Liberdade moral e liberdade pós-moral : da crítica à afirmação da agência no pensamento de Nietzsche

Abstract

Although Nietzsche presents, in his middle and late period works, a strong critique of the traditional and moral Christian notion of freedom – that is, the notion that we are free, in a superlative sense, to choose the course of our actions – and, furthermore, understand that all events in the world (including human actions) are conditioned by a deterministic web of struggle of organic forces (namely, the perspective of the will to power) aiming to dominate one another, it is observed that the philosopher constantly employs, in his mature writings, a vocabulary that involves the word "freedom" and similar ones. In this sense, we propose to analyze how it is possible to understand the use of this vocabulary as part of a Nietzschean defense of an alternative positive conception of freedom that would be, at the same time, disconnected from the moral and traditional notion of freedom and linked to an ideal of perfection and excellence in action.