Da razão prática à filosofia do direito: uma possível solução para o problema da normatividade jurídica por meio do hibridismo de razões

Abstract

This dissertation investigates the problem of legal normativity by addressing the following question: in what way and in what sense does the law provide reasons for action? It begins with the hypothesis that an adequate understanding of this problem requires, first, a broader analysis of the nature of practical reasons. Based on this, the work proposes to approach legal normativity as a particular instance of practical normativity, subjecting its claims to authority to the same evaluative criteria applicable to other forms of normativity, such as moral, prudential, and political normativity. The central aim is to argue that a reformulated version of the hybrid theory of reasons, originally proposed by Chang, offers a more robust and promising explanation for the theoretical challenges surrounding legal normativity. Hybridism maintains that reasons for action may have different normative sources: some grounded in objective facts, others created through the agent’s own acts of will. The version defended in this thesis introduces the idea that even volitional reasons depend on a normative background that renders them intelligible, thus articulating practical identity with institutional commitments. The research methodology adopts an analytical approach, starting from basic features of human agency and the nature of reasons for action, moving toward the specific problem of legal normativity. The argument unfolds across four chapters. The first chapter problematizes the traditional formulation of the problem of legal normativity and proposes a methodological reversal grounded in a general theory of reasons. The second chapter critically examines the main theories regarding the normative source of reasons (i.e., internalism, externalism, and voluntarism), arguing that hybridism overcomes the central difficulties faced by each. The third chapter applies the hybrid model to the debate between Raz’s thesis of the incommensurability of values and Dworkin’s thesis of the unity of value, showing that these views can be reconciled under an integrated normative perspective. The fourth chapter addresses the tension between Dworkin’s right answer thesis and Hart’s idea of judicial discretion, arguing that hybridism enables a reconciliation between the two, insofar as the judge’s creative role is understood as part of a continuous normative process oriented by institutional integrity. It is concluded that the hybrid theory of reasons, as reformulated in this work, constitutes a theoretical model able to integrate distinct positions in legal philosophy and of offering conceptual tools to better understand the normative demands that structure our legal and deliberative practices.