Clientelismo, eleições legislativas e o Programa Bolsa Família : um estudo de caso em Minas Gerais

Abstract

Studies in the field of clientelism shows that this specific social phenomenon can influence the voting patterns and local behavior in developing countries, maintaining in power a political elite that detains the vast majority of the local economic resources. Conditional Cash Transfer Programs, such as Bolsa Familia in Brazil, are designed to give direct cash transfers from the government to the poor, potentially affecting political relations that are bonded by those dependencies. Those programs represent an unexpected variable in the equation of clientelism – they provide an escape for clients, with resources that no longer depend on the patron’s approval. This dissertation pursues a hypothesis that the presence of Bolsa Familia changes the vote-seeking strategies of Federal Deputies with voting patterns aligned with clientelism, reflected on the municipal dominance levels. This is executed through a case study in Minas Gerais, observing the interaction between the Bolsa Familia program and the levels of municipal dominance across the years of the program implementation. The quantitative analysis is, then, supplemented by a qualitative part to provide additional inferential leverage for the statistical data. Despite the theoretical evidences, data analysis showed shows that empirical evidence is inconsistent and that further research on the matter should be pursued and improved.