Frege on the reference of sentences
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Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
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Artigo de periódico
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The aim of this paper is to show that Frege’s argument which concluded
that the reference of a sentence is its truth-value, presented in On Sense
and Reference (1892), can be reconstructed taking into account the problems of the notion of conceptual content presented in the Begriffsschrift
(1879) and also other passages from a letter to Russell (1902) and the
posthumous Logic in Mathematics (1914). Once the ‘hybrid’ notion of
conceptual content was rejected as the semantic value of the expressions
of the formal language designed to carry out the logicist project, there
was no alternative between truth-values and thoughts. I claim that the
reconstructed argument is perfectly sound and convincing.
Abstract
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Frege, Gottlob, 1848-1925, Filosofia, Lógica
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Frege, Reference, Truth-values, Slingshot
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http://www.sa-logic.org/sajl-v5-i2/11-Rodrigues-SAJL.pdf