Dewey e Rorty: da metafísica empírica à metafísica da cultura

Abstract

Our thesis has as its central theme the criticism of Richard Rortys inadequate interpretation of John Deweys pragmatist philosophy. The main point of our research is twofold. On the one side, it involves the defense of Deweys empiricist metaphysics integrity against Rortys biassed interpretation, and, on the other side, it includes an attempt to show that the latter, by atacking this very metaphysics, ends up formulating something analogous, which we denominate metaphysics of culture. In order to reach these goals, we try to show initially the centralness of the concept of experiencein Deweys philosophy through its connections with Darwinian theory. Next, we move towards the Rortyan interpretation of Deweyan philosophy, presenting in addition the objections made by some of Rortys more important critics. Finally, we attempt to establish that the Rortyan criticism of empiricist metaphysics is implicitly based upon a Rortyan metaphysics of culture.