O problema da separação da forma pela razão a paritr da Metafísica de Aristóteles

Abstract

This thesis aims to understand and explain the separation (chôrismos) of the substance, but especially the separation kata ton logon of the Aristotelian form (to eidos) based on the method by which the mathematician operates. Indeed, in three fundamental passages of Metaphysics, Aristotle states that form is separable (Metaph. Δ8, 1017b 24-26) and separable according to reason (Metaph. H1, 1042a 28-29; Ph. II 1, 193b 3- 5). Some interpreters and translators choose to translate this separation as a definitional, logical, conceptual or thought separation (logô chôriston estin). We do not make a distinction between these terms, opting to summarize the expression, sometimes as logical-rational separation or separation by thought. In the first part of this thesis, we present the status quaestionis that involves the problem of separation and its intimate relationship with that of priority. We try to explain Aristotle's fundamental dispute with his Platonic opponents, as well as the way in which the Stagirite himself assumed for his doctrine of substance the note of separability and ontological and logical priority. In the same way, we elucidate some meanings of separation that Aristotle assumes in his philosophy. In the second part of the thesis, we bring some fundamental assumptions to affirm the separability of form such as, for example, the presence of the problem in the book of aporias (Beta of Metaphysics), the notion of tode ti, as well as the discussion about definition and essence for let us emphasize the purity of the form attested in Metaphysics Z10-11. In the last part of the thesis, we try to highlight that form, in addition to being understood as particular and universal, can also be better assumed as a principle of individuation. Arriving at the center of our research, we highlight some general aspects about Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics to understand, based on the book M (Mi) of Metaphysics, the ontological status of mathematical entities and the way in which those who investigate them operate in apprehension knowledge of them through the method, for example, of subtraction (aphairesis) and through a separation that considers their aspects as mathematical and not as sensitive. We try, therefore, to endorse that the same applicability can be executed out with regard to the separation of the kata ton logon form through a kind of subtraction of matter to defend the logical-rational separation or by thinking about the Aristotelian form.