Governança corporativa e earnings management em empresas negociadas na BM&FBOVESPA

Abstract

he purpose of this paper was to analyze the relationship between governance mechanisms, earnings management, the quality of financial information disclosed and firm-level characteristics of companies listed on BM&FBOVESPA. The argument was built upon the Jensen and Meckling (1976) bonding costs hypothesis, the Bushman and Smith (2003) argument about the quality of information disclosed and, on the empirical evidence such as Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003), Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and LaFond (2004), Fernandes and Ferreira (2007) and, in the Brazilian context, Lopes and Tukamoto (2007), Martinez (2001, 2010a) and Barros, Soares and Lima (2013), Holanda, Rebouças and Coelho (2013) and Mazzioni et al (2015). We find out that earnings management associates negatively with the gross revenue. This suggests the higher the growth opportunities, the lower earnings management level. We also find an inverse relationship between earnings management and dependence on external resources. The analysis of the determinants of the quality of profits disclosed showed an inverse and significant relationship with ownership concentration. This research contributes to the literature on the relationship between governance and earnings management since it analyses if in an environment of high ownership concentration and boards controlled by large shareholders like the Brazilian market, the governance mechanisms effectively allow to restrain earnings management levels. To sum up, the empirical evidences found allow us to make the conclusion that only ownership dispersion is effective in achieving this purpose.