Pela reabilitação da objetividade : mito do dado, segunda natureza, racionalidade e contingência

Abstract

The main objective of my thesis is to show that Sellars's attack on the Myth of the Given, developed in the text Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (1956), cannot be thought how an invitation to abandon epistemology or even the idea of objectivity as it suggests Rorty in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979). To reach the objective of the thesis, I follow these steps. In the first chapter, I tell in that the Sense-Data theory consists, and I show why Sellars regards the Given as a Myth. I present the notions of space of reasons and psychological nominalism as positive concepts introduced by Sellars in his attack on the Given. In the second chapter, I show how Sellars's attack on the Myth of the Given was central to Rorty's metaphilosophical thesis that we must abandon epistemology. I point out how influenced by Sellars he rejects the idea of foundation. I say that Rorty defends the thesis that justification is a conversational issue. Finally, I present Rorty's hermeneutics, and show how he suggests that hermeneutics must replace epistemology. In the third chapter I present old and new objections against Rorty's thinking that epistemology should be abandoned. I discuss Rorty's interpretation of the space of reasons and his thesis that justification is a conversational matter. Therefore, I present some criticisms against Rorty's ethnocentric relativism. Finally, I point out problems in the position that we must be hermeneutics in investigating knowledge and say that hermeneutics cannot replace epistemology. In the last chapter, I defend the rehabilitation of objectivity against Rorty's idea that we should search solidarity. I claim that his main motivation for rejecting objectivity is Sellars' attack on the Myth of the Given, because according to him, the attack on the Given makes the idea of foundation useless. To defend the rehabilitation of objectivity, I consider McDowell's reflections on the notion of second nature developed in his book Mind and World (1994). I show that second nature concerns the human capacity to occupy the space of reasons. So, I argue that by occupying the space of reasons, human beings rationally open their eyes to the objective public world. Assuming this, I claim that we are able to rationally recognize, from our point of view, that the world has normative authority over our beliefs.