A implementação de nudges a políticas públicas: ganhos de bem-estar e riscos à autonomia

Abstract

Over the last decade, nudges and libertarian paternalism have become known as a new way of intervention in private life, with huge potential and low cost. However, since the concept was created by Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, the legitimacy of using nudges has become the subject of an enormous academic controversy. Indeed, several authors have argued that nudges are not legitimate in ethical, practical, and epistemological grounds. Although numerous papers regarding this controversy have been published, a consensus seems still far from being reached. In light of these criticisms, this dissertation will evaluate to what extent nudges can generate effective welfare gains, considering the effectiveness of these measures and the reasons used to support them, and what risks nudges present to autonomy. As an initial hypothesis, it is admitted that, in a scenario marked by supposedly irrelevant factors that impact decisions, nudges can generate well being without excessive risks to autonomy, especially given its cost effectiveness. To test this hypothesis, some theoretical challenges need to be overcome, such as the exact definition of nudge, its differentiation from other behavioral techniques, its behavioral foundations, and its effects on a large scale. After facing these challenges, this dissertation confirms with parsimony the hypothesis previously raised. In a first aspect, nudges can generate welfare gains despite the difficulty of assessing the real preferences of decision makers, especially against the distinction between direct and indirect judgments and the possibility of assessing direct judgments under epistemologically favorable conditions. Its effects, however, are limited, especially when a nudge is implemented by a private choice architect, whose incentives do not align with the objectives of the proposed policy. In addition, nudges are compatible with substantially autonomous acts, provided that they do not impose excessive costs to decide otherwise or are implemented in an obscure manner. The institutional constraints of the Democratic State of Law, including judicial control, are mechanisms to prevent exploratory and undue nudges from being implemented.