Regulação por incentivo no setor elétrico brasileiro: instituições e eficiência

Abstract

This master thesis advocates an economic and legal analysis of Brazilian incentive regulation in electricity distribution networks, especially since 2004, the year that celebrated the consolidation of the new regulatory model. Nevertheless, attempts to understand the effect of regulation in electricity distribution utilities in the timeframe 2004-2012. To achieve the goals a multimethodological approach is used, primarily by the method of Law and Economics, specifically the approach of the New Institutional Economics, and later by statistical methods. The first method allowed the perception of transaction costs in the relationship between the regulator and the public utilities of electricity distribution and the efficiency and inefficiency of its institutions. The second method allowed the empirical perception of the effects of regulation. In conclusion, despite the perceived institutional improvement from the 90's, the paucity of new institutions, concatenated to methodological uncertainties and few credible commitments during the Periodic Tariff Review cycles considerably outweighs the transaction costs and reduces incentives expected by the incentive Regulation. Consequently, it can be stated that the Regulatory Incentive implemented in Brazil has been inefficient and ineffective. Additionally, it is concluded that the incentive regulation implemented in Brazil is ineffective in reducing tariffs for electricity supply and ineffective in establishing a fair rate.