O efeito das preferências políticas e das regras institucionais na estratégia presidencial de assessoramento na América Latina (1988-2016)

Abstract

How do ideological factors associated with institutional rules and the dynamics of the presidential agenda shape presidents' decisions about their information channels? This dissertation proposes a decision-theoretic model to explain whether and how these factors determine presidents' choices about their information channels. It is argued that presidents have two informational strategies at their disposal: relying on ministers and the bureaucracy of ministries or centralizing Presidential Advisory Units (UAPs) in the presidency. If the distance of preferences between presidents and ministers, institutional constraints and the dynamics of the presidential agenda favor centralization, presidents are more likely to use UAPs as their main information channel. These units are collegial, reporting directly to the presidency and dedicated to producing and sharing information with the presidents. The research adopts a longitudinal research design, observing the variation in the presidential advisory strategy between the post democratization and 2016 for six Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay. To test the theoretical propositions, a panel data as identification strategy is applied, with logistic regression models with unbalanced panel data and fixed effects. The data used in the research comes from an original database of presidential normative decisions regarding the creation of UAPs and secondary databases of projects such as Comparative Agenda, Who Gov, Presidential Cabinet, Database of Political Institutions, and Worldwide Governance Indicator. The results partially support the argument: contrary to expectations, the association of ideological factors with institutional rules and the dynamics of the presidential agenda does not affect presidents' decisions about their information channels. On the other hand, the salience of the ministry's public policies areas and the ministerial referendum mechanism matter significantly for this decision by the presidents. Furthermore, others alternative factors are statistically significant: the bureaucratic capabilities of the ministries, the pre-existence of advisory units centralized in the presidency and the type of government. The latter, however, showed a direction contrary to expectations. The latter, however, showed a direction contrary to expectations. The main contribution of this research is to produce relevant knowledge about the factors that affect presidents' decisions regarding their information channels and to qualify the debate on the use of presidential administrative prerogatives, contributing to the theoretical advancement of the research agenda on decision-making centralization.