Liberdade de expressão e discurso de ódio: por que devemos tolerar ideias odiosas?

Abstract

This dissertation intends to outline the main philosophical arguments which justify a broad freedom of speech protection to demonstrate the fundamental role that it plays in a Democratic state. Many Law scholars defend the need to impose restrictions on discourses in every area arguing that dignity would be a legitimate limit to offensive, hateful speech. Doing so, they resort to the questionable judicial principle weighing theory define which of the conflicting rights will prevail in the specific case. However, this argument - widely used by countrys doctrine and case law is inconsistent and superficial, because, besides trivializing the importance of dignity, it doesnt comprehend the substantial role that freedom of speech plays in contemporary societies. After verifying that there is not only one concept of good that guides individuals in modern societies, I argue that there is no room for the State to choose which ideals can or cannot be expressed. In a democracy composed by morally autonomous individuals, it is indispensable that every opinion and thought can manifest freely, away from the claws of state censorship. Therefore, we agree with this reasoning which has been consolidated in the American supreme court over the past century, providing the first amendment the widest protection possible. In this sense, following the liberal scholars, mainly Dworkin, Baker, Holmes Jr and Louis Brandeis, we argue that in a democracy even the ideas we hate should be tolerated. First, because we are all equally free to decide upon which principles, beliefs and ideologies we will live by and, secondly, because the evidence supports that broad and uninhibited debate seems to be the best option to fight hate speech, since every idea condemned to censorship has more to gain than to lose.