SUCESSÃO DA ALTA ADMINISTRAÇÃO E SUA INFLUÊNCIA SOBRE A GOVERNANÇA COOPERATIVA E O DESEMPENHO DAS COOPERATIVAS DE CRÉDITO BRASILEIRAS

Abstract

There is a link between the main managers and the organizational culture of some institutions that makes it difficult to replace the CEO or the chairman of their Board of Directors, which may favor the perpetuation of the manager in power and complicate his succession. Linked to this fact, it is understood that the succession of senior management affects the operational and financial performance of organizations and is linked to the good corporate governance practices implemented by the institution. In this sense, the Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance (IBGC) understands that succession planning represents a good corporate governance practice and can guarantee the good conduct of business. In this context, the National Monetary Council (CMN), through Resolution of the Central Bank of Brazil (Bacen) 4.538, of November 24, 2016, subsequently changed by Resolution 4.878, of December 23, 2020, provided for the mandatory implementation of a succession program at senior management level, in financial institutions and other institutions authorized by Bacen, such as cooperatives. The senior management of credit cooperatives is made up of the General Assembly, the Board of Directors and the Executive Board, with the main position being the president of the Board of Directors. Its management is carried out mainly by its members, who go through selection processes and assume senior management positions, thus directing the rumors and actions of each cooperative. Thus, the problem question that guided this thesis arises: What is the influence of the succession of senior management of Brazilian credit cooperatives on good cooperative governance practices and the performance of these institutions? In this sense, the main objective is to verify the influence of senior management succession on good cooperative governance practices and the performance of Brazilian credit cooperatives. The sample is made up of credit cooperatives in Brazil, whether classic, full or loan capital. The period investigated was from 2010 to 2021, with the justification of analyzing a space that includes before and after the publication of Bacen Resolution 4.538/2016. The econometric methods used were Factor Analysis, with the aim of creating a governance proxy, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and the Test of Means. The results made it possible to conclude that the succession of the chairman of the Board of Directors affects the performance and governance of credit cooperatives. In this sense, the present study allows us to infer that succession planning has not proven to be efficient in credit cooperative entities, not having the capacity to determine an increase in the financial performance indicators of these institutions. It was also evidenced that the replacement of the Chairman of the Board and the alternation of positions on the Board of Directors and the Board of Directors help to achieve greater monitoring of management, that is, when a given manager alternates between these positions, the credit cooperative starts to have a higher level of good corporate governance practices, compared to those that did not present alternation of positions.