Compreensão de ser como crítica à relação sujeito e objeto em Ser e Tempo

Abstract

In the Heideggerian existential analytic, as the ground for fundamental ontology, we find a critique of traditional conceptions of philosophy that understand knowledge as a relationship between man and the world. These conceptions establish a dichotomy between two subsisting entities, which entails the general legacy of representationist theories of knowledge. From there, dualisms arise: man and world, subject and object. Heidegger seeks to deconstruct this dualistic notion, arguing that a relationship between subject and object arises only secondarily, given that the original opening of manifestation of entities is carried out by a unitary phenomenon called being-in-the-world. Dealing with Heidegger's encompassing argument, our core hypothesis is that understanding plays the main role in this attempt, inasmuch as it establishes being-in-the-world. Thus, we will show how Heidegger operates with a deconstruction of the term that we commonly call understanding, a conception of cognitive nature, aiming for a conception of understanding that lays the existential possibilities constituted from his notion of the world.