Epistemic akrasia and epistemic inefficacy : a virtue-based approach

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dc.creatorVeronica de Souza Campos
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-06T15:14:25Z
dc.date.accessioned2025-09-08T23:19:55Z
dc.date.available2022-10-06T15:14:25Z
dc.date.issued2022-09-08
dc.description.sponsorshipCAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1843/46037
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidade Federal de Minas Gerais
dc.rightsAcesso Aberto
dc.subject.otherEpistemic akrasia
dc.subject.otherWeakness of the will
dc.subject.otherEpistemic inefficacy
dc.subject.otherVice epistemology
dc.subject.otherEpistemology of inquiry
dc.titleEpistemic akrasia and epistemic inefficacy : a virtue-based approach
dc.title.alternativeAkrasia epistêmica e ineficácia epistêmica : uma abordagem baseada em virtudes
dc.typeTese de doutorado
local.contributor.advisor1André Joffily Abath
local.contributor.advisor1Latteshttp://lattes.cnpq.br/4938760014695877
local.contributor.referee1Ernesto Perini Frizzera da Mota Santos
local.contributor.referee1Alexandre Meyer Luz
local.contributor.referee1Arthur Viana Lopes
local.contributor.referee1Breno Ricardo Guimarães Santos
local.creator.Latteshttp://lattes.cnpq.br/3175469280309670
local.description.resumoIn this dissertation I make the case for a “new” epistemic vice, the vice of epistemic inefficacy. While baptizing and sketching profiles to vices is a bold philosophical enterprise, the task is made unpresuming by the fact that the vice I attempted to shed light on is actually correlated with a longstanding and much known problem in the history of philosophy: the problem of weakness of willpower, or akrasia. I make the case for this interrelatedness by showing that, while they’re not, strictly speaking, the same problem, or mirror problems, weakness of willpower and epistemic inefficacy have a lot in common. In fact, epistemic inefficacy, I submit, is as close as you can get to weakness of willpower in intellectual, or epistemic, contexts, since in those contexts the notion of willpower (ability to control thoughts and actions) is not preponderant. The preponderant notion when it comes to epistemic activity is efficacy (ability to yield the intended results). To accomplish this, I show that there is a good deal of problems with the thing that is normally thought to be, or meant to be, weakness of willpower’s mirror-concept, the so-called “epistemic akrasia”; and I devise a comprehensive presentation of vice epistemology and inquiry epistemology, and of why epistemic inefficacy squares of as an epistemic vice following the tenets of those disciplines
local.publisher.countryBrasil
local.publisher.departmentFAF - DEPARTAMENTO DE FILOSOFIA
local.publisher.initialsUFMG
local.publisher.programPrograma de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia

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