Os fundamentos morais do papel judicial: uma investigação filosófica sobre obrigações constitutivas de papéis

Abstract

In reasonably just legal systems, especially in democratic ones, there is a broad consensus in both political philosophy and common sense reason that judges have a moral obligation to obey the law, even if this implies making unjust or morally questionable decisions. Such a moral obligation is seen to be of a special kind, namely, a role obligation, a duty acquired by the fact that the agent occupies the judicial role. The thesis will seek to call into question this strong conviction about the moral obligations of judges. Therefore, would judges in fact have an obligation derived from their role, which binds them morally to law? Are social-professional roles, such as the judicial one, sources of moral obligations? Answering these questions requires an in-depth investigation into the character of duties related to social roles and on the possibility of roles acting as determinants of moral obligations.