FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF MINAS GERAIS

Faculty of Philosophy and Human Sciences

Graduate program in Political Science

Yulieth Estefani Martínez Villalba

REGIONAL INTEGRATION ORGANIZATIONS AND TRANSBOUNDARY EMERGENCIES: Assessing the Regional IOs' Emergency Measures for the COVID-19 Pandemic (Sars-Cov-2).

Belo Horizonte

2025

Yulieth Estefani Martínez Villalba

REGIONAL INTEGRATION ORGANIZATIONS AND TRANSBOUNDARY EMERGENCIES: Assessing the Regional IOs' Emergency Measures for the COVID-19 Pandemic (Sars-Cov-2).

Doctoral Dissertation submitted to the Graduate Program in Political Science at the Federal University of Minas Gerais in satisfaction with the requirements for the Ph.D. degree in Political Science.

Advisor: Prof. Dr. Dawisson Elvécio Belém Lopes

Research Area: Political Institutions and International Politics

Belo Horizonte

2025

UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE MINAS GERAIS

ATA

FAFICH - COLEGIADO DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM CIÊNCIA POLÍTICA - SECRETARIA

ATA 02ª/2025 DA DEFESA DA TESE DA ALUNA YULIETH ESTEFANI MARTINEZ VILLALBA

Realizou-se, no dia 14 de março de 2025, às 08:00 horas, por videoconferência, a defesa da tese, intitulada "ORGANIZAÇÕES REGIONAIS DE INTEGRAÇÃO E EMERGÊNCIAS TRANSFRONTEIRIÇAS: Avaliação das Medidas Emergenciais das OIs Regionais para a Pandemia da COVID-19 (Sars-Cov-2)", elaborada e apresentada por YULIETH ESTEFANI MARTINEZ VILLALBA - número de registro 2020708382, graduada no curso de NEGÓCIOS INTERNACIONAIS. A defesa é requisito parcial para a obtenção do grau de Doutora em CIÊNCIA POLÍTICA, e foi submetida e analisada pela seguinte Comissão Examinadora: Prof. Dawisson Elvécio Belém Lopes - Orientador (DCP/UFMG), Prof. Christian Kreuder-Sonnen (Friedrich Schiller University Jena), Profa. Indira Sen (University of Mannheim), Prof. Ulysses de Barros Panisset (UFMG), Profa. Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann (PUC Rio). A Comissão considerou a tese APROVADA. Finalizados os trabalhos, lavrei a presente ata que, lida e aprovada, vai assinada eletronicamente pelos membros da Comissão. Belo Horizonte, 14 de março de 2025.

Documento assinado eletronicamente por **Indira Sen**, **Usuária Externa**, em 14/04/2025, às 18:34, conforme horário oficial de Brasília, com fundamento no art. 5º do Decreto nº 10.543, de 13 de novembro de 2020.

Documento assinado eletronicamente por **Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann**, **Usuária Externa**, em 14/04/2025, às 22:14, conforme horário oficial de Brasília, com fundamento no art. 5º do Decreto nº 10.543, de 13 de novembro de 2020.

Documento assinado eletronicamente por **Christian Kreuder-Sonnen**, **Usuário Externo**, em 15/04/2025, às 04:59, conforme horário oficial de Brasília, com fundamento no art. 5º do Decreto nº 10.543, de 13 de novembro de 2020.

Documento assinado eletronicamente por **Dawisson Elvecio Belem Lopes**, **Diretor**, em 28/04/2025, às 16:53, conforme horário oficial de Brasília, com fundamento no art. 5º do Decreto nº 10.543, de 13 de novembro de 2020.

Documento assinado eletronicamente por **Ulysses de Barros Panisset**, **Professor do Magistério Superior**, em 30/04/2025, às 05:14, conforme horário oficial de Brasília, com fundamento no art. 5º do Decreto nº 10.543, de 13 de novembro de 2020.

A autenticidade deste documento pode ser conferida no site https://sei.ufmg.br/sei/controlador_externo.php?acao=documento_conferir&id_orgao_acesso_externo=0, informando o código verificador **4024070** e o código CRC **8C80943E**.

FINANCIAL SUPPORT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

The rising frequency and complexity of transboundary emergencies (TEs) present significant global and regional governance challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic, as a Global Transboundary Emergency (GTE), tested the capacity of International Organizations (IOs) to manage crises effectively. While much research has focused on national responses, the role of Regional Integration Organizations (Regional IOs) in addressing these crises remains underexplored. This dissertation examines the Regional IOs' responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, assessing their emergency measures (EMs). The primary objective is to analyze the role of Regional IOs in managing transboundary emergencies, focusing on their institutional responses to COVID-19 and the dynamics of exceptionalism triggered by the pandemic. Specifically, the dissertation addresses the following questions: (1) How did Regional IOs respond to the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic? (2) What indicates a greater or lesser level of regional IO response during emergencies (the COVID-19 pandemic)? (3) What were the characteristics of the Exceptional Emergency Measures (EEMs) employed? These questions are explored across three interrelated chapters, each utilizing a different methodological approach. Data is drawn from the Emergency International Measures Database (EIMD), which includes a novel dataset of 729 emergency measures issued by Regional IOs. Chapter 1 establishes the conceptual framework by conducting a scoping review of emergency politics and policy. It clarifies key concepts and identifies gaps in existing literature. Chapter 2 offers a comparative analysis of six regional IOs, developing the Emergency Measures Index (EMI) through computational text analysis and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to evaluate their regional responses. Chapter 3 conducts a case study of the European Union (EU), examining its emergency measures through mixed-methods research, which combines Large Language Model (LLM), Structural Topic Modeling (STM) and dictionary-based text analysis, with a qualitative case study of the EU's vaccine export transparency mechanism. The findings reveal significant variation in regional IOs' responses to COVID-19, highlighting the influence of institutional design, decision-making flexibility, and available resources. This study contributes to the literature on crisis management and emergency politics by highlighting the tensions between efficiency and democratic legitimacy that regional IOs encounter when addressing emergencies. The implications of this research emphasize the need for further exploration of regional governance mechanisms to improve global preparedness and response for future transnational emergencies.

Keywords: regional IOs; transboundary emergencies; Covid-19 pandemic; emergency politics; emergency measures.

RESUMO

A frequência e a complexidade crescentes das emergências transfronteiriças (ETs) apresentam desafios significativos de governança global e regional. A pandemia da COVID-19, como uma Emergência Transfronteiriça Global (ETG), testou a capacidade das Organizações Internacionais (OIs) de gerenciar crises de forma eficaz. Embora muitas pesquisas tenham se concentrado em respostas nacionais, o papel das Organizações de Integração Regional (OIs Regionais) no enfrentamento dessas crises permanece pouco explorado. Esta tese examina a respostas das OIs Regionais à pandemia da COVID-19, avaliando sua produção de medidas de emergência (MEs). O objetivo principal da pesquisa é analisar o papel das OIs Regionais no gerenciamento de emergências transfronteiriças, com foco em suas respostas institucionais à COVID-19. Especificamente, a dissertação aborda as seguintes questões: (1) Como as OIs Regionais responderam aos desafios impostos pela pandemia da COVID-19? (2) Quais fatores contribuem para os diferentes níveis de resposta das OIs Regionais durante emergências? (3) Quais foram as características das Medidas de Emergência Excepcionais (MEEs) empregadas? Essas questões são exploradas em três capítulos inter-relacionados, cada um utilizando uma abordagem metodológica diferente. Os dados são extraídos do Emergency International Measures Database (EIMD), que inclui um novo conjunto de dados de 729 medidas de emergência emitidas por OIs Regionais. O Capítulo 1 estabelece a estrutura conceitual conduzindo uma revisão de escopo de políticas e políticas de emergência. Ele esclarece conceitos-chave e identifica lacunas na literatura existente. O Capítulo 2 oferece uma análise comparativa de seis OIs regionais, desenvolvendo o Emergency Measures Index (EMI) por meio de análise de texto computacional e Análise de Componentes Principais (PCA) para avaliar as respostas das OIs Regionais. O Capítulo 3 conduz um estudo de caso da União Europeia (UE), examinando suas medidas de emergência por meio de pesquisa de métodos mistos, que combina Modelo de Linguagem Grande (LLM), Modelagem de Tópicos Estruturais (STM) com um estudo de caso qualitativo do mecanismo de transparência de exportação de vacinas da UE. As descobertas revelam variação significativa nas respostas das OIs regionais à COVID-19, destacando a influência do design institucional, flexibilidade de tomada de decisão e recursos disponíveis. Este estudo contribui para a literatura sobre gerenciamento de crises e política de emergência ao destacar as tensões entre eficiência e legitimidade democrática que as OIs regionais encontram ao lidar com emergências. As implicações desta pesquisa enfatizam a necessidade de maior exploração dos mecanismos de governança regional para melhorar a preparação e a resposta global para futuras emergências transnacionais.

PALAVRAS CHAVES: OIs regionais; emergências transfronteiriças; pandemia de Covid-19; política de emergência; medidas de emergência.

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AI – Artificial Intelligence

AMSP – African Medical Supplies Platform

ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations

AIDS – Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome

APAs – Advance Purchase Agreements

CEMs – Conventional Emergency Measures

COVAX – COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access

COVID-19 – Coronavirus Disease of 2019

CRII – Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative

Commonwealth – Commonwealth of Nations

DG ECHO – Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations

EEMs – Exceptional Emergency Measures

EFTA – European Free Trade Association

EHU – European Health Union

EIMD – Emergency International Measures Database

EMI – Emergency Measures Index

ESI – Emergency Support Instrument

ESM – European Stability Mechanism

EU – European Union

FREX – Frequency-Exclusivity Score

GTE – Global Transboundary Emergency

Global IOs – Global International Organizations

HERA – Health Emergency Preparedness and Response

HIV – Human Immunodeficiency Virus

IOs – International Organizations

IPCR – Integrated Political Crisis Response

LLM – Large Language Model

Mercosur – Southern Common Market

NC – Nordic Council

NGEU – Next Generation EU

NLP – Natural Language Processing

OIC – Organization of Islamic Conference

OI – International Organizations

OIL – Liberal International Order

OIR – Regional Integration Organizations

PCA – Principal Component Analysis

Regional IOs – Regional Integration Organizations

SADC – Southern African Development Community

SC – Shanghai Cooperation Organization

STM – Structural Topic Modeling

TEs – Transboundary Emergencies

UCPM – Union Civil Protection Mechanism

UN – United Nations

UNISDR – United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction

WHO – World Health Organization

WTO – World Trade Organization

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

Emergencies have become a defining feature of the 21st century, with their frequency and impact increasing at an alarming rate (EFE verde, 2020; Freebairn et al., 2020). While localized disasters have long-shaped political and social landscapes, modern emergencies are increasingly transboundary, cutting national borders and necessitating cooperative responses(Blondin & Boin, 2020; Boin & Rhinard, 2008; Kreuder-Sonnen, 2019). This shift has been driven by globalization, environmental degradation, and geopolitical complexities (Walika et al., 2023). Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the Director-General of the World Health Organization, emphasized that, in light of the overlapping and converging crises we face, "pandemics are far from the only threat we face" (UN News, 2023). Whether in the form of climate change, financial disruptions, or global health crises, transboundary emergencies (TEs) have come to dominate global governance challenges, necessitating institutional mechanisms that can respond effectively across jurisdictions.

Among these, the pandemic produced by Coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) stands out as one of the most disruptive crises in contemporary history (Horton, 2021; Tabish, 2020). Beyond its devastating impact on public health, it triggered a cascade of social, economic, and political emergencies on a global scale. At the individual level, millions faced the physical toll of the virus and the psychological distress of prolonged isolation, uncertainty, and fear (Miller, 2024; Paul et al., 2022). Societally, healthcare systems were stretched to their limits, economies collapsed, and public administrators faced unprecedented governance challenges (Chu et al., 2020; Nicola et al., 2020; Riswan, 2021). Governments' emergency policies and public administration capacities varied significantly across regions, shaping pandemic outcomes and public compliance. As a result, the pandemic served as a stress test for national and international governance structures, exposing both their strengths and weaknesses in real time (Barberia et al., 2021).

The COVID-19 emergency also reignited long-standing debates about the effectiveness and legitimacy of IOs, particularly in the context of the contestation of the Liberal International Order (Debre & Dijkstra, 2021). Like national governance structures, the pandemic highlighted significant deficiencies within IOs, including

slow responses, inadequate enforcement mechanisms, and political disagreements that hindered collective action. For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) faced criticism for its initial handling of the outbreak and for political pressures that undermined its credibility following previous emergencies (Hanrieder & Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014). These shortcomings fueled skepticism about IOs' ability to manage transboundary emergencies effectively, leading to renewed discussions on the need for reform and adaptation in global governance structures. However, despite these limitations, the pandemic also demonstrated that IOs remain essential for coordinating large-scale responses and mitigating the worst effects of global emergencies (Ayuso, 2023).

This dissertation emerges from the urgent need to reassess global emergency governance in the face of growing threats. Recent political developments, such as the resurgence of nationalist and isolationist movements, have placed additional strain on international cooperation (Brubaker, 2020; Miller-Idriss, 2019). Five years after the pandemic began, Trump's second term appears to have worse damaging potential than his last. The Trump administration's revived threat to withdraw funding from major international organizations, including the WHO, exemplifies how political decisions can profoundly affect global emergency preparedness and response.

In an era of increasing fragmentation, the question of how international institutions can maintain their legitimacy and effectiveness is more critical than ever. This research argues that Politics goes beyond electoral dynamics, involving fundamental issues of life, death, and the value of human existence. As Hannah Arendt (1958) posited in *The Human Condition*, politics is deeply embedded in human action and collective decision-making, shaping the conditions of life itself. Thus, understanding the role of IOs in managing transboundary emergencies is not just a matter of institutional analysis but a crucial inquiry into the political dimensions of survival and governance in the contemporary world.

Political Science provides various frameworks for analyzing the COVID-19 pandemic, political responses, and broader implications. These frameworks include perspectives on political behavior and communication, public administration, and institutional responses at different levels—from individual decision-making to the

international system. While there are many approaches within political science to studying emergencies, this dissertation primarily focuses on crisis management and emergency politics. Crisis management scholars usually examine how institutional preparedness, coordination mechanisms, and administrative responses can influence crisis mitigation (Khodarahmi, 2009). In contrast, emergency politics explores emergency governance's legal and political aspects, addressing how emergency declarations can change institutional authority by centralizing decision-making and suspending standard procedures(Heupel, Koenig-Archibugi, Kreuder-Sonnen, Patberg, Séville, et al., 2021; Kreuder-Sonnen, 2019; White, 2015a). By applying these perspectives to an international context and incorporating insights from international politics literature, this study aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the roles of Regional IOs in managing transboundary emergencies.

This introduction is structured as follows: The first section discusses crisis management and emergency politics, highlighting key theoretical insights relevant to this dissertation. The second section examines the concepts of emergencies, transboundary emergencies (TEs), and global transboundary emergencies (GTEs), as well as the role of Regional IOs in addressing them. The third section provides methodological annotations, outlining the research methods employed, including the innovative use of AI-driven text analysis. The final section presents the structure of the dissertation, summarizing the three main chapters.

1.1. Primary Theoretical Lenses: Crisis Management and Emergency Politics

This dissertation is mainly rooted in the dialogue between crisis management and emergency politics literature. Crisis management is typically seen as a crucial component of strategic management (Gundel, 2005). Researchers in this field examine how institutional preparedness, coordination mechanisms, and administrative responses contribute to effective crisis mitigation (Khodarahmi, 2009). While this area of study has integrated insights from other disciplines (Boin et al., 2016), most research on crisis management continues to emphasize the managerial aspects of emergencies. It primarily focuses on the strategic processes organizations

and governments employ to effectively detect, manage, and recover from crisis events (Coombs, 2007).

The literature on emergency politics, in contrast, has shifted its emphasis from managerial competence to the political dimensions of decision-making in high-pressure situations (Kreuder-Sonnen & White, 2021; Rhinard, 2019). Scholars in this field explore dynamics that have often been overshadowed by the predominant focus on management, including the implications of declaring emergencies, the expansion of executive power, and the trade-offs between efficiency and democratic accountability during emergencies. Although this scholarship is still relatively new, it calls our attention to fundamental issues like the long-term consequences of exceptionalism and the potential erosion of democratic principles.

These two theoretical lenses have practical implications for this dissertation, underpinning the key concepts of EMs and EEMs. The literature on crisis management provides a foundation for defining emergency measures. While the dissertation focuses on these measures within the IO context (Chapter 2), the fundamental idea is that emergency measures are actions taken to address and contain an emergency. Based on their nature, emergency measures can be categorized into two types: proactive and reactive. EEMs fall into the reactive category. In this context, EMs serve as a broader category that includes EEMs. Formulating EMs relates to the dynamics of conventional crisis management, whereas creating EEMs is linked to the exceptionalism dynamics arising from certain emergencies. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between these two concepts and their respective frameworks.

The relationship between crisis management and emergency politics is complex. Crisis management focuses on the efficiency and procedural continuity of emergency responses, while emergency politics examines the broader implications of crisis governance. The interaction of these two perspectives reveals inherent tensions: on the one hand, the urgency of emergencies often justifies the use of exceptional measures that bypass traditional governance structures. On the other hand, these measures risk setting precedents that could weaken democratic structures, expanding executive power beyond the emergency period.

Figure 1 – Concepts and Frameworks Relationships

The specific conditions of emergencies determine the actual scale of each set. Theoretically, conventional emergency measures are still more common than exceptional ones.

This dissertation aims to bridge the gap between these two perspectives by exploring how Regional IOs navigate the tension between effectiveness and legitimacy in their emergency responses. Crisis management frameworks provide insights into institutional design and operational strategies, while emergency politics draws attention to the political consequences of these actions. By integrating both approaches, this study contributes to the broader debate on how IOs address emergencies in ways that balance efficiency with democratic accountability. This research offers a nuanced perspective on the governance of transboundary emergencies, suggesting that emergency measures must be operationally effective and politically sustainable.

1.2.   Transboundary Emergencies and Regional IOs

This dissertation conceptualizes *emergencies* as unexpected and threatening situations with factual and intersubjective dimensions. The factual dimension refers to objective characteristics that jeopardize the continuity or quality of human life. In contrast, the intersubjective dimension reflects how society perceives and frames these threats as "emergencies," particularly by political actors. Distinguishing emergencies from similar terms, such as crises and disasters, is crucial for analytical clarity. Following Rubenstein (2015), this dissertation differentiates these terms based

on their temporal dimensions. Emergencies require immediate action to prevent or mitigate harm, whereas disasters involve situations where damage has already occurred. Crises, on the othe hand, indicate prolonged uncertainty or instability. Following Rubenstein's framework, this dissertation argues that emergencies can turn into disasters when they have concluded or crises when they persist over time. Thus, emergencies exist at a critical intersection where decisive intervention can prevent escalation into a crisis. For further information, please consult chapter 1 and Appendix C – General distinction between the emergency, disaster, and crisis terms

With globalization and increased interconnectivity, emergencies have escalated in scale and complexity, often transcending national boundaries and requiring collective responses. When emergencies acquire a transnational scope, they become Transboundary Emergencies (TEs) (Blondin & Boin, 2020). These emergencies involve risks and consequences that extend beyond a single state's jurisdiction, necessitating coordinated responses across multiple governance levels. Examples of TEs include pandemics, climate-related emergencies, and cross-border conflicts. Among these, Global Transboundary Emergencies (GTEs) represent the most extensive category, affecting multiple macro-regions simultaneously and presenting governance challenges that exceed the capacities of individual states or even single regional organizations.

Transboundary emergencies require collective responses, and Regional IOs can play a vital role in managing and resolving these issues. In this sense, we can define Regional IO as "the specific institutional result of a regional integration process, which includes a foundational constituent document and the establishment of a headquarters with a permanent secretariat" (Herz et al., 2015, pp. 165-166). These organizations are distinct from the regional offices of Global International Organizations (Global IOs) due to their mandate, functions, and organizational dynamics. While the regional offices of Global IOs are important for localized crisis management, they primarily serve as extensions of their parent organizations, implementing globally formulated policies in specific regions. In contrast, Regional IOs possess independent institutional frameworks that enable them to develop and implement policies tailored to the unique needs of their member states. Although the regional offices of Global IOs were also important in managing the COVID-19

pandemic, this dissertation exclusively focuses on Regional IOs because of their decision-making autonomy and governance structures.

Numerous studies have emphasized that regional organizations play a crucial role in emergency management due to their unique advantages (Barnett & Finnemore, 2019; Hurrell & Fawcett, 1998; Pugh & Sidhu, 2003; Tavares, 2009). However, the involvement of Regional IOs in addressing contemporary transboundary emergencies, particularly GTEs, has not been thoroughly examined. The COVID-19 pandemic is a prime example of a GTE, as it has affected multiple regions simultaneously and revealed significant limitations in regional and global governance mechanisms. Moreover, the pandemic was a stress test for collective action at both continental and regional levels. This is because if one country fails to control the spread of the virus, it can negatively impact its neighbors and others over time (Medinilla et al., 2020). Consequently, this emergency is particularly valuable as a case study due to its global impact, which allows for comparative analysis across different Regional IOs. Unlike localized dynamics, COVID-19 influenced every continent, highlighting the variations in governance responses.

Initially classified as a public health emergency, the pandemic quickly expanded into economic, social, and political spheres, necessitating diverse policy interventions. It exposed the WHO challenges in coordinating a unified response, intensifying coordination issues within and between states. Given these dynamics, COVID-19 is an essential example for studying transboundary emergencies, particularly in understanding the role of Regional IOs in addressing global collective problems. By analyzing the COVID-19 pandemic as a case study, this research aims to enhance our understanding of how these collective bodies manage complex transboundary emergencies in an increasingly interconnected world.

1.3. Methodology Annotations and the Usage of AI

The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated digitalization worldwide, transforming social interactions and research methodologies. The global shift to virtual environments expanded access to digital tools, remote learning, and computational techniques, influencing how data is collected, processed, and analyzed. This

dissertation integrates these digital advancements, leveraging computational methodologies to explore the role of Regional IOs in transboundary emergency management. The ability to access cutting-edge techniques remotely and the training received at the University of Konstanz have been instrumental in shaping the research methods applied in this study.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools have become central to contemporary research, revolutionizing how data is managed and analyzed. The ability of AI to process vast amounts of information, detect patterns, and enhance analytical precision makes it an invaluable asset for social science research. This dissertation uses AI-driven computational text analysis methods to classify and interpret emergency measures issued by Regional IOs, allowing for systematic cross-regional comparisons. These tools enable the extraction of latent patterns in emergency measures, offering insights that would be difficult to obtain through traditional qualitative analysis alone. AI enhances the objectivity and reproducibility of research, reducing potential biases that arise from manual coding while enabling a more comprehensive and scalable assessment of transboundary emergency measures.

The innovative nature of this dissertation also lies in its methodological approach, which bridges computational social science and crisis governance studies. While research on emergency politics and crisis management has traditionally relied on qualitative case studies or small-scale comparative analyses (Boin & Rhinard, 2023; Mariano et al., 2022; Nguyen et al., 2022), this study employs a multi-method approach that combines bibliometric techniques, Large Language Model (LLM, and machine learning algorithms -Structural Topic Model (STM). The Emergency Measures Index (EMI) development using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) represents significant methodological advancements in the field. These techniques allow for systematically identifying institutional responses across different Regional IOs, capturing nuances in emergency management and politics beyond single-case studies.

Transparency and replicability are fundamental principles of this research. The dissertation adheres to the Transparency in Empirical Research (TIER) protocol, ensuring that all data sources, coding procedures, and analytical steps are systematically documented and accessible for verification. The TIER protocol

specifies the organization and documentation of research materials, detailing data, scripts, and supporting files necessary for replication (TIER Protocol, 2022). Furthermore, this dissertation aims to foster collaborative research by publicly making available the Emergency International Measures Database (EIMD). This initiative seeks to encourage contributions from other researchers to expand the database with new emergency cases, Regional IOs, and policy classifications. By ensuring methodological transparency and promoting open data practices, this study enhances the reliability and impact of research on transboundary emergency governance.

1.4.   Dissertation Structure

This dissertation is structured into three interrelated chapters, each fulfilling a specific role in understanding Regional IOs' responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. The first chapter establishes the conceptual framework, the second provides a comparative analysis, and the third offers an in-depth case study of the European Union.

Chapter 1 serves as the conceptual foundation of the dissertation. It aims to clarify the theoretical landscape of emergency politics and policy by conducting a systematic scoping review of existing literature. The central research question guiding this chapter is: *What insights does the existing literature provide regarding the concepts and components of emergency politics and policies?* The study employs the Arksey and O'Malley (2005) scoping review framework, analyzing scholarly contributions through bibliometric and content analysis techniques. This chapter highlights critical gaps in literature, including the overreliance on Carl Schmitt's theories of exception and the absence of a clear definition of emergency policy. By addressing these gaps, this chapter contributes to refining theoretical definitions and improving the approach to studying emergency governance.

Chapter 2 presents a comparative study of Regional IOs' responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. This chapter seeks to answer two key research questions: *How did Regional IOs respond to the challenges posed by COVID-19? and What factors indicate a greater or lesser level of Regional IO response during emergencies?* The study introduces the Emergency International Measures Database (EIMD), comprising 729 emergency

measures issued by six Regional IOs. Using computational text analysis powered by large language models (LLMs) and Principal Component Analysis (PCA), this chapter develops the Emergency Measures Index (EMI) to assess and compare Regional IOs' response levels in the COVID-19 pandemic governance. By quantitatively evaluating emergency measures, this chapter provides empirical insights into the role of Regional IOs in addressing transboundary emergencies, exploring exceptionalism dynamics, and contributing a novel methodological approach for assessing institutional responses.

Chapter 3 transitions from a broad comparative perspective to a detailed case study of the European Union's emergency governance during the COVID-19 pandemic. This chapter examines how the EU's executive bodies—the European Council, the European Commission, and the Council of the EU—formulated and implemented emergency measures. It seeks to answer two key questions: *How did the EU's executive institutions respond to the pandemic, and what were the characteristics of the EU's Exceptional Emergency Measures (EEMs)?* Utilizing a mixed-methods research design, this study combines computational text analysis, including Structural Topic Modeling and dictionary-based approaches, with qualitative case study analysis. The chapter specifically focuses on one exceptional emergency measure—the vaccine export transparency and authorization mechanism—to illustrate how emergency governance can reshape institutional authority. By integrating perspectives on crisis management and emergency politics, this chapter provides a nuanced analysis of how the EU faces challenges in balancing efficiency with legitimacy in its emergency responses.

This chapter examines a subset of the Emergency International Measures Database (EIMD) that focuses on the European Union's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The decision to analyze the EU separately is based on three key reasons. First, the EU is a unique political entity that cannot be easily compared to other forms of regional integration (Hix & Høyland, 2022; Leuffen et al., 2022; Schmitter, 2004). Its distinctive institutional structure combines supranational elements with a complex interplay between national and intergovernmental levels, making it challenging to draw parallels with other regional organizations (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2015; Leuffen et al., 2022; Mattli & Sweet, 2012). Second, disregarding these unique characteristics and comparing the EU to other Regional IOs in the sample could lead to inaccurate

conclusions and biased results. It is essential to avoid treating the European integration process as a model for others, acknowledging their specific contexts and refraining from establishing a hierarchy between the EU and other organizations (Acharya, 2016; Börzel & Risse, 2016). Finally, the intricate nature of the European Union system warrants careful analysis, and it deserves thorough exploration with greater attention to detail.

Together, these chapters comprehensively examine Regional IOs' role in managing transboundary emergencies, contributing to crisis management, emergency politics, and international organization theory.

2. EMERGENCIES AND THEIR POLITICS: A SCOPING REVIEW OF EMERGENCY POLITICS AND POLICY CONCEPTS

2.1. Introduction

This paper systematically reviews both theoretical and empirical literature related to the concepts of "emergency politics" and its derivative, "emergency policy." In an era characterized by frequent global crises —ranging from political upheavals and natural disasters to pandemics and security threats— the need to understand how states and international organizations (IOs) manage extraordinary situations has never been more pertinent. The existing literature also presents a variety of terms—such as crises, disasters, and risks—that are often conflated with or used interchangeably with the concept of an emergency. This study aims to clarify what constitutes an emergency by mapping the conceptual landscape of "emergency politics" and intentionally excluding similar but distinct frameworks, such as "crisis politics". By doing so, this review not only establishes clear boundaries for these terms but also highlights their differences, providing valuable insights for both academic research and practical policy-making.

The primary aim of this study is to map the existing scholarship on these topics through a scoping review. A scoping review is a "preliminary assessment of the potential size and scope of available research literature" (Grant & Booth, 2009). This methodological approach is especially valuable when the literature has not been comprehensively reviewed or displays a complex and heterogeneous nature (Peters et al., 2015, p. 141). Following the recommendations of Munn et al. (2018), this review pursues three specific objectives: (i) to clarify the concepts of emergency politics and emergency policy within the literature, (ii) to identify the key characteristics associated with these concepts, and (iii) to pinpoint potential gaps in knowledge.

The study employs the well-established framework proposed by Arksey and O'Malley (2005) as its research protocol. The central research question guiding this review is: What insights does the existing literature provide regarding the concepts and components of emergency politics and policies? This inquiry examines how scholarly works interpret and define these terms. To address the central question, I developed a literature search strategy to identify publications related to "emergency

politics" and "emergency policies" terms. Searches were conducted across three major scientific databases: Web of Science (WOS), Scopus, and ScienceDirect, in addition to Google Scholar. The initial search yielded 1,171 records, then refined through rigorous inclusion and exclusion criteria, resulting in a final dataset of 30 scholarly works.

This final dataset was analyzed using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The bibliometric analysis examined the general characteristics of the sample by evaluating variables such as annual production, prominent authors, keywords, and the most cited studies. In conjunction with this, a content analysis was conducted to gain deeper insights into the texts. This analysis categorized studies based on their theoretical approaches, methodological designs, scopes, and research areas while also highlighting the limitations of the current scholarship. Specialized software tools— such as R, Sci-space, and Atlas.ti—facilitated both analyses.

The bibliometric analysis indicates that the study of emergency politics is still in its early stages. Bonnie Honig's seminal work, "Emergency Politics" (2009), stands out as the sample's foundational and most frequently cited study. Additionally, the analysis emphasizes the prominence of European scholars in this field, many of whom contextualize the concept within European political frameworks.

The content analysis reveals that only 11 studies clearly define the concept of emergency politics. Additionally, only two utilized the term emergency policy without a corresponding definition. This comprehensive examination has allowed me to present a nuanced portrayal of the sample by exploring various aspects of the topic. This analysis helps identify three primary limitations within the existing literature: (i) an overreliance on Carl Schmitt's notions of exception when discussing emergency politics, (ii) a persistent tendency to conflate similar terms without offering explicit definitions, and (iii) a significant absence of a definition for emergency policy.

This lack of definitional clarity highlights a notable gap in the literature this study aims to address. The absence of a well-defined concept for emergency policy can impede research progress in this field. Therefore, a key contribution of this paper is formulating a definition for emergency policy, along with proposed operational indicators. In this context, an emergency policy is conceptualized as a tangible output of emergency politics—a form of public policy developed rapidly by states or

intergovernmental organizations. It is characterized by its reactive and temporal nature, justified by the perceived urgency of emerging threats.

An inductive approach characterizes the structure of this paper. The first section outlines the methodological strategy, detailing the data collection and analysis methods. Following this, subsequent sections present the bibliometric findings and explore the content analysis, discussing key themes and limitations. Finally, the paper proposes a refined conceptualization of emergency policy. In conclusion, it synthesizes the main findings and suggests directions for future research and contributes to academic discussions associated with emergency management.

2.2.   Methodology

The study adhered to the five-stage framework outlined by Arksey and O'Malley (2005), with each stage elucidated in detail below. Firstly, I delineated the **research question** to guide the search: "*What insights does the existing literature provide regarding the concepts and components of emergency politics and policies?*" This question was intentionally broad, devoid of specificity in terms of field, to encompass all primary studies relevant to emergency politics and policy concepts. Consequently, I maintained an open approach to the search, acknowledging the potential for influential studies across various scientific disciplines.

The second phase involved **identifying relevant studies**. To accomplish this, I implemented a strategy that entailed searching for research evidence across three prominent scientific databases: Scopus, Web of Science, and Science Direct[1]. These databases are widely recognized within the scientific community for their comprehensive coverage across various disciplines. By amalgamating the results obtained from these databases, I aimed to obtain a sample size that adhered to the standards for a scoping review. The initial search was conducted in October 2022.

---

[1] Limiting the selection to just three scientific databases imposes certain constraints by potentially excluding studies not indexed on these platforms. However, it is worth noting that these databases, among the largest and most influential in the field, encapsulate a significant portion of the mainstream discourse on any given scientific topic. Hence, the characterization of these studies gives us a valuable panorama to understand the evolution of specific fields.

In addition to the database search, I amplified the search process by utilizing the Google Scholar search engine to uncover studies not captured in the preceding database search. This supplementary search was carried out in January 2023. Finally, the search criterion employed involved the combination of the terms "emergency politics" OR "emergency policies" without imposing any restrictions on time, language, or field. I deliberately exclude similar terms, such as "crisis politics," because the paper's objective is to map what literature understands as "emergency politics" and "emergency policy." In this sense, this study will help clarify the concept of emergency politics and differentiate it from similar terms. Table 1 provides an overview of the sources employed, their search terms, and the number of results obtained.

Table 1 – Search protocol

Source	Search Term	Search Within	Hits
Scopus	"Emergency Politics" OR "Emergency Policies"	Article title, abstract, Keywords	194
Web of Science	"Emergency Politics" OR "Emergency Policies"	Topic	97
Science Direct	("emergency politics" OR "emergency policies")	Find articles with these terms	380
Google Scholar	emergency politics or emergency policies		500
TOTAL			1171

The **study selection** is the third stage. During this stage, the screening process is concentrated on applying inclusion/exclusion criteria to reduce the sample, leaving the interest studies merely. However, to complete this stage, it was necessary firstly to standardize and clean the data. Since the dataset comes from three different sources, some publications appeared more than once. Hence, 101 duplicate observations were eliminated[2].

Once the dataset was cleaned up, I began the screening process. This involves looking at crucial information from each study, such as the title, abstract, and full text, to see if it meets the criteria for inclusion. An inclusion/exclusion criterion was established for each of these parts, and the scanning process was done incrementally.

---

[2] R packages are too sensitive to the character strings. In this sense, the function "duplicated" removed eighty-nine (89) duplicated works, but it could not identify as equal to the title of twelve (12) studies that were the same. Therefore, we made this identification manually when selecting the relevant studies to compose the final review sample.

The first inclusion criterion was that *the title must contain at least the word emergency*. From this operation, 339 studies were removed from the dataset's first screening, remaining only 731 for the next screening. The second inclusion criterion applied to the abstract was that *it should mention at least one of the keywords: emergency politics or emergency policy*. Six hundred seventy-one (671) studies did not meet this criterion and were dropped through this screening. The last criterion applied to the full text was that *the study should deal with emergency politics or policy concepts or discuss their components, even if it was tangentially*. From this last screening, a final sample of 30 studies was selected to do the comprehensive review (See Figure 2). This exhaustive qualitative review employed Atlas.ti.

Figure 2 – Flow diagram of the study selection process.

The fourth stage involves systematizing and **charting the data**. In this stage, I created a master table summarizing key details from the chosen articles. This table included information such as the author's name, publication year, title, type of study, source, research focus, approach (whether theoretical, empirical, or a mixed), theory

used, method employed, central definitions, and scope. More details can be found in Appendix A – Overview of selected studies.

The scoping review culminated in **collating, summarizing, and reporting the analysis findings**. In this final phase, I undertook both bibliometric and content analyses. To explore bibliometric aspects, I utilized the R package 'bibliometrix,' aiming to uncover key characteristics of the research corpus and identify primary trends. To thoroughly examine the entire sample, I conducted a content analysis using the artificial intelligence tool 'Sci-space' and the qualitative data analysis software Atlas.ti. Initially, 'Sci-space' was utilized to extract information regarding methods, primary theories, and certain contributions from the sample. Subsequently, I read each document and coded them using Atlas.ti. This process resulted in the generation of 56 codes derived inductively. Additional details regarding the codes generated during the content analysis can be found in Appendix B – List of inductive codes created in Atlas.ti

The following section will present the results from the first exploration of the sample, the bibliometric analysis.

2.3. Bibliometric analysis

In this section, I analyze the sample characteristics bibliometrically by exploring variables such as annual production, prominent authors, keywords, countries of affiliation, most cited studies, and the sample distribution according to the author's sex.

The final sample comprises 30 studies published between 2004 and 2022. Research production remained relatively steady until 2013, after which an upward trend emerged, resulting in an overall annual growth rate of 19.58%. Notably, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic catalyzed a significant surge in scholarly output across various disciplines, including political science. Between 2020 and 2022, the annual growth rate soared to 58.11%. Regarding publication types, articles were the most prevalent (n = 23), followed by books (n = 6) and a single short communication.

The bibliometric analysis further enabled an examination of scientific production by country based on author affiliations (see Figure 3). The figure —a

"Three Field Plot" represented through a Sankey diagram[3]— illustrates the interrelationships among authors' countries, authors, and keywords. In the first column, the diagram presents the authors' countries, with Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US) emerging as the most prominent. These countries are associated with most of the studies in the final sample, underscoring the significant contribution of European institutions. Specifically, of the ten countries represented in the sample, six are European, two are North American, and two are Asian[4].

Figure 3- Three field plot combining the author's country, author, and keywords.

The second column highlights key authors whose works are included in the final sample. Jonathan White, Christian Kreuder-Sonnen, and Bonnie Honig emerge as central figures in this field. White and Kreuder-Sonnen, affiliated with European institutions, significantly influenced theoretical and empirical discussions surrounding emergency politics. Bonnie Honig's contributions are also crucial in shaping foundational understandings of the concept. The rest of the authors included in the sample contributed just one piece of work. See Appendix A – Overview of selected studies for an overview of 30 selected research.

---

[3] Sankey diagrams are flow diagrams in which the width of the arrows is proportional to the flow rate of the depicted extensive property.

[4] The ten countries included in the sample are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, the UK, and the US.

Despite the fact that Honig's sample includes only two works —*Emergency Politics: Paradox, Law, Democracy (2009)* and *Three Models of Emergency Politics (2014)*— these publications are widely cited. Her contributions play a pivotal role in the study of emergency politics, as they challenge traditional perspectives rooted in Schmittian exceptionalism. Honig argues that emergencies should be seen through the lens of democratic contestation, emphasizing that crises can serve as opportunities to reaffirm and strengthen democratic commitments rather than merely justifying extraordinary executive powers. Her theoretical insights have significantly shaped subsequent scholarly discussions on the tension between emergency governance and democratic principles.

The third column presents the are the most prominent author's keywords[5]. The most frequently used keyword is "emergency politics," confirming the central focus of this review. Its confirmation as the most commonly used keyword contributes to validating the sample. Other closely related themes include "European Union," "legitimacy," "COVID-19," "emergency," "democracy", and "constitutionalism" —indicating that much of the scholarship addresses emergency politics within institutional, legal, and regional governance frameworks. Although not included in the search terms, additional keywords, such as "crisis" and "crisis politics," suggest that these concepts could be used as synonyms to refer to the same phenomenon.

The analysis of Figure 2 is incomplete without describing the connection between the three columns, represented by arrows. The Three-Field Plot reveals a strong interconnection between the countries of author affiliation, key scholars, and dominant research themes, illustrating the geographical concentration of scholarship and the intellectual currents shaping the field of emergency politics. The prominence of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States as leading contributors aligns with the presence of influential scholars such as Jonathan White, Christian Kreuder-Sonnen, and Bonnie Honig, whose works have significantly shaped the conceptualization of emergency politics. Notably, White and Christian Kreuder-

---

[5] Some scientific databases, such as Web of Science, add their keywords to their indexed publications. Nevertheless, I preferred to analyze the keywords attributed by the authors based on the understanding that this is how the authors project their studies.

Sonnen often focuses on the European Union and constitutionalism, reflecting emergency governance's institutional and legal dimensions, particularly within European political frameworks. This suggests that much of their literature approaches emergency politics through an institutional lens, analyzing how governmental structures respond to emergencies and the legal justifications for extraordinary measures.

The thematic connections between authors and keywords further highlight the field's ongoing theoretical debates and empirical inquiries. For instance, Bonnie Honig's critical engagement with democracy and legitimacy resonates with broader discussions on the implications of emergency governance for democratic institutions. Similarly, Christian Kreuder-Sonnen's research on European emergencies, legitimacy, and constitutionalism underscores how recent global crises have intensified scholarly focus on the intersection of emergency politics and institutional responses. The inclusion of terms like "crisis politics" within the keyword connections indicates that while emergency politics is a distinct concept, it is often analyzed in relation to broader crisis governance frameworks.

Figure 4 displays the top 10 most cited studies in proportional terms, meaning that citations are adjusted for the number of years since publication. This figure highlights the key scholarly contributions that have influenced the field of emergency politics. As mentioned earlier, Bonnie Honig's (2009) book, *Emergency Politics*, stands out as the most influential publication, receiving the highest annual citation rate. Following closely is Jonathan White's (2015a) paper, *Emergency Europe*, which also garners significant citations. White's research explores how emergency measures modify democratic governance within the European Union, making it highly relevant for scholars examining institutional responses to crises.

Other highly cited works include Handmer & Dovers's (2012) *The Handbook of Disaster and Emergency Policies and Institutions*, which provides a broader policy-oriented perspective on emergency management, and Hanrieder & Kreuder-Sonnen's (2014) *Who Decides on the Exception? Securitization and emergency governance in global health* which explores decision-making authority in emergency situations. Notably, Kreuder-Sonnen appears multiple times in the ranking, reflecting his substantial contribution to the institutionalist approach to emergency politics, particularly in the context of

international organizations and transnational governance. Other influential studies include Bjørnskov & Voigt's (2018) work on states of emergency, Adey's (2016) analysis of emergency mobilities, and White's (2015a) study on authority after emergency rule, all of which contribute to an evolving discourse on how emergencies impact governance, mobility, and institutional power.

Figure 4- Top 10 of the most cited studies in the sample

Although the results of the bibliometric analysis rarely mention them, authors such as Jennifer Rubenstein (2015), Vivien A. Schmidt (2021), and Bohdana Kurylo (2022) have made significant contributions to the debate. They have formulated essential concepts and analyzed theoretical relationships that merit exploration. The three authors focus on the normative aspects of emergencies, criticizing the prevalent elite-centric exceptionalist framework in the study of emergencies and advocating for the inclusion of other perspectives, particularly those of vulnerable populations. For example, Jennifer Rubenstein expresses concern about how everyday injustices can infiltrate the politics of emergencies. She proposes that the emergency state has a regressive aspect rather than a conservative one.

To summarize, the bibliometric analysis provided an overview of the studies in the database, offering initial insights into the final sample. It helped us identify important features, such as the authors, their locations, and the topics they addressed. In the next section, I will explore the sample from a qualitative perspective, examining the characteristics of the studies, their contributions, and any potential gaps.

2.4. Analyzing the contributions and gaps from emergency politics literature.

This section enhances previous findings by analyzing the studies' content and highlighting gaps in existing literature. It also characterizes the sample by addressing the studies' approaches, theories, methods, scope, and research areas.

In terms of research approaches, most studies (23) adopted a theoretical framework to achieve their objectives, while only six utilized a mixed methods approach, combining theoretical frameworks with empirical analysis. Only three studies relied exclusively on empirical data. Key theoretical frameworks employed included Law Theory, Democracy Theory, Emergency Management, and Security Theory. The methodologies used were quite diverse. Although traditional qualitative methods, such as literature reviews and theoretical analyses, were standard, some studies employed more systematic qualitative approaches, including in-depth case studies as well as historical and content analyses. Quantitative methods mainly featured descriptive statistics.

The scope of the studies reveals that the majority, fifteen (15) in total, focused on the transnational system as their primary level of analysis. Eleven (11) studies examined emergency politics within nation-states, especially in democratic societies. Additionally, six studies adopted a multi-level perspective, exploring the phenomenon in national and international contexts. Notably, most studies center on the transnational system, as this contrasts with my initial expectation that there would be a greater focus on national-level dynamics. The findings indicate that "emergency politics" and its various conceptual interpretations are largely associated with discussions surrounding international governance, institutional responses, and cross-border crises.

This trend also highlights how terminology can influence the scope and focus of research. If the search criteria had included terms like "state of exception" instead of "emergency politics," the results may have shown a stronger emphasis on national-level analyses, as discussions of exceptionality often revolve around domestic constitutional frameworks and executive decision-making. Therefore, the distribution of studies observed not only reflects current research interests but also demonstrates how different terminologies shape scholarly discourse.

The prior systematization and comprehensive analysis of the study's sample enabled me to identify its key characteristics and recognize the main challenges. Three primary limitations can be highlighted: (i) an excessive dependence on Schmitt's concept, (ii) the use of multiple terms without clear definitions, and (iii) the lack of a definition for emergency policy.

2.4.1. Excessive Dependence on Schmitt's Concept

The first notable limitation is the excessive reliance on Schmitt's concept of "state of exception," which serves as a foundational reference for most of the studies included in the sample. Schmitt's concept is problematic for several reasons, one of which is its historical context. This concept was developed during the rise of Nazism by one of its theorists. As a result, frequent references to Schmitt's work—whether to adopt or criticize his ideas—can make it challenging to separate the discussion of emergency politics from his framework. This entanglement can hinder comprehension of key concepts like sovereignty, violence, security[6], and power.

Another reason is Schmitt's famous argumentation in favor of the state of exception and, as he called it, "constitutional dictatorship" (Schmitt, 2005, 2008, 2014), which have impacted the conformation of contemporary society in several levels of governance. Authors such as Kreuder-Sonnen (2019) call our attention to the aspect that Schmitt's concept has implications for European crisis management (Chalmers, 2013; Hanrieder & Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014) and for what he calls "IO exceptionalism." Similarly, Kurylo (2022) indicates "the dominance of an elite-centric, exceptionalist paradigm in the study of emergency" (p. 1), based on the Schmittian

---

[6] According to Wæver (2011, p. 478), "the concept of security is Schmittian, because it defines security in terms of exception, emergency and a decision."

definition of exception. She calls our attention to the problem that stems from the prevalence of this approach and privileges the discourses of some agents to the detriment of others.

Kurylo (2022, p. 5) states that this paradigm reinforces the notion that an emergency is essentially undemocratic because it institutionalizes a decisionist government, ultimately diminishing the exercise of political power. Decisionism is accompanied by discretion, both granted to the executive by Schmitt in his concept of "state of exception." Even though executive discretion is seen as characteristic of emergencies, it is neither spontaneous nor automatic. Discretionary decisionism is a determination of political actors who play an essential role in the state organization, especially in the executive branch. This depends on the actors' willingness to identify specific conditions such as those of an emergency and the willingness of others to accept this diagnosis (White, 2015b, p. 596). In other words, the legitimization of these decisions depends significantly on the **authority** of these agents.

The last reason is Schmitt's assumptions can lead to the deliberate dissociation that excludes civil society from the discussion when an issue is labeled as an 'emergency.' This idea has been pointed out by several authors in the sample (Adey, 2016; Heath, 2016; Heupel et al., 2021; Honig, 2009; Kurylo, 2022; White, 2015a, 2015b). The rhetorical use of "emergency" to break with the typical convention in democratic societies also applies to deliberative principles. Indeed, Schmittian decisionism – according to which the sovereign determines the exception – (Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014, p. 343) has become common in the decision-making process inside and beyond the states during emergencies.

The decisions made during emergencies involve essential issues such as life, death, and the value of life (Adey, 2016). However, the urgency of emergency politics may cause fast deliberations or, even worse, no deliberation. This is problematic because speed in the decision-making process "might close out dissenting voices and other forms of response" (Adey, 2016). For this reason, Honig (2014) claims that deliberation is perfectly serviceable for those moments of emergency, defending the "deliberative democracy's capacity to inform and enhance civic efforts to think and act in an emergency" (Honig, 2014, p. 3). Following Honig's recommendation of *de-exceptionalizing the emergency* means moving beyond the traditional elite-centric paradigm

that Kurylo (2022) described. This approach involves considering the demands and needs of civil society during emergencies and incorporating these elements into the study of emergency politics. Excluding these groups from examining emergencies can hinder the field's progress, as they play a vital role in political dynamics during regular times and will remain crucial even in unusual situations.

2.4.2. Polyphony of terms without clear definitions

The second limitation relates to the persistent mixing of concepts. Emergency is often treated interchangeably with terms like *disaster*, *crisis*, *catastrophe*, and *exception*. This conceptual ambiguity poses a significant challenge, as many authors provide a single overarching definition—usually centered on the term "emergency"—while using these alternative terms without clearly differentiating their meanings. As a result, the theoretical boundaries between these concepts become blurred, making it difficult to understand the phenomenon precisely. Furthermore, this lack of differentiation extends to various related terms, such as *emergency politics*, *emergency regime*, and *emergency power* (Figure 6), often used indiscriminately across different studies. This conceptual fluidity highlights the need for more precise definitional frameworks, as failing to clarify these terms may lead to analytical inconsistencies and misinterpretations in the broader discourse on emergency governance.

Figure 5- Conceptual Map of Emergency-Related Terms

Figure 6 presents the inductive codes derived from the qualitative analysis of scientific works, organizing them by their semantic and conceptual relationships to the term "emergency." The diagram illustrates how various terms are connected to the central concept of emergencies, highlighting both hierarchical relationships and synonymous usage across different scholarly texts.

A key insight from the diagram is the causal and structural relationship between emergency politics and emergency policy. I propose that emergency politics arises as a response to an emergency situation, which in turn influences the formulation of emergency policies—concrete (inter)governmental responses to these situations. Other terms, such as emergency power, emergency regime, emergency rule, and state of exception, are frequently used interchangeably with emergency politics, indicating conceptual overlaps within the literature. The figure also highlights distinct yet related processes where emergency claims and rights are closely connected to developing emergency policies. In contrast, emergency management is mainly associated with creating emergency plans. This visualization emphasizes the terminological ambiguity present in this emerging field, underscoring the necessity for more precise conceptual distinctions in future research to address this limitation.

Given the lack of clear differentiation among emergency synonyms in the sample, one study stands out: Jennifer Rubenstein's (2015) article titled "Emergency Claims and Democratic Action." In her work, Rubenstein meticulously distinguishes the concept of "emergency" from similar terms like "disaster" and "crisis," elucidating why it is pertinent to treat emergency claims as distinct. According to the author, the primary differences among these terms are as follows: (i) an emergency represents an imminent disaster that can potentially be mitigated, at least to some extent; (ii) the term "emergency" carries a sense of possibility, invoking an optimistic perspective where emergencies serve as windows of opportunity for beneficial action; and (iii) the imperative for immediate action is inherent in the concept of emergency, whereas for disasters and crises, the term "impending" must be added. For further elaboration on the meanings and distinctions among these terms, please refer to Appendix C – General distinction between the emergency, disaster, and crisis terms

Rubenstein (2015) also highlighted an important aspect regarding the differences in temporal focus between emergency claims and other types of

assertions. According to her, emergency claims are primarily directed towards immediate actions needed to address urgent issues. In contrast, disaster claims relate to events that have, at least in part, already taken place. Additionally, while crisis claims are similar to emergency claims in that they focus on the present, they imply a longer duration than emergency claims (Rubenstein, 2015, pp. 107-108). Rubenstein was not alone in examining this critical characteristic of the emergency definition. At least 12 authors (37.5%) also delved into this aspect from various perspectives, as indicated in Table 2.

Table 2– Authors' classification according to differences in temporal emphasis of emergency

Emergency as temporal situation	Emergency with enduring legacies	Emergency with several temporal scales
Ferejohn & Pasquino (2004) Beckett (2013) White (2015b) Rubenstein(2015) Kurylo (2022)	White (2019) Kreuder-Sonnen (2019) (McHugh et al., 2021) Kurylo (2022) (Hanrieder & Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014)	Honig (2009) Ansell et. al (2010) Handmer & Dovers (2012) Adey (2016)

Table 2 outlines studies that address the concept of emergency temporality, organizing them into three groups. The first group consists of studies examining emergencies' temporal nature as one of their defining characteristics, primarily drawing on Schmitt's notion of "constitutional dictatorship." For instance, Ferejohn and Pasquino (2004, p. 3) state that "emergency powers in modern constitutions are meant to address temporary situations and are intended to restore conditions to a normal state." Overall, authors in this group perceive emergencies as temporary situations with a beginning and end (White, 2015b; Kurylo, 2022).

The second group criticized the assumption that emergencies are temporary. They highlighted recent situations where emergency measures have been prolonged. It is rarely true that these measures would merely be adopted for a limited amount of time before returning to the status quo ante (Kreuder-Sonnen, 2019, p. 3). In fact, "the practices of emergency rules reveal the crystallization of long-term tendencies that cannot be reduced to any single policy area" (White, 2019, p. 5).

Some authors in the first group believed that the purposes of emergency powers and measures were fundamentally conservative. They argued that these measures aimed to address the threat to the system and then restore it to its prior state (Beckett, 2013; Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004; Rubenstein, 2015; White, 2015a). In contrast, authors in the second group critically examined the supposed temporary nature of emergency measures. They emphasized the lasting effects on governance systems, which sometimes extend beyond the period of a declared state of emergency due to shifts in power among decision-making bodies (Hanrieder & Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014; McHugh et al., 2021).

The third group is very singular because it is the only one with studies of the emergency management area. Ansell et al. (2010) and Handmer & Dovers (2012) emphasize the administrative connotation of emergencies, seeing this atypical situation as a problem to solve. This perspective emphasizes functional aspects of emergency management, such as risks, while often overlooking other essential political dimensions of emergencies (Kreuder-Sonnen & White, 2021). Hence, these works are not usually interested in the decision-making process's political agendas, normative stakes, or long-term consequences. To Handmer & Dovers (2012, p. 63), for instance, "the temporal scale of disasters has two contrasting characteristics: long periods demanding preparedness that may be difficult to justify and rapid onset events that entail sudden impacts and enormous political urgency." In the same direction, Ansell et al. (2010, p. 5) add that "ecological changes and their cascading consequences (...) tend to unfold at multiple spatial and temporal scales".

From a political theory perspective, Adey (2016, p. 14) understands that the governance of emergencies has "complex times and temporalities within and outside of the law." Similarly, Bonnie Honig (2009) recognizes that emergency powers are not just temporal, but they may be spatial, too. She gave an example to illustrate that in a national emergency, we are not all equally subject to emergency politics and remember that societal inequalities have maintained and even increased during emergencies. For her, people with more resources can avoid many constraints and sometimes remain decriminalized.

2.4.3. Absence of a definition for emergency policy

One of the most striking gaps in the analyzed literature is the absence of a clear definition of emergency policy. Although 11 out of 30 studies in the sample explicitly define emergency politics, none provides a corresponding definition for emergency policy, despite its logical connection as a potential output of emergency politics dynamics. This omission raises significant concerns about the conceptual clarity of the field, as policies enacted during emergencies are crucial for understanding how emergency governance operates in practice. Without a precise definition, scholars and policymakers may struggle to distinguish *emergency policies* from other forms of crisis-driven decision-making.

The term "emergency policy" appears infrequently in the literature, with only two studies—Handmer & Dovers (2012) and Bestari & Sinaga (2022)—giving it significant attention. However, neither of these studies provides a formal definition; instead, they use the term descriptively or in passing. This lack of a clear definition suggests that while the concept of emergency politics has been the focus of considerable theoretical inquiry, its practical implications for policymaking remain underexplored. A possible explanation for this absence is that alternative terms such as "emergency measures," or "emergency response," are used interchangeably to refer to emergency-related policymaking. However, without a precise definition, it remains challenging to determine whether these terms reflect distinct governance processes or are simply synonyms. This lack of conceptual clarity limits theoretical advancements and hinders comparative empirical research on how policies are formulated and implemented under emergency conditions.

In the following section, I will further explore this gap by synthesizing existing definitions of emergency politics and proposing a conceptual framework for emergency policy, outlining its defining characteristics and operational dimensions. This contribution aims to provide greater analytical clarity and bridge the disconnect between emergency politics as a theoretical construct and emergency policy as a tangible governance mechanism.

2.5. Definitions of emergency politics and a proposal for emergency policy.

Table 4 summarizes the studies included in the sample that have, at least partially, defined the concept of "emergency politics." The studies are arranged chronologically to highlight the evolving understanding of this concept over time. Bonnie Honig (2009) was the first to define this term, describing emergency politics as "a moment in that larger institutional struggle between judicial and administrative power" (Honig, 2009, p. 156). She emphasized the tensions that arise between different institutional powers of the state, which often intensify during emergencies. Furthermore, in her 2014 work, she expanded upon this concept by proposing three distinct models of emergency politics within the state and characterizing each of them.

Table 3 - Synthesis of studies in which emergency politics definitions were found.

Authors	Year	Title	Emergeny Politics definitions
Honig Bonnie	2009	Emergency politics	**Emergency politics** as a moment in that larger institutional struggle between judicial and administrative power (...), while also emphasizing more approvingly than Salyer, I think, the extra procedural and not always law-governed role played in that struggle by the personalities (Rossiter) and decisions of judges, administrators, elites, legal clients, and all sorts of political actors (p.156).
Honig Bonnie;	2014	Three models of emergency politics	**Three models of emergency politics**: Deliberative, Activist, and (a particular kind of) Legalist. (...) All are aimed at democratizing emergency and at de-exceptionalizing it (p. 48- 49).
White Jonathan;	2015	Emergency Europe	**Emergency Politics** is a distinctive mode in which actions contravening established procedures and norms are defended – often exclusively – as a response to exceptional circumstances that pose some form of existential threat. (...) Emergency politics is a mode of rule (p. 302-303)
Rubenstein Jennifer C;	2015	Emergency claims and democratic action	**Emergency politics**, in turn, consists of many different actors making and not making, accepting, and rejecting, a wide range of overlapping and competing emergency claims (p.101).

White Jonathan;	2019	Politics of last resort: governing by emergency in the European Union	The **transnational politics of emergency** is the context in which these tendencies find their most concentrated expression, as well as a key context for efforts to rationalize and legitimize them (p. 5). (...) This is an **emergency politics** informally co-produced by the many (p.6) The **politics of emergency** is a way of coping with weakening public authority in the age of governance (p. 9).
Kreuder-Sonnen Christian;	2019	Emergency powers of international organizations: between normalization and containment	**Emergency politics** always entail an expansion of executive discretion for the authority-holders and incursions into the political autonomy of the authority-addresses —sometimes short-term, sometimes long-term (p. 6).
Torney Diarmuid;	2020	The politics of emergency? ireland's response to climate change*	How do we know **emergency politics** when we see it? I argued here that there are four central characteristics. The first is that the issue should become the central—if not effectively the sole—focus of policymaking. Second, very substantial resources should be mobilised in support of the policy response. Third, we could expect delegation to experts who would be insulated from the vagaries of electoral politics. Fourth and related, we should expect decreased opportunities for oversight and scrutiny of government decision-making (p. 25).
Kreuder-Sonnen Christian; White Jonathan;	2021	Europe and the transnational politics of emergency	We define **emergency politics** as a mode of politics in which actions departing from convention are rationalised as necessary responses to exceptional and urgent threats (p. 1).
Truchlewski Zbigniew; Schelkle Waltraud; Ganderson Joseph;	2021	Buying time for democracies? european union emergency politics in the time of covid-19	**emergency politics** applied to one set of crisis measures may buy time for democratic contestation regarding another set of crisis measures (p. 1357).
Heupel Monika; Koenig-Archibugi Mathias; Kreuder-Sonnen Christian; Patberg Markus; Seville Astrid; Steffek Jens; White Jonathan;	2021	Emergency politics after globalization	**Emergency politics** is conceived here as a particular policy style, but also a rhetorical strategy of the executive that seeks to push through controversial measures. That conceptual shift is accompanied by a redefinition of power that takes us from the "power to coerce," as it was in Schmitt, to the "power to persuade" (Oppenheim 1978, 590) (p. 9).
Schmidt Vivien A;	2021	European emergency politics and the question of legitimacy	(...) **emergency politics** tends to suspend the traditional democratic processes of citizen representation and even parliamentary consultation expected for political (input) legitimacy in the name of effective policy (output) performance and procedural (throughput) efficacy (p. 4).

To enhance the synthesis of Table 4, these studies can be aggregated into two groups. On the one hand, Honig's pieces (2009, 2014), together with Rubenstein's (2015) and Torney's (2020) can be clustered in a group of works that explore the concept of emergency politics inside the boundaries of the state. On the other hand, White (2015) inaugurated a series of studies that seek to extrapolate the concept of emergency politics beyond the state dynamic. He considers this phenomenon a possible situation even in the international scenario, focusing on the European context. His works (2015, 2019), together with Kreuder-Sonnen (2019), Kreuder-Sonnen & White (2021), Truchlewski et al. (2021), Heupel et al. (2021), and (Schmidt, 2021), compound the group of studies that deal with the international implication and dynamics of this phenomenon.

Jonathan White and Christian Kreuder-Sonnen deserve special attention as they each authored influential books that systematically examine exceptional politics at a transnational level (Heupel et al. 2021). Kreuder-Sonnen's Emergency Powers of International Organizations: Between Normalization and Containment (2019) and White's Politics of Last Resort: Governing by Emergency in the European Union (2019) are the most comprehensive works on emergency politics to date. According to the bibliometric analysis results, these authors contributed the most to the sample studied. While both books are crucial for understanding the manifestation of emergency politics, their focus is primarily on the European context.

Jonathan White (2015b) developed the emergency politics concept most used in the subsequent literature. In his paper, *Emergency Europe*, White delineates emergency politics as a distinct mode of governance characterized by "actions contravening established procedures and norms are defended – often exclusively – as a response to exceptional circumstances that pose some form of existential threat" (White, 2015b, p. 302). Building upon White's framework, Kreuder-Sonnen collaborated with White to refine and expand upon this concept, introducing novel components and nuances. In their collaborative effort, *Europe and the Transnational Politics of Emergency*, the authors broaden the concept's scope from a mere mode of rule to encompassing a mode of politics. They define emergency politics as a political style "in which actions departing from convention are rationalized as necessary responses to exceptional and urgent threats" (Kreuder-Sonnen & White, 2021, p. 1).

This concept evolution introduces two pivotal elements: firstly, the recognition that emergency politics entails a repertoire of unconventional practices, and secondly, the rationalization of these actions as imperative responses to extreme circumstances.

This extension opened the doors to formulating an emergency policy concept based on these two key elements. In general terms, it is possible to locate emergency policies as part of the repertoire of emergency politics. One used by executive bodies within governments and interstate organizations to address threats arising from emergencies. In this direction, Table 3 synthesizes some practical dimensions to differentiate emergency policies from other manifestations, such as traditional public policies and emergency measures[7].

Table 4 - Dimensions of emergency policy concept

Indicators of Emergency Policy	
Who create it?	Government
	Interstate organization
In what circumstances?	An exceptional situation (an emergency). It is a necessary condition to formulate it, but sometimes it is not sufficient.
Characteristics	A kind of public policy. So, the phases of the policy cycle also apply to it, but on a different time scale.
	Reactive nature, but with normative principles
	Concrete measures not just rhetorical
	Break the conventional rules
	Temporal in its constitution, but it can be extended or normalized.

One of the critical characteristics of emergency policies lies in their reliance on the occurrence of an emergency scenario. This condition can be deemed a fundamental prerequisite for their development, yet it alone does not ensure the formulation of such policies. While emergency policies may be categorized under the public policy umbrella, they inherently possess a reactive logic distinct from traditional public policies. Emergency policies are primarily responsive to external exigencies

---

[7] I understand emergency measures as tangible and intangible actions institutional actors create to address emergencies.

rather than being driven by predetermined normative priorities (Kreuder-Sonnen & White, 2021, p. 3). While normative principles may not be as influential during emergencies, they are not entirely absent from the discussion.

Emergency policies, like conventional public policies, follow a cyclical or procedural framework. However, the key difference lies in the time allocated to each phase. In typical circumstances, policymakers and decision-makers typically have ample time to carefully assess various options and their consequences. In contrast, decisions must be made quickly during emergencies, as any delay can be perceived as incompetence or negligence. Inaction or hesitation in emergency situations can mean the difference between life and death for citizens (Adey, 2016).

The second aspect of emergency politics can also inform the definition of emergency policy. In this context, formulating emergency policies often deviates from standard rules, justified as necessary responses to the implications of the emergency. For this reason, these policies are usually intended as temporary measures lasting only during the emergency. However, as previously mentioned, emergency policies are not always temporary and often have lasting impacts.

In summary, this paper posits that emergency policies represent concrete outcomes of emergency politics. They are developed by states or their organizations in less time than conventional policies, are reactive in nature, temporary in their constitution, and justified by the dangers produced by the advent of emergencies.

2.6.   Conclusions

This scoping review systematically examined the developing scholarship on emergency politics and policy, synthesizing conceptual definitions, core characteristics, and critical gaps in the field. By integrating bibliometric analysis with qualitative content analysis, the study illuminated the field's quantitative trajectory and the qualitative nuances of its theoretical and methodological approaches. Three key contributions emerge from this review: mapping the field, highlighting theoretical limitations, and offering a new conceptualization of emergency policy to clarify existing ambiguities.

From a quantitative perspective, the bibliometric analysis revealed that while emergency politics remains a relatively emerging field, its scholarly production has increased significantly in recent years, particularly following the outbreak of COVID-19. The pandemic catalyzed research in different areas, including political science, where the study of emergency governance gained renewed importance. Between 2020 and 2022, the annual growth rate of publications on emergency politics rose to 58.11%, indicating a heightened academic focus on the political dimensions of emergency responses. This shift underscores how emergencies drive scholarly inquiry, leading to new theoretical and empirical explorations of emergency governance.

The Three-Field Plot (Figure 2) shows that Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States are the key countries contributing to this field of study. Influential scholars such as Jonathan White, Christian Kreuder-Sonnen, and Bonnie Honig have significantly shaped the conceptual discourse. Notably, Bonnie Honig's work is the most frequently cited, emphasizing her crucial role in challenging traditional views on emergency politics, particularly those based on Schmittian exceptionalism. Her contributions challenge traditional perspectives on emergency politics, highlighting the necessity of moving beyond this notion in future research. While these elements are undoubtedly relevant, they do not fully capture the complexity and diversity of emergency governance in democratic and transnational contexts.

Beyond these bibliometric trends, the content analysis provided a more nuanced understanding of the research approaches, theoretical frameworks, methodologies, and scope of studies on emergency politics. Most studies relied on theoretical frameworks, using Law Theory, Democracy Theory, Emergency Management, and Security Theory as their primary lenses. In terms of methodology, qualitative methods, such as literature reviews and theoretical analyses, were predominant in the sample. Regarding the scope of the research, most studies concentrated on the transnational system as their primary level of analysis. This result is explained by the fact that figures like Jonathan White and Christian Kreuder-Sonnen have significant influence in the sample and frequently frame discussions around emergency politics within international governance structures and European emergencies.

The content analysis also identified three primary limitations in the existing literature: (i) an excessive dependence on Schmitt's concept of exception, (ii) the use of multiple emergency-related terms without clear definitions, and (iii) the absence of a formal definition for emergency policy. While the first two limitations reveal theoretical and terminological ambiguities, the lack of a definition for emergency policy represents a particularly significant gap. Scholars have devoted substantial effort to defining emergency politics but have largely overlooked the policies that emerge from these extraordinary circumstances. Although some studies reference emergency policy, its definition remains absent. Only two studies—Handmer & Dovers (2012) and Bestari & Sinaga (2022)—engaged with the term meaningfully, yet neither provided a formal conceptualization.

To address this limitation, this paper proposes a definition of emergency policy, conceptualizing it as the concrete output of emergency politics developed by states or international organizations within compressed timeframes, reactive in nature, temporary in constitution, and justified by the perceived dangers of the emergency itself. This contribution provides a crucial conceptual foundation for future research, enabling more precise analyses of the emergency policymaking process and its implications. By offering this definition, the study not only fills an existing gap but also opens new avenues for research into the effectiveness, legitimacy, and long-term consequences of emergency policies.

In conclusion, this scoping review makes several important contributions to the study of emergency politics and policy. First, it offers a clear and transparent systematization of existing research, providing a structured analysis of the field's theoretical, methodological, and empirical dimensions. Second, it presents a concise yet comprehensive summary of central concepts, clarifying key terms and addressing conceptual ambiguities. Third, mapping the field's evolution up to 2022 identifies trends, leading contributors, and research gaps. Finally, it critically engages with dominant frameworks, particularly Schmittian exceptionalism, and encourages alternative perspectives. This review is essential for scholars looking to establish a solid foundation and explore future research directions in emergency politics.

Appendix Chapter 1

This appendix complements the information related to the qualitative analysis of the final sample from the scoping review. First, it provides a comprehensive systematization of the sample. Second, it presents the inductive codes developed during the analysis using Atlas.ti. Finally, it outlines the general distinction between the key concept of "emergency" and its various synonyms.

Appendix A – Overview of selected studies

Authors	Year	Title	Type	Source	Editor	Research Area	Approach	Method	Central Definitions	Scope
Ferejohn John; Pasquino Pasquale;	2004	The law of the exception: a typology of emergency powers	Article	International Journal of Constitutional Law	Ferejohn & Pasquino (2004)	Law, Political Science; Social Science	Theoretical-Law Theory	Literature review	**Emergency** may be defined as a situation that produces a grave disturbance of the political system or order, threatening its survival (p. 231). **Emergency powers** as an exceptional derogation vis-à-vis the constitutional government, meaning here normal or ordinary government (p. 222).	National systems, specifically, liberal democratic orders.
Alexander David	2005	Towards the development of astandard in emergency planning	Book Chapter	Emergency policy: volume iii	Legrand & McConnell (2017)	Industry; Law; Politics; International Relations	Theoretical-Emergency Management	Literature review	**"Emergency"** is a broader term that includes disasters, catastrophes (which some would define as major disasters) and smaller disruptive events. It can be defined as an imminent or actual event that threatens people, property or the environment and which requires a coordinated and rapid response. Emergencies are usually unanticipated, at least in terms of exactly what happens and when and where they take place (p. 159).	National systems with a focus on local authorities.
Honig Bonnie	2009	Emergency politics	Book	Emergency Politics	Honig (2009)	Law, Political Science; Social Sciences	Theoretical-Democratic Theory	Literature review	**Emergency politics** as a moment in that larger institutional struggle between judicial and administrative power (...), while also emphasizing more approvingly than Salyer, I think, the extra procedural and not always law-governed role played in that struggle by the personalities (Rossiter) and decisions of judges, administrators, elites, legal clients, and all sorts of political actors (p.156).	National systems, precisely, constitutional democracies.

Ansell Chris; Boin Arjen & Keller Ann	2010	Managing Transboundary Crises: Identifying the Building Blocks of an Effective Response System	Book Chapter	Emergency policy: volume iii	Legrand & McConnell (2017)	Industry; Law; Politics; International Relations	Theoretical-Crises Managment	Theory building	**Crisis** is a threat is perceived against the core values or life-sustaining functions of a social system, which requires urgent remedial action under conditions of deep uncertainty (Rosenthal et al., 1989) (...) **Crises differ from complex emergencies** (hostage takings, explosions, fires) that occur with some regularity and, therefore, provide operational agencies enough past experience to prepare for future events (p. 196).	Transboundary jurisdictions
Victor Galaz, Fredrik Moberg, Eva-Karin Olsson, Eric Paglia & Charles Parker	2011	Institutional and political leadership dimensions of cascading ecological crises	Book Chapter	Emergency policy: volume iii	Legrand & McConnell (2017)	Industry; Law; Politics; International Relations	Theoretical-Crises Managment	Conceptual analysis	**Cascading ecological crises (CECs):** abrupt shifts in ecological systems that trigger crises that cascade through sectoral and geographical boundaries (p. 364). Our emphasis on **'crisis'** rather than on ecological degradation, in general, pinpoints changes that also are perceived by policymakers as immediate threats to core values or life-sustaining systems, and that require urgent response under conditions of deep uncertainty (see Rosenthalet al. 1989; Gibbons 2007; LaPorte 2007; Smith and Fishbacher 2009) (p.364).	Multiple administrative levels, including the international level.

Handmer John; Dovers Stephen;	2012	The handbook of disaster and emergency policies and institutions	Book	the handbook of disaster and emergency policies and institutions	Handmer & Dovers (2012)	Law, Political Science; Social Sciences	Theoretical-Emergency Managment	Theory discussion with some case studies.	**Emergency and disaster-related institutions and policy processes** were not developed for the broader challenge of longer-term strategic policy development but for effective response, and occasionally for prevention, emphasizing events well-defined in space and time (p. 6) **Disasters** are (...)uncontrollable events that are concentrated in time or space, in which a society(…) undergoes severe danger and incurs such losses (…) that the social structure is disrupted and the fulfilment of all or some of the essential functions is prevented (Fritz, 1961, p.655). (p. 23) **Emergencies** can (...) be placed in three categories (...): routine, non-routine and complex. (...) In summary, the attributes of routine emergencies will generally be at the lower end of the attribute continuums, while complex emergencies are characterized by attributes at the higher, more difficult, end of the continuums. Non-routine emergencies lie in between (p. 112).	Multiple administrative levels inside a state.
Beckett Greg;	2013	The politics of emergency	Article	Reviews in Anthropology	Beckett (2013)	Political Anthropology	Theoretical-Democratic Theory	Literature review	(...) **Emergencies** are moments of great danger that necessitate an urgent response. For states, such a declaration grants expanded powers to the executive branch of government and allows certain actions to be carried out without legislative debate or deliberation. At the international level, the declaration of emergency is regularly used to justify forms of intervention that, in nonemergency moments, would violate the global norm of territorial sovereignty (p. 85-86). If an **emergency** is a moment outside of the everyday, then perhaps it operates somewhat like the liminal space of a rite of passage (p. 92). (...) **emergency** not as the antithesis of thought and deliberation, but as an event that we collectively survive because we have already thought and deliberated about it as one possible future (p.96).	International System with a focus on military and humanitarian interventions.

Hanrieder Tine; Kreuder-Sonnen Christian;	2014	WHO decides on the exception? Securitization and emergency governance in global health	Article	Security Dialogue	Hanrieder & Kreuder-Sonnen (2014)	Political Science; International Relations	Theoretical-Securitization theory and legal theory.	Theoretical analysis and case study.	An **'Emergency trap'** is triggered when the emergency powers of international organizations reduce the obstacles to, and increase the incentives for, the securitization of further issues (p. 331). **Emergency governance** by international organizations (IOs) is different from state-level exceptionalism in that it lacks direct enforcement capacities. (...) Just as the presentation of a problem as a threat to national security amplifies executive discretion at the state level, so the securitization of transboundary risks may also strengthen the supranational authority of IOs (p. 332).	International System with a focus on International Organizations.
Honig Bonnie;	2014	Three models of emergency politics	Article	BOUNDARY 2-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LITERATURE AND CULTURE	Honig (2014)	Cultural Studies; Literature	Theoretical-Democratic Theory	Theoretical Essay	**Democratizing emergency** means seeking sovereignty, not just challenging it, and insisting that sovereignty is not just a trait of executive power that must be chastened but also potentially a trait of popular power as well, one to be generated and mobilized (p. 48). **Three models of emergency politics:** Deliberative, Activist, and (a particular kind of) Legalist. (...) All are aimed at democratizing emergency and at de-exceptionalizing it (p. 48- 49).	National systems, precisely, liberal democracies.
White Jonathan;	2015	Authority after Emergency Rule	Article	The Modern Law Review	White (2015a)	Government & Law; Political Science	Theoretical-Legal and political theory	Case study approach	The **politics of emergency is conducive to descriptive authority** also because the institutional structures that survive it, or the measures initiated under its auspices, may come to seem robust precisely because they have weathered a period of crisis (p. 606). **Emergency rule** presents itself as a self-contained episode, the interruption of something enduring. The very idea of exceptional measures implies the awaited resumption of political normality, with the connotations of legitimacy this widely implies (p. 609).	International System with a focus on Regional Organizations.

Author	Year	Title	Type	Journal	Citation	Subject	Approach	Method	Definitions	Context
White Jonathan;	2015	Emergency Europe	Article	POLITICAL STUDIES	White (2015b)	Government & Law	Theoretical-Legal and political theory	Theoretical analysis with practical examples	The **emergency regime** is a collaborative phenomenon, promoted by those with an interest in its production and consolidated by those who lack the authority to revoke it or who actively give credence to the authority claims of others (p. 301). **Emergency Politics** is a distinctive mode in which actions contravening established procedures and norms are defended – often exclusively – as a response to exceptional circumstances that pose some form of existential threat. (...) Emergency politics is a mode of rule (p. 302-303). The distinction between a **crisis situation** and an **emergency response** is subtle, since it is in large part by the nature of the response that situations are constructed as such. Yet situations can be cast as grave and challenging without producing emergency politics: they can be handled in a 'cold', considered fashion as well as in the 'hot' manner associated with emergency (p.316).	Transnational systems focus on European Union.
Rubenstein Jennifer C;	2015	Emergency claims and democratic action	Article	SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY & POLICY	Rubenstein (2015)	Social Sciences - Other Topics; Philosophy	Theoretical-Democratic Theory	Theoretical Essay	An **emergency claim** is a claim that a particular (kind of) situation is an emergency, made by particular actors against particular background conditions to particular audiences, which in turn accept, ignore, or reject that claim (p.101). **Emergency politics**, in turn, consists of many different actors making and not making, accepting, and rejecting, a wide range of overlapping and competing emergency claims (p.101). **Large-scale emergencies**, such as those associated with hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, famines, heat waves, epidemics, nuclear accidents, chemical spills, terrorist attacks, and violent conflicts, are tremendously important social and political phenomena (p.101). According to the Oxford English Dictionary, an "**emergency**" is "a state of things unexpectedly arising and urgently demanding immediate action." (p. 105).	Political systems, including national and international

Author	Year	Title	Type	Journal/Publisher	Citation	Field	Theory	Method	Key concepts/Quotes	Scope
Adey Peter;	2016	Emergency mobilities	Article	MOBILITIES	Adey (2016)	Geography; Transportation	Theoretical-Governance Theory	Theoretical exploration	**Emergency mobilities** appear as exceptional events that we should take notice of, and yet are normal to the precariousness of modern existence that they demand sustained attention (p. 34). More than a legal-juridical suspension of the normal running of law, or a certain capability of sovereign power, **an emergency** is a more general and open space-time or interval (Aradau and van Munster 2012) in which threats to life generate a moment when certain sets of action are prescribed, or possible (p. 35).	Political systems, including national and international
Heath J Benton;	2016	Global emergency power in the age of ebola	Article	Harvard International Law Journal	Heath (2016)	Governance; Politics; International Relations; Global Health	Mixed approach, but mainly theoretical (Legal theory)	In-depth case study	**Emergency power** is no longer the sole province of states, or even of international assemblies or executive councils, and instead is spread among the bureaucratic components of international organizations, privately funded NGOs and hybrid entities, and more diffuse epistemic communities (p. 10). The idea of **emergency** (...) is a fundamentally political and legal concept, referring not to a particular set of facts but to a justification for using extraordinary power (p. 27).	International System with a focus on International Organizations.
Reynolds John;	2017	Empire, Emergency and International Law	Book	Emergency Policy: Volume III	Reynolds (2017)	Public International Law; Law; Politics and International Relations	Theoretical-Critical Theory	Theoretical exploration	It is the particular experiences and struggles that constitute the tradition of the oppressed which teach us that the **state of emergency is convention**, not exception – and that the supposedly new normal is in fact part of a continuing historical constellation of emergency control mechanisms (p. 10). (...) state of emergency is similarly better understood as structure rather than as event (p. 14). The **emergency** does not produce something novel or exceptional, but rather reproduces colonial nodes of governance through proliferation of law and legal stratification (p.).	Political systems, including national and international

Dos Reis Filipe;	2017	law, politics and state (s) of emergency	Short Communication	New Perspectives	Dos Reis (2017)	Law, Political Science	Theoretical-Political Theory	Review	(...) a **state of emergency**, as its proponents argue, 'helps' democracies in times of crisis by temporarily suspending normal democratic politics and/or constitutional rights to install emergency measures – often in a vocabulary mobilising militaristic metaphors (p. 137).	National systems
Bjørnskov Christian; Voigt Stefan;	2018	why do governments call a state of emergency? on the determinants of using emergency constitutions	Article	European Journal of Political Economy	Bjørnskov & Voigt (2018)	Political Economy	Empirical	Statistical analysis	Declaring a **state of emergency** has far-reaching consequences for all citizens – not least because basic rights are frequently suspended under emergencies. But declaring a state of emergency also has far-reaching consequences for the balance of powers within government: the power of both the legislature and the judiciary are usually curtailed to the advantage of the executive (p.2-3). We find that constitutions matter and that descriptive statistics indicate that countries without constitutionalized emergency provisions declare states of emergency significantly more often than countries with such provisions.	National systems, democratic and autocratic societies.
White Jonathan;	2019	politics of last resort: governing by emergency in the european union	Book	politics of last resort: governing by emergency in the european union	White (2019)	European Studies; Political Science	Mixed approach, but mainly theoretical (political Theory)	The methods used in this book include historical analysis, policy analysis, and critical theory.	(...) with the **concept of emergency rule** one sees not just how a certain socio-economic order comes to be entrenched, but how the particular way this is done disables the democratic forces that might resist it (p. 4. The **transnational politics of emergency** is the context in which these tendencies find their most concentrated expression, as well as a key context for efforts to rationalize and legitimize them (p. 5). (...) This is an **emergency politics** informally co-produced by the many (p.6) The **politics of emergency** is a way of coping with weakening public authority in the age of governance (p. 9).	Transnational systems focus on European Union.

Kreuder-Sonnen Christian;	2019	emergency powers of international organizations: between normalization and containment	Book	emergency powers of international organizations: between normalization and containment	Kreuder-Sonnen (2019)	Government & Law; Public Administration; Political Science	Mixed approach - (international political Theory)	Theory building and empirical analysis	**Emergency politics** always entail an expansion of executive discretion for the authority-holders and incursions into the political autonomy of the authority-addresses —sometimes short-term, sometimes long-term (p. 6). **IO exceptionalism** that encompasses constitutionally *deviant acts of IO authority* that extend the IO's executive competencies and/or interfere with the rights of its rule-addressees—and hence give it **emergency powers**—based on *justifications* of necessity due to exceptional circumstances (p. 8). (...) **IO exceptionalism**, understood as the constitutionally deviant expansion of executive discretion on the horizontal and/or the vertical dimension that is justified by an emergency situation (p.48).	The international system, including all types of International Organizations.
Kreuder-Sonnen Christian;	2019	International authority and the emergency problematique: io empowerment through crises	Article	INTERNATIONAL THEORY	Kreuder-Sonnen (2019)	International Relations; Government & Law	Mixed approach - (international political Theory)	Qualitative research method	(...) **the state of exception or state of emergency** is understood as a legal institution regulating the suspension of (certain provisions of) the normally applying constitutional order – the state of normalcy (see Dyzenhaus 2006; Gross and Ní Aoláin 2006; Scheuerman 2006; Fatovic 2009) (p. 190). The formal constitutional denomination for this exceptional increase in executive discretion is the assumption of ***emergency powers*** (p 191). In sum, the logic of **exceptionalism** generally comprises two necessary elements: (1) **emergency powers** expanding **executive discretion** both horizontally and vertically and (2) the explicit or implicit justification of the political measures by reference to necessity (p. 192). **IO exceptionalism** must be understood as a discrete, post-national type of **emergency politics**, which exhibits a number of distinctive features (see also White 2015b; Scheuerman 2018) (p. 192).	The international system, including all types of International Organizations.

Grogan Joelle;	2020	States of emergency: analysing global use of emergency powers in response to covid-19	Article	European Journal of Law Reform	Grogan (2020)	European Union Law; Public Law	Theoretical-Law Theory	Comparative qualitative study	States can have highly prescriptive conditions attaching to a s**tate of emergency,** including the obligation to derogate from constitutional rights and international treaties, arguably attach to higher bars for their activation and so act as a legal or constitutional safeguard on their use (p. 340).	National systems
Torney Diarmuid;	2020	The politics of emergency? ireland's response to climate change*	Article	Irish Studies in International Affairs	Torney (2020)	Governance; Politics; International Relations	Theoretical-Enviromental Politics and Security Studies	Literature review and case study.	(...) **four characteristics of emergency politics**: policy prioritisation, mobilisation of resources, the role of experts in policymaking, and oversight and scrutiny of government decision-making (p. 13). How do we know **emergency politics** when we see it? I argued here that there are four central characteristics. The first is that the issue should become the central—if not effectively the sole—focus of policymaking. Second, very substantial resources should be mobilised in support of the policy response. Third, we could expect delegation to experts who would be insulated from the vagaries of electoral politics. Fourth and related, we should expect decreased opportunities for oversight and scrutiny of government decision-making (p. 25).	National systems focus on democratic societies

Kreuder-Sonnen Christian; White Jonathan;	2021	Europe and the transnational politics of emergency	Article	JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY	Kreuder-Sonnen & White (2021)	Government & Law; Public Administration	Mixed approach - (international political Theory)	Conceptual analysis and case study analysis.	We define **emergency politics** as a mode of politics in which actions departing from convention are rationalised as necessary responses to exceptional and urgent threats (p. 1). (…) **emergency politics** denotes on the one hand a set of *practices*. It entails actions on the part of governing authorities that break with established norms and/or codified rules and expand executive discretion by suspending or evading the constraints to which it is normally subject. In parallel, emergency politics involves a certain way of *rationalizing* such moves (see also Rauh, 2021, this Section). It entails casting actions as largely unavoidable responses to exceptional and challenging circumstances. **Emergency politics is a reactive logic**, one that sees actions explained in terms of external demands rather than chosen normative priorities (p.3).	Transnational systems focus on European Union.
McHugh Lucy Holmes; Lemos Maria Carmen; Morrison Tiffany Hope;	2021	Risk? crisis? emergency? implications of the new climate emergency framing for governance and policy	Article	Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change	McHugh et al. (2021)	Policy and Governance	Theoretical-Social Science	Critical literature review	**Risk** is therefore considered both as an action that could bring undesirable consequences, as well as an activity that allows exploration of new possibilities (Giddens, 1999) (p. 3). Across the social sciences, **crisis** is typically understood as an event or process, with stages before, during and after, and defined by the presence of uncertainty (like risk), as well as by threat and urgency (unlike risk) (Boin et al., 2017; McConnell, 2020). A common definition is that **crises** are "events or developments widely perceived by members of relevant communities to constitute urgent threats to core community values and structures" (Boin et al., 2009, p. 89) (p. 5). (…) with "**crisis**" understood as synonymous with "**emergency**" (p. 5).	Political systems in general

Author	Year	Title	Type	Journal	Citation	Field	Approach	Method	Concepts	Focus
Truchlewski Zbigniew; Schelkle Waltraud; Ganderson Joseph;	2021	Buying time for democracies? european union emergency politics in the time of covid-19	Article	WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS	Truchlewski et al. (2021)	Government & Law	Empirical	Content analysis and descriptive statistical	(...) Honig's (2009: 3) conception of **emergency politics** as a means to come to terms with **Rousseau's paradox** of democracy: those with whom power should lie, the people, are not of one unified will and need institutions that enable them to exercise power reflecting the will of many. **Emergencies** can be periods in democratic life in which this paradox comes to the fore and collective institution building flips from an effect of democratic politics to its cause (p. 1354). (...) **emergency politics** applied to one set of crisis measures may buy time for democratic contestation regarding another set of crisis measures (p. 1357).	Transnational systems focus on European Union.
Heupel Monika; Koenig-Archibugi Mathias; Kreuder-Sonnen Christian; Patberg Markus; Seville Astrid; Steffek Jens; White Jonathan;	2021	Emergency politics after globalization	Article	INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW	Heupel Monika; Koenig-Archibugi Mathias; Kreuder-Sonnen & White (2021)	International Relations; Government & Law	Theoretical-Political Theory	Theoretical exploration	**Emergency regimes** tend to be normalized, and much of today's global institutional architecture is the legacy of yesterday's such measures. **Emergency rule** is a key way in which powers are redis tributed in global politics—from national to transnational arenas, from legislatives to executives—as well as the basis of efforts to legitimize these transfers (p. 3) (...) a **crisis** can be understood as "a process," as "a moment of decisive intervention, a moment of transformation" (Hay 1996, 254). **A crisis** implies more than a rupture or breakdown: it refers to a situation in which agents—state agents, public and transnational authorities—need to intervene and make decisions (p. 7). **Emergency politics** is conceived here as a particular policy style, but also a rhetorical strategy of the executive that seeks to push through controversial measures. That conceptual shift is accompanied by a redefinition of power that takes us from the "power to coerce," as it was in Schmitt, to the "power to persuade" (Oppenheim 1978, 590) (p. 9).	The international system, including all types of International Organizations.

Kreuder-Sonnen Christian;	2021	Does europe need an emergency constitution?	Article; Early Access	POLITICAL STUDIES	Kreuder-Sonnen (2021)	Government & Law	Theoretical - Political and Law Theory	Theoretical exploration	(...) the **state of exception** or **state of emergency** can be understood as a legal institution regulating the suspension of (certain provisions of) the normally apply ing constitutional order—the state of normalcy. In theory, the state of emergency is triggered by an emergency situation—an exceptional threat to the state that requires an exceptional response (p. 7). The set of legal rules—typically contained in a special chapter of the constitution—that govern the state of emergency is referred to as an ***emergency constitution*** (Ackerman, 2004) (p. 7). These extremes represent the tension between the two main goals inscribed into the regulative ideal of emergency powers, namely, **political discretion** and **constitutional containment** (...) (p. 8).	Transnational systems focus on European Union.
Schmidt Vivien A;	2021	European emergency politics and the question of legitimacy	Article	JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY	Schmidt (2021)	Government & Law; Public Administration	Theoretical - Political Theory	Literature review and case study.	(...) the contribution differentiates between **the fast-burning phase of emergency politics**, when governing authorities need to decide quickly to avoid disaster, and the **slow burning period of potential normalization or reversal**, when the crisis, although not resolved, no longer threatens to explode just then, leaving executive actors time to reflect on and amend their actions (Crespy & Schramm, 2021; Seabrooke & Tsingou, 2019) (p. 3). **Legitimacy,** understood not only as citizen consent to a governing authority in the classical Weberian sense but also as acceptance of such an authority's governing activities, is naturally at issue during times of emergency politics (p. 3). **emergency politics** tends to suspend the traditional democratic processes of citizen representation and even parliamentary consultation expected for political (input) legitimacy in the name of effective policy (output) performance and procedural (throughput) efficacy (p. 4).	Transnational systems focus on European Union.

Rauh Christian;	2022	supranational emergency politics? what executives' public crisis communication may tell us	Article	JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY	Rauh (2022)	Government & Law; Public Administration	Empirical	Descriptive text analysis	(...) extraordinary circumstances are not solely a challenge for **executive actors**. Such circumstances also present strategic opportunities to limit the choice set of possible political responses. By reference to sheer necessity and inevitability, executives may utilize crisis events to silence controversial debates and circumvent procedural rules constraining them in 'normal' times (p. 1). Equally **constitutive of emergency politics** are executives' attempts to cultivate the crisis nature of the circumstances to then rationalize their measures in the light of the proclaimed emergency (see also Scicluna & Auer, 2019) (p. 4).	Transnational systems focus on European Union.
Tesche Tobias;	2022	Pandemic politics: the european union in times of the coronavirus emergency	Article	JCMS-JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES	Tesche (2022)	Business & Economics; International Relations; Government & Law	Theoretical - Political Theory	Theoretical exploration	(...) recalibration of authority during emergency rule can have long-lasting consequences as suggested by the emergency politics approach (p. 482). **Emergency rule** can recalibrate political authority by setting precedents that will increase political polarization (p. 482).	Transnational systems focus on European Union.
Bestari Prayoga; Obsatar Sinaga;	2022	Emergency policy from a public policy perspective	Article	Croatian International Relations Review	Bestari & Obsatar (2022)	Public Policy; Politics	Mixed approach - Public Policy Theory	Narrative review method	**Public policy stages**, in Asmorowati et al. (2022) conclusion include defining the agenda for policies, influencing the perception of a stakeholder group that a phenomenon is a problem, limiting the scope of the problem, and enlisting support for the inclusion of the issue on the agenda of the government (p. 155). (...) in an **emergency**, first and foremost dwellers obey the rule and also understand and give feedback to policy stakeholders including policy formulators so that policies that are published have more merits or in other words more effective (p. 163).	National system focus on Indonesia

| Kurylo Bohdana; | 2022 | Emergency: a vernacular contextual approach | Article | INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW | Kurylo (2022) | International Relations; Government & Law | Theoretical - Security Theory | Qualitative research method | **Exceptionalism** denotes the practice and discourse of designating certain situations "as 'exceptional' in order to legitimate exceptional policies, practices, executive measures, and laws" (Neal 2010, 31) (p. 5). (...) **emergency** is defined not by existential necessity but by how difficult and significant a particular situation is perceived to be in relation to certain valued things that vary among different actors (p. 12). In the **"emancipatory" conception of emergency**, the focus switches from its prevailing definition as the onset of existential threats to emergency as the emergence from a challenging situation that can, nonetheless, be a productive force that creates new possibilities (p. 14). | National system |

Appendix B – List of inductive codes created in Atlas.ti

No.	Code
1	Accountability/ Contention
2	American Case
3	Anticipation
4	Authority
6	Carl Schmitt
7	Conservative Function
8	Constitutions
9	Contestation
10	Covid-19
11	Crises
12	Dangers
13	Decision-making
14	Deliberation
15	Democracy
16	Derogation
17	Disasters
18	Emergencies
19	Emergency Claims
20	Emergency Management
21	Emergency Plan
22	Emergency Policy
23	Emergency Politics
24	Emergency Power
25	Emergency Regime
26	Emergency Rule
27	Emergent Right
28	Europe

No.	Code
29	Executive Authority
30	Expansion/ Innovation
31	Framing
32	Imperialism/ Neoliberalism
33	Institutions
34	International Inst.
35	Justification
36	LATAM
37	Legislative
38	Legitimacy
39	Military
40	Norms
41	Policy
42	Policy Cycle
43	Politics
44	Populism
45	Public Opinion
46	Resilience
47	Risk
48	Roman Model
49	Securitization
50	Sovereignty
51	State of exception
52	Supranational Authority
53	Technocratic
54	Temporality
55	Transnational dynamic

Appendix C – General distinction between the emergency, disaster, and crisis terms based on Rubenstein (2015)

Expression	Definition	Main differences	Time-related aspects of their claims
Emergency	According to the Oxford English Dictionary, an "emergency" is "a state of things unexpectedly arising and urgently demanding immediate action." (p. 105). The "unexpectedly arising" characteristic distinguishes emergencies from chronic situations, while the "urgently demands immediate action" distinguishes emergencies from disasters (p. 105).	* An emergency is thus an impending disaster that can potentially be warded off, at least to some extent (p. 105). *(...) "emergency" telegraphs far more possibility; the optimistic view of emergencies is that they are windows of opportunity for helpful action (p. 106). * More generally, we speak of "impending" disasters and crises, implying the need for immediate action to avoid them, but we generally do not speak of impending emergencies, because the need for immediate action is built into the concept of emergency (p. 106).	While emergency claims typically require a negative divergence from the status quo ante to be accepted, they are strongly focused on near-future action to address near-future (pp. 107-108)
Disaster	In a disaster, immediate action is not necessary (or at least not necessary in the same way as in an emergency) because the bad outcome has already occurred: a disaster is "a sudden or great misfortune, mishap, or misadventure; a calamity (p. 105).		A disaster claim is primarily a claim about what has, at least in part, already happened. They are, therefore, slightly more backward-looking than emergency claims (p. 108).
Crisis	(...) a crisis is "a vitally important or decisive stage in the progress of anything; a turning-point (p. 107).		Crisis claims are present-oriented, like emergency claims. Yet crisis claims sometimes imply a longer duration than emergency claims: while we often say that we are in the midst of a crisis, we tend not to say that we are in the midst of an emergency or a disaster because the latter are seen as being of shorter duration (p. 108).

3. THE EMERGENCY MEASURES INDEX (EMI): EXAMINING REGIONAL IO RESPONSES TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

3.1. Introduction

Emergencies are a constitutive part of human life on Earth. They have always been a part of human reality and, more importantly, have collective dimensions. With the advancement of globalization process, emergencies have assumed increasingly larger scales, configuring transboundary risks. When they acquire transnational scales, these risks are also configured as complex transnational collective problems, which require internationally coordinated and cooperative responses to be solved (Blondin & Boin, 2020; Boin & Rhinard, 2008; Kreuder-Sonnen, 2019). Hence, International Organizations (IOs) have also become crucial to governing and resolving such transboundary emergencies.

Regional Integration Organizations (Regional IOs) are a subset of international organizations produced due to an integration process (Herz et al., 2015, p. 165-166)[8]. They differ from Global International Organizations (Global IOs) in scope, size, and objectives, among other aspects. Regional IOs are circumscribed to a particular geographic area, which means they have a limited number of members and focus primarily on issues relevant to that region. In contrast, Global IOs aim to address broader and more complex global issues and typically have a larger membership, as they are established to include states worldwide. More members in Global IO can boost decision legitimacy but also make consensus harder. For that reason, these organizations may face challenges in responding swiftly and effectively to transboundary emergencies, leading to delays in the decision-making process (Biersteker & Weber, 1996; Hanrieder & Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014; Kreuder-Sonnen, 2019).

In recent decades, Global IOs, like the World Health Organization (WHO) or United Nations (UN), have faced severe predicaments in acting as coordinators during emergencies due to difficulties in aligning preferences, balancing power relation, and

---

[8] A Regional Integration Organization can be defined as the "specific institutional result of a regional integration process, which includes a basic constituent document and the creation of a headquarters with a permanent secretariat" (Herz et al., 2015, p. 165-166).

distributing the cost of collective solutions (Hanrieder & Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014; Kreuder-Sonnen, 2019). These solutions may be more challenging to achieve each time, mainly because planetarian emergencies involve coordinating large and very diverse groups of actors at several levels of governance. Larger group sizes raise transaction costs and complicate coordination, making collective decisions tougher to achieve and maintain (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990; Sandler, 1997). In this scenario, Regional IOs could be crucial in effectively addressing transboundary emergencies. By minimizing the scale of the response and the number of involved actors in emergency management, they can help simplify the process and reduce costs, offering emergency responses at an intermediate level of governance.

The role of Regional IOs in managing transboundary emergencies is still unclear, especially in those that simultaneously affect more than one macroregion[9], also called Global Transboundary Emergencies (GTEs). Although some studies address the regional IOs' actions during the pandemic, most studies focus on domestic measures and government responses (Greener, 2021; Hale et al., 2020, 2021; Shvetsova, 2023). Studies about regional IOs are mainly centered on a specific region (Mariano et al., 2022) or one organization (Boin & Rhinard, 2023). Others compare different regions but use only two organizations (Nguyen et al., 2022), and the most comprehensive comparative studies, in terms of analysis units, are temporarily limited (Debre & Dijkstra, 2021). This study addresses the gap by examining the role of Regional IOs during the pandemic from a broader comparative perspective, analyzing the emergency measures generated by six Regional IOs from 2020 to 2024.

This chapter aims to answer two main research questions: How did regional IOs respond to the challenges produced by the spread of COVID-19 in their regions? What indicates a greater or lesser level of regional IO response during emergencies (the COVID-19 pandemic)? This study explores novel data grouped into the Emergency International Measures Database (EIMD) to answer these questions. This dataset was created using web scraping techniques and comprises 729 observations representing emergency measures formulated by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Southern Common Market (Mercosur), Nordic Council (NC), Organization

---

[9] Macroregions are larger territorial units or subsystems that exist between the level of states and the global system (Söderbaum, 2009).

of Islamic Conference (OIC), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SC), and Commonwealth of Nations (Commonwealth).

This study used a multi-method approach, combining a computational text analysis strategy —a large language model (LLM)— with a dimensionality reduction technique known as Principal Component Analysis (PCA). I employed the OpenAI API with ChatGPT 4o to extract and classify information from measures' descriptions, categorizing them into institutional variables. These variables represented key dimensions of emergency measures, including implementation status, typology, exceptionalism, collaborations, expert involvement, financial resource allocation, and values.

PCA was performed to synthesize these factors into orthogonal components. The results from the PCA identified three main components that explained 72% of the variance in the dataset. These components were named (i) Legal Strength and Institutional Attributes, (ii) Expert-Driven Emergency Governance, and (iii) Emergency Flexibility and Exceptional Measures. These three components were then aggregated to create the Emergency Measures Index (EMI), which enables a comparative assessment of the response levels of Regional IOs in managing the pandemic.

This article is structured as follows. The first section explores two theoretical frameworks —crisis management and emergency politics— to analyze the regional governance of transboundary emergencies and their implications. The second section details the variables that make up the Emergency Measure Index (EMI). The third section introduces the Emergency International Measures Database (EIMD) and outlines the methodology used in the study. The fourth section presents the results, divided into two subsections: an examination of the index components and an analysis of the EMI scores of Regional IOs. Finally, the concluding section summarizes the main findings, emphasizes the potential contributions of the EMI, and offers suggestions for future research.

3.2. Management and Politics of Transboundary Emergencies

Transboundary emergencies (TE) are "rude surprises" with severe potential damage (Boin & Rhinard, 2008). Despite these threats often surpassing the capabilities of individual states and national bureaucracies, Regional IOs, like other international organizations, are not usually equipped with specific emergency management capacities (Boin & Rhinard, 2008; Debre & Dijkstra, 2021). This section examines the Regional IOs' **emergency capacities** from two theoretical lenses: crisis management and emergency politics literature. In the first subsection, I will describe the Regional IO's functions and limitations to global governance during TE, addressing the concept and typology of emergency measures (EM). In the second section, I will briefly discuss the particularities of emergency politics in the international scenario and introduce an extra type for EM.

3.2.1. Crisis Management and Regional Governance

The crisis management literature provides a robust framework for analyzing Regional IOs' actions during emergencies. Central to this theoretical perspective is the crisis management cycle, which can be defined in several ways. I employ Pursiainen's (2017) proposal of the crisis cycles stages because his proposal considers a long-term, multidimensional emergency management (or governance) system. Instead of the classical four stages, the author employs six in concordance with the international standardization organizations: risk assessment, prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and learning.

The pre-crisis stages involve preparation before an emergency occurs. Although risk assessment is not often considered a separate phase, it plays a crucial role in crisis management. This process forms the foundation for effective management by identifying vulnerabilities and guiding resource allocation (Inan et al., 2023; Pursiainen, 2017) The second stage, prevention, aims to avoid disasters or minimize their potential impacts (United Nations, 2009; UNISDR, 2012). This stage emphasizes proactive strategies to reduce risk factors and enhance resilience (Sandoval et al., 2023). As a result, prevention and mitigation are typically pointed together (Pursiainen, 2017).

When an emergency arises, public managers must be prepared and respond swiftly to it. The preparedness stage involves planning and organizing resources to respond to risks that prevention efforts cannot completely eliminate. Therefore, as stated by Pursiainen (2017), "If crises cannot be prevented, one should at least be prepared for them." In contrast, the response phase involves immediate actions to ensure safety and minimize further damage. This includes deploying emergency services, conducting search and rescue operations, and providing medical care during or right after the emergency (United Nations, 2009). In this sense, effective response relies heavily on the preparedness measures established beforehand (Sandoval et al., 2023; Pursiainen, 2017).

Once the most challenging part is overcome, it is time to recover from damage and assess the measures taken during the emergency. The recovery phase focuses on restoring and, when necessary, improving the facilities, livelihoods, and living conditions of communities affected by emergencies (United Nations, 2009). This phase includes rebuilding infrastructure, providing psychological support, and implementing measures to mitigate future risks (Alexander, 2015). Finally, the learning stage centers on integrating the insights gained into organizational practices and policies, enhancing future crisis preparedness and response capabilities. Although this phase can overlap with and influence the other phases, some theorists argue that post-emergency learning is a distinct stage in which managers evaluate the decisions made and their long-term consequences(Pursiainen, 2017; Stark et al., 2014).

By examining how Regional IOs navigate these phases, we can better understand their contributions in addressing transboundary emergencies. In the risk assessment and prevention stages, the Regional IOs can play a decisive role in identifying potential threats and facilitating collective early warning mechanisms. These systems rely on information-sharing protocols and cross-border monitoring to anticipate and mitigate regional risks (Boin et al., 2013). During the preparedness phase, these organizations can enhance the capacities of member states by developing standardized protocols and training programs or establishing regional stockpiles of essential supplies (Bossong & Hegemann, 2016; World Health Organization, 2020). When responding to emergencies, Regional IOs may help to coordinate actions among member states, ensuring timely and effective interventions. They can implement

logistical support, resource mobilization, and the execution of regionally agreed-upon policies (Tavares, 2009). In the final stages, Regional IOs can contribute to recovery efforts by facilitating financial assistance, evaluating policies, and institutionalizing lessons learned to improve future preparedness (Ansell et al., 2010).

In general terms, Regional IOs have comparative advantages in managing transboundary emergencies compared to Global IOs (Barnett & Finnemore, 2019; Hurrell & Fawcett, 1998; Pugh & Sidhu, 2003; Tavares, 2009). Some of these advantages include: (i) the ability to act as first responders in international emergencies, thanks to their geographical proximity and cultural understanding (Barnett & Finnemore, 2019); (ii) the capacity to generate more effective responses due to their closer political, economic, and social ties with member states (Tavares, 2009); and (iii) the potential to foster cooperation among neighboring states, which helps to reduce the risk of conflict spillover (Hurrell & Fawcett, 1998). Additionally, Regional IOs can complement the efforts of Global IOs to solve these collective problems (Pugh & Sidhu, 2003). While involving Regional IOs in managing TEs can offer various benefits, it can also obstruct the development of effective global collective solutions.

Regional IOs also face limitations in managing GTE, including disparities in resource distribution, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and varying levels of political commitment among member states (Brosig, 2011). The Regional IOs' focus can potentially lead to fragmented responses because they prioritize their interests over the global common good (Lal et al., 2020; Van Hecke et al., 2021). Most of these organizations operate with intergovernmental bodies at the highest levels, responsible for making significant decisions based on consensus among member states. Due to power asymmetry among the members, this method can sometimes delay decision-making or even render it impossible (Christiansen & Piattoni, 2003). In addition, tensions between national sovereignty and regional mandates, as well as the imprecise distribution of responsibilities during emergencies, restrict the scope of regional IOs interventions (Brosig, 2011).

The Regional IOs' governance capacities, which relate to preparedness, analytical capabilities, coordination, regulation, and the ability to deliver effective crisis management (Lodge & Wegrich, 2014; Van Hecke et al., 2021), are usually poorly developed. Consequently, when a transboundary emergency occurs, Regional IOs, like

other IOs, must "craft responses in line with the institutions they have at their disposal" (Debre & Dijkstra, 2020, p. 5). In this context, Regional IOs tend to employ strategies during emergencies that are similar to those used during periods of relative stability. These strategies can be understood as legalized arrangements designed to address political and substantive challenges (Abbott et al., 2000; Abbott & Snidal, 2000).

Abbott & Snidal (2000) argue that international actors use various legal arrangements that differ in their legalization level. This brings different benefits and costs, making them suitable as institutional solutions in diverse situations. In another article, Abbott and collaborators (2000) define legalization as a type of institutionalization characterized by *obligation, precision*, *and delegation*. Obligation refers to the binding nature of rules or commitments on states or other entities. Precision involves clarifying rules that must explicitly outline the expected conduct. Delegation concerns the authority given to third parties to enforce, (re)interpret and apply these rules (Abbott et al. 2000). Based on this definition, Abbott & Snidal (2000) classify various degrees and forms of legalization in international governance into two categories: hard law and soft law (Abbott & Snidal, 2000; Shelton, 2003; Trubek et al., 2005).

Hard law refers to precise, *legally binding obligations* that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law (Abbott and Snidal, 2000). This type of legal arrangement is not typical in international relations because it is complex to achieve it due to the system's partially anarchical nature (Lake, 2007). Soft law, conversely, encompasses non-binding norms, guidelines, and conduct codes that may influence other actors' behavior. Abbott and Snidal (2000) used this term to distinguish the broad class of deviations from hard law—and, at the other extreme, from purely political arrangements in which legalization is largely absent. In consequence, while hard law exhibits high levels of three legalization components, soft law may involve varying degrees of these attributes, often providing a framework for cooperation that can evolve over time (Abbott and Snidal, 2000).

Regional IOs also use legal arrangements during emergencies to address the challenges posed by threatening situations. These organizations can generate different emergency measures (outputs) to handle crisis dynamics, ranging from merely rhetorical statements to creating new organs and policy instruments (Debre & Dijkstra,

2021). In this direction, I define *IO's emergency measures as legal arrangements developed by these organizations to deal with dangerous situations, aiming to avoid them, resolve them, or deal with their implications.* According to this definition, emergency measures can be past, present, or future-oriented. Indeed, the time orientation of an emergency measure defines its nature, determining its characteristics (See Table 5).

The emergency measure levels can be defined following the framework proposed by Abbott and Snidal (2000). We can categorize these emergency measures into three types according to their levels: (i) *Non-legal measures*, which include rhetorical responses such as statements or speeches by the IO's General Secretary; (ii) *Soft legal measures*, which encompass recommendations, reports, and guidelines; and (iii) *Hard legal measures* cover regulations, treaties, and actions involving financial commitments. In summary, this classification determines the degree of complexity of emergency measures and can function as an ordinal variable that organizes them in ascending order.

Table 5- Typology of Emergency Measures in IOs

Nature	Characteristics	Cycle stage	Levels
Preventive	They require only the possibility of an emergency to be defined.	Risk Assessment Prevention Preparedness	- Non-legal measures
	There is less time pressure for their creation.		
	They are intended for the medium or long term.		- Soft legal measures
	The appeal to "necessity" is not as strong in the discourse of their promoters.		
Reactive	The occurrence of an emergency is a prerequisite for their establishment.	Response Recovery	- Hard legal measures
	There is increased time pressure for their formulation and implementation.		
	They are inherently temporary but can be extended if needed.		
	Their advocates typically justify them as necessary responses to the emergency.		

Source: own elaboration

Table 5 provides a typology of emergency measures that IOs employ to address transboundary crises. This is a general framework that also can be applied to Regional IOs. Based on their nature, characteristics, and alignment with the crisis management cycle stages, these measures are categorized into two primary types: preventive and reactive.

Preventive measures are proactive actions taken to reduce potential risks before they escalate into emergencies or to prepare for such situations in case they arise. In fact, potential risks are the minimal condition for implementing these measures. When dealing with preventive measures, IO's public managers or leaders can develop medium- to long-term strategies because the longer timeframe allows them to think through and implement these plans without significant pressure. They must guarantee the accuracy of risk assessment to justify the investment in these measures. Therefore, they may face considerable resistance from public opinion, as citizens may not see the situation's urgency. Hence, although crisis managers' narrative emphasizes the necessity of acting to avoid probable future, evoking the necessity sentiment is not as strong as in current emergencies.

Preventive measures include the three levels of emergency measures. IOs' General secretaries can use non-legal approaches, such as public declarations reinforcing emergency initiatives, to gain support for more binding preventive actions. For instance, the **speech by António Guterres, UN Secretary-General, at the Climate Action Summit** in 2019[10] (Guterres, 2019). At the second level, cross-border monitoring systems and shared frameworks for emergency preparedness represent soft law preventive measures. For example, The **ASEAN Health Protocol for Pandemic Preventive Measures in Public Places** encourages member states to adopt best practices in surveillance, preparedness, and risk communication during pandemics without imposing legal obligations.

Capacity-building initiatives and legally binding preparation protocols are considered hard legal preventive measures. A prime example is the **EU's Decision No. 1082/2013/EU**[11] on serious cross-border threats to health. This decision requires

---

[10] https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2019-09-23/remarks-2019-climate-action-summit
[11] Decision No 1082/2013/EU was a legally binding decision of the European Parliament and the Council. It was in effect from November 6, 2013, but was repealed by Regulation (EU) 2022/2371 of the European Parliament and Council on November 23, 2022 (European Union, 2024).

member states to enhance their preparedness through binding commitments, such as maintaining adequate healthcare resources and creating contingency plans for transboundary crises (European Union, 2013). These examples demonstrate the proactive efforts of Regional International Organizations in risk mitigation.

Reactive measures, conversely, are initiated after an emergency has occurred and are inherently time-sensitive. The appearance of a threatening situation and its framing as an emergency by political authorities and public opinion are necessary conditions for their formulation. In this regard, reactive emergency measures are primarily responsive to external exigencies rather than driven by predetermined normative priorities (Kreuder-Sonnen & White, 2021). These measures are typically developed during the response and recovery phases of the crisis management cycle. The time available for their formulation and implementation is generally shorter than for preventive measures, as political leaders must make quick decisions. Any delay may be viewed as public managers' incompetence or negligence during emergencies (Van Middelaar, 2021).

By definition, reactive emergency measures are temporary in their constitution. However, they can be extended based on evolving circumstances or have enduring legacies (McHugh et al., 2021; White, 2019). Their advocates justify them as essential responses to emergencies, often invoking the principle of necessity to legitimize their rapid formulation and implementation. Hence, reactive measures prioritize immediate relief, resource mobilization, and coordinated interventions to minimize the emergency impacts. From a theoretical perspective, the characteristics of reactive emergency measures are grounded in the emergency politics literature and the discussions explored in Chapter 1.

As in preventive measures, public managers and political leaders can implement reactive measures at three levels. While these actors may also utilize non-legal approaches during emergencies, their rhetoric significantly differs from that of preventive measures. In emergency situations, public declarations or speeches emphasize the necessity and urgency of acting swiftly to create effective and binding measures. A notable example is **Ursula von der Leyen's speech in March 2020**

regarding the COVID-19 response[12]. On a different level, soft legal reactive measures refer to non-binding actions taken during an emergency. **The ASEAN Leaders' Declaration on COVID-19 Response (2020)**[13] exemplifies this approach. This non-binding declaration outlined immediate priorities for cooperation among member states, such as sharing real-time information, facilitating the cross-border movement of essential goods, and supporting joint public health responses. Although it lacked enforceability, the declaration established a framework for collective regional actions during the pandemic and encouraged member states to act in solidarity (ASEAN, 2020).

Hard legal reactive measures are binding actions created to address emergencies as they occur. For instance, the **European Union's Temporary Framework for State Aid Measures (2020)**[14] served as a legally binding instrument that permitted EU member states to provide direct financial support to businesses affected by COVID-19. This framework required compliance from all member states and was implemented quickly to alleviate the economic impact of the pandemic (European Commission, 2024b). This, together with the previous examples, highlights the adaptability of reactive measures. Indeed, soft-legal approaches encourage cooperation and consensus, while hard-legal approaches mandate immediate, binding actions in times of emergencies.

The distinction between preventive and reactive measures underscores the multiple responsibilities of IOs in managing crises. Its simplification and dichotomization into two categories have practical purposes more than being a complete translation of reality. In this sense, preventive measures reflect long-term planning to reduce vulnerabilities and enhance member states' capacities to manage risks collaboratively. Reactive measures, on the other hand, demonstrate the operational capacity of Regional IOs to address urgent needs through decisive actions.

---

[12] https://speech-repository.webcloud.ec.europa.eu/speech/speech-president-von-der-leyen-european-parliament-plenary-eu-coordinated-action-combat

[13] https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/FINAL-Declaration-of-the-Special-ASEAN-Summit-on-COVID-19.pdf

[14] https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/coronavirus/temporary-framework_en#:~:text=The%20State%20aid%20Temporary%20Framework%20was%20adopted%20on%2019th,context%20of%20the%20coronavirus%20outbreak.&text=Since%20its%20adoption%2C%20the%20Temporary,available%20in%20all%20EU%20languages%5D

Such differentiation is central to this chapter because it focuses primarily on the reactive measures. This empirical analysis examines the emergency measures created by Regional IOs during the COVID-19 pandemic as a response to it. While I recognize that preventive measures can set the stage for reactive ones, some Regional IOs may not be adequately prepared to handle specific emergencies when they occur. This emphasis allows for a comprehensive understanding of how Regional IOs adapt to dynamic emergencies, formulating responses based on their governance capacities and sometimes extending their traditional roles.

The following section will enrich this discussion by incorporating insights from the literature on emergency politics and introducing the concept of Exceptional Emergency Measures.

3.2.2. Emergency Politics in international organizations

In general terms, emergency politics is a phenomenon in which "actions contravening established procedures and norms are defended – often exclusively – as a response to exceptional circumstances that pose some form of existential threat" (White 2015, p. 302). This phenomenon can assume different manifestations depending on the governance level. At the domestic level, for example, most modern democracies have legal or constitutional provisions to vest emergency powers in the executive branch, especially in the head of the state (Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004; Krisch, 2010). This means that when an emergency arises, heads of state can quickly activate certain discretionary powers to face it without necessarily challenging the continuity of the democratic regime (Heupel, Koenig-Archibugi, Kreuder-Sonnen, Patberg, Seville, et al., 2021; Honig, 2014). In contrast, global emergency governance differs structurally from the typical state of exception seen at the domestic level (Hanrieder & Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014).

Emergency powers are generally not part of the legal frameworks of international organizations (IOs). Most authorities in these organizations lack coercive power and depend on member states' deference. There is also no precise authority figure due to the nature of delegation and the uneven power distribution among the member states. As a result, IOs often face complex challenges when managing

emergencies. The absence of a centralized body with enforcement power—like a government—affects how authority is exercised and how power is distributed within these organizations (Biersteker and Weber 1996; Kreuder-Sonnen 2019; Kreuder-Sonnen and White 2021). Understanding authority is then crucial for analyzing emergency politics beyond state boundaries.

At the international level, authority is often dispersed and derived from treaties, conventions, and agreements that rely heavily on the principle of consent and compliance by states. International institutions have weak enforcement mechanisms because they typically do not have coercive power. Hence, compliance is often achieved through diplomatic means, economic incentives, or sanctions. In these bodies, decisions are frequently made through negotiation and consensus among member states, reflecting a multilateral approach most of the time (Biersteker & Weber, 1996; Kreuder-Sonnen, 2019; Kreuder-Sonnen & White, 2021). Hooghe et al. (2017, p. 3) define the authority of IOs as "the power to make collective decisions based on a recognized obligation to obey," which means international authorities exercise it when they can induce deference in other actors (Barnett & Finnemore, 2019; Heath, 2016). For further clarification on the distinction between authority at the domestic and international levels, see Appendix A, section 1.

The notion of authority is also central to the idea of IO exceptionalism. Kreuder-Sonnen (2019) understands emergency politics as a specific mode of global crisis politics based on justifications of exceptionalism. For this author, IO exceptionalism refers to actions taken by these organizations that deviate from constitutional norms, allowing them to **expand their executive powers** or infringe upon **the rights of those they govern**. Such actions are often justified by the need to respond to exceptional circumstances, granting these organizations emergency powers. Thus, IOs can exercise emergency powers that enable them to increase executive discretion while partially suspending the rights of individuals under the organization's authority. Similar to the national context, global politics of emergency can lead to an empowerment of the executive bodies within IOs (Hanrieder & Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014; Kreuder-Sonnen, 2019; Kreuder-Sonnen and White, 2021).

Exceptionalism can take various forms depending on the institutional configuration of IOs. Kreuder-Sonnen and White (2021) developed a descriptive

typology of European exceptionalism based on two key distinctions: (i) who holds power and (ii) which norms or laws are set aside. The authors identify four forms of emergency politics: supranational, multilateral, unilateral, and domestic. Although this typology is based on the European Union, the authors' broad criteria make it applicable to other IOs as well.

Supranational emergency politics refers to situations where institutions with delegated authority from states expand their executive discretion, sometimes bypassing the usual restrictions on their authority. In contrast, multilateral emergency politics occurs when member states collectively increase their discretion, creating new authority structures. Unilateral emergency politics involve actions by one or more member states to expand their executive power, allowing them to suspend or revoke existing rules set by the international organization that typically restrict such actions. Lastly, domestic emergency politics represents the most conventional form of exceptionalism; it involves national governments extending their executive discretion about their nation's constitutional norms. This study will consider only the supranational, multilateral, and unilateral emergency politics since these types occur within the IO's framing. Domestic emergency politics is outside this article's scope.

This framework enables me to consider an extra type of reactive emergency measures that I call Exceptional Emergency Measures (EEMs). EEMs are a concrete manifestation of executive exceptionalism dynamics and are part of the broader repertoire of emergency politics. They are primarily characterized by suspending existing norms and expanding executive authority through the exercise of specific emergency powers. EEMs are reactive because their justification is firmly grounded in the existence of an emergency. However, while emergencies are essential prerequisites for their creation, they alone do not guarantee their formulation. International organizations' authorities typically require additional elements to formulate and execute them, such as a high level of legal authority and a strong compliance rate.

Table 6– Differences between conventional and exceptional reactive measures

Nature	Subtypes	Characteristics
Reactive	Conventional	They respond to emergencies by following established conventions and norms.
	Exceptional	They change the established patterns and rules to respond to a specific emergency by justifying that conventional measures are ineffective.

Source: own elaboration

Table 6 summarizes the differences between the two subtypes of reactive measures. Conventional Emergency Measures (CEMs) are actions taken during or immediately after an emergency to address the situation and its consequences. As a concrete example, I can mention the **African Union's African Medical Supplies Platform (AMSP)[15]**, which coordinated the procurement and distribution of personal protective equipment (PPE), ventilators, and other medical resources across member states to address the pandemic. This action addressed immediate shortages and adhered to established norms and procedures (South African Government, 2020). Exceptional Emergency Measures (EEMs), on the contrary, are also enacted during or after an emergency, but they often break established norms and conventions. Sometimes, the EEMs can work as critical junctures because they can modify existing trajectories. A notable example is the **temporary suspension of the Schengen Area's free movement** rules by the European Union (EU) to contain the spread of COVID-19[16]. This measure compromised one of the EU's fundamental principles, representing an exceptional response to an unprecedented health crisis (European Court of Auditors, 2022; European Parliament, 2020).

In this context, while CEMs maintain continuity with established norms even during atypical situations, EEMs diverge from previous decision-making rules, empowering certain actors while potentially restricting others. Implementing EEMs can create a winner-and-loser dynamic, as different actors have competing preferences regarding the long-term implications of IOs' emergency powers (Kreuder-Sonnen,

---

[15] https://amsp.africa/
[16] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/coronavirus-response/travel-during-coronavirus-pandemic_en

2019). Finally, although CEMs and EEMs can be enacted during emergencies, CEMs are probably more common than EEMs.

3.3. IO's Emergency Measure Index

Understanding the factors that influence the response level of emergency measures implemented by IOs is crucial for enhancing their capabilities during crises. The Emergency Measure Index (EMI) aims to capture not only the occurrence of a legal arrangement during emergencies but also its characteristics and complexities. In this version, the EMI comprises seven factors: implementation status, measure type, exceptionalism, collaboration, expert involvement, financial resource allocation, and quantity. The following table outlines the EMI's variables and their implications for IO response levels. For additional information on variable types, their indicators, and scales, please consult Appendix A, Section 2.

Table 7- EMI's variables and their implications for IO response levels.

Variables	Response Factor	Implications for IO Response
Implementation status	Implementation Capacity	Reflects decision-to-action transition and operational readiness.
Measure Type	Legal and Policy Framework	Determines enforceability and institutional commitment.
Exceptionalism	Legal and Ethical Soundness	Enhances agility but may raise questions about legitimacy and legality.
Collaborations	Coordination and Partnerships	Strengthens resource access and global alignment for transnational emergencies.
Financial resources	Fund Allocation	Indicates feasibility, prioritization, and strength of the measure.
Values		
Human resources	Consultant bodies and Expertise	Improves decision-making process and measures design through expert input.

Source: own elaboration

The first indicator, *implementation status*, concerns whether a measure has been implemented or is merely proposed. This indicator reflects Regional IO's ability to transition from decision-making to action. A high capacity for implementation suggests

a strong and timely response, improving the organization's credibility and effectiveness. Conversely, low implementation capacity can reveal gaps in resources or political will, undermining trust and delaying emergency responses. Successful implementation involves the organization's ability to mobilize resources, coordinate among member states, and execute plans promptly. Therefore, Regional IOs with a high implementation rate are generally better equipped to respond effectively during emergencies.

The legal nature of an emergency measure (*measure type*) ranges from non-legal arrangements to hard legal obligations. This factor significantly influences the IO enforceability and the degree of compliance it receives from member states. Non-legal measures, such as speeches, aim to influence stakeholder behavior but have limited effectiveness. Soft legal measures, like guidelines and declarations, establish shared expectations but lack enforcement. In contrast, hard legal measures, including binding laws and treaties, compel adherence and provide clear frameworks for action. The choice of legal instrument should align with the urgency and severity of the emergency to ensure an appropriate balance between enforceability and adaptability. Regarding the impact of Regional IO's response level, hard legal measures often signal robust institutional authority and commitment to action. Conversely, a reliance on non-legal or soft legal measures may suggest flexibility but can also indicate limited legal capabilities or a reluctance to enforce stricter regulations.

The *exceptionalism* indicator captures whether a Regional IO expands its executive discretion, partially suspending the rights of its rule consignees to produce exceptional emergency measures. While exceptionalism could enhance agility by removing bureaucratic obstacles, it necessitates careful consideration. Overused or poorly communicated, they can erode trust and legitimacy, particularly if they infringe on individual rights or lack accountability mechanisms, bringing legal and ethical implications to maintain legitimacy and public trust in Regional IOs.

The *collaboration* indicator records whether an analyzed organization is receiving aid from a particular partner to address the emergency's challenges. Regional IOs, especially those with restricted capacities, can benefit from collaboration with external organizations, gaining additional resources, expertise, and legitimacy needed for producing practical emergency actions. In this sense, low levels in this indicator may

signal insularity or limited external networks, potentially hindering the Regional IO's ability to address transnational challenges effectively.

Adequate economic support is crucial for binding emergency measures. The *financial support* indicator reflects whether an emergency measure involves allocating funds. The underlying assumption is that emergency measures requiring financial resources are more complex and challenging to implement compared to those that do not. Organizations with larger budgets have greater flexibility in distributing resources for emergency initiatives. As a result, financial constraints can limit or impede the execution of critical interventions. The financial support indicator has a subsidiary element called "*values*." This indicator records the amount of money allocated to emergency measures. As a continuous variable, values enhance the financial support indicator by illustrating its magnitude.

Finally, the involvement of expert committees and advisory groups brings specialized knowledge and skills for informed decision-making during emergencies. Thus, the *human resources* indicator measures the creation or inclusion of expert groups for managing the emergency. Participation of these groups could ensure that measures are contextually appropriate and scientifically sound. Moreover, the guidance provided by expert groups can assist member state leaders in promoting the adoption of shared international standards in their domestic policies. The reliance on human resources and expert knowledge reflects the constructivist emphasis on the role of epistemic communities in influencing IO behavior (Haas, 1992).

The emergency response levels of Regional IOs are complex and shaped by various factors. The Emergency Management Index (EMI) framework presented here is not intended to be exhaustive. Instead, it represents an effort to create a comparative tool for evaluating Regional IOs' emergency response. As such, the incorporation of additional variables in the future is anticipated.

3.4.   Regional IO Responses to the Covid-19 - Data and Methods

This chapter examines the COVID-19 pandemic responses from six Regional IOs across various global regions (See Table 8). These responses are grouped into the Emergency International Measures Database (EIMD). Through this analysis, this study

aims to bring light to the role of Regional IOs in Global Transboundary emergencies, focusing on the COVID-19 pandemic case. Additionally, the chapter introduces a comparison tool called the Emergency Measures Index (EMI) to systematically evaluate the actions taken by these organizations during emergencies. This chapter employs quantitative methods to achieve these objectives, linking computational text analysis strategies with a dimensionality reduction technique, the Principal Component Analysis (PCA).

Table 8- Regional IOs included in the EIMD

Regional IO	Region	n
The Southern African Development Community (SADC)	Africa	197
Southern Common Market (Mercosur)	America	49
Nordic Council (NC)	Europe	84
European Union (EU)[17]		446
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC)	Middle East	70
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SC)	Asia Pacific	195
Commonwealth of Nations (Commonwealth)	Mixed Regions	134

Source: Own elaboration.

The selection criteria for these organizations focused on geographic distribution, presence in existing databases, and the availability of data regarding pandemic measures. The primary criterion was to develop a representative sample of Regional IOs from diverse regions, ensuring the inclusion of at least one organization from each continent or macro-region. The second criterion aspires to facilitate future studies that use the EMI as a dependent variable to investigate the reasons behind differences in the response levels of Regional IOs during transboundary emergencies. For that reason, I selected the Regional IOs included in established databases, particularly those that assess institutional capacities, such as authority databases. The final criterion was the availability of pandemic measures on official websites and the feasibility of collecting this data using web-scraping techniques. This requirement excluded major Regional Ios, like ASEAN[18], from the final sample.

---

17 The European Union is not included in this chapter's analysis.

18 The ASEAN website has a security block, making it hard for me to collect data despite trying various scraping methods.

This chapter will analyze six Regional IOs instead of seven because the European Union (EU) will be examined separately as a case study in the dissertation's last chapter. This decision is motivated by the extensive data available for the EU and concerns about potential biases that could arise from comparing it to other organizations. By analyzing the EU independently, I aim to avoid the inclination to evaluate other regionalisms using benchmarks heavily influenced by the EU's institutions and processes (Acharya, 2016).

Data on COVID-19 responses were collected through web scraping techniques from the official websites of the sample' Regional IOs. I employed the search function for "COVID-19" to compile all relevant results because there was no designated section for these measures. The initial data collection occurred in January 2023, followed by an update in July 2024. The raw dataset included 1,237 observations of actions these Regional IOs took during the COVID-19 pandemic, spanning 2020 to 2024. This dataset was organized into five variables: Regional Organization (*RO*), *date*, *year, title*, and *text*. After a cleaning and review process —removing duplicates and missing information—the dataset comprised 1,197 observations. To enhance the classification and data extraction tasks for both the model and annotators, I summarized the contents of the text variable in the clean dataset. Summarization was necessary because some observations contained lengthy texts from press releases or reports. The summaries were kept between 100 and 150 words to maintain conciseness[19].

After completing the manual review, I realized that some actions taken were unrelated to the pandemic. As a result, I began using a large language model (LLM) to filter the information and determine whether each measure was related to the emergency focus of the COVID-19 pandemic. The model I employed is the OpenAI API with ChatGPT-4, which operates as a black-box LLM. In this first application, this unsupervised model classified the information into a binary variable (cov = 1, 0) to eliminate the noise from measures unrelated to this chapter's topic. This classification

---

[19] To summarize the content, I reviewed all observations to determine which ones should be reduced. Then, I synthesized them using Grammarly's AI, ensuring the text's semantics and primary information were preserved.

resulted in a final dataset that includes 729 actions taken by the six sampled Regional IOs related to pandemic management[20].

Figure 6 - Distribution of pandemic response among sampled Regional IOs

Source: own elaboration.

3.4.1. Large Language Model application

With the final database prepared and reviewed, the LLM model was applied once more. This time, it was used to classify and extract information regarding the characteristics of emergency measures, primarily focusing on the factors that will make up the Emergency Measure Index (EMI). I used two text-to-text prompts to instruct the model on the requirements for both tasks: classification and extraction. For the classification task, the prompt briefly describes the parameter and asks the model to classify it into either two categories (dichotomous variable) or multiple categories (categorical variable). In the extraction task, the prompt was designed to identify and record information related to the specific characteristics of the measures. When creating these prompts, I applied the concept of directional stimulus prompts by including examples at the end to guide the model toward producing more accurate and relevant outputs (Li et al., 2024). For further details about the prompts and their formulation, please refer to Appendix Part B, section 1.

---

[20] Since GPT-4o charges based on input tokens, this approach helped minimize unnecessary costs related to processing actions outside the scope of this chapter's analysis.

Before I ran the model using Chat GPT4o, I ran a pretest using Chat GPT 3.5 turbo[21] with a sample of 10% of the whole data to test the model and adjust the prompts. Three codifiers, including me, manually classified this sample to prepare the golden data and compare it to the non-supervised model results. With the golden data ready, I compared the results from manual codifications, Chat GPT 3.5 turbo, and Chat GPT 4o. As most of the variables are numeric (*'status', 'type_mes', 'except', 'partnership', 'fin_sup',* and *'hum_res'*), I used a confusion matrix to contrast them. On average, the Chat GPT 4o performed better than the others for both comparison methods. For further information about the pretest, model comparisons, and black-box LLM limitations and dilemmas, please consult Appendix Part B, sections 2 and 3.

3.4.2. Implementation of the Principal Component Analysis

After the LLM[22], I conducted a simple Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to develop the Emergency Measures Index (EMI). PCA is a dimensionality reduction technique that transforms correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated components while preserving as much variance as possible (Jolliffe, 2002, 2014). This method is beneficial for reducing complexity and maintaining interpretability, making it ideal for constructing indices from multiple variables. PCA identifies 'n' orthogonal dimensions that account for the most significant portion of the remaining variation in the data by calculating eigenvalues and eigenvectors. Mathematically, eigenvalues represent the scale of these dimensions, while eigenvectors indicate their direction (Magyar, 2022). In practice, the eigenvectors are the principal components. The first principal component corresponds to the eigenvector with the highest eigenvalue, showing the direction of the most significant variation. Each subsequent principal component is orthogonal to the previous ones and captures the remaining variance in the data (Abdi & Williams, 2010; Jolliffe, 2014).

This study employed PCA to evaluate the variability in Regional IOs' responses during the COVID-19 pandemic. This technique identified latent patterns in the data

---

[21] I used Chat GPT 3.5 turbo for the pretest because it is cheaper than Chat GPT 4o but still performs well for these tasks.

[22] The LLM model generated 11 new variables. For more information on these variables, consult Appendix Part B, section 4.

and provided a composite measure synthesizing multiple dimensions into a single index. The analysis focused on seven key variables *Measure Status, Type of Emergency Measure, Exceptional Measures, Partnerships, Financial Resources, Quantity of Money,* and *Human Resources*. The dataset was standardized to ensure comparability, as PCA is sensitive to variable scaling. Standardization applied the Z-score normalization to ensure all variables have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. This process prevents larger-scale variables from dominating the analysis and enables fair comparisons across features (Jolliffe, 2002). To handle missing values, mean imputation was used for the respective variables, maintaining consistency across the dataset. I employed the standardized dataset to compute the covariance matrix, eigenvalues, and eigenvectors, resulting in the final principal components. This approach ensures that the principal components accurately capture the variance structure of the dataset while preserving statistical integrity.

Two key criteria guided the selection of principal components: Kaiser's Criterion, which retains components with eigenvalues greater than 1 (Kaiser, 1960), and a cumulative explained variance threshold of 70% to 80% (Jolliffe, 2002). The results indicated that three components met the Kaiser's criterion and collectively accounted for at least 70% of the total variance (see Table 9). These findings support the consistency of the constructed index in capturing the variability in Regional IOs' responses. Only the components that met the established selection criteria were retained for index construction to facilitate interpretation.

Table 9- PCA Results: Eigenvalues, Variance Ratios, and Cumulative Explained Variance

Principal Component	Eigenvalue	Explained Variance Ratio	Cumulative Explained Variance
PC1	2,961	0,417	0,417
PC2	1,133	0,160	0,577
PC3	1,028	0,145	0,722
PC4	0,971	0,137	0,858
PC5	0,644	0,091	0,949
PC6	0,259	0,036	0,985
PC7	0,103	0,015	1,000

Source: Own elaboration.

To create the Emergency Measures Index (EMI), I developed a weighted index that integrates the results of three principal components into a single measure. The index was formulated using the following equation:

$$EMI = (\lambda_1 \times PC1) + (\lambda_2 \times PC2) + (\lambda_3 \times PC3)$$

where $\lambda_1, \lambda_2,$ and λ_3 represent the explained variance ratios for each component.

This weighted index was constructed by multiplying each principal component score by its corresponding explained variance ratio. This approach ensures that the most significant components have a greater influence on the final index. Consequently, the index inherits the characteristics of the transformed components. Finally, the EMI was integrated into the data set, enabling a direct comparison of the emergency response levels of Regional IOs.

3.5. Regional IOs' role during transboundary emergencies

This section analyzes the responses of Regional IOs to the COVID-19 pandemic by examining the results of the Emergency Measures Index (EMI). The findings will illuminate the role of these collective entities during transboundary emergencies and assess the different levels of their emergency responses. The presentation of results will occur in two stages. First, I will describe the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) results, focusing on the components of the EMI and their relationships with the original variables. Second, I will evaluate the level of response by regional IOs based on the EMI scores, highlighting the characteristics of these organizations and the regions they represent.

3.5.1. Inspecting the EMI's components

To examine the PCA results, it is essential to understand how it works better. In PCA, each principal component is a linear combination of the original variables constructed to capture the maximum variance in the data (Jolliffe, 2014). The correlation, or loading, of each variable with a principal component shows how much that variable contributes to the component. High positive or negative loadings indicate

a strong influence of the variable on the component, while loadings close to zero suggest a weak contribution data (Abdi & Williams, 2010). Below, I present the loading values for the three principal components selected and analyze their composition based on their correlations with the original variables.

Table 10- Loading values for the PC selected

Variables	PC1	PC2	PC3
Measure status	**0,5228**	-0,0893	0,0093
Type of measure	**0,5526**	-0,0747	0,0043
Partnership	-0,3519	-0,4632	0,0007
Financial Resources	**0,5331**	0,0027	0,0014
Values	0,0859	-0,4053	**-0,7045**
Exceptionalism	0,0759	-0,4694	**0,7056**
Human Resources	-0,0096	**0,6224**	0,0757

Source: Own elaboration.

As seen before, these three principal components accounted for around 72% of the data's total variance (Table 9). Each principal component, however, is explained by a portion of its correlation with the original variables. To interpret the components accurately, we should select a threshold representing the minimal correlation we will accept. For this case, a correlation greater than 0.5 is deemed relevant. In this context, PC1 is correlated mainly with the *type of emergency measure*, the *allocation of financial resource*s, and the *measure status*, respectively. PC2, interestingly, has only one strong association *with human resources attribution* in emergency management. Finally, PC3 has a robust positive correlation with *exceptional measures* and a negative correlation with the *quantity of financial resources attributed* to these measures. The combination of these variables characterizes the principal components, giving them a name, as we will see below.

3.5.1.1. *PC1: Legal Strength and Institutional Attributes*

The loading of the legal nature of emergency measures (0.5526) indicates that is the most crucial for this component. Regional IOs capable of formulating and implementing hard legal measures are better positioned to respond to emergencies than those that rely solely on rhetorical strategies and non-binding measures. The loading

associated with measure status (0.5228) emphasizes the implementation capacity of Regional IOs, highlighting their ability to execute proposed measures promptly. Additionally, the loading for financial support (0.5331) indicates that funding is vital for successfully implementing hard legal measures.

The strong positive correlation among these three variables suggests that hard measures are typically implemented and involve significant financial resources compared to other measures. This combination implies that PC1 represents emergency measures' legal strength and institutional attributes. Regional IOs that produce many measures scoring highly on this component are likely characterized by their capacity to enact legally robust measures regularly and possess solid financial resources and institutional capabilities. The institutional configuration of Regional IO probably influences the results in this index component.

3.5.1.2. PC2: Expert-Driven Emergency Governance

This component is strongly defined by the presence of human resources, particularly the role of expert committees and advisory groups in shaping emergency responses. The elevated loading of 0.6224 indicates that measures that score highly on this component depend on the specialized knowledge provided by these expert groups. Engaging technical experts ensure that emergency measures are scientifically sound, evidence-based, and context-sensitive, which can enhance both the legitimacy and effectiveness of policies. Indeed, epistemic communities are relevant in building the liberal international order and several international regimes. As Peter Haas (1992) states, epistemic communities help decision-makers define their problems, identify policy solutions, and assess outcomes.

Regional IOs with many emergency measures that rank highly on this component exhibit a technocratic and expertise-driven approach to emergency governance. Unlike IOs that primarily depend on hard emergency measures or exceptional actions, those with high scores on PC2 focus on soft legal measures created by advisory bodies and expert groups, including reports, guidelines, or policy papers. This approach reflects a crisis governance model where scientific assessments, epidemiological projections, and risk analyses inform emergency responses. However, this raises critical questions about the institutional capabilities of these organizations to

develop measures that possess greater legal strength and binding authority. In any case, PC2 highlights an IO's reliance on expert-driven governance rather than on financial or legalistic mechanisms. It underscores the role of these organizations in establishing epistemic standards and common norms that influence various aspects of life, particularly during emergencies.

3.5.1.3.PC3: Emergency Flexibility and Exceptional Measures

The strong positive loading of exceptionalism (0.7056) denotes that this component is heavily influenced by the extent to which Regional IOs stretch executive competencies by creating special rules or eliminating previous authorizations to accelerate procedures. Conversely, the high negative loading on resource allocation quantity (-0.7045) suggests that greater financial allocations were inversely related to using exceptional measures by the Regional IOs in the sample. These results should be interpreted cautiously, as only a tiny percentage of the collected data (5.35%) indicated the distribution of resources, and even fewer measures (3.15%) explicitly mentioned the total amount of resources allocated. In this context, the low level of financial resource allocation may be linked to these organizations' institutional capacities or reflect a lack of transparency regarding resource distribution.

This component reflects Regional IO's propensity to make flexible institutional constraints, adopting exceptional measures during emergencies. While these measures can help manage specific crises, they also attract criticism regarding the potential violation of rules by IO's authorities and question the limits of their competence. Undeniably, IOs may leverage emergencies as windows of opportunity to expand their authority (Debre & Dijkstra, 2021). However, using exceptional emergency measures represents a specific approach to crisis management —a mode of governance in which IOs prioritize swift and decisive actions, justifying them as necessary, sometimes affecting their rule addresses' rights and their decisions' legitimacy (Kreuder-Sonnen, 2019b).

3.5.2. Regional IO Responses to the Covid-19 Pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic has served as a litmus test for the efficacy and responsiveness of diverse institutions worldwide. The Regional IOs are not the exception. Nevertheless, we did not have a systematic study comparing these organizations or a measure for this purpose. The Emergency Measure Index (EMI) is an attempt to create a parameter that allows the assessment of the Regional IOs' responses during transboundary emergencies. EMI scores were aggregated and weighted by the number of measures in each organization to obtain a more precise measurement. The results are shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7 – EMI scores of the Regional IOs in the sample

3.5.2.1. High EMI Scores: Strong and Coordinated Responses

The Southern African Development Community (SADC), a 16-member[23] organization operating in southern Africa, was the most responsive organization in the sample. SADC not only produced the most significant number of measures —197 in total— but also implemented large soft and hard legal measures, allocated significant financial resources, and received substantial support from external partners. Most

---

[23] The SADC's members are Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

importantly, the SADC was the only organization to produce EEMs. Although there were very few (5), these measures highlight specific SADC institutional capacities that set it apart from the rest of the sample.

One example of the SADC's Exceptional Emergency Management (EEM) is the declaration made by the SADC Ministerial Task Force on Regional Integration and the Committee of Ministers of Trade during virtual meetings on 30 July 2021. In this declaration, the ministers emphasized that to ensure the continuity of SADC business, Member States must adhere to their National COVID-19 Response Plans as well as the Hybrid Plan for regional meetings approved by the Ministers of Health on 17 June 2021 and subsequently endorsed by the Council on 22 June 2021 (Martínez-Villalba, 2025). This example illustrates a multilateral emergency politics dynamic in which member states, represented by their Ministers of Trade, acted collectively, increasing their discretion and establishing new authority structures. They made the organization's trade relations continuity conditional on adopting certain measures to combat COVID-19 by member states.

The high scores in soft and hard legal measures (Figure 8) reflect the organization's institutional capacity to propose actions beyond mere rhetoric. Additionally, SADC was a forum for discussion among its member states. Reaching specific agreements and receiving external aid was essential for managing the pandemic. The European Union and the Federal Republic of Germany (represented by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) were SADC's primary external partners during this period, providing support and funding for important initiatives such as the third Cooperation for the Enhancement of SADC Regional Economic Integration programme (CESARE III)[24].

Interestingly, many of SADC's emergency measures did not focus solely on COVID-19; they also addressed other health challenges in the region, such as

---

[24] CESARE III received €12.2 million from the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation, €6 million in co-financing from the European Union (EU) Delegation in Lesotho, and €4.4 million from the EU Delegation in Botswana. This program played a crucial role in eliminating non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade that had been implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, certain pharmaceutical exports could flow freely without delays caused by the need for export permits. This initiative restored trade flows and improved the livelihoods and health of citizens in the region (Martínez-Villalba, 2025).

HIV/AIDS and cholera[25]. Press releases or meeting summaries often presented the COVID-19 as one of several issues facing the region, sometimes even framing it as a contextual issue. This approach sets SADC apart from other organizations, such as the Nordic Council, where the pandemic and its implications took a more central role.

Figure 8 – Distribution of EM's type in the sample

The second-strongest responder was the **Southern Common Market (Mercosur)**, a Southern American trade bloc comprising six member states and seven associated members[26]. It demonstrated a moderately strong institutional response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Unlike SADC, Mercosur implemented the fewest emergency measures in the sample (49). However, its measures were more consistent in proportion compared to other organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). As a primarily commercial bloc, Mercosur coordinated efforts to ensure the free flow of essential goods, harmonized health protocols, and provided platforms for member states to share best practices.

---

[25] For example, "Four Southern African Development Community (SADC) Member States have commended the SADC Secretariat for taking the lead in the fight against communicable diseases, including COVID-19 and cholera, through the installation of handwashing facilities at border crossings. (...)" (Martínez-Villalba, 2025).

[26] Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay are the founding members of Mercosur. Venezuela is a full member but has been suspended since December 1, 2016. Bolivia became a full member on July 8, 2024. The associate countries are Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Panama, Peru, and Suriname.

An important Mercosur's initiative aimed at enhancing public health systems in its member states to address COVID-19. This included the FOCEM Multi-State Project, "Research, Education, and Biotechnology Applied to Health"[27]. The initiatives allocated non-refundable funds to national institutes within member states to produce essential items during the pandemic, such as diagnostic equipment and RT-PCR kits. In addition to implementing these hard legal measures, Mercosur held meetings, published statements, and issued recommendations for economic recovery, demonstrating a collaborative approach. Together, these measures helped mitigate the pandemic's impact on the health and economic fronts of the subregion.

3.5.2.2. *Moderate EMI Scores: Limited but Positive Engagements*

Despite its strong tradition of regional cooperation, the **Nordic Council** showed a moderate EMI score. This inter-parliamentary organization, which comprises the Nordic countries and their autonomous regions[28], serves more as a forum for cooperation than a decision-making authority with binding power. This factor likely affected its ability to implement effective emergency measures during the pandemic. Initially, responses were marked by individual national strategies, leading to temporary border closures and unilateral actions(Lindström, 2023). However, the Council eventually facilitated dialogues to align policies, demonstrating a cautious yet constructive approach to regional coordination.

The Council's structure is grounded in the traditions of Nordic cooperation, prioritizing consensus and parliamentary coordination over centralized decision-making. While this model encourages dialogue and policy alignment, it limits the Council's capacity for rapid emergency response. Overlapping regionalism, especially with the European Union (EU)[29] (Nolte & Weiffen, 2021; Panke & Stapel, 2018a, 2018b), may have further diminished its need for independent collective action, while

---

[27] "In April 2020, MERCOSUR swiftly approved the FOCEM Multi-State Project "Research, Education, and Biotechnology Applied to Health," allocating USD $15,807,500 to improve the diagnostic capacities of member states for epidemiological control related to COVID-19. The non-refundable funds aim to strengthen MERCOSUR's public health systems. The project involves a network of institutions that have improved virus detection capabilities by developing PCR kits and innovative diagnostic techniques, playing a crucial role in combating the pandemic" (Martínez-Villalba, 2025). The final contribution of FOCEM to this project was USD 23,662,862.00 (Mercosur, 2024).

[28] Nordic Council comprises 87 representatives from Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, as well as from the autonomous areas of the Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Åland.

29 Denmark, Finland, and Sweden are also EU members.

its structural limitations constrained its ability to implement binding emergency measures. Unlike the EU, which has strong executive institutions like the European Commission, the Nordic Council lacks similar institutional mechanisms. This situation resulted in a restricted capacity to enact enforceable legal measures and prevented it from taking a leading role in the pandemic response.

The Council's meeting and reports on COVID-19 covered a range of topics, including the virus's impact on gender violence and inequalities, young people, the green transition, sustainable energy, and antibiotic resistance. Although the discussions mainly focused on managing and understanding the implications of COVID-19, the topic of antibiotic resistance particularly caught my attention. The Council's forward-looking approach emphasized potential future health crises, especially those related to antibiotic resistance —an emergency with potentially even more severe implications. Notably, this issue was not addressed in the discussions by other organizations.

3.5.2.3. *Low EMI Scores: Restricted Regional Responses*

The **Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)** inaugurates the group of Regional IOs with unfavorable EMI scores. This organization brings together Muslim-majority countries on a regional platform to voice their concerns and represent their interests. The OIC primarily serves as a venue for dialogue and cooperation among its member states rather than acting as an enforcement body. This lack of centralized authority may have limited its capability to coordinate an effective regional response to pandemics.

The OIC's moderated negative EMI score reflects a weak or inconsistent emergency response to the pandemic. This situation is mainly due to the organization's measures, which were primarily political in nature and lacked binding authority, such as meetings and speeches from the secretary-general (Figure 8). Additionally, the organization's large membership—comprising 57 member states across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia[30]—complicates the effective implementation of collective action

---

[30] The OIC's members are: Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Djibouti, Chad, Indonesia, Morocco, Cote d'Ivoire, Palestine, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Iraq, Iran, Cameroon, Qatar, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Comoros, Kuwait, Libya, Lebanon, Maldives, Malaysia, Mali, Egypt, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somali, Sudan, Surinam, Syria*, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Türkiye, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Oman, Jordan, Yemen.

(Acharya, 2018). Although hard legal measures were limited, the organization issued statements promoting collaboration and provided a platform for sharing information and resources, emphasizing the importance of solidarity during the emergency. During its summits, the OIC addressed critical issues such as food insecurity[31], humanitarian assistance for internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the pandemic's impact on women and girls.

The **Commonwealth of Nations (Commonwealth)** is ranked second-to-last in assessing regional emergency responses to the pandemic. This international association comprises 56 member states in several regions, including Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Americas, Europe, and the Pacific. It works as a forum for discussion and collaboration among former territories of the British Empire. Similarly to the OIC, the Commonwealth lacks centralized authority to coordinate effective emergency responses.

Despite promoting numerous actions (134), the vast majority had negative indexes for most of the pandemic (Figure 9). Its aggregated EMI score suggests challenges in formulating and implementing hard legal emergency measures. The Commonwealth's limited institutional capacity to generate these measures hampers its ability to respond effectively, even during regular times. Although the Commonwealth has introduced some hard measures, such as a coronavirus tracker, most of its initiatives were non-legal, including ministerial meetings without concrete outcomes, blogs, and statements from its Secretary-General.

The **Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)** received the highest negative EMI score, indicating a weak or minimal regional response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This Eurasian organization, which includes ten member states[32], implemented the second-largest number of actions (195). Unlike the SADC, the SCO's response primarily consisted of non-legal and soft-legal measures (Figure 8), with few actions involving fund allocation to address the pandemic. Notably, these measures mainly focused on digital transformation, infrastructure projects, and economic

---

[31] For example, The Secretary General of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, Dr. Yousef Al-Othaimeen, on 3rd December 2020, urged for more efforts to address food insecurity and hunger in OIC Member States as COVID-19 pandemic has further exacerbated these challenges (Martínez-Villalba, 2025).

[32] The SCO was founded in 2001 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. India and Pakistan became members in 2017, followed by Iran in 2023, and Belarus in 2024.

digitalization rather than public health emergency management. This suggests that the organization prioritized long-term economic resilience over immediate health interventions.

Figure 9- EMI's evolution from 2020 to 2024

Most member states took independent actions, while others engaged in some bilateral cooperation (for example, China providing medical aid to Russia and Central Asian countries) rather than coordinating through a unified SCO framework. This reflects a broader trend in SCO governance, where cooperation is often state-driven rather than institution-driven, which limits the organization's ability to function as a strong regional emergency manager. Additionally, the SCO's relatively low levels of delegation and pooling of authority mean that decision-making remains in the hands of individual member states rather than centralized regional institutions (Hooghe & Marks, 2015). As a result, although the SCO facilitated dialogue and policy discussions, its absence of executive mechanisms to formulate binding emergency measures could have implications on its role in managing the pandemic.

3.6.   Conclusions

The role of Regional IOs in transboundary emergencies is highly relevant yet remains understudied. This chapter addresses this gap by examining how six diverse regional IOs responded to the challenges posed by the SARS-CoV-2 virus within their

respective regions. The study analyzes 729 actions produced by six organizations between 2020 and 2024, recorded in the Emergency International Measures Database (EIMD). The findings reveal that, despite significant variation in scope and intensity, all regional IOs acted at some point in the pandemic management, suggesting that regional bodies could become important governance actors during emergencies.

The study utilized AI Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically ChatGPT-4, to extract structured information from descriptions of measures and classify them into distinct variables. These variables represent key institutional factors that influence Regional IOs responses during emergencies. A Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was performed to synthesize these various factors, revealing that three main components accounted for 72% of the total variance in the dataset. These components—*Legal Strength and Institutional Attributes, Expert-Driven Emergency Governance*, and *Emergency Flexibility and Exceptional Measures*—were then combined to form the Emergency Measures Index (EMI). This index provides a comprehensive framework for assessing and comparing IO responses during emergencies.

The correlations observed in the EMI components align with theoretical expectations regarding how various governance capacities and strategies influence an IO emergency response. High loadings on key variables indicate that specific attributes—such as legal frameworks, financial support, and expert involvement—are crucial for defining effective emergency responses. These findings highlight the institutional structures that drive crisis management within regional IOs and offer insights into the mechanisms that may enable or constrain their actions. In this context, the EMI provides a more precise comparative analysis of regional IOs' roles in managing the pandemic.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) emerged as the most proactive organization, achieving the highest EMI score. Between March 2020 and July 2024, SADC consistently provided structured support to its member states. It distinguished itself by implementing the largest proportion of hard legal measures and formulating exceptional initiatives compared to other studied IOs. The findings suggest a potential link between the development of EEM and their legally binding nature. This also indicates that their formulation may require certain conditions, such as a specified level of authority and compliance rate.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) recorded the lowest EMI score, reflecting its limited regional role, reliance on national responses, and weak institutional authority. IOs, such as Mercosur and the Nordic Council, displayed moderate levels of engagement, but their measures were less binding and depended more on cooperation mechanisms. Finally, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Commonwealth approached the COVID-19 crisis without clear multilateral actions, which restricted their contributions to non-legal emergency measures.

Although providing causal explanations is beyond the scope of this chapter, I would like to offer some reflections. As mentioned, the institutional configuration could impact on the Regional IOs' emergency response levels (Debre & Dijkstra, 2021). Nonetheless, these are not the only considerations. External factors, such as the regional impact of the pandemic or specific characteristics of various emergencies, also play a significant role. For example, the SCO's notably low EMI score illustrates this point. Unlike Europe or the Americas, the COVID-19 outbreak was contained relatively quickly in China and other SCO member states[33]. This swift containment may have diminished the perceived urgency for a strong regional response. Indeed, the early success of China's strict containment measures may have discouraged deeper institutional cooperation within the SCO, as individual states prioritized self-sufficient national strategies over coordinated multilateral action.

Understanding the conditions that enable or hinder effective IO responses is crucial for strengthening regional emergency governance mechanisms. Future research should investigate the roles of legal frameworks, expert-driven decision-making, and exceptional measures in improving or impeding emergency preparedness and response. In this context, the EMI framework represents a significant advancement in evaluating regional IO responses during transboundary emergencies. It can potentially serve as a dependent variable in future comparative studies. The EMI enhances our understanding of regional governance in global emergencies by allowing for systematic analysis across various organizations, periods, and cases.

---

[33] In June 2021, in-person events were already taking place in Wuhan. For instance, the SCO People's Diplomacy Forum, which took place in this city on 3 June 2021, attracted over 500 attendees. The forum included cultural demonstrations and exhibitions (Martínez-Villalba, 2025).

Appendix Chapter 2

This appendix complements the data analysis information of the article title "The Emergency Measures Index (EMI): Examining Regional IO Responses to the Covid-19 Pandemic". It aims to facilitate this study's transparency and replicability. I divided it into 3 parts, making it easier for the reader to access the different methods and techniques. Part A complement information regarding theoretical discussion and the index formulation. Part B details the black-box large language model (LLM). Finally, Part C offers instructions on how to use the replication code.

Part A – Additional information for the theoretical discussion

Part B – Black-box large language model (LLM) - Chat GPT 4o.

Part C – Replication Instructions.

Part A – Additional information for the theoretical discussion

1. **Authority in domestic and international domains.**

   Table 11- Authority's characteristics at a domestic (democratic regime) and international level.

Feature	Domestic Level	International Level
Distribution	It is centralized with a clear hierarchy of command.	It is usually dispersed and based on agreements between states.
Source	Originates from domestic constitutions and legislation.	Derived from treaties and international agreements.
Enforcement Mechanisms	Robust enforcement through police, judiciary, and administrative bodies.	Rely on voluntary cooperation, diplomatic means, economic incentives, or sanctions. Limited coercive power.
Legitimacy and Accountability	Grounded in direct democracy (e.g., elections). Clear mechanisms for public oversight.	Derived from the representativeness and effectiveness of institutions. Complex accountability due to multiple governance levels.

	Streamliner and quicker compared to international decision-making. It is typically governed by established legal processes.	Intergovernmental. Sometimes, deciding requires consensus. Slower and subject to compromise.
Decision-Making Process		

Source: Biersteker and Weber (1996), Kreuder-Sonnen (2019), Kreuder-Sonnen and White (2021).

2. Index variables description

Table 12- Description of the EMI's variables.

Variable Name	Variable Code	Indicator	Type	Scale
Implementation status	status	Implementation status of the emergency measures	Dichotomous	0 = Proposal or unimplemented measures
				1 = Implemented measures
Measure Type	type_measure	Emergency measure level	Ordinal	0 = non-legal measures
				1 = soft-legal measures
				2 = hard-legal measures
Exceptionalism	except	Exceptional emergency measures	Dichotomous	0 = No suspension of the previous Regional IO rules.
				1 = Partially or suspension of the Regional IO rules.
Collaborations	partnership	External and internal collaboration linked to emergency measures.	Dichotomous	0 = No collaboration
				1 = At least one collaboration.
Financial resources	fin_sup	Financial resources were allocated with the measures.	Dichotomous	0 = No support
				1 = Money allocated
Values	values	Quantity of allocated funds	Numeric	Record the amount of money allocated.
Human Resources	hum_res	Participation of expert groups	Dichotomous	0 = No participation
				1 = Participation

Source: Own elaboration.

Part B – Black-box large language model (LLM) - Chat GPT 4o.

1. Prompt engineering

I developed directional stimulus prompts instead of zero-shot prompts because the classification task involved complex concepts as variables, for example, "types of emergency measures" and "exceptionalism." In this type of prompt, the researcher or analyst can provide detailed information and examples to guide the model toward generating the desired output and enhancing its performance (Li et al., 2024). Without additional context or guidance, these concepts are inherently difficult to define and categorize, even for humans. To further assess the model's reliability, I also requested confidence intervals for the classification task, allowing for a more precise evaluation of its performance. The prompts used in this study are presented below.

Figure 10– Prompt for filter task

As a data analyst, your task is to classify information from several regional international organizations' responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. The data comes from the regional organization's website from 2020 to 2024. The first step is determining whether the measures relate to COVID-19 or something else.

 Follow the instructions below for this classification task:

1. **COVID-19 Relevance**:
   - Determine if the text is related to a COVID-19 measure.
     - Use `1` if it is related.
     - Use `0` if the text is missing (`NaN`) or unrelated.

Example:

Given the text:

"On 17 April, Jilin Chamber of Commerce in Beijing presented anti-epidemic items to SCO member states in a ceremony held at the SCO Secretariat. The ceremony was attended by SCO Secretary-General Vladimir Norov, President of the Jilin Chamber of Commerce in Beijing Ge Jian and heads of enterprises that are members of the Chamber. Vladimir Norov thanked the Jilin Chamber of Commerce for the aid to SCO member states in their struggle against COVID-19. He said that SCO members are taking efficient measures to control and prevent the spread of the coronavirus and expressed the hope that the disease will be stopped soon through joint efforts."

Classify as:
   - COVID-19 related (`1`)

Given the text:
 "The Secretariat of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), African Development Bank (AfDB), Member States and implementing partners have launched the Programme for Improving Fisheries Governance and Blue Economy Trade Corridors (ProFishBlue) in the SADC region at a ceremony that was held in Gaborone, Botswana on 30 March, 2022."

- Classify as:
   - COVID-19 related (`0`)

Response Format

Respond in JSON format as shown below:

{"cov": 1}

(First page)

Figure 11– Prompt for classification task

As a data analyst, you will classify information from several regional international organizations' responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. The data comes from the regional organization's website from 2020 to 2024. Consider each text as one possible measure and use only one label per each criterion. Follow the instructions below for this classification task:

1. **Measure Status**:
   - Identify the stage of the measure.
     - Use 0 for proposals or measures that were being discussed.
     - Use 1 for decisions regarding measures, agreements, and implemented measures.

2. **Type of Emergency Measure**:
   - Classify the measure based on the type of International Organization's (IOs) emergency measure:
     - **Non-legal measures**: Purely political actions, such as general statements, speeches, or meetings without a clear agreement or proposals.
       - Use 0 for non-legal measures.
     - **Soft legal measures**: Non-binding norms and guidelines, such as recommendations, structured suggestions, reports, informs, proposals, plans, training events, webinars, or updates to manage the COVID-19 pandemic and its implications.
       - Use 1 for soft legal measures.
     - **Hard legal measures**: they can be divided into two subtypes:
       - Legally binding obligations, such as regulations, sanctions, mandatory decisions, loan conditions, and treaties (partnerships) regarding a specific emergency.
       - Assistance actions that seek to help member states or other entities manage the emergency, especially if these actions involve financial resources.
         - Use 2 for hard legal measures.

3. **Exceptional Emergency Measures**:
   - Determine if the organization created a measure that extends executive competencies by creating special rules or eliminating previous authorizations to accelerate certain procedures, particularly if these actions interfere with the rights of other rule addresses.

     - Use 0 for general emergency measures.
     - Use 1 for exceptional emergency measures.

4. **Confidence Level**:
   - Express your confidence level for the first and third classifications as a percentage from 50 to 100, where 50 indicates guessing and 100 indicates certainty.

(First page)

- Express your confidence level for the second classification as a percentage from 33 to 100, where 33 indicates guessing and 100 indicates certainty.

Example:

Given the text:

"In pursuance of multi-faceted emergency assistance mobilized by various organs and agencies of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), COVID-19 Pandemic related medical emergency assistance has been delivered to Afghan Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Public Health at Kabul International Airport."

- Classify as:
  - Implemented measure (1)
  - Hard measure (2) because it is an assistance action.
  - General emergency measure (0) since it does not alter previous norms.

Given the text:

"Member States of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have been urged to expedite the ratification and implementation of the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA). This appeal was made during an Extraordinary Virtual Meeting on February 15, 2021, which focused on the TFTA's status and Guidelines for Management and Monitoring of Safe Cross Border Movement of Persons and Personal Goods while Mitigating the Spread of the Coronavirus. The Chairperson, Dr. Stergomena Lawrence Tax, the Executive Secretary of SADC, underscored the urgency for the implementation of the TFTA, saying the Agreement is now needed more than ever as a critical step towards the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCTFA)"

- Classify as:
  - Non-implemented measure (0) because the TFTA was being discussed then.
  - Soft measure (1) because the meeting's participants were discussing guidelines.
  - Exceptional measure (1) because the TFTA will affect the border movement of persons, and the rhetoric used evocates urgency.

Response Format:
Respond in JSON format as shown below:
```
{
 "status": 1,
 "conf_status": 95,
 "type_mes": 2,
 "conf_typ": 90,
 "except": 0,
 "conf_exc": 95
}
```

(Second page)

Figure 12 – Prompt for extraction task

As a data analyst, you will analyze the responses of several regional international organizations to the COVID-19 pandemic. Your objective is to extract specific information from the measures taken. The data comes primarily from the organization's press releases, which discuss possible measures they took to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic from 2020 to 2024. It is important to note that the same measure can be referenced several times in the dataset. Follow the instructions below to complete your task:

1. **Sender**:
   - Identify the entity that created the measure.

2. **Receiver Name**:
   - Identify the recipient's name who was affected or benefited from the measure. See the instructions below:
     - Register states' names if the measure mentions one or more countries as recipients.
     - Register the company's names if the measure mentions one or more companies as recipients.
     - If the measure refers to the whole organization as the recipient, use "members."
     - Use "diverse" if the measure refers to more than one type of recipient.
     - Use "NA" if the recipient is unclear.

3. **Partnership:**
   - Determine if the measure was developed with help from an external partner (e.g., country, company, or international organization).
     - Use 0 for text that does not.
     - Use 1 for texts that mention joining actions (publications, events, or measures), financing, collaborations, or partnerships.

4. **Partner:**
   - Extract the partner's name that provided the external assistance to the regional organization in analysis.
   - This field should be omitted if the regional organization did not receive external assistance.

5. **Financial Resources**:
   - Determine if the measure allocates financial resources (in euros or dollars).
     - Use 1 for text that mentions money allocations.
     - Use 0 for measures that do not allocate resources.

Please do not confuse the quantity of other goods, such as vaccines, with the amount of money.

(First page)

6. **Values**:
   - If financial resources are allocated, extract the quantity in euros or dollars.
   - Do not consider or include percentages or expressions.
   - If the text describes a sum of money, please convert it into a numeric format, using euros or dollars as the standard currencies.
   - If no financial resources were allocated, this field should be omitted.

7. **Human Resources**
   - Determine if the text refers to emergency management expert committees or other advisory groups created or acted on to support the decisions regarding the pandemic.
       - Use `1` for measures that mention emergency management groups, such as advisory committees, expert groups, or agencies.
       - Use `0` for measures that do not refer to these groups.

           Please do not include ministerial groups or other regular organizational structures.

Example:

Given the text:
"The Tripartite Transport and Transit Facilitation Programme (TTTFP) has resulted in the implementation of common vehicle load management strategy, standards and regulations across the Eastern and Southern Africa (EA-SA) region. With a funding of Euro 21,6 million from the European Union under the Southern African Development Community (SADC)-European Union (EU) partnership, the programme has also resulted in the operationalisation of an integrated Transport Registers and Information Platform System (TRIPS) along selected corridors, with a common tracking system containing mandatory health information.(...)"

Extract the following information:

- **Sender**: Southern African Development Community (SADC)-European Union (EU) partnership
- **Receiver Name**: Eastern and Southern Africa (EA-SA) region
- **Partnership:** 1
- **Partner:** European Union
- **Financial Resources**: 1
- **Value:** 216000000
- **Human Resources:** 0

Given the text:
"The Commonwealth Secretariat and the Government of Rwanda are monitoring developments regarding the spread and impact of the 2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) very closely. We will apply guidance provided by the World Health Organization and we will update member countries in due course."

(Second page)

Extract the following information:

- **Sender**: Commonwealth Secretariat and the Government of Rwanda
- **Receiver Name**: members
- **Partnership:** 1
- **Partner:** Government of Rwanda
- **Financial Resources**: 0
- **Value:**
- **Human Resources:** 0

Given the text:
"*On 1 June 2021, the Tajik side chaired an online meeting of experts to prepare for the SCO Health Ministers' Meeting. Those in attendance covered the preparations for the upcoming event and heard reports on the current COVID-19 pandemic updates in the SCO member states. Other topics included measures to prevent and treat the new coronavirus infection, as well as expanded scientific and technological cooperation to develop medication, vaccines and test systems. They held a constructive discussion of the agenda of the upcoming SCO Health Ministers' Meeting and draft documents, due to be approved by the participants.*"

Extract the following information:

- **Sender**: Tajik side and experts
- **Receiver Name**: SCO Health Ministers
- **Partnership:** 0
- **Partner:**
- **Financial Resources**: 0
- **Value:**
- **Human Resources:** 1

Response Format:

Respond in JSON format as shown below:

```
{
 "sender": "SCO Secretary-General",
 "rec_name": "members",
 "partnership": 1
 "partner": "European Union",
 "fin_sup": 0,
 "values": 0,
 "hum_res": 0,
}
```

2. Pretest and model comparisons

I conducted a pretest using Chat GPT 3.5 Turbo with a 10% sample of the entire dataset. This pretest was crucial as it allowed me to refine the prompts until the outputs were satisfactory. Simultaneously, three annotators manually classified the sample and collaborated on the results to create a set of golden data. After preparing the golden data, I compared results from manual codification -one selected randomly, Chat GPT 3.5 Turbo, and Chat GPT 4o using confusion matrices for the categorical variables: *'status', 'type_mes', 'except', 'partnership', 'fin_sup',* and *'hum_res'*. Since 'values' was the only numeric variable, I manually compared the results. The manual dataset and the model using GPT-4 were both 100% accurate, while the model using GPT-3.5 achieved 96% accuracy.

The confusion matrices are practical visualization tools that helped me to identify where the model makes incorrect predictions. They also enabled me to calculate key evaluation metrics—accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score—allowing an informed decision regarding which model or strategy to employ for the entire dataset. The results comparing manual coding with unsupervised models are presented below.

Figure 13 - Comparison results based on the Accuracy metric.

Source: Own elaboration.

Figure 14 - Comparison results based on the Precision metric.

Source: Own elaboration.

Figure 15 - Comparison results based on the Recall metric.

Source: Own elaboration.

Figure 16- Comparison results based on the F1 score.

Source: Own elaboration.

While the GPT-4 model performed better than other strategies, it is still not without flaws. It achieved reasonable scores in the "status" and "type_mes" variables across all metrics, which are essential for the index. Additionally, the differences between GPT-4 and other strategies, mainly manual coding, were minimal. In this regard, I agree with Gielens et al. (2025) that using Chat GPT-4 and other large language models (LLMs) for information classification should always be supplemented with manual validation rather than relying on them blindly.

3. Black-Box LLM limitations

Regardless of the specific model—Chat GPT, Gemini, LLAMA— all the black-box LLM models have several limitations, such as lack of transparency, unpredictability, scalability and resource requirements, high costs, and ethical concerns (O'neill & Connor, 2023; Yan et al., 2024). Unlike other open large language models, such as the FLAN-T5 Large model or the CAP Babel Machine, we cannot access model details using black box models, so we do not know how this model operates. This does not mean we do not have strategies to evaluate the model's performance. On the contrary, we can, as I did here, observe the outputs and contrast them with reliable data (golden

data) to see if the model can give us what we require. Hence, it is fundamental that we critically reflect on these issues, constantly examine the outputs, and look for ways to improve the model[34].

Researchers working with Natural Language Processing (NLP) usually have a dilemma between open-sourced and black-box models because there exists a trade-off involving transparency and performance. The former are more transparent than the latter, while the latter have a better performance than the former. Hence, we usually have to make tough decisions about what element to prioritize. In this case, I chose to use a black-box model because I must be sure that the model is making accurate classifications. Otherwise, all my interpretations will be misleading. Therefore, I also employ the API to interact with black box large language models (LLMs) to mitigate some limitations and improve its transparency. Using the API, I controlled the degree of randomness and variability in the responses by adjusting specific parameters in the API call without using a seed for reproducibility, as is necessary for other local machine-learning models. In this sense, I am aware that the predictions (classifications) of the Chat GPT 4o are not perfect, but they are still better compared with other models and manual classification (Figure 13 -16).

---

[34] The evaluation process extends to the whole process of applying a LLM model using prompts. In this sense, for instance, I rewrote my initial prompt employing the Chat GPT interface. This is a widespread way to enhance prompts because models can usually write adequate prompts for themselves. It worked well then because it improved the prompts' clarity and conciseness, making it more effective. After incorporating clarifications in the prompts due to the pretest's insights, I used the Chat GPT interface again. However, it did not work well this time because it tried to synthesize the text and transformed some suggestions into fixed categories, which produced misleading outputs. So, I decided to maintain my version prompts for the final model.

4. Variables generated through LLM.

Variable	Indicator	Type	Scale
cov	Measures related to COVID-19 management	Dichotomous	0 = Not related
			1 = Related
status	Implementation status of the emergency measures	Dichotomous	0 = Proposal or unimplemented measures
			1 = Implemented measures
type_measure	Emergency measure level	Ordinal	0 = non-legal measures
			1 = soft-legal measures
			2 = hard-legal measures
except	Exceptional emergency measures	Dichotomous	0 = No suspension of the previous Regional IO rules.
			1 = Partially or suspension of the Regional IO rules.
sender	The actor who created the measure	Nominal	Record the name of the measure's formulator
rec_name	The actor who benefited from the measure	Nominal	Record the name of the measure's recipient(s)
partnership	External and internal collaboration linked to emergency measures.	Dichotomous	0 = No collaboration
			1 = At least one collaboration.
partner	The partner' names	Nominal	Record the names of partners
fin_sup	Financial Support	Dichotomous	0 = No support
			1 = Money allocated
values	Quantity of allocated funds	Numeric	Record the amount of money allocated.
hum_res	Participation of expert groups	Dichotomous	0 = No participation
			1 = Participation

Source: Own elaboration.

Part C – Replication Instructions.

#Only provided in published version#

4. BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND EXCEPTIONALISM: THE EUROPEAN UNION'S RESPONSE TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

4.1. Introduction

The European Union (EU) has resulted from concluding various unexpected internal and external shocks —emergencies, with wars being the most common example (Heupel et al., 2021; Van Hecke et al., 2021). Despite emergencies being part of the DNA of European integration (Van Hecke et al., 2021, 2022), the EU Treaties only briefly mention emergency procedures designed to address specific situations. The lack of clear procedures for decision-making and the determination of responsible levels —whether EU, national, or local government— often compromises the EU's emergency management capabilities (Wetter Ryde, 2022). As a result, EU institutions and actors frequently handle emergencies through *ad hoc* procedures, which can lead to dynamics of emergency politics and exceptionalism. These dynamics place additional strain on the EU's democratic governance, thereby undermining the legitimacy of emergency decisions (Kreuder-Sonnen, 2021, 2022; Wetter Ryde, 2022).

The COVID-19 pandemic is a compelling case for analyzing crisis management and emergency politics within the European Union (EU). It highlights the EU's adaptive response mechanisms and the tensions that can arise from them (Van Hecke et al., 2022). This situation provides an opportunity to explore the interaction between supranational and intergovernmental institutions during emergencies, as well as the **exceptional emergency measures (EEMs)** developed by these institutions to address immediate threats. By examining EEMs, we can investigate an underexplored phenomenon typically eclipsed by overemphasizing the IO's managerial competencies. This perspective combines discussions on formal capacities for managing emergencies with an analysis of how authority expansion dynamics can impact democratic institutions during such situations.

Although the EU implemented extensive **emergency measures** widely recognized as necessary and effective in dealing with the pandemic (Schmidt, 2022), any were prepared using informal structures for EU decision-making (Wetter Ryde, 2022). Some authors have argued these decisions were often made far from European

citizens and resulted in a concentration of power within a supranational body, the European Commission (Kassim, 2023; White, 2021). This situation indicates an increasing tendency of the EU to adopt a model of emergency governance that, while effective in the short term, raises significant concerns about the long-term implications for its governance, democratic legitimacy, and member-state sovereignty. The intersection of crisis management and exceptionalism emphasizes the necessity for structured mechanisms to regulate emergency powers while maintaining the Union's democratic foundations (Kreuder-Sonnen & White, 2021).

Many studies have explored the EU's management of COVID-19 (Boin & Rhinard, 2023; Brooks et al., 2023; Goniewicz et al., 2020; Gontariuk et al., 2021; Wolff & Ladi, 2020). Some of these studies focus solely on the initial phases of the virus and its impact on the region (Brooks & Geyer, 2020; Wolff & Ladi, 2020). Others offer a more comprehensive outlook over time (Boin & Rhinard, 2023; Brooks et al., 2023; Buti & Fabbrini, 2023) but either briefly apply specific theoretical frameworks to the COVID-19 case or concentrate on particular policy areas, such as economic responses. Additionally, some authors investigate the power dynamics among EU institutions during the pandemic (Kassim, 2023; Quaglia & Verdun, 2023) but do not delve deeply into the specific measures developed by each institution. Other studies assess the exceptional face of the EU's COVID-19 management (Séville, 2022; Wetter Ryde, 2022; White, 2021), although most approach the topic from a theoretical rather than an empirical perspective.

Few studies connect emergency management (or crisis management) and emergency politics, and even fewer examine the empirical aspects of exceptionalism in international organizations (Kreuder-Sonnen, 2019). This chapter aims to bridge these areas by systematically investigating the responses of three EU executive institutions—the European Council, the European Commission, and the Council of the European Union (commonly referred to as "the Council")—from 2020 to 2023. This approach allows me to evaluate various literature arguments, such as the predominance of the European Commission (Kassim, 2023), comparing it with the role of the other two institutions. Furthermore, I propose an operational definition for identifying exceptional emergency measures during crises and test it using a prompt approach with large language models. This chapter may represent one of the first empirical

assessments of exceptional measures within the EU's emergency management framework.

This chapter considers emergency management and emergency politics as two faces of the same coin. Consequently, and using the EU's response to the COVID-19 pandemic as object of study, it seeks to answer the following research questions: How did the EU's executive bodies—namely, the European Council, the European Commission, and the Council of the EU—respond to the pandemic? and what were the characteristics of the EU's Exceptional Emergency Measures (EEMs) during this period?

To address these questions, I use a mixed-methods research design that incorporates data-gathering and analysis techniques from both quantitative and qualitative methodologies (Seawright, 2016). This approach allows me to explore a subset of the Emergency International Measures Database (EIMD) concerning the European Union's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In the first part of the study, I used various computational text analysis strategies, including a black-box large language model (LLM), Structural Topic Model (STM), and dictionary-based text analysis, to systematically analyze the EU's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In the second part, I conduct an in-depth case study of one exceptional emergency measure (EEM), *the vaccine export transparency and authorization mechanism*, to illustrate the EU's EEMs during the pandemic.

The article is organized as follows: First, I define the fundamental concepts of emergency measures and exceptional emergency measures. Next, I present the theoretical lenses that guide this chapter, focusing on discussing EU emergency management and politics. Then, I present the dataset, detailing its data collection and analysis methods. The empirical analysis unfolds in four steps: First, I describe the EU's response from the perspective of its institutions (supply side) and their interaction with the recipients (demand side). Second, I analyze the types of emergency measures that were formulated. Third, I explored the exceptional measures introduced during the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, I present a brief case study highlighting the exceptional dynamics promoted by the European Commission in health policies during pandemic management. The article concludes by synthesizing the main findings and outlining possible avenues for future research.

Defining Emergency Measures (EM) and Exceptional Emergency Measures (EEMs) in International Organizations

This chapter's is grounded on the dialogue between emergency management and emergency politics. Therefore, this interaction influences the key concepts discussed here. The analysis is based on the definitions of emergency measures (EM) and exceptional emergency measures (EEM) as established by international organizations (IOs). The discussion centers on emergency management for EM, while emergency politics and exceptionalism are key to understanding EEM.

International organizations (IOs) establish **emergency measures** as legal arrangements in response to an emergency, aiming to manage it and its impacts. The measures can be divided into two categories: preventive and reactive. Emergency Preventive Measures (EPM) are intended to anticipate and prevent potential emergencies. In contrast, Emergency Reactive Measures (ERM) are implemented in response to unforeseen threats. ERMs only come into play when an emergency occurs, so they are quickly devised and are temporary by nature. Considering the advent of an emergency is a necessary condition for ERMs, this chapter's dataset and analysis only include the emergency measures produced by the EU's executive institutions in *a posteriori* to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, from now on, when I refer to emergency measures, I will be referring to ERMs.

Regardless of their type, we can classify emergency measures into three levels of complexity: (i) non-legal measures, (ii) soft legal measures, and (iii) hard legal measures. I apply the typology proposed by Abbott & Snidal (2000) to classify the EMs' levels. According to them, IOs adopt various legal arrangements to tackle political and substantive issues, which can differ based on their level of legalization. In this framework, non-legal measures are purely political arrangements with little to no formal legalization. Soft legal measures include non-binding norms, guidelines, and codes of conduct that can influence the actor's behavior. In contrast, hard legal measures consist of legally binding obligations that grant authority for interpreting and implementing the law (Abbott & Snidal, 2000). Although not explicitly designed for emergencies, I argue that IOs employ similar strategies— non-legal, soft legal, and hard legal measures—to

address unexpected threats, adapting the content and procedures while maintaining a consistent structure.

In summary, IO's emergency measures are actions taken in response to an emergency to manage the situation. These measures range from those with no formal basis to those partially or fully legalized. In this chapter, I will examine the emergency measures reactively taken by the European Union's institutions to address the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic in the region.

Exceptional Emergency Measures (EEMs), on the other hand, are based on exceptionalism within international organizations (IOs). Christian Kreuder-Sonnen (2019) defines IO's Exceptionalism as acts of an IO authority that deviate from constitutional norms, which can extend its executive competencies or interfere with the rights of those governed by its rules. Such acts give the IO emergency powers justified by the necessity arising from exceptional circumstances (Kreuder-Sonnen, 2019). In this sense, EEMs are the concrete manifestation of IO's exceptionalism during a specific emergency.

I define EEMs as measures that enhance executive powers by creating special rules or suspending prior authorizations to facilitate prompt action. Empirical observations determine what qualifies as exceptional circumstances (White, 2015, p. 597). As a result, EEMs are different from conventional emergency measures due to their potential to interfere with established rights and procedures, as well as the legitimacy implications for the authorities who enact them. The idea of exceptional measures implies the awaited resumption of political normality and the return to previous conditions, with the connotations of legitimacy this widely implies (Hanrieder & Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014).

In short, Exceptional Emergency Measures (EEMs) are a subtype of Emergency Reactive Measures (ERMs) whose main characteristic is the suspension of current norms and the extension of executive authorities' discretion through some emergency powers. During emergencies, both types are common. Still, conventional emergency measures are more usual than EEMs.

Finally, despite the EU's distinct configuration and variations from other IOs, applying these theories and concepts is feasible. Doing so can provide crucial insights into understanding its institutional dynamics and response to emergencies. White

(2021) emphasizes that the EU has increasingly adopted emergency measures in response to pressing situations, navigating the "complex interplay" between supranational authority and member-state autonomy. Additionally, (Kreuder-Sonnen et al., 2022) observes that the EU's approach to emergency management often reflects the "executive self-empowerment" seen in other international organizations, where the centralization of power is deemed necessary for effective responses to emergencies despite potential implications for democratic accountability.

4.2. Emergency management and Politics in the European Union

The European Union (EU) became increasingly visible as a crisis manager in the early 2010s, during which the organization was shocked by several demanding emergencies (Van Hecke et al., 2022). Therefore, many scholars have used the term "poly-crisis" to refer to an unrelenting series of challenges, including the Eurozone debt crisis, the migration crisis, Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine (Leuffen et al., 2022; Riddervold et al., 2021; Van Hecke et al., 2021, 2022). The continued development of measures to face these emergencies has progressively equipped the EU with the procedural and operational capacity to initiate and coordinate a shared response, enhancing its institutional resilience (Boin et al., 2013). Indeed, the EU survived despite concerns about the organization's continuity raised by these emergencies (Van Middelaar, 2021).

While the EU's trajectory demonstrates an evolving response model, the EU's crisis management primarily continues operating through the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) (Van Hecke et al., 2022). This instrument coordinates and supplements Member States' risk prevention, disaster preparedness, and response efforts. It can be activated by any EU Member State, participating state, or even a third country needing assistance. Activation occurs when the requesting country is overwhelmed by a disaster or emergency and requires support (European Commission, 2024c). Once the UCPM is activated, the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), managed by the European Commission under the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO), is the central actor responsible for coordinating the response. It facilitates the mobilization

of resources, ensures efficient information flow, and coordinates assistance from participating states and other stakeholders.

Initially, the UCPM relied on a voluntary system in which Member States pre-committed resources like rescue teams, equipment, and trained experts to a European Emergency Response Capacity pool, ready to be called upon by the Commission. However, recognizing its limitations during large-scale emergencies affecting multiple states, the Commission proposed revising UCPM legislation in 2019 to strengthen the EU's role in crisis management (European Commission, 2019, 2023). Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, a revised law aligning with the Recovery Plan for Europe was introduced in June 2020 and enacted in May 2021 (Consilium, 2024a). This legislation aims to improve UCPM's flexibility, speed, and cross-sectoral support with an expanded budget to strengthen the EU's role in crisis management. Among the key updates are the EU's authority to set Union-wide disaster resilience goals, intensify disaster data collection, and fortify the Emergency Response Coordination Centre's operational capabilities. Additionally, the Commission can directly buy or lease emergency resources, such as firefighting planes and medical equipment stored in the rescEU reserve and arrange logistical solutions to evacuate EU citizens from hazardous situations globally.

The previous description evidences the Commission's vital role in emergency management, although the European Council is the primary problem solver and crisis manager according to the treaties (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2015). The European Council is the ultimate intergovernmental decision-making body for handling emergencies, instructing the EU and national actors during threatening situations, and allocating required resources (Laffan, 2016; Lelieveldt & Princen, 2015; Van Middelaar, 2021). Defenders of the new intergovernmentalism point to the European Council's dominance in making the 'big' emergency management decisions, placing the Commission as the main loser (Bickerton et al., 2015; Laffan, 2016). However, despite its undeniable relevance, the European Council rarely acts alone due to a lack of law-making authority. In practice, the European Council relies on the other three central decision-making bodies (See Table 1): the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, and the European Parliament, where the ordinary legislative procedure applies (Kassim, 2023).

Authors have questioned the notion that the European Council always leads decision-making (Kassim, 2023; Moloney & Princen, 2024; von Ondarza, 2023). While they acknowledge that the European Council holds considerable political authority, they highlight the limitations of its formal powers, restricted organizational resources, and dependence on other EU bodies. According to Kassim (2023), European institutions' labor and responsibilities are not static but vary according to emergency conditions. The Council, for instance, is usually ignored in the debate about the role of individual EU-level bodies and the institutional balance in emergency management, which focuses on the dichotomy between the European Council and the Commission (Laffan, 2016). However, the Council plays a crucial role in emergencies by coordinating the EU's response through mechanisms like the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) and overseeing the UCPM (Consilium, 2024b).

Although the European Council took a more proactive role in previous emergencies, leading some authors to think that "crisis acts as a catalyst for a more pronounced move towards both policy management and presidentialism" (Laffan 2016, p. 919), the Covid-19 pandemic came to challenge previous understandings. The EU's response to COVID-19 underscored the Commission's ability to act as a functional crisis manager (Boin & Rhinard, 2023). After a late response, the Commission under President Ursula von der Leyen, framing of the pandemic as an EU crisis, mobilizing resources to coordinate vaccine procurement, stabilize supply chains, and support economic recovery through initiatives like the Next Generation EU (NGEU) fund (Kassim, 2023; Quaglia & Verdun, 2023). The Ministers of France and Germany proposed the NGEU in the Council before being drafted by the European Commission and finally agreed upon by the European Council (Heermann et al., 2024; Schmidt, 2022), showing the interplay between these three institutions in practice. This measure, the NGEU, marked a distinct departure from previous strategies by institutionalizing fiscal solidarity mechanisms, revealing a new level of cohesiveness in the EU's response to emergencies (Boin & Rhinard, 2023; Buti & Fabbrini, 2023).

This proactive stance by the European Commission demonstrated the institution's capacity to respond to emergencies and reignited discussions about the optimal balance of power in EU crisis management (Kassim, 2023). The Commission's ability to frame and direct the EU's COVID-19 response highlighted the flexibility and

responsiveness afforded by a supranational approach. Nevertheless, major emergencies, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, have compelled the Commission to abandon its longstanding principles and technocracy to take immediate action. These conditions establish new and unexpected tasks: to be prepared for contingency and pursue event politics instead of principle politics, such as in the past (Van Middelaar, 2021). Event politics starts with recognizing potential dangers and accurately assessing their possible consequences under time pressure because inaction or delays can be understood as negligence (Van Middelaar, 2021). In this direction, COVID-19 also underscored the limits of supranational authority, as member states retained control over health policy implementation within their borders, creating points of friction when it came to standardizing emergency measures.

The tension between these two governance approaches —intergovernmental and supranational—demonstrates an enduring challenge in the EU's crisis management structure. On the one hand, an intergovernmental approach offers tailored responses to the specific needs of member states, allowing flexibility. However, this often results in fragmented decision-making and complicating standardized measures, as seen during the COVID-19 vaccine distribution. On the other hand, the supranational model represented by the European Commission encourages a cohesive response but can face opposition from member states concerned about sovereignty and potential EU overreach. This duality creates a complex dynamic as member states balance the advantages of collective action against the risks of eroding their sovereignty (Quaglia & Verdun, 2023).

This "poly-crisis" scenario has changed traditional methods for producing collective EU policies (Rhinard, 2019). Some authors argue that they have gone from extensive decision-making processes, where different actors were linked, to ones guided by the urgency of the political event of the moment (Rhinard, 2019; Van Middelaar, 2021). Although this phenomenon currently has many names—crisis-oriented method, event politics, emergency politics, IO's exceptionalism—the truth is that there is a concern with the political aspects of decision-making under pressure in the EU (Ganderson et al., 2023; Kreuder-Sonnen, 2021, 2022; Kreuder-Sonnen & White, 2021; Rhinard, 2019; Van Middelaar, 2021). This circumstantial shift motivated

by the sequence or simultaneity of several emergencies became part of the EU governance model, even if only implicitly.

Within the EU, Emergency politics occurs when specific institutions exercise executive discretionary authority to address emergencies that exceed ordinary decision-making constraints. Such measures can include temporarily suspending regular processes or expanding the scope of EU authority beyond its typical limits to ensure an effective response (Heupel, Koenig-Archibugi, Kreuder-Sonnen, Patberg, Séville, et al., 2021; Kreuder-Sonnen, 2021, 2022; Kreuder-Sonnen & White, 2021). The justification for extending authority is often based on the idea that "exceptional times require exceptional emergency measures" (Von der Leyen, 2022). However, a central problem of emergency politics arises from distinguishing between actual emergencies that require exceptional measures and those situations that are used as rhetorical strategies to increase the concentration of power. Indeed, this dichotomy is a constitutive component of exceptionalism[35]. While providing important conditions for handling transnational emergencies, exceptionalism also challenges traditional notions of EU governance and raises questions about the balance of power and democratic accountability within the Union.

Similar to the national context, the global politics of emergency can enhance the power of executive bodies—in this case the executive organs within international organizations (Hanrieder & Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014). As the extension of powers usually happens in the executive branch, this chapter will focus on the executive institutions that form the EU's main decision-making bodies (see Table 13). This emphasis served as the central criterion for selecting cases within the EU and also facilitated a comparison of the responses from intergovernmental and supranational institutions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

---

[35] Exceptionalism, as defined by Kreuder-Sonnen (2019), refers to the invocation of extraordinary powers in times of crisis, enabling IOs to take actions that deviate from established legal and procedural norms based on the justification of an urgent threat.

Table 13– The Institutions of the EU: Their Roles, Functions, and Representation of Interests.

Institution Name	Role	Functions	Representing	Representation of Interests
European Council	Executive	Main decision-making	Member states	Intergovernmental
Council of the EU	Executive/legislative	Main decision-making	Member states	Intergovernmental
European Commission	Executive	Main decision-making	Union	Supranational
European Parliament	Legislative	Main decision-making	Citizens	Supranational
Court of Justice of the European Union	Judicial	Complementary institutions	Union	Supranational
European Central Bank	Executive	Complementary institutions	Union	Supranational
European Court of Auditors	Control	Complementary institutions	Union	Supranational

Source: Own elaboration based on Lelieveldt and Princen (2015) and consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)

The COVID-19 pandemic illuminated both the strengths and potential pitfalls of EU exceptionalism. On the one hand, the EU's ability to implement rapid, coordinated measures emphasized the value of an exceptionalist approach in safeguarding public health and stabilizing the economy. On the other hand, the EU's exceptional response led to debates over the erosion of national autonomy and the potential overreach of EU institutions, particularly the European Commission. These discussions reflect a broader question in European integration studies: How should the EU reconcile the need for effective crisis management with the preservation of democratic legitimacy and respect for national sovereignty? (Kreuder-Sonnen, 2022; Wetter Ryde, 2022; White, 2023).

Although this chapter will not answer the previous question, it contributes to shedding light on the EU's exceptionalism debate by empirically exploring COVID-19 management. Indeed, some emergency measures, such as vaccine procurement and distribution strategies, raise important questions about their exceptional nature. As Kreuder-Sonnen and White (2021) noted, this exceptionalist approach often raises concerns regarding the legitimacy of such measures, especially when actions are taken quickly and with minimal public debate. While these extraordinary measures enabled the EU to respond effectively to the COVID-19 crisis, they also revealed potential

risks, including the concentration of decision-making power and the marginalization of democratic processes within member states. Ultimately, the EU's response to COVID-19 highlights a dual trajectory: it demonstrates how emergencies can catalyze deeper integration and expansion of EU authority while intensifying discussions about the Union's democratic legitimacy.

The use of exceptionalist measures has become an integral part of the EU's crisis management toolkit, highlighting the complex interplay between supranational authority and member state sovereignty in times of emergencies (Kreuder-Sonnen, 2022; Wetter Ryde, 2022). As the EU continues to face transnational challenges, the balance between crisis-driven integration and respect for national autonomy will likely remain a central issue, with implications for its future trajectory.

4.3. European Union's response to the COVID-19 pandemic – Data and Methods

This chapter focuses on a specific portion of the Emergency International Measures Database (EIMD) concerning the European Union's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. It aims to achieve two primary goals: (i) to assess the pandemic responses of the EU's executive bodies—the European Council, the European Commission, and the Council of the EU, and (ii) to analyze the possible exceptional measures taken by the EU. To accomplish this, the study employs a mixed-methods research design that integrates both quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis techniques (Seawright, 2016).

The first part of the analysis statistically approaches the EU's emergency measures during the COVID-19 pandemic. In this part, I employed different computational text analysis strategies, such as a black-box large language model (LLM) and Structural Topic Model (STM) combined with dictionary-based text analysis, to examine the measure's description (`text`) and generate new variables from it. In the second part, I focus on exceptional emergency measures (EEMs) and conduct an in-depth case study of a measure identified by the model. The EEM selected is *the vaccine export transparency and authorization mechanism*, which is an emblematic and intriguing case to explore the expansion of Commission powers in the health domain. I supplemented the measure description in the original dataset with other sources, such as regulations,

reports, press releases, and information obtained from conversations with some European bureaucrats during a visit to the European Council in March 2024.

The European Council[36] and Commission's[37] official websites were accessed, and data from the COVID-19 timeline actions was collected using web scraping techniques. The first data collection was in January 2022; a later update was in January 2024. The resulting dataset contains five variables—*source, date, year, title,* and *text*—and 446 actions involving different emergency measures[38] concerning the European Union's actions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic from 2020 to 2023. Of those 446 actions, 287 were extracted from the Commission website, while 159 came from the European Council's website[39]. Figure 1 shows the monthly evolution of the EU's actions over time from the source variable.

Figure 17- European Institutions' actions to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic from 2020 to 2023.

---

[36] Two important clarifications are necessary. First, the link I used to scrap the information from the European Council's website is no longer available (https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/coronavirus/timeline/). However, there is another one with the same information (https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/coronavirus-pandemic/timeline/). Second, the European Council's official website works also for the Council of the European Union because both institutions share it.

[37] Follow the link containing the extracted information regarding the European Commission's action: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/coronavirus-response/timeline-eu-action_en.

[38] The dataset is organized as panel data, which presents the evolution of the EU's actions over time. This means that the dataset exhibits new measures, as well as their modification and suspension. Hence, it is inaccurate to say that the EU's institutions produced 446 measures to face the COVID-19 pandemic because the same measure can appear at different timeline moments.

[39] It is essential to say that the source (official website) must not be confused with the institution that created the measure because the timelines also included information about measures taken by other agents and institutions. For instance, the timeline on the European Council's website also contains measures produced by the Council of the EU, Eurogroup, and different ministerial councils. For this reason, I also extracted information related to the measure producer during the data analysis, as I will explain later.

To begin the data analysis, I used a black-box large language model (LLM) through the OpenAI API using ChatGPT 4o[40]. This non-supervised model was applied to classify and extract information regarding the measure's characteristics based on different criteria (Appendix Part A, section 1). For that, I created two text-to-text prompts for each task, i.e., one for classification and another for extraction. For the classification task, the prompt provides the model with a brief description of the parameter and then asks to classify it into two categories (dichotomous variable) or several categories (categorical variable). For the extraction task, the prompt mainly requires identifying and annotating the information related to a specific measure's characteristic, such as its formulator. When creating prompts, I followed the idea of directional stimulus prompts by including some examples at the end to guide the model toward desired and better outputs (Li et al., 2024). For further information about the prompts and their formulation, see Appendix Part A, section 2.

I also used a second non-supervised model, a Structural Topic Model (STM), to get the *policy issues* each measure regards. As the COVID-19 pandemic was a sanitarian emergency with different implications, the picture of the EU's action would be incomplete if we do not know the typology of the measures taken to deal with SARS-CoV-2. Hence, I decided to use an STM instead of other existing dictionary-based approaches, such as Lexicoder Topic Dictionaries (Albaugh et al., 2013), or recent Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques, such as the CAP Babel Machine (Sebők et al., 2024) or other fine-tuned BERT models (Lasri et al., 2023; Mendelsohn et al., 2021) for two reasons.

First, I tested these models in the data, for instance, the issue-generic frame model from Mendelsohn et al. (2021). Still, it did not fit well with the data characteristics because it produced partial-interpretable results that did not suit my original objective (See Appendix Part B, section 1). Second, based on the awareness of the singularity of the EU and the unparalleled conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic, I realized that an inductive strategy could be the best option. The STM is helpful in this

---

[40] Before I ran the model using Chat GPT4o, I pretested a 10% sample of data using Chat GPT 3.5 Turbo, with manual classifications from three codifiers to create golden data. I compared the outputs from manual codifications with those of Chat GPT 3.5 Turbo and Chat GPT 4o. Chat GPT 4o performed better on both classification and extraction tasks. For more details on the pretest and model comparisons please refer to Appendix Part A, sections 3 and 4.

direction because it captures which words belong to each topic – sets of words – based on the correlations between the mentions of these terms (Roberts et al., 2014). Hence, I employed the stm package for R (Roberts et al., 2019) to run the model and other complementary packages to prepare the dataset. The preprocessing followed the steps and suggestions of the existing literature[41] (Carvalho et al., 2024; Roberts et al., 2014, 2019; Weston et al., 2023).

The resultant document-term matrix contains 446 documents, 302 terms, and 7698 tokens. The number of topics (8) in the model was chosen based on a standard STM procedure, the ratio between semantic coherence and exclusivity[42] (See Appendix Part B, section 2). I labeled each topic using two indicators: (i) the most frequently occurring terms (Highest Prob) and (ii) the Frequency-Exclusivity (FREX) score, which refers to those terms that are at the same time frequent and exclusive for each topic. The eight topics generated by the model were labeled as follows: (1) Political Concertation; (2) Finance; (3) Vaccines, Testing, and Treatment; (4) Economy Recovery; (5) Vaccine Purchase; (6) Movement Restriction; (7) Humanitarian aid; and (8) Crisis management. For further information on STM resulting topics, consult Appendix Part B, section 3.

The aim of running an STM model was to find similar categories to policy issues or agendas and use them to classify the measures. Despite the eight topics adequately summarizing the content of the EU's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, not all the topics could be translated into policy agenda subjects. Therefore, I dropped the first and last topics - Political Concertation and Crisis Management, since they pertain to the political and administrative dynamics of the emergency. Thus, I only employed the remaining topics. Instead of using all six resting topics as dictionary categories, I condensed them into three based on their conceptual proximity, avoiding repeated terms to make them mutually exclusive categories. Consequently, the final dictionary has the following categories: (i) Economy and Finance, which includes terms related to

---

[41] I preprocessed the `text` variable following standard procedures, which include standardizing all the texts to lowercase, stemming all words, removing common stop words and frequently occurring terms, merging compound words, and avoiding excessively rare or overly common terms (GRIMMER and STEWART, 2013).

[42] Semantic coherence accesses the frequency of word co-occurrence within a topic. The most coherent topics are those containing words with a similar frequency. Exclusivity, on the other hand, measures the extent to which the terms within a topic are exclusive – i.e., whether they belong exclusively to that topic or span across multiple topics ((Carvalho et al., 2024; Roberts et al., 2014, 2019; Weston et al., 2023).

economic efforts, financial plans, and other economic strategies; (ii) Health - which covers health-related terms, including vaccines, treatments, and contracts; and (iii) Social which focuses on travel restrictions, social distancing rules, and humanitarian efforts. Consult Appendix Part B, section 4, for further information about the dictionary categories.

When the categories were defined and well-delimited, I put the dictionary into practice and classified the measures according to their policy issues. I formulated the policy issue detection as a multilabel classification problem for the three typologies, meaning the same measure could belong to more than one category. This classification strategy reflects reality because contemporary policies or measures usually address more than one issue at a time. Although several categories could be applied to the same measure, this does not mean they have the same proportions. Therefore, I calculated the typology proportions based on the length of the measure description - total words in the text variable - and then normalized them to ensure the prevalence sum was one (1) at the end (See Appendix Part B, section 5).

The second part of the research design, the qualitative one, complements the LLM's classification results. This part is not as extensive as the first one but equally important. It also responds to a different motivation: to identify and explore the possible EEMs produced by the European Executive institution during the COVID-19 pandemic. The criteria for distinguishing between conventional and exceptional emergency measures are based on the definitions provided in the first section and summarized in the LLM model's prompt description.

I started the qualitative analysis by inspecting the 28 actions the LLM model classified as exceptional to double-check the model's performance. As the dataset is a timeline and the actions may refer to the same measures, I extracted the information about single measures in this classification. In this process, I identified at least eight (8) EEM produced by the EU institutions. Although all cases are interesting, I selected only one to explore carefully because its deep analysis demands complementing the data with new sources and detailed attention. I supplement the dataset information, bringing other sources and adding new facts by consulting related institutional documents, such as reports, regulations, and communications. Finally, I explored these

documents using approaches from content analysis and Atlas.ti as qualitative data analysis software. The results of both research strategies will be presented as follows.

4.4. Examining the European Institutions' response to the Covid-19 pandemic:

This section presents an overview of the EU's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, exploring the results of the text analysis strategies - LLM, STM, and the dictionary. The description of the results has three steps. First, I outline the EU response from the perspective of the EU's institutions (the supply side) and their connections with the recipients of the Emergency Measures (the demand side). Second, I analyze the Emergency Measures created during this time, examining their typology and policy issues addressed according to the EU Institution that produced them. Lastly, I examined the exceptional measures introduced during the COVID-19 pandemic, assessing their scope and classification.

4.4.1. Portraying the EU's response to the pandemic

Figure 18 plots the emergency measures EU bodies took to address the pandemic from December 2019 to mid-2023. This graph allows us to analyze the measures' frequency over time, differentiating them according to their formulators[43]. Although the graph includes all the European institutions that produce or participate in at least one of the policy cycle stages, the highlight is clearly for the European Commission, European Council, and Council. The rest of the institutions had significantly reduced participation, so they were aggregated in the "other" category.

The first visual inspection of Figure 18 ratifies the European Commission's predominance in managing pandemics. In frequency terms, the Commission, led by Ursula von der Leyen, played a more active role than other EU executive institutions, producing more measures and mobilizing other EU agencies to respond to the

---

[43] This distinction was possible after the classification task when I observed that data extracted from the European Council's website also included information regarding other European Institutions, such as the Council, EU ambassadors, or Eurogroup. This disaggregation prevented me from misunderstanding the intensity of the European Council's action during the COVID-19 pandemic.

pandemic. Indeed, the Commission's actions can serve as a proxy for the COVID-19 pandemic phases in the EU's member states. These peaks coincide with crucial developments, such as virus waves, vaccination efforts, and reopening strategies.

Figure 18- Monthly evolution of emergency measures generated by the European Union Institutions.

The highest level of emergency measures production by the EU occurred in March-April 2020, coinciding with the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe. During this time, the Commission and the Council elevated the number and complexity of the measures, trying to change the first image of incoordination and inaction (Van Middelaar, 2021; Wolff & Ladi, 2020). The EU's measures responded to the high death rate generated by the first wave of COVID-19 in the region and the anticipation of the socio-economic consequences of the pandemic. The Commission measures included launching emergency procurement of medical supplies as a response to their shortages, coordinating the European cross-border health measures, establishing the Emergency Support Instrument (ESI)[44] to support member states and

---

[44] The ESI is a tool that enables the EU to support its Member States when a crisis reaches an unprecedented scale and impact, with wide-ranging consequences for citizens' lives. This instrument was created in 2016 and activated for the second time from April 2020 to January 2022 to help EU countries address the COVID-19 pandemic (European Commission, 2020a).

the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative (CRII) to mobilize resources (European Commission, 2020a, 2020b, 2024a).

The Commission's response from July to August 2020 relates to the summer reopening in many EU countries after the first wave of the pandemic. It attempted to manage the transition from strict lockdowns to economic recovery while maintaining health security. Crucial emergency recovery measures like the *Next Generation EU* were also proposed and approved. Another notable peak appears between November 2020 and January 2021, corresponding to Europe's second major COVID-19 wave. During this period, the Commission focused on controlling the virus's second wave and supporting mass vaccination efforts.

A final peak took place from mid-2021 onwards. In this stage, the Commission centered on managing the pandemic's long-term consequences, boosting the vaccination campaigns, and implementing the Digital COVID Certificate to facilitate safe travel across EU member states. Since 2022, the frequency of emergency measures declines, suggesting a shift toward the management phase of the pandemic rather than the earlier emergency response. By this point, many initial emergency measures were institutionalized or no longer required frequent updates.

Although all these trends highlight the European Commission's proactive role in coordinating responses during the pandemic's most critical periods, the EU's supply of emergency measures also depended on the European Council's and the Council's actions. Both intergovernmental bodies acted in concordance with the Commission, endorsing its proposals and ensuring national measures aligned with broader EU goals. The European Council was crucial in ensuring constant communication and coordination between European governments. This coordination was essential for implementing emergency measures, especially unpopular ones, such as closing external borders. However, the frequency of its actions in the frame of the EU suggests the heads of state and government focused their attention on managing internal demands and solving problems caused by the COVID-19 outbreak in their territories, giving tacitly the responsibility of coordinating the collective response to the Commission and the Council.

On the supply side, it is clear that the European Commission had an active role in managing the COVID-19 pandemic, acting more than other European Union

executive bodies (Figure 18). However, what about the demand side, the measures' recipients? Figure 19 adds this information, showing the connections between the formulators and beneficiaries of the European Union's emergency measures to address the COVID-19 pandemic. It is a directed network with 89 nodes (vertex) and 101 links (edges), which means the ties have one direction—some nodes send, and others receive. Though the resulting network is straightforward, it is a beneficial tool for graphically presenting information about the measures' senders and recipients.

As a direct network, I employed degree centrality as the primary metric to organize and analyze its relations[45]. We can calculate two separate degree centrality measures for direct networks: in-degree and out-degree. The in-degree measure represents the number of incoming edges to a node - connections directed toward the node. The out-degree measure refers to the number of outgoing edges from a node - connections directed away from the node (Newman, 2018; Saxena & Iyengar, 2020; Wasserman, 1994). In the case of Figure 19, I used the out-degree measure because this metric generated better clusters, making distinguishing between the measures' producers and the receivers easier. It is possible to identify the main measures' formulators in the middle of the network in different colors and sizes, while the measures' recipients are in the network periphery, represented by the lilac cluster. This cluster includes as receivers the nation-states inside and outside the EU, companies, and international organizations. The other two clusters, the light green and blue, portray other individual measures' participants and formulators.

---

[45] Like other centrality metrics, degree centrality helps researchers assess the nodes' importance, influence, or prestige. The degree of a node refers to the number of connections (or edges) it has to others.

Figure 19 - Key actors and interactions of the EU's COVID-19 Response

The network confirms the European Commission's centrality, showing it as the most significant node (in brown), which indicates this institution played a central role in producing and coordinating emergency measures. Its dominant size reflects its heavy involvement and broad connections with multiple countries, institutions, and initiatives. Its near connections mainly refer to individual measures directed to members of the European Union (for instance, Germany, Spain, or France), other European countries outside the EU (like Ukraine or Albania), and Companies (like BioNTech and Pfizer). The links to pharmaceutical companies denote the Commission's health and vaccine distribution efforts, mainly represented by the common vaccine procurement strategy (Schmidt, 2022). Although the Commission has produced several individual measures, the most significant impact (represented by the thickest arrow) comes from the package of measures directed at all EU members.

The second most significant node is "European Union" (in green). This node comprises the labeled measures as created by the whole organization. Though these measures could have followed a similar path to the others, their description mentioned

the entire EU as a supplier instead of an individual internal institution. Perhaps it was a communications strategy because these measures were primarily directed at nation-states beyond Europe, such as African states (for instance, Uganda, Gambia, and Ghana) or Asian states (like India), and international organizations like the World Health Organization (WHO) or World Trade Organization (WTO).

The Council (in Fuchsia) and the European Council (in orange) also appear as central nodes, though they are less dominant than the Commission. Their position in the network suggests that although they were key players, their function might have been more collaborative or facilitating compared to the Commission's direct involvement. The network also shows other European institutions participating in formulating emergency measures. The EU ambassadors, for instance, endorsed the Commission's and Council's proposals regarding economic and sanitarian issues directed to diverse stakeholders. As an example, I can mention the shipment of doses of the COVID-19 vaccines to a group of EU members (Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, and Slovakia) in April 2021. They also agreed with economic measures directed at essential sectors such as rail companies or EU fishermen and aquaculture farmers.

4.4.2. The EU's emergency measures for COVID-19

Figure 20 shows how the EU's institutions used different levels of emergency measures—non-legal, soft legal, and hard legal—in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The European Commission is the primary formulator of EMs, issuing the largest volume and with a particular emphasis on hard legal measures. This aligns with the literature highlighting the Commission's central role, as it took on significant regulatory and financial responsibilities to stabilize the Union (Kassim, 2023; Schmidt, 2022). For example, the Commission led initiatives like the joint vaccine procurement program, which required binding legal frameworks and substantial coordination across member states, underscoring its capacity to deliver cohesive and enforceable policy actions. This proactive approach, as analyzed by Kassim (2023), reflects the Commission's capacity to produce binding policies, positioning it as a key player in EU emergency response (Kassim, 2023; Quaglia & Verdun, 2023).

In contrast, the Council and the European Council primarily issued soft legal and non-legal measures, in accordance with their supportive and political agreement roles. This distribution is consistent with their intergovernmental nature, where member states often prioritize national sovereignty over supranational directives. As Boin and Rhinard (2023) observe, COVID-19 required both binding and flexible responses. Therefore, the Commission enacted immediate, enforceable measures while the Council provided recommendations and guidelines to accommodate member states' autonomy (Boin & Rhinard, 2023). This layered response highlights a unique EU emergency management dynamic, in which supranational bodies like the Commission are empowered to implement rapid, binding measures, while intergovernmental bodies contribute non-binding guidance. This approach reflects a fragile balance between urgent intervention and respect for national sovereignty in a multi-level governance structure (Kreuder-Sonnen & White, 2021)

Figure 20- Emergency Measures (EM) types produced by EU Institutions

Continuing the analysis of the nature of the EU's emergency measures, Figure 21 exhibits their distribution across different policy issues—social, health, and economy/finance. The intensity of the color indicates the average focus of each institution on these policy domains, with darker shades representing a higher emphasis. The policy domain (area) matters for two reasons. First, there are some policy issues in

which the EU can legislate more than others, such as health policy, which historically falls outside EU competencies. Second, the powers, responsibilities, and resources of the EU institutions vary between and within policy domains (Boin et al., 2013; Kassim, 2023; Leuffen et al., 2022). Consequently, Figure 21 provides us with a radiography we can use to identify possible changes in the behavior of EU institutions regarding policy areas during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Figure 21- Policy issues of the EU's emergency measures.

The economy/finance domain, one of the European Union's foundational issues, is predominant in almost all EU institutions, with a particular highlight on the Eurogroup. As expected, the Eurogroup displays a strong focus on economic and financial measures, consistent with its role in overseeing economic stability within the Eurozone. This verification also aligns with the observation that the COVID-19 crisis had a profound economic impact across the EU, necessitating a significant response in financial governance. On the other hand, the emphasis on health measures by multiple institutions denotes the unique demands of the COVID-19 pandemic, where cross-border health threats required a coordinated response that extended beyond the usual economic focus of EU crisis management. This pattern illustrates the EU's ability to expand its competencies in response to a transboundary health emergency, balancing

economic stabilization with urgent health and social interventions (Brooks & Geyer, 2020; Quaglia & Verdun, 2023).

Regarding the executive institutions in analysis, the European Commission shows a broader policy focus, addressing economic measures, health, and social, respectively. Considering that health policy remains primarily a national competence (Lamping, 2013), t is interesting that this domain was expressed more strongly in the Commission's emergency measures than in the Council, where the health ministers are. This captivating fact can be partially explained by the agency characteristics of the Commission's president, Ursula von der Leyen. She used her medical background to call for more responsibility for the Commission and propose significant reforms in the health domain. The STM analysis confirmed von der Leyen's relevance, listing her as the only EU political leader in the FREX term for "Political Concertation" Topic (See Appendix B - Section 3). In this sense, the Commission took the lead on health policy areas traditionally dominated by member states, demonstrating the flexibility and adaptability of EU institutions under emergency conditions (Kassim, 2023).

4.4.3. Exploring the EU's EEMs characteristics.

Defined as measures that extend executive competencies by creating special rules or suspending previous authorizations to expedite action, EEMs are distinct from standard emergency measures due to their potential interference with established rights and procedures. The following subsection analyzes the typology (Figure 22-A) and scope (Figure 22-B) of exceptional emergency measures (EEMs) formulated by EU institutions during the COVID-19 pandemic. It also explores how EU institutions use EEMs across various policy domains, highlighting the multi-dimensional and pluri-institutional approach in EU emergency governance (Kassim, 2023).

Figure 22- Types and policy issues of the EU's Exceptional Emergency Measures (EEMs)

Graph A shows the typology distribution of EEMs across different EU institutions, divided between soft and hard legal measures. The Council stands out as the primary promoter of EEMs, particularly in the form of hard legal measures. This result can be interpreted as an extension of emergency politics dynamics at domestic levels during COVID-19. During this time, different EU governments created emergency policies and empowered their executive bodies, especially some of their ministers. As Kreuder-Sonnen (2021) highlights, emergency politics within the EU often results in executive self-empowerment, and the Council's predominant participation in issuing hard legal EM could exemplify this dynamic (Kreuder-Sonnen, 2021). While also involved in producing EEMs, the European Commission's role is more limited than that of the Council. It suggests a possible link with intergovernmental dynamics in which member states retain significant influence.

Notably, non-legal measures are absent in Graph A, as they do not qualify as exceptional emergency measures by definition. Rhetorical responses, such as declarations or speeches, play a role in framing the emergency narrative but do not extend executive competencies. For an emergency response to be classified as

exceptional, it must involve either soft or hard legal measures that formalize and enforce new rules or temporarily suspend previous ones. Therefore, the presence of only soft and hard legal measures in the graph reflects the EU's focus on enforceable policies during emergencies, with the Council and Commission issuing directives that can be swiftly implemented across member states. This approach aligns with the understanding of EMs as fast-tracked solutions that enable decisive action in transboundary emergencies (Heupel et al., 2021).

Graph B categorizes the policy issues EEMs address across EU institutions, revealing a multi-dimensional strategy for handling emergencies. The graph indicates that policy issues often overlap, with many measures encompassing multiple domains. This multi-label classification underscores the complexity of emergency management during COVID-19, where interconnected policy areas demanded holistic responses. For example, the Council's EMs often address issues related to economic and social agendas, emphasizing the importance of balancing financial stability with societal well-being. However, due to the unique circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Council's EEMs that connected economic and financial issues with health demands were just as significant as the socioeconomic EEMs. This reflects a distinct aspect of the emergency situation. In this context, while economic and financial concerns were the primary drivers of the Council's EEMs, social and health-related factors played a secondary role in shaping these measures.

The Commission's EEMs lean more heavily toward the measures that combine the three domains. This focus demonstrates the EU's pluri-institutional approach, where institutions address distinct but overlapping policy needs to create a cohesive emergency response. The multi-issue approach is sometimes necessary to justify enacting exceptional emergency measures as effective and comprehensive, addressing immediate and long-term needs. Finally, it is essential to note that even though the Council participated more actively in enacting the EEMs during COVID-19, the Commission acted as the first mover of most of them, fulfilling its mandate as a proponent of new initiatives.

4.4.4. Going beyond the numbers: Looking into the EEMs in the EU

This section provides a detailed examination of one Exceptional Emergency Measures (EEMs) introduced by the European Commission in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. While the Council was the primary executive institution driving the EEMs, the Commission formally proposed most of these measures due to the EU's institutional structure. The case explored here is the *Vaccines Export Transparency and Authorization Mechanism*. This measure mainly relates to the health domain and went through a process of normalization (ratchet effect) after its temporary implementation (Kreuder-Sonnen, 2019).

The Vaccines export transparency and authorization mechanism.

The EU introduced the vaccine export transparency and authorization mechanism (the vaccine export mechanism) in January 2021 to address COVID-19 supply challenges. This mechanism was designed to ensure that vaccine doses manufactured within the EU met domestic needs before being exported. The primary objective was to address potential shortages by maintaining a stable vaccine supply within the EU, thereby upholding contractual obligations under the Advance Purchase Agreements (APAs)[46] made with pharmaceutical companies.

The APAs are essential for understanding the vaccine export mechanism. The European Commission reached an agreement with all EU Member States to negotiate and sign APAs with vaccine manufacturers on their behalf. Article 4 of the agreements between the Commission and the Member States established that the supranational institution has the authority to conclude an APA that mandates participating Member States to acquire COVID-19 vaccine doses (European Commission, 2020). In this context, the Commission provided 'pull' incentives to encourage pharmaceutical companies to develop and produce COVID-19 vaccines, taking responsibility for ensuring that the EU population had access to secure vaccines in sufficient quantities.

---

[46] APAs are instruments designed to encourage companies to invest in the development and production of products that society requires, while also reducing the associated risks. They are primarily used in areas where the market lacks sufficient incentives to motivate companies to make these essential investments (Boulet et al., 2021).

This approach entailed significant risks for at least two reasons. First, it marked the first time the EU entered into an APA for vaccines that had not yet been proven effective. Second, companies were given advanced payments to accelerate the late-stage development and manufacturing of COVID-19 vaccines (Boulet et al., 2021). As a result, the COVID-19 pandemic introduced new dynamics in health policies, as the Commission, rather than the Member States, was responsible for supplying perhaps the most critical asset during this emergency: vaccines. In this sense, the vaccine export mechanism is a good example of EEM in the health domain because it extended executive competencies in the EU by centralizing decision-making powers within the Commission.

Figure 23 illustrates the gradual implementation and refinement of the European Union's vaccine export transparency and authorization mechanism during the COVID-19 pandemic. On January 29, 2021, the Commission introduced the initial mechanism through Regulation (EU) 2021/111, which required export authorizations for COVID-19 vaccines produced within the Union. Although this mechanism was originally set to expire on March 31, it was extended multiple times as the pandemic continued. On March 11, Regulation (EU) 2021/442 extended the export authorization requirement until June 30 and introduced additional coordination measures, requiring member states to consult the Commission before approving any exports. Subsequent amendments included provisions to address reciprocal agreements with importing countries, to prioritize the EU's security of supply, and to manage vaccine distribution based on epidemiological conditions.

By March 24, 2021, Regulation (EU) 2021/521 added stricter transparency requirements and expanded the authorization conditions to account for reciprocity and the epidemiological situation in destination countries. This effort was to maintain vaccine supply stability while managing political tensions arising from the unequal vaccine distribution globally. Over the following months, the mechanism was further extended and modified by regulations in May (EU 2021/734) and June (EU 2021/1071), adjusting the authorization terms to align with production capacity and regional vaccination progress within the EU. By the end of 2021, as production stabilized, these measures were replaced by more permanent frameworks under the

Health Emergency Preparedness and Response (HERA) and the European Health Union (EHU) to create a long-term mechanism for handling health crises.

Figure 23 - Timeline of the European Union's vaccine export transparency and authorization mechanism

The final extension of the vaccine export mechanism happened in September 2021 and guarantees its application until 31 December 2021 (Figure 23). Since January 2022, the vaccine producers did not have to request authorization to export vaccines outside the EU. Nevertheless, the Commission continues to have timely access to company-specific vaccine export data through institutionalizing the transparency component in a new mechanism (European Commission, 2021a). The transition to a permanent framework under the HERA and the EHU normalized these exceptional emergency measures. It also established an infrastructure where the Commission monitors and centralizes relevant data collected for EU Member States customs authorities regarding essential supplies in health emergencies. This framework, its various legislative proposals submitted by the Commission, and the expansion of European Medicines Agency powers are evidence of the attempt to increase the EU's role in health, strengthening its emergency capacities (Quaglia & Verdun, 2023).

Following Christian Kreuder-Sonnen's (2019) theory of IO exceptionalism, I could point out a possible reason for partially normalizing the EU's vaccine export

transparency and authorization mechanism. The author analyzes the dynamics of emergency politics in international relations, focusing on the dichotomy between winners and losers. The "winners" are typically those in executive positions who benefit from increased discretion, encouraging the institutionalization of exceptional powers. This entrenchment or extension of emergency powers is known as the *ratchet effect*. Conversely, those affected by these emergency measures—"rule-addresses"—may initially support specific actions, but over time, they experience dissatisfaction and see themselves as losers. In response, they may mobilize against infringements on their rights and the executive's expanding authority. If this mobilization is successful, it can result in a reversal or limitation of emergency powers, a process referred to as the *rollback effect* (Kreuder-Sonnen, 2019; Posner & Vermeule, 2007; Tarrow, 2016).

When analyzing the actors involved or impacted by the vaccine export mechanism, we can identify at least three groups: (i) EU member states and their governments, (ii) pharmaceutical companies, and (iii) the population of the EU (see Figure 24). Although each group was impacted in different ways, the autonomy of all these entities was impacted by the regulations implemented by the Commission concerning the vaccine mechanism and other health responses during the emergency. Despite the implications, this mechanism has undergone a normalization process ("ratchet effect"), maybe because the involved parties did not perceive themselves as disadvantaged. On the contrary, many benefited from expanding the Commission's emergency powers and its central role in managing COVID-19 (Figure 24). So far, there is no compelling reason to reverse or limit strengthening the Commission's emergency management capabilities.

My assessment indicates that the primary entities adversely affected by this export mechanism are outside the EU, particularly the beneficiaries of the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) consortium. As these actors possess minimal influence over the EU's decision-making processes and legal framework, the vaccine mechanism's entrenchment (*ratchet effect*) has occurred with little resistance until now. Moreover, although the Commission attempted to promote international solidarity by exempting low-income countries and humanitarian exports from this mechanism (European Commission, 2021b, 2021c), the EU's vaccine strategy has faced criticism for fostering *vaccine nationalism* (Evenett, 2021; Petti, 2022; von Bogdandy & Villarreal,

2021; White, 2021). This approach may have undermined the effectiveness of COVAX, as the EU prioritized its own vaccine purchasing program and donated a substantial portion of doses outside of the initiative despite its support for COVAX (de Bengy Puyvallée & Storeng, 2022; Zhou, 2022).

Figure 24– Vaccines Export Transparency and Authorization Mechanism Diagram.

Another reason there was little resistance to the extension of the Commission's discretionary powers and their subsequent integration into the EU's framework is individual states' adoption of emergency powers and state of exception. During the COVID-19 pandemic, implementing exceptional powers within European countries became commonplace. In this sense, the ambiance was favorable for the extension of executive discretion in domestic and regional scenarios. In fact, some Member States refused to lift their domestic export bans on medical supplies, even when it came to transactions within the EU (Schmidt, 2022). These states insisted that the Commission, acting under its delegated authority, could guarantee that European medical supplies would not be exported to third countries (Wetter Ryde, 2022, p. 13).

The vaccine export mechanism is generally regarded as a proactive measure by the EU to protect public health during a crucial time. However, the Commission's

enforceable regulations, implemented through non-legislative acts, have raised legitimate concerns among different stakeholders, especially the EU's trading partners. These regulations have compromised fundamental European values, particularly the autonomy of companies in liberal markets and the legitimacy of decision-making during emergencies. In this sense, the authorization mechanism not only highlighted the Commission's decisive role but also demonstrated the exceptionalism inherent in the EU's approach, in which new patterns of executive centralization with political motivations shape legal frameworks (Petti, 2022).

4.5.   Conclusion

This chapter systematically investigates the European Union's response to the COVID-19 pandemic from 2020 to 2023. It provides a comprehensive overview of emergency measures to address the pandemic by analyzing the actions of three EU executive institutions: the European Commission, the European Commission, and the Council. The analysis is grounded in crisis management and emergency politics literature. These theoretical lenses allowed a thorough examination of the institutional interplay among executive bodies in handling COVID-19 while exploring the nature of Exceptional Emergency Measures (EEMs) and their impact on EU governance.

The study also examined various literature arguments, such as the European Commission's predominance in COVID-19 management (Kassim, 2023; Schmidt, 2022). The descriptive results show the European Commission as the primary formulator of EMs (Figure 18). This institution, led by Ursula von der Leyen, took a leading role in managing the emergency, framing it as an EU crisis and opening the door to generating binding measures, even in the health domain, to address the pandemic and its impacts. The Commission's supranational capacities, together with the agency characteristics of its president, put this institution at the center of emergency management (Figure 19). In this position, this executive body created the largest volume of hard legal measures (Figure 20), proposed and implemented several EEMs (Figure 22), promoted significant reforms in the health domain (HERA), and mobilized financial resources and EU agencies to respond collectively to the pandemic.

The European Council and the Council complement the role of the Commission, although their functions were less prominent (Figure 19). These intergovernmental bodies endorsed the Commission's proposals, ensuring national measures aligned with broader EU goals. This supportive role was confirmed by descriptive results showing that soft legal and non-legal measures were more prevalent in these institutions (Figure 20). The European Council and the Council supported the Commission as the central emergency manager while providing non-binding guidance. This distribution of roles is consistent with their intergovernmental nature, as these institutions cannot unilaterally enact enforceable legal measures for the entire Union.

Contrary to the European Council's dominance in emergency management decisions advocated by defenders of the new intergovernmentalism (Laffan, 2016; Bickerton et al., 2015), the COVID-19 pandemic illustrated that executive institutions engaged in a cooperative, positive-sum arrangement in which the Commission took the lead (Quaglia & Verdun, 2023). Effective pandemic management required a holistic approach, integrating all types of emergency measures (EMs) and involving relevant functions from the executive institutions. These findings also reinforce the argument that the distribution of labor among executive institutions is more fluid and can vary based on emergency conditions (Kassim, 2023). Consequently, the Commission's leading role in managing the COVID-19 pandemic is provisional and may change depending on structural and agent-related factors.

The research also highlights the relevance of EEMs in shaping the EU's response to COVID-19. The study found that the Council was the primary supporter of these measures, although the Commission acted as the first mover of most of them (Figure 22). This finding may reflect the trajectory of emergency politics in the Union during the pandemic, which could have begun at domestic levels and then transitioned to a supranational context. Another important finding was the confirmation of the legal nature of EMMs. For an emergency response to be classified as exceptional, it must include either soft or hard legal measures that formally establish new rules or temporarily suspend existing ones.

Actions related to EEMs constituted less than 7% of the total. Although limited in number, these actions included some of the EU's most challenging measures, such as the *vaccine export transparency and authorization mechanism*. This served as an excellent

example of EEM during the pandemic, as it expanded the Commission's executive competencies by centralizing decision-making powers and enhancing its influence in the health sector. Additionally, this mechanism underwent a normalization process ("ratchet effect"), transitioning into a permanent framework under the HERA and the EHU structures. While this mechanism effectively safeguarded against vaccine shortages, it also raised concerns about protectionism and the potential limits of supranational intervention.

In conclusion, the findings contribute to two key areas: (i) enhance the broader discussion about the EU's governance capacities during emergencies, and (ii) examine how crises influence institutional changes through adopting exceptional measures. Study results emphasize the significant dynamics of the EU's exceptionalism, sometimes overshadowed by a more managerial approach to crisis management (Kreuder-Sonnen & White, 2021). Future studies can use these findings as a starting point to further understand the evolution of EEM within the EU framework, comparing different emergencies, considering the role of other institutions, and addressing the influence of institution presidents in the management and politics of emergencies.

Appendix Chapter 3

This appendix complements the data analysis information, facilitating this study's transparency and replicability. In this sense, I divided it into 3 parts, making it easier for the reader to access the different methods and techniques. Part A details the black-box large language model (LLM) and the pretest process. Part B provides complementary information regarding the Structural Topic Model (STM) and the dictionary. Part C offers instructions on how to use the replication code.

Part A – Black-box large language model (LLM) - Chat GPT 4o.

Part B – STM and dictionary.

Part C – Replication Instructions.

Part A – Black-box large language model (LLM) - Chat GPT 4o.

5. Variables

Table 14- Description of the variables in chapter three.

Variable	Indicator	Type	Scale
cov	Measures related to COVID-19 management	Dichotomous	0 = Not related
			1 = Related
status	Implementation status of the emergency measures	Dichotomous	0 = Proposal or unimplemented measures
			1 = Implemented measures
type_measure	Emergency measure level	Ordinal	0 = non-legal measures
			1 = soft-legal measures
			2 = hard-legal measures
except	Exceptional emergency measures	Dichotomous	0 = No suspension of the previous Regional IO rules.
			1 = Partially or suspension of the Regional IO rules.
sender	The actor who created the measure	Nominal	Record the name of the measure's formulator
rec_name	The actor who benefited from the measure	Nominal	Record the name of the measure's recipient(s)

			International Organization
rec_tye	The type of recipient according to pre-set categories	Categorical	Member
			Companies
			External State
			Diverse
rec_qu	The recipients' quantity	Nominal	Record the number of recipients
fin_sup	Financial Support	Dichotomous	0 = No support
			1 = Money allocated
values	Quantity of allocated funds	Numeric	Record the amount of money allocated.
hum_res	Participation of expert groups	Dichotomous	0 = No participation
			1 = Participation

6. Prompt engineering

As I mentioned in the methodology section, I created directional stimulus prompts, including detailed information and some examples to guide the model toward the desired output and enhance its performance (Li et al., 2024). I decided to use this kind of prompt instead of others, such as zero-shot prompts, because the classification task included several complex concepts, such as types of emergency measures and exceptionalism. These concepts are especially tricky to understand and allocate without additional input or clues, even for humans. For this reason, I also asked for confidence intervals for the classification task to get an idea about the model completion. The prompts used in this study are presented below.

Figure 25– Prompt for classification task chapter three

As a data analyst, your task is to classify information from the European Union's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The data comes from the timeline with all measures adopted by the EU from 2020 to 2022, which means the same measure can be referred to several times in the dataset. Consider each text as one response and use only one label per each criterion. Follow the instructions below for this classification task:

1. **COVID-19 Relevance**:
   - Determine if the measure is related to the COVID-19 pandemic.
     - Use 1 for yes.
     - Use 0 for no.
2. **Measure Status**:
   - Identify the stage of the measure.
     - Use 0 for proposals or measures that were being discussed.
     - Use 1 for decisions regarding measures, agreements, and implemented measures.
3. **Type of Emergency Measure**:
   - Classify the measure based on the type of International Organization's (IOs) emergency measure:
     - **Non-legal measures**: Purely political actions, such as general statements, speeches, or meetings regarding the emergency.
       - Use 0 for non-legal measures.
     - **Soft legal measures**: Non-binding norms and guidelines, such as recommendations, structured suggestions, reports, plans, or updates to manage a specific emergency and its implications.
       - Use 1 for soft legal measures.
     - **Hard legal measures**: they can be divided into two subtypes:
       - Legally binding obligations, such as regulations, sanctions, mandatory decisions, loan conditions, and treaties (partnerships) regarding a specific emergency.
       - Assistance actions created by the regional institutions to help member states or other entities manage the emergency.
       - Use 2 for hard legal measures.
4. **Exceptional Emergency Measures**:
   - Determine if the measure extends executive competencies by creating special rules or eliminating previous authorizations to accelerate certain procedures, particularly if these actions interfere with the rights of other rule addresses.
     - Use 0 for general emergency measures.
     - Use 1 for exceptional emergency measures.
5. **Confidence Level**:
   - Express your confidence level for the second and fourth classifications as a percentage from 50 to 100, where 50 indicates guessing and 100 indicates certainty.

   - Express your confidence level for the third classification as a percentage from 33 to 100, where 33 indicates guessing and 100 indicates certainty.

(First page)

Example:

Given the text:
"In an effort to ensure timely access to COVID-19 vaccines for all EU citizens and to tackle the current lack of transparency of vaccine exports outside the EU, the Commission put in place a measure requiring that such exports are subject to authorization by Member States."

- Classify as:
    - COVID-19 related (1)
    - Implemented measure (1)
    - Hard measure (2) because it is a regulation.
    - Exceptional measure (1) because it alters the normal autonomy of pharmaceutical exports.

Given the text:
"The Commission disbursed €12.1 million to Luxembourg in pre-financing, equivalent to 13% of the country's financial allocation. This payment will help to kick-start the implementation of the crucial investment and reform measures outlined in Luxembourg's recovery and resilience plan,"

- Classify as:
    - COVID-19 related (1) because the Luxembourg plan is part of the EU response to the COVID-19 crisis.
    - Implemented measure (1).
    - Hard measure (2) because it involves financial assistance.
    - General emergency measure (0) since it does not alter previous norms.

Response Format:

Respond in JSON format as shown below:

```
{
 "cov": 1,
 "status": 1,
 "conf_status": 95,
 "type_mes": 2,
 "conf_typ": 90,
 "except": 0,
 "conf_exc": 95
}
```

(Second page)

Figure 26 – Prompt for extraction task chapter three

As a data analyst, you are tasked with analyzing the European Union's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Your objective is to extract specific information from the measures taken. The data comes from the timeline with all measures adopted by the EU from 2020 to 2022, which means the same measure can be referred to several times in the dataset. Follow the instructions below to complete your analysis:

1. **Sender**:
   - Identify the entity that created the measure.
2. **Receiver Name**:
   - Identify the recipient's name who was affected or benefited from the measure. See the instructions below:
     - Register states' names if the measure mentions one or more countries as recipients.
     - Register the company's names if the measure mentions one or more companies as recipients.
     - If the measure refers to the whole European Union as recipients or is unclear, use "European Union members."
     - Use "Other nations" if the measure refers to countries not members of the European Union as recipients.
3. **Receiver Type**:
   - Classify the recipient of the measure into one of the following categories:
     - **International Organizations** - Use this category if the measure mentions an international organization as one of its recipients.
     - **Members** - Use this category if the measure has as recipient one or more of the European Union member states (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden).
     - **Companies** - Employ this category if a company is the measure's recipient.
     - **External state** - Employ this category if a country outside the European Union is the measure's recipient.
     - **Diverse:** Use this category if the measure refers to more than one type of recipient.
     - If unclear, use "NA".
4. **Receiver Quantity**:
   - Count the number of recipients.
   - For general measures applicable to all member states, use 27.
   - If unclear or does not mention the recipients nominally, use "NA".

(First page)

5. **Financial Resources**:
- Determine if the measure allocates financial resources (in euros).
  - Use `1` for text which explicitly mentions the amount of money allocated.
  - Use `0` for measures that do not allocate resources or do not mention a specific amount of money.

    Please do not confuse the quantity of other goods, such as vaccines, with the amount of money.

6. **Values**:
- If financial resources are allocated, extract the quantity in euros.
- Do not consider or include percentages, only money.
- If the text describes a sum of money, please convert it into a numeric format, using euros as the standard currency.
- If no financial resources are allocated, this field should be omitted.

7. **Human Resources**
- Determine if the text refers to expert committees or other advisory groups.
  - Use `1` for measures that mention these groups, such as advisory committees, expert groups, or European agencies.
  - Use `0` for measures that do not refer to these groups.

Example:

Given the text:
"The Commission decided to prolong until 30 June 2022 the State aid Temporary Framework (currently set to expire by 31 December 2021). In order to further accelerate the recovery, the Commission has also decided to introduce two new measures to create direct incentives for forward-looking private investment and solvency support measures, for an additional limited period."

Extract the following information:

- **Sender**: Commission
- **Receiver Name**: European Union members
- **Receiver Type**: Members
- **Receiver Quantity**: 27
- **Financial Resources**: 0
- **Value:** 0
- **Human Resources:** 0

(Second page)

Given the text:

"EU leaders, who met by video conference, endorsed the package agreed by the Eurogroup. It is composed of three safety nets for workers, businesses and member states worth 540 billion euro. ", "Leaders also tasked the Commission to urgently come up with a proposal for a recovery fund. \"This fund shall be of a sufficient magnitude, targeted towards the sectors and geographical parts of Europe most affected,\" said President Michel.", "Heads of state or government welcomed a European roadmap towards lifting COVID-19 containment measures, presented by Presidents Michel and von der Leyen on 15 April."

"They also welcomed the Joint Roadmap for Recovery, which defines four key areas for action: single market, massive investment efforts, EU global action and better governance. It also sets out important principles, such as solidarity, cohesion and convergence."

Extract the following information:

- **Sender**: EU leaders
- **Receiver Name**: European Union members
- **Receiver Type**: Members
- **Receiver Quantity**: 27
- **Financial Resources:** 1
- **Values:** 540000000000
- **Human Resources:** 0

Response Format:

Respond in JSON format as shown below:

```
{
 "sender": "Commission",
 "rec_name": "European Union members",
 "rec_type": "Members",
 "rec_qu": 27,
 "fin_sup": 0,
 "values": 0,
 "hum_res": 0,
}
```

(Third page)

7. Pretest and model comparisons

I conducted a pretest using Chat GPT 3.5 Turbo with a 10% sample of the full dataset. This pretest involved three annotators, including myself, who manually classified the sample to create a set of golden data for comparison with the outputs of the non-supervised model. After preparing the golden data, I compared results from manual codification -one selected randomly, Chat GPT 3.5 Turbo, and Chat GPT 4o. I used a confusion matrix for categorical variables ('cov', 'status', 'type_mes', 'except', 'fin_sup', and 'hum_res') and the exact match ratio for variables with multiple categories or free-form text ('sender', 'rec_name', 'rec_type', 'rec_qu', and 'values').

The confusion matrixes are helpful visualization tools because they show the distribution of actual vs. predicted values, making it easy to identify where the model makes incorrect predictions. Hence, they were handy for the prompt adjustment process[47]. The confusion matrixes also allowed me to calculate the evaluation metrics— accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score to make an informed decision about which model or strategy to employ for the whole dataset. However, As I also have free-form text variables in the model, I used the exact match ratio to evaluate them. The exact match ratio measures the percentage of instances where the predicted string exactly matches the expected (golden) string.

The results regarding the comparison between manual coding and unsupervised models are shown below. I employed the F1 score instead of other metrics to compare the techniques' performance with categorical variables. It is beneficial because it balances precision and recall, providing a metric that considers false positives and false negatives (Sasaki, 2007). Figures 27 and 28 exhibit the comparison results based on the F1-score and the Exact Match Ratio.

---

[47] I improved the prompts as I ran the first models with Chat GPT 3.5 turbo.

Figure 27 - F1-score Comparison for the EU's study

Figure 28 - Exact Match Ratio Comparison for Different Models

Part B – STM and dictionary.

1. Testing the issue-generic frame model (Mendelsohn et al., 2021)

Mendelsohn et al. (2021) utilized a supervised model, specifically the RoBERTa model (Liu et al., 2021), to identify frames in tweets related to immigration. The authors approached frame detection as a multilabel classification problem, using two types of framing: issue-specific and issue-generic frames. While I tested the issue-generic frames on the dataset, I found that these labels provide limited insight into the specific policies implemented by the EU during the pandemic. Therefore, although the model functions effectively, it does not adequately address the primary goal of identification. Figure 29 shows the distributions of the issue-generic frames on the dataset.

Figure 29 - Distribution of Frames as a Fraction of Total Data for the European Union


2. Trade-off between exclusivity and semantic coherence

Semantic coherence accesses the frequency of word co-occurrence within a topic. The most coherent topics are those containing words with a similar frequency. Exclusivity, on the other hand, measures the extent to which the terms within a topic

are exclusive – i.e., whether they belong exclusively to that topic or span across multiple topics (Carvalho et al., 2024; Roberts et al., 2016, 2019).

There is an inherent trade-off between two important metrics. Achieving high semantic coherence is relatively easy when the model has fewer topics because common words tend to dominate, resulting in higher co-occurrence. However, this can lead to lower exclusivity, as those common words may appear across multiple topics. Conversely, increasing the number of topics can enhance exclusivity by assigning unique words to specific topics, but this may reduce semantic coherence if the top words do not frequently co-occur (Carvalho et al., 2024; Weston et al., 2023). Therefore, the ideal number of topics should strike a balance between these two metrics. Figure 30 illustrates that eight topics provide the best combination of these metrics for this study.

Figure 30 - Ratio between topics' exclusivity and semantic coherence.

3. The STM results

Table 15– Labeled Topics with their most frequent words and FREX terms.

Number	Topic Label	Highest Prob	FREX
1	Political Concertation	health, respon, global, presid, council, action, leader, prepar, call, coordin, research, new, effort, work, togeth	action, presid, research, call, global, prepar, **vonderleyen**, health, risk, togeth, effort, strengthen, leader, work, respon
2	Finance	resili, plan, facil, implement, invest, disbur, reform, prefinanc, crucial, grant, financ, outlin, billion, adopt, posit	prefinanc, resili, reform, facil, outlin, plan, crucial, implement, disbur, invest, payment, kickstart, equiv, grant, alloc
3	Vaccines, Testing and Treatment	vaccin, develop, authori, market, medicin, test, effect, strategi, access, treatment, agenc, product, base, avail, condit	authori, medicin, market, develop, treatment, agenc, vaccin, condit, strategi, product, test, access, base, effect, avail
4	Economic Recovery	billion, eur, fund, financ, million, instrument, sure, packag, council, programm, budget, bond, propo, crisi, europ	fund, eur, instrument, sure, billion, bond, packag, budget, programm, nextgenerationeu, year, financ, due, issu, next
5	Vaccine Purchase	million, vaccin, dose, compani, purcha, contract, pharmaceut, agreement, provid, addit, approv, option, reach, conclud, potenti	dose, purcha, contract, compani, pharmaceut, option, million, agreement, conclud, potenti, vaccin, reach, approv, addit, behalf
6	Movement Restriction	travel, council, adopt, certif, recommend, restrict, digit, temporari, lift, rule, use, propo, updat, nonessenti, new	travel, certif, restrict, updat, rule, nonessenti, temporari, digit, lift, recommend, free, adopt, requir, certain, council
7	Humanitarian Aid	coronavirus, help, protect, medic, across, humanitarian, equip, air, citizen, flight, need, region, system, health, mechan	equip, medic, humanitarian, protect, air, across, flight, coronavirus, region, immedi, oper, help, civil, africa, citizen
8	Crisis Management	minist, discuss, confer, video, also, sector, respon, agr, exchang, focus, leader, view, crisi, inform, impact	confer, video, minist, discuss, exchang, sector, focus, held, met, inform, view, agr, ceu, via, impact

4. Dictionary

Table 16 - STM result and their transformation into the dictionary's categories.

Number	Dictionary categories	Dictionary terms	Topics labels	Highest Prob	FREX
1	Economy and Finance	prefinanc, resili, reform, facil, outlin, plan, crucial, implement, disbur, invest, payment, kickstart, grant, alloc, fund, eur, instrument, sure, billion, bond, packag, budget, programm, nextgenerationeu, financ	Finance	resili, plan, facil, implement, invest, disbur, reform, prefinanc, crucial, grant, financ, outlin, billion, adopt, posit	prefinanc, resili, reform, facil, outlin, plan, crucial, implement, disbur, invest, payment, kickstart, equiv, grant, alloc
			Economic Recovery	billion, eur, fund, financ, million, instrument, sure, packag, council, programm, budget, bond, propo, crisi, europ	fund, eur, instrument, sure, billion, bond, packag, budget, programm, nextgenerationeu, year, financ, due, issu, next
2	Health	authori, medicin, develop, treatment, agenc, vaccin, condit, test, access, effect, avail, dose, purcha, contract, pharmaceut, agreement, potenti, reach, approv, health, equip	Vaccines, Testing and Treatment	vaccin, develop, authori, market, medicin, test, effect, strategi, access, treatment, agenc, product, base, avail, condit	authori, medicin, market, develop, treatment, agenc, vaccin, condit, strategi, product, test, access, base, effect, avail
			Vaccine Purchase	million, vaccin, dose, compani, purcha, contract, pharmaceut, agreement, provid, addit, approv, option, reach, conclud, potenti	dose, purcha, contract, compani, pharmaceut, option, million, agreement, conclud, potenti, vaccin, reach, approv, addit, behalf
3	Social	travel, certif, restrict, rule, nonessenti, temporari, digit, lift, free, humanitarian, protect, air, across, flight,	Movement Restriction	travel, council, adopt, certif, recommend, restrict, digit, temporari, lift, rule, use, propo, updat, nonessenti, new	travel, certif, restrict, updat, rule, nonessenti, temporari, digit, lift, recommend, free, adopt, requir, certain, council

	immedi, oper, help, civil, africa, citizen		coronavirus, help, protect, medic, across, humanitarian, equip, air, citizen, flight, need, region, system, health, mechan	equip, medic, humanitarian, protect, air, across, flight, coronavirus, region, immedi, oper, help, civil, africa, citizen
		Humanitarian aid		

5. Proportion Calculation

For each text, I calculate the proportion of words that match each category's dictionary terms relative to the total number of words in the text. I follow a three-step process. First, I separate the text into individual words. Next, I count how many of those words match the terms in the relevant category dictionary. Finally, I calculate the proportion for each category by dividing the number of matched words by the total number of words in the text.

$$Raw\ \text{Proportion} = \frac{\text{Number of matched}}{\text{Total number of words}}$$

In order to ensure that the proportions for each category sum to 1, it was necessary to normalize them. First, I calculate the total of the raw proportions across all categories, which provides a "total proportion" that represents the overall text captured by all categories combined. Next, I divide each category's raw proportion by this total proportion. The formula for normalization is as follows:

$$\text{Normalized Proportion} = \frac{\text{Raw Proportion}}{\text{The total proportion}}$$

Part C – Replication Instructions.

#Only provided in published version#

5. CONCLUSION

The COVID-19 pandemic, one of the most disruptive global crises in modern history, not only tested the resilience of national governments but also renewed debates about the role of international organizations (IOs) in emergency management. In particular, the pandemic highlighted the importance of Regional Integration Organizations (Regional IOs) as intermediaries between national and global responses, addressing gaps in governance that state-centric emergency management approaches.

The pandemic raised important questions about the capacity, legitimacy, and effectiveness of Regional IOs in responding to large-scale disruptions. This contributed to broader discussions regarding the contestation of the Liberal International Order and the future of multilateralism in crisis governance. Furthermore, the emergency provided a valuable opportunity to explore the dynamics of emergency politics within these collective bodies from a comparative perspective. It allowed for an analysis of changes in decision-making processes that circumvented standard institutional constraints, emphasizing the need for swift implementation of exceptional measures.

This dissertation contributes to the ongoing debate by systematically analyzing the emergency measures adopted by Regional IOs in response to COVID-19, engaging with two primary theoretical frameworks: emergency politics and crisis management. The dissertation is structured into three chapters, each addressing critical aspects of this phenomenon. The first chapter maps the field of emergency politics studies, providing essential conceptualization for the subsequent chapters. The second chapter develops the Emergency Measures Index (EMI) to evaluate the responses of six Regional IOs worldwide. The final chapter examines the European Union as a single case study, exploring its emergency management capabilities and the dynamics of its exceptionalism.

This conclusion section synthesizes the key findings of each chapter, discusses the dissertation's contributions and limitations, outlines possibilities for future research, and explores the potential and challenges of using artificial intelligence (AI), especially related to research in Global South.

5.1.   **Summary of Key Findings**

Below, I summarize the results from each chapter, highlighting their theoretical and empirical contributions while suggesting possibilities for future research.

1.1. *Chapter 1- Emergencies and their politics: A scoping review of emergency politics and policy concepts.*

The first chapter aimed to map the field of emergency politics and policy by conducting a systematic scoping review of the existing literature. Using a combination of bibliometric analysis and qualitative content analysis, the study examined scholarly trends, theoretical perspectives, and methodological approaches to emergency governance. The review covered publications from multiple disciplines, offering an interdisciplinary synthesis of emergency-related concepts.

The findings revealed a significant increase in academic interest in emergency governance, particularly following the COVID-19 outbreak. However, the literature is characterized by three significant conceptual challenges: (i) an overreliance on Carl Schmitt's notion of exception, (ii) the inconsistent use of emergency-related terms, and (iii) the lack of a formal conceptualization of emergency policy. These gaps hinder the development of a coherent analytical framework for studying emergency governance.

The chapter's theoretical contributions include a critical reflection on Schmittian exceptionalism's dominance in emergency politics and an effort to clarify key terminologies. Empirically, it provides a structured synthesis of the field's evolution and significant scholarly contributions. The research highlights the need for alternative theoretical perspectives that account for the complexities of contemporary emergency governance beyond the traditional dichotomy of normalcy and exception (Honig, 2009).

Future research should further investigate the diverse institutional and political configurations of emergency responses, moving beyond elite-centric and Eurocentric analyses. Comparative studies examining regional variations in emergency governance could offer valuable insights into how emergencies shape political authority and decision-making processes.

1.2. *Chapter 2 - The Emergency Measures Index (EMI): Examining Regional IO Responses to the Covid-19 Pandemic*

The second chapter developed the Emergency Measures Index (EMI) as a tool for systematically evaluating Regional IOs' responses to transboundary emergencies. The study analyzed 729 emergency measures recorded in the Emergency International Measures Database (EIMD) across six Regional IOs from 2020 to 2024. This chapter represents an attempt to move beyond Eurocentric studies by incorporating six diverse Regional IOs: the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Southern Common Market (Mercosur), Nordic Council (NC), Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and Commonwealth of Nations (Commonwealth).

The results showed considerable variation in how Regional IOs managed the COVID-19 crisis. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) had the highest EMI score, indicating proactive governance through legally binding measures and exceptional interventions. In contrast, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) recorded the lowest score, relying primarily on national responses rather than regional coordination. The findings suggest that the institutional design and governance capacity of Regional IOs significantly impacts in the levels of emergency measures (Debre & Dijkstra, 2021).

The study makes two key theoretical contributions. First, it advances debates on institutional effectiveness in crisis management, highlighting the role of legal strength, expert-driven governance, and flexibility in shaping emergency responses. Second, it problematizes the duality of emergency politics. While it can enhance agility by removing bureaucratic obstacles, it can also erode the trust and legitimacy of Regional IOs.

Future research should apply the EMI to other crises, such as climate disasters or geopolitical conflicts, to assess whether the same institutional patterns hold across different types of emergencies. Refining the index through expert validation and expanding the dataset to include more IOs would enhance its applicability for comparative analyses.

1.3. Chapter 3- Between conventional emergency management and exceptionalism: the European Union's response to the COVID-19 pandemic

The third chapter examined the European Union's institutional response to the COVID-19 pandemic, focusing on the roles of the European Commission, the European Council, and the Council of the European Union. The study employed crisis management and emergency political frameworks to analyze the institutional interplay and formulation of emergency measures to address the pandemic from 2020 to 2023.

The findings confirmed that the European Commission played a leading role in coordinating the EU's emergency response, challenging the intergovernmentalist assumption that the European Council would dominate crisis management. Despite having limited formal authority in the health sector, the Commission formulated the most binding emergency measures, including health-related ones. Exceptional Emergency Measures (EEMs) constituted a small but significant subset of EU actions, with some, such as the vaccine export transparency mechanism, eventually becoming permanent governance instruments.

The chapter contributes to the literature by refining our understanding of emergency-induced institutional change. It illustrates how emergencies can expand executive authority within supranational governance structures and how exceptional measures can undergo normalization processes. Empirically, the study provides a comprehensive dataset of EU emergency measures, contributing to future analyses of institutional adaptation during emergencies.

Future research should explore the long-term implications of these measures for EU governance and assess whether similar patterns emerge in other emergencies. Additionally, studying the influence of individual leaders on emergency responses could provide valuable insights into the role of agency in emergency management.

5.2. Primary contributions

5.2.1. Emergency International Measures Framework: A Theoretical Contribution

This dissertation contributes to the study of transboundary emergency governance by developing the Emergency International Measures Framework. This theoretical construction aims to systematize and clarify the understanding of emergency

measures enacted by Regional IOs. Although the field of emergency management has seen various attempts to define and categorize emergency responses (Ansell et al., 2010; Boin et al., 2009), existing scholarship has struggled to provide a unified framework that is applicable across different institutional and geopolitical contexts. This research builds upon and extends these efforts by offering a structured typology of emergency measures that differentiates them based on their legal nature, stage in the cycle, time orientation, and objectives.

A key contribution of this framework is the classification of emergency measures into two categories: preventive and reactive. Preventive measures are implemented before an emergency occurs and include risk assessment, preparedness initiatives, and legal arrangements to mitigate potential crises. These measures are essential for ensuring long-term resilience and institutional stability. In contrast, reactive measures are deployed during or after an emergency and are characterized by their swift implementation and a heightened sense of urgency. This distinction enables a more precise analysis of how Regional IOs address emergencies at different stages and how their governance mechanisms adapt in response to them.

The framework classifies emergency measures based on their level of legal enforcement: non-legal measures, soft legal measures, and hard legal measures (Abbott & Snidal, 2000). By incorporating these dimensions, the Emergency International Measures Framework serves as an analytical tool for scholars and policymakers to evaluate the scope and effectiveness of interventions by Regional IOs during emergencies. Moreover, it also contributes to the existing literature on crisis management by incorporating insights from emergency politics and international governance. This viewpoint enables a more nuanced understanding of how emergency governance operates within regional IOs and emphasizes the trade-offs involved in developing EEMs.

This framework expands on existing conceptualizations of emergency politics by incorporating the notion of EEMs. Drawing from Kreuder-Sonnen (2019), this concept captures instances where Regional IOs suspend existing norms and expand executive discretion to address crises. The distinction between conventional and exceptional emergency measures aims to avoid misunderstanding to the extent that separates the usual measures that do not challenge the institutional conventions from

those whose main characteristic is rule-breaking. This theoretical lens will allow researchers to examine the long-term implications of emergency politics, particularly in terms of institutional power dynamics and legal norm evolution.

5.2.2. *Emergency Measures Index: An Empirical Contribution*

Building upon the theoretical contributions of the Emergency International Measures Framework, this dissertation introduces the Emergency Measures Index (EMI), an empirical tool designed to evaluate IOs' emergency responses systematically. The EMI provides a comparative assessment of how different organizations respond to emergencies, allowing for an objective analysis of their scope, effectiveness, and institutional engagement.

The EMI is based on a multidimensional approach that captures key attributes of emergency measures across Regional IOs. It consists of seven core indicators: implementation status, measure type, exceptionalism, collaboration, financial resources, amount of money allocated, and expert involvement. These indicators reflect essential crisis management and emergency politics dimensions, ranging from financial and human resource mobilization to norm modifications. By quantifying these factors, the EMI enables scholars and policymakers to identify patterns in emergency governance and evaluate the Regional IO responses.

One of the EMI's key contributions is its ability to capture the role of exceptional emergency measures in shaping IO responses. The index empirically differentiates between conventional and exceptional measures, highlighting cases where Regional IOs bypass standard legal frameworks to enact urgent policies. This distinction is useful for understanding how emergency politics can shift institutional authority and governance paradigms (Kreuder-Sonnen & White, 2021). Thus, EMI is a diagnostic tool for assessing IO emergency responses and a foundation for future research on governance anomalies during transboundary emergencies.

Despite its empirical strengths, the Emergency Measures Index (EMI) has certain limitations. While it provides a structured method for comparison, it does not fully capture all elements that influence emergency policymaking. Factors such as the scope of emergency measures —whether they affect one member state or the entire

organization— their duration, and other resource types were more difficult to quantify yet play a crucial role in shaping IO responses. Future improvements to the EMI should consider incorporating qualitative case studies that offer deeper insight into the characteristics of emergency measures.

5.3. Opportunities and Challenges for Using AI Tools

The application of AI techniques in this research has shown considerable advantages. Large Language Models (LLMs) and machine learning-based content analysis provide a reliable, cost-effective alternative that streamlines data collection and analysis. This approach significantly reduces the time and resources required for empirical studies. Although I do not intend to address this topic in depth, I would like to call attention to the necessity of critically reflecting on AI-driven methodologies, especially concerning the future of scientific research in the Global South.

For researchers in developing regions, AI technologies present opportunities to overcome traditional data access and analysis barriers. Open-source AI tools can facilitate knowledge production, enabling scholars to conduct sophisticated analyses without the usual financial constraints. However, adopting AI in research also comes with risks and challenges. Issues such as data biases, algorithmic opacity, and ethical concerns must be addressed to ensure that AI tools do not undermine transparency in research processes or reinforce existing disparities in global knowledge production.

While digitalization promotes information decentralization, advanced AI tools are still predominantly developed in high-income countries, leading to potential imbalances in access and influence. It is important to remember that AI technologies are not perfect and cannot replace human oversight. Using tools like Chat GPT-4 and other LLMs for information classification should always involve manual validation rather than blindly relying on them (Gielens et al., 2025).

To mitigate these problems, academic communities should advocate for ethical AI governance, promote open-access initiatives, and invest in digital capacity-building programs. These efforts will ensure equitable access to AI-driven research methodologies. By addressing these challenges, researchers can harness the potential of AI while fostering a more inclusive and technologically advanced research environment.

REFERENCES

Abbott, K. W., Keohane, R. O., Moravcsik, A., Slaughter, A.-M., & Snidal, D. (2000). The concept of legalization. *International Organization*, *54*(3), 401–419.

Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (2000). Hard and soft law in international governance. *International Organization*, *54*(3), 421–456.

Abdi, H., & Williams, L. J. (2010). *Principal component analysis. 2*, 433–459. https://doi.org/10.1002/wics.101

Acharya, A. (2016). Regionalism beyond EU-centrism. *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism*, 109–130.

Acharya, A. (2018). *Constructing global order: Agency and change in world politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Adey, P. (2016). Emergency Mobilities. *Mobilities*, *11*(1), 32–48. https://doi.org/10.1080/17450101.2015.1103533

ADVANCE PURCHASE AGREEMENT ("APA")1 for the Development, Production, Advance Purchase and Supply of a COVID-19 Vaccine for EU Member States (2020). https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2021-01/curevac_-_redacted_advance_purchase_agreement_0.pdf

Albaugh, Q., Sevenans, J., Soroka, S., & Loewen, P. J. (2013). The automated coding of policy agendas: A dictionary-based approach. *The 6th Annual Comparative Agendas Conference, Antwerp, Belgium*.

Alexander, D. E. (2015). *Disaster and emergency planning for preparedness, response, and recovery*. Oxford University Press.

Ansell, C., Boin, A., & Keller, A. (2010). Managing Transboundary Crises: Identifying the Building Blocks of an Effective Response System. *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, *18*(4), 195–207. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5973.2010.00620.x

Arendt, H. (1958). *The human condition*. University of Chicago press.

Arksey, H., & O'Malley, L. (2005). Scoping studies: towards a methodological framework. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, *8*(1), 19–32.

ASEAN. (2020, April 14). *Declaration of the Special ASEAN Summit on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)* . https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/FINAL-Declaration-of-the-Special-ASEAN-Summit-on-COVID-19.pdf

Ayuso, A. (2023). *Analysing the performance of multilateral organizations facing major crises: Covid-19 in comparative perspective.*

Barberia, L., Plümper, T., & Whitten, G. D. (2021). The political science of Covid-19: An introduction. *Social Science Quarterly*, *102*(5), 2045–2054.

Barnett, M., & Finnemore, M. (2019). *Rules for the world: International organizations in global politics*. Cornell University Press.

Beckett, G. (2013). The Politics of Emergency. *Reviews in Anthropology*, *42*(2), 85–101. https://doi.org/10.1080/00938157.2013.788348

Bestari, P., & Sinaga, O. (2022). Emergency Policy from A Public Policy Perspective. *Croatian International Relations Review*, *28*(90), 154–168. https://doi.org/10.2478/CIRR-2022-0026

Bickerton, C. J., Hodson, D., & Puetter, U. (2015). *The new intergovernmentalism: states and supranational actors in the post-Maastricht era*. Oxford University Press.

Biersteker, T. J., & Weber, C. (1996). *State sovereignty as social construct* (Vol. 46). Cambridge University Press.

Bjørnskov, C., & Voigt, S. (2018). Why do governments call a state of emergency? On the determinants of using emergency constitutions. *European Journal of Political Economy*, *54*, 110–123. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.01.002

Blondin, D., & Boin, A. (2020). Cooperation in the face of transboundary crisis: A framework for analysis. *Perspectives on Public Management and Governance*, *3*(3), 197–209.

Boin, A., Ekengren, M., & Rhinard, M. (2013). *The European Union as crisis manager: Patterns and prospects*. Cambridge University Press.

Boin, A., & Rhinard, M. (2008). Managing transboundary crises: What role for the European Union? *International Studies Review*, *10*(1), 1–26.

Boin, A., & Rhinard, M. (2023). Crisis management performance and the European Union: the case of COVID-19. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *30*(4), 655–675.

Boin, A., Stern, E., & Sundelius, B. (2016). *The politics of crisis management: Public leadership under pressure*. Cambridge University Press.

Boin, A., 't Hart, P., & McConnell, A. (2009). Crisis exploitation: political and policy impacts of framing contests. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *16*(1), 81–106.

Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2016). *The Oxford handbook of comparative regionalism*. Oxford University Press.

Bossong, R., & Hegemann, H. (2016). EU internal security goverance and national risk assessments: towards a common technocratic model? *European Politics and Society*, *17*(2), 226–241.

Boulet, P., t Hoen, E., Perehudoff, K., Mara, K., & Tan, E. (2021). *Advanced purchase agreements for Covid-19 vaccines: Analysis and comments*.

Brooks, E., de Ruijter, A., Greer, S. L., & Rozenblum, S. (2023). EU health policy in the aftermath of COVID-19: neofunctionalism and crisis-driven integration. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *30*(4), 721–739.

Brooks, E., & Geyer, R. (2020). The development of EU health policy and the Covid-19 pandemic: trends and implications. *Journal of European Integration*, *42*(8), 1057–1076.

Brosig, M. (2011). The emerging peace and security regime in Africa: The role of the EU. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, *16*(1).

Brubaker, R. (2020). Populism and nationalism. *Nations and Nationalism*, *26*(1), 44–66.

Buti, M., & Fabbrini, S. (2023). Next generation EU and the future of economic governance: towards a paradigm change or just a big one-off? *Journal of European Public Policy*, *30*(4), 676–695.

Carvalho, T., Santos, V., & Martínez, Y. (2024). Following the Trail of Words: Mapping the Trending Topics of Graduate Research in the Brazilian IR Scholarship (1987-2018). *Brazilian Political Science Review*, *18*(1), e0003.

Chalmers, D. (2013). *European restatements of sovereignty*.

Christiansen, T., & Piattoni, S. (2003). *Informal governance in the European Union*. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Chu, I. Y.-H., Alam, P., Larson, H. J., & Lin, L. (2020). Social consequences of mass quarantine during epidemics: a systematic review with implications for the COVID-19 response. *Journal of Travel Medicine*, *27*(7), taaa192.

Consilium. (2024a). *A recovery plan for Europe*. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-recovery-plan/

Consilium. (2024b, October 21). *How the Council coordinates the EU response to crises*. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/ipcr-response-to-crises/

Coombs, W. T. (2007). *Ongoing crisis communication: Planning, managing, and responding*. Sage.

de Bengy Puyvallée, A., & Storeng, K. T. (2022). COVAX, vaccine donations and the politics of global vaccine inequity. *Globalization and Health*, *18*(1), 26.

Debre, M., & Dijkstra, H. (2021). COVID-19 and Policy Responses by International Organizations: Crisis of Liberal International Order or Window of Opportunity? *Global Policy*, 1758-5899.12975. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12975

EFEverde. (2020). *La ONU advierte que los desastres climáticos aumentaron un 80 % en el siglo XXI - EFEverde*. https://efeverde.com/onu-desastres-climaticos-aumentaron-80-siglo-xxi/

European Commission. (2019). *Decision (EU) 2019/420 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2019 amending Decision No 1313/2013/EU on a Union*

Civil Protection Mechanism. EUR-Lex. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32019D0420

European Commission. (2020a). *Emergency Support Instrument*. https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/emergency-support-instrument_en

European Commission. (2020b, April 2). *Inforegio - Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative*. https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/publications/factsheets/2020/coronavirus-response-investment-initiative

European Commission. (2021a). *EU replaces COVID-19 vaccines export authorisation mechanism*. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6283

European Commission. (2021b, January 28). *Questions and Answers: Transparency and authorisation mechanism for exports of COVID-19 vaccines*. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_21_308

European Commission. (2021c, March 10). *Commission extends transparency and authorisation mechanism for exports of COVID-19 vaccines*. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_1121

European Commission. (2023). *Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Decision No 1313/2013/EU on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism*. EUR-Lex. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52023PC0194#footnote4

European Commission. (2024a). *Inforegio - Cohesion policy action against coronavirus*. https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funding/coronavirus-response_en

European Commission. (2024b). *The State Aid Temporary Framework*. https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/coronavirus/temporary-framework_en

European Commission. (2024c, May 14). *EU Civil Protection Mechanism*. https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en

European Court of Auditors. (2022). *Free movement in the EU during the COVID-19 pandemic*. https://www.google.com/search?q=temporary+suspension+of+the+Schengen+Area%27s+free+movement&oq=temporary+suspension+of+the+Schengen+Area%27s+free+movement&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOdIBCDE3ODNqMGo3qAIAsAIA&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

European Parliament. (2020). *The impact of coronavirus on Schengen borders*. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/649347/EPRS_BRI(2020)649347_EN.pdf

European Union. (2013). *Decision - 2013/1082 - EN - EUR-Lex*. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013D1082

European Union. (2024). *Serious cross-border threats to health | EUR-Lex*. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/serious-cross-border-threats-to-health.html?fromSummary=29

Evenett, S. J. (2021). Export Controls on COVID-19 Vaccines: Has the EU Opened Pandora's Box? *Journal of World Trade*, *55*(3).

Ferejohn, J., & Pasquino, P. (2004). *The law of the exception: A typology of emergency powers*. http://www.constitution.org/mac/disclivy_.htm.

Freebairn, A., Hagon, K., Turmine, V., Pizzini, G., Singh, R., Kelly, T., & Fisher, D. (2020). *Tackling the humanitarian impacts of the climate crisis together World Disasters Report 2020*. https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/world-disaster-report-2020

Ganderson, J., Schelkle, W., & Truchlewski, Z. (2023). Who is afraid of emergency politics? Public opinion on European crisis management during Covid-19. *Comparative European Politics*, *21*, 470–490. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-023-00329-5

Gielens, E., Sowula, J., & Leifeld, P. (2025). *Goodbye human annotators? Content analysis of social policy debates using ChatGPT*. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279424000382

Goniewicz, K., Khorram-Manesh, A., Hertelendy, A. J., Goniewicz, M., Naylor, K., & Burkle, F. M. (2020). Current response and management decisions of the European Union to the COVID-19 outbreak: a review. *Sustainability*, *12*(9), 3838.

Gontariuk, M., Krafft, T., Rehbock, C., Townend, D., Van der Auwermeulen, L., & Pilot, E. (2021). The European Union and Public Health Emergencies: expert opinions on the management of the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic and suggestions for future emergencies. *Frontiers in Public Health*, *9*, 698995.

Grant, M. J., & Booth, A. (2009). A typology of reviews: an analysis of 14 review types and associated methodologies. *Health Information & Libraries Journal*, *26*(2), 91–108. https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1471-1842.2009.00848.X

Greener, I. (2021). Comparing country risk and response to COVID-19 in the first 6 months across 25 organisation for economic co-operation and development countries using qualitative comparative analysis. *Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy*, *37*(3), 211–225.

Gundel, S. (2005). Towards a new typology of crises. *Journal of Contingencies & Crisis Management*, *13*(3).

Guterres, A. (2019). *Remarks at 2019 Climate Action Summit | United Nations Secretary-General*. https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2019-09-23/remarks-2019-climate-action-summit

Haas, P. M. (1992). *Knowledge, power, and international policy coordination*. University of South Carolina Press Columbia, SC.

Hale, T., Angrist, N., Goldszmidt, R., Kira, B., Petherick, A., Phillips, T., Webster, S., Cameron-Blake, E., Hallas, L., & Majumdar, S. (2021). A global panel database of pandemic policies (Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker). *Nature Human Behaviour*, *5*(4), 529–538.

Hale, T., Angrist, N., Kira, B., Petherick, A., Phillips, T., & Webster, S. (2020). *Variation in government responses to COVID-19*.

Handmer, J., & Dovers, S. (2012). *The Handbook of Disaster and Emergency Policies and Institutions*.

Hanrieder, T., & Kreuder-Sonnen, C. (2014). WHO decides on the exception? Securitization and emergency governance in global health. *Security Dialogue*, *45*(4), 331–348. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010614535833

Heath, J. B. (2016). *Global Emergency Power in the Age of Ebola* (Vol. 57, Issue 1). www.asil.org/insights/volume/8/issue/8/revision-world-health-organizations-international-health-regula

Heermann, M., Leuffen, D., & Tigges, F. (2024). Change to stay the same? German European preference formation during the COVID-19 crisis. *German Politics*, *33*(2), 411–433.

Herz, M., Hoffman, A., & Tabak, J. (2015). *Organizações internacionais: história e práticas*. Elsevier Brasil.

Heupel, M., Koenig-Archibugi, M., Kreuder-Sonnen, C., Patberg, M., Séville, A., Steffek, J., & White, J. (2021). Emergency Politics After Globalization. *International Studies Review*, *23*(4), 1959–1987. https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viab021

Hix, S., & Høyland, B. (2022). *The political system of the European Union*. Bloomsbury Publishing.

Honig, B. (2009). *Emergency Politics*.

Honig, B. (2014). Three models of emergency politics. *Boundary 2*, *41*(2), 46–70. https://doi.org/10.1215/01903659-2686088

Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2015). Delegation and pooling in international organizations. *The Review of International Organizations*, *10*(3), 305–328.

Horton, R. (2021). *The COVID-19 catastrophe: What's gone wrong and how to stop it happening again*. John Wiley & Sons.

Hurrell, A., & Fawcett, L. L. (1998). *Regionalism in world politics: regional organization and international order*. Oxford University Press.

Inan, D. I., Beydoun, G., & Othman, S. H. (2023). Risk Assessment and Sustainable Disaster Management. In *Sustainability* (Vol. 15, Issue 6, p. 5254). MDPI.

Jolliffe, I. (2002). *Principal component analysis for special types of data*. Springer.

Jolliffe, I. (2014). Principal Component Analysis. In *International Encyclopedia of Statistical Science* (pp. 1094–1096). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04898-2_455

Kaiser, H. F. (1960). The application of electronic computers to factor analysis. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, *20*(1), 141–151.

Kassim, H. (2023). The European Commission and the COVID-19 pandemic: a pluri-institutional approach. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *30*(4), 612–634.

Khodarahmi, E. (2009). Crisis management. *Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal*, *18*(5), 523–528.

Kreuder-Sonnen, C. (2019a). *Emergency powers of international organizations: Between normalization and containment*. Oxford University Press.

Kreuder-Sonnen, C. (2019b). International authority and the emergency problematique: IO empowerment through crises. *International Theory*, *11*(2), 182–210. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971919000010

Kreuder-Sonnen, C. (2021). Does Europe Need an Emergency Constitution? *Political Studies*. https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217211005336

Kreuder-Sonnen, C. (2022). The Case For an EU Emergency Constitution. *EU Crisis Management*, 59–74.

Kreuder-Sonnen, C., Schmidt, V. A., Séville, A., Wetter Ryde, A., & White, J. (2022). EU Crisis Management. In *EU Crisis Management*.

Kreuder-Sonnen, C., & White, J. (2021). Europe and the transnational politics of emergency. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *29*(6), 953–965. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1916059

Krisch, N. (2010). *Beyond constitutionalism: the pluralist structure of postnational law*. Oxford University Press, USA.

Kurylo, B. (2022). Emergency: A Vernacular Contextual Approach. *International Studies Review*, *24*(3). https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viac036

Laffan, B. (2016). Europe's union in crisis: tested and contested. *West European Politics*, *39*(5), 915–932.

Lake, D. A. (2007). Escape from the state of nature: Authority and hierarchy in world politics. *International Security*, *32*(1), 47–79.

Lal, A., Erondu, N. A., Heymann, D. L., Gitahi, G., & Yates, R. (2020). Fragmented health systems in COVID-19: rectifying the misalignment between global health security and universal health coverage. *Lancet (London, England)*, *397*(10268), 61. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)32228-5

Lamping, W. (2013). European Union health care policy. In *European Union Public Health Policy* (pp. 19–35). Routledge.

Lasri, K., de Castro, P. V. Q., Schirmer, M., San Martin, L. E., Wang, L., Dulka, T., Naushan, H., Biyong, J. P., Legovini, A., & Fraiberger, S. (2023). EconBERTa: Towards Robust Extraction of Named Entities in Economics. *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2023*, 11557–11577.

Lelieveldt, H., & Princen, S. (2015). *The politics of the European Union*. Cambridge University Press.

Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., & Schimmelfennig, F. (2022). *Integration and differentiation in the European Union: Theory and policies*. Springer.

Li, Z., Peng, B., He, P., Galley, M., Gao, J., & Yan, X. (2024). Guiding large language models via directional stimulus prompting. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, *36*.

Lindström, M. (2023). The COVID-19 pandemic and the timing of government response: A comparison of four Nordic countries March–June 2020. *Scandinavian Journal of Public Health*, *51*(5), 754–758.

Liu, Z., Lin, W., Shi, Y., & Zhao, J. (2021). A robustly optimized BERT pre-training approach with post-training. *China National Conference on Chinese Computational Linguistics*, 471–484.

Lodge, M., & Wegrich, K. (2014). *The problem-solving capacity of the modern state: Governance challenges and administrative capacities*. Oxford University Press, USA.

Magyar, Z. B. (2022). What makes party systems different? A principal component analysis of 17 advanced democracies 1970–2013. *Political Analysis*, *30*(2), 250–268.

Mariano, K., Bressan, R., & Ferreira, G. (2022). Latin American and Caribbean regional organizations facing the COVID-19 pandemic. *Contexto Internacional*, *44*, e20220049.

Martínez-Villalba, Y. (2025). *Emergency International Measure Database (EIMD)*.

Mattli, W., & Sweet, A. S. (2012). Regional integration and the evolution of the European polity: On the fiftieth anniversary of the Journal of Common Market Studies. *J. Common Mkt. Stud.*, *50*, 1.

McHugh, L. H., Lemos, M. C., & Morrison, T. H. (2021). Risk? Crisis? Emergency? Implications of the new climate emergency framing for governance and policy. In *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change* (Vol. 12, Issue 6). John Wiley and Sons Inc. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.736

Medinilla, A., Byiers, B., & Apiko, P. (2020). *African regional responses to COVID-19*. Discussion Paper.

Mendelsohn, J., Budak, C., & Jurgens, D. (2021). Modeling framing in immigration discourse on social media. *ArXiv Preprint ArXiv:2104.06443*.

Mercosur. (2024). *Investigación, Educación y Biotecnologías Aplicadas a la Salud :: FOCEM.* https://focem.mercosur.int/es/proyecto/investigacion-educacion-y-biotecnologias-aplicadas-a-la-salud/

Miller, E. D. (2024). The COVID-19 pandemic crisis: The loss and trauma event of our time. In *Loss and Trauma in the COVID-19 Era* (pp. 60–72). Routledge.

Miller-Idriss, C. (2019). The global dimensions of populist nationalism. *The International Spectator*, *54*(2), 17–34.

Munn, Z., Peters, M. D. J., Stern, C., Tufanaru, C., McArthur, A., & Aromataris, E. (2018). Systematic review or scoping review? Guidance for authors when choosing between a systematic or scoping review approach. *BMC Medical Research Methodology*, *18*(1), 1–7.

Newman, M. (2018). *Networks*. Oxford university press.

Nguyen, L. A., Crocco, O. S., Tkachenko, O., & Jonathan, V. (2022). Crisis leadership during COVID-19: the response of ASEAN and EU regional leaders. *Human Resource Development International*.

Nicola, M., Alsafi, Z., Sohrabi, C., Kerwan, A., Al-Jabir, A., Iosifidis, C., Agha, M., & Agha, R. (2020). The socio-economic implications of the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19): A review. *International Journal of Surgery*, *78*, 185–193.

Nolte, D., & Weiffen, B. (2021). Regionalism under stress. *Europe and Latin America in Comparative Perspective. Nueva York: Routledge*.

Olson, M. (1965). *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

O'neill, M., & Connor, M. (2023). *Amplifying Limitations, Harms and Risks of Large Language Models*.

Ostrom, E. (1990). *Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action*. Cambridge university press.

Panke, D., & Stapel, S. (2018a). Exploring overlapping regionalism. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, *21*, 635–662. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-016-0081-x

Panke, D., & Stapel, S. (2018b). Overlapping regionalism in Europe: Patterns and effects. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, *20*(1), 239–258. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117737924

Paul, I., Mohanty, S., & Sengupta, R. (2022). The role of social virtual world in increasing psychological resilience during the on-going COVID-19 pandemic. *Computers in Human Behavior*, *127*, 107036.

Peters, M. D. J., Godfrey, C. M., Khalil, H., McInerney, P., Parker, D., & Soares, C. B. (2015). Guidance for conducting systematic scoping reviews. *JBI Evidence Implementation*, *13*(3), 141–146.

Petti, A. (2022). EU COVID-19 purchase and export mechanism: A framework for EU operational autonomy. *Common Market Law Review*, *59*(5).

Posner, E. A., & Vermeule, A. (2007). *Terror in the balance: Security, liberty, and the courts.* Oxford University Press.

Pugh, M. C., & Sidhu, W. P. S. (2003). *The United Nations & regional security: Europe and beyond.* Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Pursiainen, C. (2017). *The crisis management cycle.* Routledge.

Quaglia, L., & Verdun, A. (2023). The COVID-19 pandemic and the European Union: politics, policies and institutions. In *Journal of European Public Policy* (Vol. 30, Issue 4, pp. 599–611). Taylor & Francis.

Rhinard, M. (2019). The crisisification of policy‐making in the European Union. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, *57*(3), 616–633.

Riddervold, M., Trondal, J., & Newsome, A. (2021). European union crisis: an introduction. *The Palgrave Handbook of EU Crises*, 3–47.

Riswan, M. (2021). *Social implications of Covid-19 pandemic: A brief analysis.*

Roberts, M. E., Stewart, B. M., & Tingley, D. (2016). Navigating the local modes of big data. *Computational Social Science*, *51*(91), 1–40.

Roberts, M. E., Stewart, B. M., & Tingley, D. (2019). Stm: An R package for structural topic models. *Journal of Statistical Software*, *91*, 1–40.

Roberts, M. E., Stewart, B. M., Tingley, D., Lucas, C., Leder-Luis, J., Gadarian, S. K., Albertson, B., & Rand, D. G. (2014). Structural topic models for open-ended survey responses. *American Journal of Political Science*, *58*(4), 1064–1082.

Rubenstein, J. C. (2015). EMERGENCY CLAIMS and DEMOCRATIC ACTION. *Social Philosophy and Policy*, *32*(1), 101–126. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052515000096

Sandler, T. (1997). *Global challenges: an approach to environmental, political, and economic problems*. Cambridge University Press.

Sandoval, V., Voss, M., Flörchinger, V., Lorenz, S., & Jafari, P. (2023). Integrated disaster risk management (IDRM): elements to advance its study and assessment. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Science*, *14*(3), 343–356.

Sasaki, Y. (2007). *The truth of the F-measure*.

Saxena, A., & Iyengar, S. (2020). Centrality measures in complex networks: A survey. *ArXiv Preprint ArXiv:2011.07190*.

Schmidt, V. A. (2021). European emergency politics and the question of legitimacy. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *29*(6), 979–993. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1916061

Schmidt, V. A. (2022). Economic crisis management in the EU: from past Eurozone mistakes to future promise beyond the COVID-19 pandemic. In *Economic Crisis Management in the EU*. Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies.

Schmitt, C. (2005). *Political theology: Four chapters on the concept of sovereignty*. University of Chicago Press.

Schmitt, C. (2008). *The concept of the political: Expanded edition*. University of Chicago Press.

Schmitt, C. (2014). *Dictatorship*. John Wiley & Sons.

Schmitter, P. C. (2004). *Neo-neofunctionalism* (Vol. 6, Issue 0). na.

Seawright, J. (2016). *Multi-method social science: Combining qualitative and quantitative tools*. Cambridge University Press.

Sebők, M., Máté, Á., Ring, O., Kovács, V., & Lehoczki, R. (2024). Leveraging Open Large Language Models for Multilingual Policy Topic Classification: The Babel Machine Approach. *Social Science Computer Review*, 08944393241259434.

Séville, A. (2022). How to Do and Communicate Politics Beyond Routines: reflections on political exceptionalism in the COVID-19 pandemic. *EU Crisis Management*, 75–86.

Shelton, D. (2003). *Commitment and compliance: The role of non-binding norms in the international legal system*. Oxford University Press, USA.

Shvetsova, O. (2023). *Government Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic: Between a Rock and a Hard Place*. Springer Nature.

Söderbaum, F. (2009). Comparative regional integration and regionalism. *The Sage Handbook of Comparative Politics*, 477–496.

South African Government. (2020). *President Ramaphosa launches the Africa Medical Supplies Platform to help fight COVID-19 Coronavirus Pandemic*. https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/president-ramaphosa-launches-africa-medical-supplies-platform-help-fight?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Stark, A., McConnell, A., & Drennan, L. T. (2014). *Risk and crisis management in the public sector*. Routledge.

Tabish, S. A. (2020). COVID-19 Pandemic: The crisis and the longer-term perspectives. *Journal of Cardiology & Current Research*, *13*(2), 41–44.

Tarrow, S. (2016). *WAR, STATES, AND CONTENTION: FROM TILLY TO THE WAR ON TERROR*. https://doi.org/10.17813/1086-671X-21-1-1

Tavares, R. (2009). *Regional security: The capacity of international organizations*. Routledge.

TIER Protocol. (2022, August 8). *TIER Protocol 4.0 | Project TIER | Teaching Integrity in Empirical Research*. https://www.projecttier.org/tier-protocol/protocol-4-0/

Torney, D. (2020). The Politics of Emergency? Ireland's Response to Climate Change*. *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, *31*, 13–26. https://doi.org/10.3318/ISIA.2020.31.10

Trubek, D. M., Cottrell, M. P., & Nance, M. (2005). "Soft Law,'"Hard Law,'and European Integration: Toward a Theory of Hybridity. *Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper*, *1002*.

Truchlewski, Z., Schelkle, W., & Ganderson, J. (2021). Buying time for democracies? European Union emergency politics in the time of COVID-19. *West European Politics*, *44*(5–6), 1353–1375. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.1916723

UN News. (2023). *World must be ready to respond to next pandemic: WHO chief | UN News*. https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/05/1136912

UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction (2009) (2009). www.unisdr.org

UNISDR, W. (2012). Disaster risk and resilience. *Thematic Think Piece, UN System Task Force on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda*.

Van Hecke, S., Fuhr, H., & Wolfs, W. (2021). The politics of crisis management by regional and international organizations in fighting against a global pandemic: the member states at a crossroads. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, *87(3)*, 672–690. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852320984516

Van Hecke, S., Paulissen, T., & Walle, B. Vande. (2022). How COVID-19 Hit Brussels and Beyond: The EU's Crisis Management Tested by a Pandemic. In *The EU Political System After the 2019 European Elections* (pp. 381–399). Springer.

Van Middelaar, L. (2021). *Pandemonium: Saving Europe*. Agenda Publishing.

von Bogdandy, A., & Villarreal, P. A. (2021). *The EU's and UK's Self-Defeating Vaccine Nationalism*.

Von der Leyen, U. (2022). *Speech by the President at the European Parliament Plenary* [Broadcast]. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_22_5964

Walika, M., De Almeida, M. M., Delgado, R. C., & González, P. A. (2023). Outbreaks following natural disasters: a review of the literature. *Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness*, *17*, e444.

Wasserman, S. (1994). Social network analysis: Methods and applications. *The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge*.

Weston, S. J., Shryock, I., Light, R., & Fisher, P. A. (2023). Selecting the Number and Labels of Topics in Topic Modeling: A Tutorial. *Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science*, *6*(2). https://doi.org/10.1177/25152459231160105/ASSET/IMAGES/LARGE/10.1177_25152459231160105-FIG8.JPEG

Wetter Ryde, A. (2022). Introduction: How Should the EU Govern in an Emergency? *EU Crisis Management*, 11–18.

White, J. (2015a). Authority after emergency rule. *The Modern Law Review*, *78*(4), 585–610.

White, J. (2015b). Emergency Europe. *Political Studies*, *63*(2), 300–318. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12072

White, J. (2019). Politics of Last Resort. In *Politics of Last Resort*. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198791720.001.0001

White, J. (2021). Emergency Europe after Covid-19. *Pandemic, Politics, and Society: Critical Perspectives on the Covid-19 Crisis*, 75–92.

White, J. (2023). Constitutionalizing the EU in an Age of Emergencies. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, *61*(3), 781–796.

Wolff, S., & Ladi, S. (2020). European Union responses to the covid-19 pandemic: Adaptability in times of permanent emergency. *Journal of European Integration*, *42*(8), 1025–1040.

World Health Organization. (2020). *Investing in and building longer-term health emergency preparedness during COVID-19 pandemic: interim guidance for WHO member states*. World Health Organization.

Yan, L., Sha, L., Zhao, L., Li, Y., Martinez-Maldonado, R., Chen, G., Li, X., Jin, Y., & Gašević, D. (2024). Practical and ethical challenges of large language models in education: A systematic scoping review. *British Journal of Educational Technology*, *55*(1), 90–112. https://doi.org/10.1111/BJET.13370

Zhou, Y. R. (2022). Vaccine nationalism: contested relationships between COVID-19 and globalization. In *Post-Covid Transformations* (pp. 82–97). Routledge.