Da dissolução ontológica do problema da dominação social

Abstract

This work examines what is called here the process of ontological dissolution of the problem of social domination in the context of the critical theory of society. To this end, it starts from the observation that, at the turn of the 20th to the 21st century, there has been a transformation in the way it is conceived: from being a historical and social situation to be overcome politically, domination has come to be understood as "inscribed at the level of being". It is suggested that the core of this dissolution can be traced back to the recent privilege granted to the notion of "power" by social criticism. The aim, therefore, is to analyze the presuppositions and consequences of this dissolution by examining a theoretical program that considers an adequate definition of "power" as an indispensable requirement for social criticism. This program is formulated by three authors linked in some way to the tradition (Amy Allen, Rainer Forst and Martin Saar), based on a critique of Axel Honneth. A dissatisfaction with Honneth's insufficient thematization of the mechanisms of power will lead these authors to a rapprochement with the thought of Michel Foucault and Judith Butler. It is argued that this program necessarily incorporates what is referred to here as the "two dogmas" of Foucault's theory of power: 1) power only applies to freedom; 2) power produces the real. Together, these principles maintain that there is no opposition between power and freedom, but a necessary link that structures every possible social relationship. From there, methodologically, the argument develops as an immanent critique of ontology. The procedure adopted follows the classic scheme of reductio ad absurdum: the premises are taken to the point where their consequences become untenable. The two dogmas of the theory of power lead to the conception of freedom as a transformation of ontology and, correlatively, of domination as a mere illusion of the fixation of this ontology. The limits of this conception are highlighted by the introduction of the hypothesis of the "iron cage of ontology": assuming that ontology is politically and normatively constructed, freedom could still be eliminated if ontology found an a posteriori closure based on "irrevocable commitments". The plausibility of this situation lies in the "objective restrictions" imposed by a particular technical artifact: nuclear weapons. It is argued that the mere existence of these artifacts is enough to unilaterally determine social normativity as a whole, regardless of consensus, intentionality and legitimacy due to their technical nature. The consequence is that the theory of power needs to be abandoned. At the same time, it is suggested that the "nuclear order" could be taken as the material "infrastructure" of the "post-liberatory" condition of critique in which the very program aimed at an adequate definition of "power" is inscribed. In other words: the ontological dissolution of the problem of social domination could be interpreted as a symptom of the unavailability of ontology. Finally, the thesis suggests the need to reposition the question of the possibility of freedom in fully historical and political terms, as something that must be referred to experience, and not as an ontological given assumed a priori. Along these lines, it reformulates the relationship between technique, normativity and freedom, and provides an interpretation of nuclear weapons as "absolutely negative objects", that is, objects from which no "surplus" can be extracted and whose mode of existence is in a relationship of direct negation towards humanity.