Unilateralismo e delegação de poderes : efeitos sobre a política externa no Brasil (1990 - 2022)

Abstract

This work analyzes the delegation of powers and the phenomenon of presidential unilateralism in Brazilian foreign policy between 1990 and 2022. The study explores the factors influencing the unilateral production of international acts by Brazilian presidents, without the participation of Congress. In this context, the 1988 Federal Constitution establishes two distinct procedures for the formulation of international acts: the abbreviated procedure, in which the President can directly incorporate international acts into Brazilian law, and the complete procedure, which requires the approval of the National Congress for acts that impose significant obligations on the country. The research examines theoretical discussions on the delegation of powers between the Executive and Legislative branches and their implications for foreign policy. It also investigates the conditions under which the President may resort to unilateral action, particularly through the use of abbreviated international acts, as a strategic tool in response to the different relationships established with Congress. The research analyzes whether the different variables examined affect the likelihood of international acts being concluded through the abbreviated procedure, namely: i) the need for coalition; ii) the conclusion of multilateral international acts; iii) the distance of preferences between the President and the Congress; and iv) the salience of foreign policy for each president. Using a database composed of 6,061 international acts concluded between 1990 and 2022, extracted from the Concórdia Platform, maintained by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, logistic regression models were constructed to estimate the likelihood of an act proceeding through the abbreviated procedure (unilateral action). In this regard, this work offers new insights into the dynamics of the delegation of powers in Brazil and its effects on foreign policy, emphasizing the strategic use of unilateral tools by the President in response to institutional and political challenges. The findings indicate that the ideological distance between the President and Congress is an important factor for the use of unilateral powers by the Executive in foreign policy, while the effect of multilateralism indicates that the political cost of bypassing the Legislature also influences this decision. Thus, it is still necessary to consider factors such as the multilateral nature of international acts and the costs associated with unilateral action in future studies to better understand the conditions that lead Brazilian presidents to choose such measures.