Uma solução artefactual para o problema da referência de objetos fictícios

Abstract

Our aim is to trace a theoretical path about the reference of fictional objects. Therefore, we present Frege, Russell and Meinong's treatments to give the classical background upon which our theme is. We try to show how insufficient this classical frame is due to its solutions for the reference of fictional objects and the results we want to meet. We then suggest that Kripke's line of argument established from Naming and Necessity, through Vacuous Names and Fictional Entities to Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures, as an alternative to the study of these objects. Nonetheless, despite its innovation, became clear how incomplete the set of theses put forward by Kripke was. However, the importance of this set up is clearly noticed as the base ground for artefactual theories of fiction. In this sense, we utilize Amie Thomasson's Fiction and Metaphysics in order to show the results gathered from this theory to the problem of the reference of fictional objects. After analyzing the artefactual set up presented by the author, we consider thomasson's artefactual theory to offer the solutions that best connect to our language practices regarding fictional objects and how we deal to the problem of its reference.