Mundo, espaço e lugar : uma crítica à teoria dos dois mundos atribuída a Platão

Abstract

We argue against the "two worlds theory" interpretation imputed to Plato's philosophy. The differentiation between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη at the end of Book V of the Republic does not promote a separation of two totalities or two opposing worlds, the intelligible world and the sensible world. From the speech in the Timaeus about the generation of the κόσμος (27c-40d), in particular the introduction of the intelligible living being as a model of the world, and the speech about the third genre, the “space” (χώρα) (47e-61c), we show that the two worlds theory collides with the postulation of the unity of the κόσμος and the Platonic reflections on τόπος and χώρα in both dialogues, more particularly in the Timaeus. An analysis of the meanings of "world" and "space-place" will renew some questions inherent in the theory of intelligible Forms, and an outline of the history of the two worlds theory will show how this interpretation was projected onto Plato's philosophy. The widespread interpretation of the two worlds theory does not correspond to the essence of Plato's thought, contrary to popular belief. This interpretation does not presuppose a satisfactory consideration of what “world” properly means and goes against a closer analysis of the philosophy of dialogues, not only against the ontology and epistemology of the works, but against the basic principles of Platonic cosmology and topology. At the outset, a study of the definitions, origins, assumptions and implications of the two worlds theory will be crucial, since, despite the spread of interpretation, we can notice vagueness, inconsistencies and gaps in its assumptions and usual methods of analysis. We discuss the ontological-epistemological criticisms directed at the two worlds theory by G. Fine, F. Gonzalez and M. Marques, among others, which we are in favor of, and we propose that this standard bias be enriched and complemented by the study of concepts (as well as metaphors and images) of “world” and “space-place”. We raise the questions about what is the two worlds theory, what is the world and what is space-place, to show that, despite the history of the two-worlds theory and its wide acceptance among scholars, fundamental images and concepts of Platonic thought explicit in the Timaeus directly contradict the assumption of the existence of two separate and opposite worlds. We highlight in particular the principle of uniqueness of κόσμος and the theory of space-place in Plato, whose analysis will illustrate crucial nuances in the notion of “separation”, that the becoming and sensibility is not unreal or less real and that Platonic ontology maintains a unifying principle in which the heterogeneity of kinds or of the sensible and intelligible τόποι is asserted in a dialectical context of recognition of complexities and integration of differences between what appears and what is understood. From this, against the prevailing opinion, we defend the idea that there are not two worlds in Platonic philosophy, but two (or more) aspects or possibly different degrees of determination of a single world.