Plea-bargaining and sentencing at international criminal courts

Abstract

Plea-bargaining, although initially rejected, is now an integral part of the activitiesconducted by international criminal judges, lawyers and prosecutors. The thesis aims toevaluate the introduction of this practice in the case-law of three courts: the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former-Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal forRwanda and the International Criminal Court. After assessing the main decisions on thesubject of these institutions, one can see that plea-bargaining had been transplanted fromthe domestic realm to the international fora with caution and certain adaptations. Twomain trends were identified. Firstly, international criminal judges exercise significantcontrol over sentencing, even in cases of plea-bargaining. Therefore, they are not formallybound by the plea agreements nor willing to accept blindly sentence recommendations bythe prosecution. Secondly, judges insistently pursue the international criminal tribunalsgoal to identity and record the truth. As such, they will only accept a plea if there isenough evidence to corroborate its content. In conclusion, international criminal tribunalsimplement plea-bargaining taking into account their particular structural and ideologicalfeatures, and not just as an automatic transposition from domestic law.