Uma nota sobre uma teoria medieval acerca de inexistentes

Abstract

Some medieval solutions to the sophism ´omnis homo de necessitate est animal´ postulate a special kind of being, the being of essence (esse essentiae), in order to explain how a necessary predication can be true about beings whose existence is contingent. The esse essentiae, distinct from the actual being (esse actuale), has only necessary properties. From this feature of medieval theories, two differences with contemporary Meinongian approaches follow. Firstly, according to Meinong, the sort of property an object has does not depend on its ontological status – the so-called ´Independence Principle´. Moreover, the esse essentiae is not part of the account of intentionality. Medieval theories that deem necessary to postulate a special kind of being to explain intentionality do not postulate the esse essentiae. Meinongian objects, on the other hand, are part of the account of intentionality and of the evaluation of sentences about non-existents.