A crítica à "prima philosophia" em Theodor W. Adorno : considerações ontológicas na Dialética negativa

Abstract

This dissertation examines the concept of prima philosophia in Theodor W. Adorno, especially in his later work Negative Dialectics (1966), but also uses indications already present in Against Epistemology: A Metacritique (1956). It is discussed the guidelines provided by the author to overcome the logical structuring of these philosophies, disclosing the conditions for a thought that does not come from a foundation. Thus, the formulation of negative dialectics, which is constituted as a dialectical procedure of internal deconstruction of the systematic and methodical structure of the first philosophies, is analyzed in terms of its possibility of removing the ontological character fixed in the concepts. A procedure that takes place in order to maintain a materialist thought that places the object as central, but that is a thought, at first, in conflict with ontologies. From the perspective of an ontology that can only be, in Adorno, a “negative ontology” –the ontology of the false condition –, the discussion about the status of ontology in his work emerges. However, if the rupture with the stabilization of a fixed identity in first philosophies can only be obtained, according to the author, within these philosophies themselves, through an immanent critique, thus arises the dialectic between the immanent destitution of ontological claims and the need of a rationality that glimpses the transcendence to this stability. This argument opens, again, the debate both to objections to an absolutization of criticism in Adorno and to readings that interpret the possible ontologization of critical negativity as a force to be endorsed in negative dialectics. Positions among which this work sought to align mainly with the latter and with the ontological horizons that it can give rise to.