Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1843/52204
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dc.creatorLetícia Santos de Limapt_BR
dc.creatorFrank Merrypt_BR
dc.creatorBritaldo Silveira Soares Filhopt_BR
dc.creatorHermann Oliveira Rodriguespt_BR
dc.creatorChristiane Dos Santos Damacenopt_BR
dc.creatorMarcos A. Bauchpt_BR
dc.date.accessioned2023-04-18T21:31:03Z-
dc.date.available2023-04-18T21:31:03Z-
dc.date.issued2018-12-05-
dc.citation.volume13pt_BR
dc.citation.issue12pt_BR
dc.citation.spagee0207855pt_BR
dc.citation.epage21pt_BR
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207855pt_BR
dc.identifier.issn1932-6203pt_BR
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1843/52204-
dc.description.resumoBrazil recently began granting timber concessions in public forests to promote sustainable forest use. The effectiveness of this strategy hinges on the design and implementation of the concessions themselves as well as their competitive position within the logging sector as a whole. There is, however, a lack of information on the competitive interaction between legal and illegal logging and its effects on concessions profits. We address this knowledge gap by using a spatially explicit simulation model of the Amazon timber industry to examine the potential impact of illegal logging on timber concessions allocation and profits in a 30-year harvest cycle. In a scenario in which illegal logging takes place outside concessions, including private and public “undesignated” lands, concession harvested area would decrease by 59% due to competition with illegal logging. Moreover, 29 out of 39 National Forests (≈74%) would experience a decrease in harvested area. This “leakage” effect could reduce concession net rents by up to USD 1.3 Billion after 30 years. Federal and State “undesignated” lands, if not adequately protected, could have 40% of their total volume illegally harvested in 30 years. Our results reinforce the need to invest in tackling illegal logging, if the government wants the forest concessions program to be successful.pt_BR
dc.description.sponsorshipCNPq - Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológicopt_BR
dc.format.mimetypepdfpt_BR
dc.languageengpt_BR
dc.publisherUniversidade Federal de Minas Geraispt_BR
dc.publisher.countryBrasilpt_BR
dc.publisher.departmentENG - DEPARTAMENTO DE ENGENHARIA HIDRÁULICApt_BR
dc.publisher.departmentIGC - DEPARTAMENTO DE CARTOGRAFIApt_BR
dc.publisher.initialsUFMGpt_BR
dc.relation.ispartofPLoS ONEpt_BR
dc.rightsAcesso Abertopt_BR
dc.subjectTimber industrypt_BR
dc.subjectIllegal loggingpt_BR
dc.subjectConservation strategiespt_BR
dc.subject.otherEcologiapt_BR
dc.subject.otherBiodiversidade - Conservaçãopt_BR
dc.subject.otherBrasilpt_BR
dc.subject.otherMadeira - Exploraçãopt_BR
dc.subject.otherIndústria madeireirapt_BR
dc.titleIllegal logging as a disincentive to the establishment of a sustainable forest sector in the Amazonpt_BR
dc.typeArtigo de Periódicopt_BR
dc.url.externahttps://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0207855#sec020pt_BR
dc.identifier.orcidhttp://orcid.org/0000-0002-0268-2055pt_BR
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-7703-946Xpt_BR
Appears in Collections:Artigo de Periódico

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