Conteúdo não conceitual e a idealidade transcendental do espaço e do tempo

Abstract

The debate on Kantian nonconceptualism has gained prominence in contemporary Kantian philosophy research since the publication of Robert Hanna’s paper, in 2005, “Kant and nonconceptual content”. Since then, much has been discussed about this new reading of the doctrine of transcendental idealism and his attempts to reconcile the Kantian epistemic doctrine with the nonconceptualist arguments of analytic philosophy. We want to show how the pure intuition of space, as a pure form of sensibility, introduces a spatial-egocentric structure in the perceptual experience that does not require the function of the synthesis governed by concepts, performed by the faculty of understanding, and allows to structure a kind of content that has a non-conceptual nature. To achieve this goal, this dissertation was divided into three chapters. In the first, we discuss the development of the doctrine of the transcendental idealism of space and time that culminates in the thesis of the pure non-conceptual forms of sensibility. In the second chapter, we take a look at the debate between conceptualists and nonconceptualists in contemporary philosophy. More specifically, we address the problems that govern the standard conceptual position, mainly supported by John McDowell, and the nonconceptualist responses, developed from Gareth Evans’s position, with special focus on the theory of egocentric space. Finally, in the third chapter, we address the main problems that the nonconceptualist Kantian position must face when it proposes that the doctrine of transcendental idealism of space and time is compatible with the thesis non-conceptual content of experience.