Direitos humanos como trunfos e a proibição absoluta do uso de mecanismos de tortura pelo direito internacional

Abstract

Discourses about the need for the defense and effectiveness of human rights are recurrent and there is no doubt about the centrality of these rights. The great debate in the Philosophy of International Law usually involves the definition of its role, as well as the hypotheses in which violations occur. In this context, theoretical research was carried out with the purpose of investigating some of the main definitions of human rights, in order to show, in the end, that Dworkin's theory is currently the most adequate for the effectiveness of human rights and, especially, to explain and defend the absolute prohibition of the use of torture mechanisms. This article will apply this Dworkin concept of human rights, that is, rights that act as trumps against the justifications for political action, to the practice of torture, demonstrating that it constitutes a serious violation of human rights. For that, it applies the theoretical and jurisprudential research as methodological technique and the methodological procedure of content analysis.