Realismo lógico e pluralismo lógico

Abstract

In the face of the diversity of existent logics, a strong appeal for forms of pluralism arises in philosophy of logic. Pluralism is the perspective according to which there are more than one correct logic, and relates to the multiplicity of treatments that can be given to the notion of logical consequence. Nevertheless, forms of pluralism tend to conflict with the perspective that logic describes reality in its more general aspects. That is: once there is only one reality, there should not be more than one true description of its more general aspects. This dissertations purpose is to conciliate these two points of view. For such, it advocates for a form of pluralism that is based on the different properties that can be preserved from premises to conclusion. Therefore, the classical logic keeps being interpreted as having an ontological feature, for it preserves truth. Other logics can be justified in a different scope, where they dont conflict with classical logic as description of reality. It is argued, following the works of Carnielli and Rodrigues3, that this is the case of some paraconsistent logic, which would be reconcilable with classical logic for having an epistemological feature and intends to preserve evidence; and, similarly, that would be the case of intuitionistic logic, which also has an epistemological feature and intends to preserve availability of proof.