Crisipo e Sêneca face à questão do tempo, ou, O tempo concebido como reflexo dos acontecimentos

Abstract

This study is a proposal of comparison between the Stoic conceptions of time in the thoughts of Chrysippus and Seneca. The origin of this research was an intuition that this topic has a special position in the philosophy of these authors, although its justification, as investigation, can only be given once the connection between both philosophers’ conceptions becomes explicit – and this is a long task. Hence, we aim to show that there is not only a possible dialogue between such perspectives, but also a complementarity between Chrysippus and Seneca’s accounts of time – insofar as both of them can, each in his own way, be of aid to shed light upon each other, as well as to enrichen a possible, even though diversified, stoic conception of time. Chrysippus, in the 3rd century BC Athens, offered a theory according to which the distinction between some aspects of time (χρόνος) would allow us, despite its continuous nature, to conceive it as an interval capable of reflecting happenings – thus enabling us the knowledge of the status of existent beings (SVF II 509); Seneca, in the Imperial Rome of the 1st century AD, would exemplify and validate Chrysippus’ strategy, by conceiving, in the philosophical issue of time, (tempus) the thought reflex of human existence, reason by which the recurrence of this topic in works such as the Epistulae Morales and De Brevitate Vitae would become a core strategy in favor of the awakening of moral and philosophical consciousness which stems from realizing human condition. In such a way that, although conflict between their conceptions enables to compreehend that both Chrysippus and Seneca begin from a common perspective – that time constitutes a reflex of happenings –, the nuances and points of divergence, according to the particularity of their methods and purposes, would lead, as a result, to a transition of perspectives in the stoic conception of time.