; and the more the double assumes the identity of Dorian, the more the man “gets alienated from his self” (Cârstea 4) to a point that he becomes the *other*. By excluding himself from the natural process of aging, he comes to represent a “Victorian fantasy of the monstrous” (Budziak 278). Again, in a play of reflection, Dorian embodies the exact opposite of Frankenstein’s creature, yet both are monsters all the same: in his immutability, Dorian “is no less disturbing, even, perhaps, grotesque. Devoid of the human capacity for change, for growth or decline, Dorian becomes strangely akin to the figure of Frankenstein’s creation which is monstrous by being excluded from the cycle of human growth” (Budziak 256). While the product of the doctor’s experiment is isolated from the contact with humans for his antinatural structure, his inadequacy between limbs and, in other words, utter ugliness, Dorian distances himself from his kind precisely for he is “wonderfully handsome, with his finely-curved scarlet lips, his frank blue eyes, his crisp gold hair” (17) that seem to never change a bit throughout the years. As Dryden comments, in Wilde’s novel “the deviant in society exhibiting regressive tendencies is not a monster whose degeneracy is figured in his repulsiveness, as in Hyde [or Frankenstein’s creature], but rather a monster whose deviancy is caused by his extreme narcissism, a decadent Gothic subject whose beauty is the wellspring of horror” (114). In his insatiable, “wild desire to know everything about life” (43), Dorian starts to lose his self to himself (Cârstea 4), and before realizing, his “search for sensation becomes perverse” (Raitt 172), rapidly becoming “indistinguishable from a willed self-corruption” (Raitt 173). His blind immersion into the realm of senses leads him “into more primitive, even bestial modes of being” (Raitt 173) that makes him just as monstrous (if not more) as Frankenstein’s creature.

Oates suggests that Dorian's unconditional freedom that exceeds moral and ethical extremes is a consequence of his loss of humanity, which is a result of his soul being appropriated by, or exchanged for, the portrait (426). At first, he confuses the portrait with his conscience — placed outside of himself —, which is the actual case in Poe's *William Wilson*. He believes that "the portrait that Basil Hallward had painted of him would be a guide to him through life, would be to him what holiness is to some, and conscience to others, and the fear of God to us all" (82). Yet to have such a moral compass as an exterior entity leads Dorian to distance himself from feeling any remorse. From the moment his *doppelgänger* becomes the "repository of his suffering and guilt, [Dorian] assume[s] that he can act without fear of punishment" (Liebman 307). What was once the naive wish of an infant-Dorian to preserve youth turns into a sense of immortality which leads to the belief of his impunity (Dryden 133). As he "begins to enjoy his dual existence" (Dryden 133), he leaves the responsibility of filtering his conduct to the portrait. In his fascination with the power he believes to have over his picture, and therefore, his assumed immortality, "Dorian starts deliberately to seek out sensations that will lead to self-transformation" (Raitt 173) and, in a distorted way, replaces Basil's position as artist for he is now capable of "modify[ing] the expression on the canvas, making it more and more old, cruel, and brutal" (Poteet 246); Basil's actual murder in later chapters, only reinforces Dorian's authorship.

In a wicked inversion of circumstances, the portrait "Hallward had painted ... out of love" (Dryden 135) turns into a portrayal of evil by Dorian's very own hands. The man thus becomes "both artist and work of art" (Poteet 246), but fails to recognize that "his" art, more than a receptacle for his sins, also has the ability to influence him in pursuing his own decay (Raitt 173). As a result, the "monstrosity of his soul" becomes "an aesthetic experience" (Herdman 142) and his fixation with the beauty of the piece soon enough turns into an obsession with the marks of his corruption (Dryden 135) — he feels "keenly the terrible

pleasure of a double life” (147). Wilde writes: “he would sit in front of the picture, sometimes loathing it and himself, but filled, at other times, with that pride of individualism that is half the fascination of sin, and smiling, with secret pleasure, at the misshapen shadow that had to bear the burden that should have been his own” (119). On that, Craft comments that the “sheer recursivity of this process — from sin to altered image; from altered image to image-altering sin — only enhances the uncanny power that holds Dorian in thrall to portrait and mirror alike, precisely because they are so unlike” (116). Gradually, the reflected image of his transgression grows indispensable for Dorian to make sense of himself (Rohit 308), and reality becomes completely dependent on the picture up to a point in which he is fully immersed in his own alienation, unable to distinguish illusion from reality, Dorian from portrait.

As his double gains control over Dorian, he starts to descend into a swirling state of paranoia. His shadows begin to follow him in daylight, haunting “his present while bearing the physical implications of his past” (May, *William Wilson's Echoes* 31); he starts to sense “his own soul ... looking out at him from the canvas and calling him to judgment” (102). His change of heart is not based on some sudden guilty conscience or desire to be better, however, but on the realization that as he loses control of his environment and of himself, his secret at last can be discovered: “[s]urely the world would know his secret Perhaps the world already suspected it” (120). Rather than “a genuine shift in moral attitude, Dorian’s aspirations toward goodness result from his own vanity, as well as from his apprehension regarding the potential loss of the self that he adores above all others in his community” (Womack 178). The more the marks of his corruption emerge on the painting, the more he feels the impending moment in which his true self will be exposed and his perfect world of illusions crumble to the ground. As Šubertová explains, “if the Other were ever to see [the portrait], the protective layers of the Imaginary would become severed and Dorian’s whole

reality would immediately shatter into pieces” (99). He finds himself trapped: as long as the portrait exists, it will be the testimony to “the living death of his own soul” (185). He is alone against his own self:

The lack-in-being that had been filled with his desire of remaining “forever young”, is balanced by a continual voiding of whatever emerged in himself as a potential peril to his artificially preserved physical purity. Thus, he comes to painfully acknowledge that all he’s left with is his own Apollinic flesh, while his spirit had migrated towards the canvas (Cârstea 4).

He realizes that he cannot sustain such a state of degradation for much longer, but is held hostage by the portrait as it holds his past and commands his future. To emerge anew, a chapter should be closed, thus a choice is to be made: Dorian or Dorian’s portrait, the final separation must take place.

Dorian longs for the riddance of his *doppelgänger* for he repudiates the truth it reveals about himself. Like his contemporaries, however, he refuses to accept the reality of his duality and chooses to repress it (by destroying it) instead of accepting it. He intends to get rid of the painting, for confessing was never on his plans (187); but as he seizes the knife “and stab[s] the picture with it” (187), “the face of [his] soul” (132) reveals what he tried to deny till then: “[h]is beauty had been to him but a mask, his youth but a mockery” (185). Finally, Dorian is killed “by what he can neither assimilate nor escape, the very byproducts of his hateful and wasteful life” (Raitt 175). The illusions of the Imaginary that laid the foundations to his identity and guided him throughout life are proven to be simply illusions. Just like Henry Jekyll, death reveals the corruption of his soul (Dryden 146), bringing to light the truth they tirelessly attempted to keep in the shadows. Dorian, as much as the other main characters of the novels previously analyzed, is unable to achieve synthesis with his dual nature. The price

is, thus, a forced union, because the imbalance he has caused to the natural law of things had to be resolved, if not in life, in death.

9. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

After analyzing the depiction of each double in the four novels, it is clear that there is a progression. It goes from creature to barbarian, to second personality to portrait. Considering each example of *doppelgänger*, all of them produce in the reader and in the characters around the uncanny feeling of the *unheimlich*, or, uncanny. Each of the four is an *other*, but the way the *other* is depicted in relation to the subject, that is, the one the double emerged from, differs. Frankenstein's creature is undeniably a monster. Despite Victor's attempts to explain its existence by scientific apparatus, its existence heavily relies on supernatural features to convince the reader of its plausibility. It is a creature that attests the immortality of the body, which resembles the remarks on the origins of the concept of double, a supernatural existence that attests the immortality of the soul. Heathcliff, however, is a double who is also a human being, much closer in nature to his counterpart, Catherine, but still sustaining unnerving aspects about him. His wickedness and lack of morals make him, in a sense, a monster in human form and his connection to Catherine deals with forces that are beyond scientific understanding or nature's Laws. Then, there is Jekyll, who is also Hyde, a condition that is not represented only metaphorically. Physically, they are the same individual, but there are still some aspects that otherize one from the other such as their striking differences in manners, morals and characterization. Finally, Dorian's double is the closest to one's own self that one can get — a portrait. The object is an identical representation of the subject and even though it is an object instead of a human, the connection it creates with the young man — Dorian confuses himself with the painting — makes it the closest to its subject among all the four.

Portraying the double as a monster, for its deformed and enormous body, moral corruption or animalistic instincts, is not simply an aesthetic choice. The figure of the

monster, regardless of the interpretation, is the utmost representation of the *other*. In Jeffrey Jerome Cohen's words, "[t]he monster is difference made flesh, come to dwell among us. In its function as dialectical Other ... , the monster is an incorporation of the Outside, the Beyond-of all those loci that are rhetorically placed as distant and distinct but originate Within" (41). Thus, to characterize the *doppelgänger* as an actual monster — in the case of Frankenstein's creature — or displaying monstrous qualities — such as Heathcliff and Hyde — is an attempt, even if (un)intentional, to distance, or *otherize*, their existence and all they might represent. Such reactions are not surprising because a monster, more than a scary or dangerous creature, is an existence that challenges the individual and its systems of belief in all aspects. As explained by Jeffrey Andrew Weinstock, "[t]he monster is that which threatens understandings of the world, the self, and the relations between the two" (3). The monstrous doubles put in question all sense of reality of their counterparts, pushing the boundaries of self-knowledge to the extreme. Thus, it is natural to avoid it for it represents a threat not only to the self but to the way one's reality is structured. The existence of a monster "threatens to destroy not just individual members of a society, but the very cultural apparatus through which individuality is constituted and allowed" (Cohen 45), therefore such a presence is life-threatening, unpredictable and above all puts the subject as an other in relation to the rest of his/hers perceivable world. It suggests a new possibility of being, that of being an *other than*: other than self, other than subject, other than good, other than (conventionally known) human. As a result, to create distance between subject and monster/double is to maintain oneself in the safety of being *nothing other than* good, nothing other than self, nothing other than human. David D. Gilmore states that "monsters are fully [or even *more*] human: their unmotivated malice and destructiveness are [inherent] human ... traits" (193). Even when carrying undeniable distinctive attributes, making the double a monster, an *other*, is just a type of denial, from character and/or author, to recognize the monstrous aspect of the human

experience. Timothy Beal explains the origin of the word monster as deriving “from the Latin *monstrum*, which is related to the verbs *monstrare* (‘show’ or ‘reveal’) and *monere* (‘warn’ or ‘portend’)” (Beal qtd. in Weinstock 2). The first, ‘to show’ or ‘to reveal’ confirms the theories seen in this thesis regarding the definition of the *other*: as Freud demonstrates that the outsider — another definition to the *other* — is but a tangible representation of the *unheimlich*, which is a part of the *heimlich* that came from within, Lacan argues that the *other* is an essential entity to the formation of one own sense of self, responsible to reveal to the infant what it is *not*, so it can understand what it *is*.

Therefore, there is no point denying the monster, the *doppelgänger*, the *other* or whatever it may be called, because denying or not, it represents an inherent part of human nature. As in Cohen’s explanation in his “Monster Culture (Seven Theses)”, it “can be pushed to the farthest margins of geography and discourse, hidden away at the edges of the world and in the forbidden recesses of our mind, but they always return. And when they come back, ... they bear self-knowledge, human knowledge — and a discourse all the more sacred as it arises from the Outside” (52). Frankenstein creates a monster for he cannot acknowledge the existence of his double — and everything it entails regarding himself —; Heathcliff is a monstrous outsider, a villainous black skinned gypsy because the upper society that governed Catherine’s decisions portrayed him as such; Hyde is a monster in his actions because he was the embodiment of evil and even though Jekyll acknowledges him as a part of his own, he still insists on a clear distinction of Jekyll, the good, and Hyde, the bad, maintaining the separation between other and self. Dorian, on the other hand, derives his sense of self *from* his double, an image of himself, so by the time it changes and starts to display marks of monstrosity — the evidence of his self’s decay — he is already fully immersed in the identification with the *other*.

At the beginning of the 1900s, the internalization of Cohen’s words seems to start to

take place till it becomes a known fact — consciously or not — at the end of the century with *The Picture of Dorian Gray*. The revelation brought by the double is inescapable and urgent. The more humankind reflects on itself — generally and individually —, the more it becomes clear the complexities of defining one's self and how blurred the line between self and other is. By all means, in all the four novels the emergence of the *doppelgangers* out of the shadows conveys the same message: to try to otherize one's other-self is pointless because one cannot deny its own being. From the beginning of the century to its end, the depiction of the double develops in a circle, starting and finishing at the roots of the concept's origins, but with a comparatively more mature and rational conclusion; it may be a shadow, a reflection, an other entity or personality, it does not matter because the reality remains the same: your double is yourself/your self. Ultimately, the *doppelgänger* is that part that one wishes to alienate from, but to remain as one requires the integration of all parts. The subject, who tries to divide the self between what is to preserve from what is to eliminate is bound to fail for one can only be a whole being if maintaining all the qualities that compose the self, no matter if it is good or bad. The attempt to fracture the self between what is welcome and what is not is simply that, an *attempt*, because, as seen throughout this study, total separation is unattainable. All things considered, the quest of the double is not precisely to achieve union but to embrace it: embrace the unknown as part of the known, animalistic as a part of humanity, evil as a part of good, degradation as a part of honor, ugliness as a part of beauty, other as a part of self.

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