Da ação individual à ação conjunta

Abstract

This dissertation analyzes the conceptual step from individual intentional action to collective intentional action. The primary agent of an individual action is only one agent who acts according to his or her desires, beliefs and intentions. In order to analyze individual action, we will take Davidson’s theory of action (2001), according to it a mere bodily movement becomes an intentional individual action only when it is justified, rationalized and caused by an agent’s mental events. However, Davidson does not take an intention as a distinctive mental event and reduces it to the primary reason, which is constituted by a pro-attitude (desire) and a belief. We will make a critical analysis about Davidson’s theory of action taking Bratman’s planning theory of intention. For Bratman an intention is a distinctive mental event that plays fundamental roles in the configuration and elaboration of action plans that extend through time and it is irreducible to desire and belief. Bratman’s theory of action will be taken as an extension of Davidson’s theory. This extension will be fundamental for relating the planning theory of intention in individual action with Bratman’s theory of shared intention in joint action. We will make critical analyses about nonreducionists theories of shared intention such as Gilbert’s (1987) and Searle’s (1992). Thus, we conclude that shared intention is a psychological phenomenon that is socially manifested and that is better explained in terms of individual attitudes of the agents who constitute the group of a joint action.