O reflexo de um CEO narcisista na contabilidade: uma avaliação sobre o nível de gerenciamento de resultados

Abstract

The objective of this thesis is to identify the effect of the narcissist CEO on Result management. Therefore, this thesis is divided into three scientific articles. The first article executes a literary revision concerning the existing research about the CEOs’ personality traits and its impact on the corporative decisions, as well as on the quality of accounting information. The analyzed studies provide support for the Upper Echelon Theory (UET), highlighting that: (i) narcissistic CEOs tend to opt for risky financial decisions and with greater public visibility; and (ii) narcissistic CEOs are more prone to engage in the practice of results and fraud management. With a view to empirically test if these relations found in international literature apply to the Brazilian context, the second and third articles have as an objective to analyze the relationship between the CEOs narcissism and the accrual earnings management and real activities management results, respectively. The sample consists of 534 B3-listed companies’ observations, in the period between the years of 2010 and 2019. The narcissism is picked up through CEOs speeches in quarterly teleconferences, the accruals earnings management results is measured through the three Roychowdhury models (2006). The results found demonstrate that the CEO’s narcissism raises the result and fraud accruals earnings management. Concerning the real activities management, it states that CEOs with high narcissism level when participating on the Directors Board tend to execute result management by cash flow and discretionary expenses. Thus, no direct significance between narcissistic CEOs and real management. It was also found that the accruals earnings management is considered a substitute to the real management. In that manner, the practice of accruals earnings management decreases the real management. The variables duality, tenure time, economic recession, ROA and company size, size of the board of directors, level of governance, leveraging, and MTB affect the result management. This evidences the necessity of caution on the part of the board of directors as to hiring narcissistic individuals, as well as on their monitoring, since they are more prone to manipulate results within the organization.