Emendamento de medidas provisórias pelo congresso nacional: os projetos de lei de conversão no presidencialismo brasileiro

Abstract

This work deals with the attempts at Provisional Measures in Congress. Considering the legislative powers that the constitution of 1988 allocated to the President in Brazil the power to issue provisional measures, the Executive has given a great power agenda, but with drew from the Congress the authority to monitor the executive action. The paperdiscusses the theories about the Brazilian political system that addressed this issue. The work also attempts to investigate how Congress tries to interfere with the executive agenda initiated by the proposed amendments to the Provisional Measures by the BillsConversion (PLVs). The clipping used in the empirical analysis covers the period after them EC 32/2001 until the end of 2010. This rite of EC changed the conduct of MPsand change parameters of the bargain between the powers, making room for a new order in the conduct of MPs. The work raises the explanatory hypotheses for the approval of PLVs mainly referred to the formal and informal rules that interfere in theprocess. The results indicate that the Congress is able to interfere with the MPs in a definitive way in 43.4% of cases, rejecting considerations about the passivity of Congress and calling the thesis that there is indeed a shared agenda between the powers in Brazil. The conclusion is that the PLVs constitute as windows of opportunity legislation to Congress to make incremental changes in MPs issued by the Executive.