O uso epistemológico da noção de justiça em Parmênides

Abstract

The aim of this dissertation is to understand how we can speak of a method/way for the investigation of nature, based on Parmenides' On Nature, that does not fall into the misleading order (apatelòn, B8.52) of two-headed mortals (díkranoi, B6.5) that name two separate forms (dúo gnomas, B8.53). In order to understand the method/way, the notion of dike (Justice) will be worked out in the different contexts in which it appears in the poem, in an attempt to establish how it operates as an “instrument” for knowledge and so that a fair discourse can be pronounced on the things. Thus, the notion of justice favors, in our view, the abandonment of discourse that lacks discernment (àkrita B.6 7) , for a fair and reliable discourse (pístis), the result of a decision preceded by reasoning (Krinai dè logos B7.5). Our hypothesis is, therefore, that the notion of dike operates as a “key piece” to understand the “epistemological” intention that constitutes the background of Parmenides' poem.