Reexaminando a filosofia do direito internacional de Ronald Dworkin: poderia o ouriço ter feito de outra maneira?

Abstract

I will examine in this essay Dworkin’s effort to extend his general theory of municipal law to the realm of international law. The question to answer is whether this effort is successful. One must not only look at the important assumptions he made in his posthumous essay “A New Philosophy for International Law” but also at his final book Justice for Hedgehogs. I argue that Dworkin’s theory of international law is premised on at least three important assumptions at the heart of his “one-system picture” of law and morality: i) a non-metaphysical conception of moral facts; ii) an optimistic view about the objectivity of moral judgments; and iii) an anti-naturalistic account of the truth of moral propositions. The conclusion I argue for is that Dworkin’s philosophy of international law resists its critics. Without these principles – mitigation and salience – Dworkin would be at pains to provide a moral foundation for international institutions. Indeed, without them his account would collapse into a metaphysical theory of natural law. Before we can find a ground for this conclusion, however, we must revisit the general features of Dworkin’s theory of international law.