A via transcendental na constituição do mundo da vida em Edmund Husserl : a relação entre subjetividade, intersubjetividade e Lebenswelt

Abstract

The aim of this research is to present the correlation between the life-world (Lebenswelt) and intersubjectivity in Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. Initially, we contextualize contemporary understandings of the concept of the life-world to situate the conceptual convergences and divergences in relation to Husserlian phenomenology. Next, we address the relationship between pre-givenness and the life-world, highlighting the importance of genetic phenomenology in uncovering the layers presupposed in the concept of the horizon. For this purpose, we focus on Husserl’s works and manuscripts that explicitly or implicitly shaped the concept of the life-world, especially: The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936), Die Lebenswelt (1916–1937), and the three volumes of Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, particularly the third (1929–1935). In this phase, we elucidate the meaning of an a priori structure as indicative of a world totality and its relation to the constitutive fulfillment derived from notions of the body, familiar and foreign worlds, and the we-horizon. Subsequently, we explore the intersubjective layer of subjectivity to analyze the constitution of a universe of co-subjects and its implications for the conception of humanity’s life. We then underscore the importance of the phenomenological method as a means of accessing a more general structure of the life-world, aiming to expand the natural attitude addressed in Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy (1913). This also serves to elucidate how the natural domain is announced from the intersubjective life-world. Following this, with an expanded notion of the life-world horizon, we discuss its teleological dimension and its relationship with the fields of historicity and generativity. We find that the focus on the co-implication between the structure of the world’s pre-givenness and transcendental constitution is essential for understanding the correlation between intersubjectivity and the life-world. Moreover, the expanded scope of the natural domain highlights a significant link between empathy and the notion of the life-world. Beyond an empty a priori structure or a world constitution stemming from a solitary ego, Husserl’s analyses of the life-world reveal the transcendence of intersubjective consciousness immersed in the world’s pre-givenness and inseparable from its empathetic constitution.With this correlation, we argue that the lifeworld is neither reduced to an empty a priori structure nor to a constitution of the world by a solitary ego, but rather implies a transcendence of intersubjective consciousness, which reveals itself as immersed in the pre-givenness of the world through an empathetic constitution within the world.