A simplicidade como critério de hipóteses científicas: a abordagem naturalista de W. V. O. Quine

Abstract

My aim in this dissertation is to discuss Quines understanding of the problem of simplicity of scientific hypotheses, i.e., the problem of justifying the choice of a hypothesis or scientific theory based on the (comparative) determination of simplicity of his postulates/statements. I argue that simplicity is justified simply because it is strongly rooted in scientific practice. In the first chapter, I present the general aspects of Quines philosophical thought, highlighting positions which constitute the core of his philosophical system and that serve as a basis to the treatment of the issue of simplicity, i.e., naturalism and holism. In the second chapter, I present a partial answer to the question regarding how we evaluate a given hypothesis or scientific theory, approaching the criteria from which we made use for such an evaluation, viz.: precision, conservatism, modesty, generality, refutability and simplicity. In the third chapter, I evaluate Quines naturalistic defense of simplicity grounded in several neurobiological explanations for our propensity to simplicity. I maintain that the pragmatic posture Quine adopts dissolves the border between epistemic and pragmatic explanations for the adoption of simplicity in the scientific praxis.