O problema da verdade na obra do jovem Heidegger (de 1914 a 1927) : a influência da fenomenologia de Husserl e a elaboração de uma hermenêutica da facticidade

Abstract

This work aims to offer a contribution to the investigations on the question of truth in Martin Heidegger's initial thinking. From a historical-philosophical reflection, we present transformations and displacements of notions inherited from Husserl's phenomenology, in particular, intentionality (Intentionalität), expression (Ausdruck), meaning (Bedeutung) and shading (Abschattung) in the Heidegerian formulation of the notion of truth as an alethéia - veiling and unveiling of Being. Although the question of truth permeates Heidegger's entire philosophy, our cut focused on the works prior to 1927, when the approach to the problem was interconnected to the being-there (Dasein) and the concepts of understanding (Verstehen) and transcendence (Transzendenz). We start from the work The doctrine of judgment in psychologism: A critical-positive contribution to logic (Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus. Ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik, 1914), in order to describe Heidegger's effort to shift the structural elements of phenomenology from Husserlian intentionality to its phenomenological hermeneutics of being-there. Next, we show how, in the courses of 1919 and 1927 - The idea of philosophy and the problem of the conception of the world (Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem) and Fundamental problems of phenomenology (Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie) - the human being-there (menschliches Dasein) was configured as an opening (Erschlossenheit), while factual life (faktisches Leben) was affirmed in a practical and everyday sense in the modes of unveiling and veiling of being. Under the lights of the works Fundamental Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy (Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie, 1923-1924) and Prolegomena to the history of the concept of time (Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, 1925), subsequent investigations strove to deal with facticity and truth from the modes of openness of the existence of the being-there, in particular, in the sense of the ek-static unit that outlines the being-in-the-world structure (In-der-Welt-sein), allowing the being-there to be constituted temporally as a project. Finally, we come to the works The fundamental problems of phenomenology (Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Sommersemester 1927) and Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, 1927), having been elaborated the dynamics that involves the relationship between projecting and time, discriminating it as the vigor of having been (Gewesen-sein), updating and coming (future) as an ontological mode from which truth is given (sich gibt) in its historicity (Geschichtlichkeit).