Illegal logging as a disincentive to the establishment of a sustainable forest sector in the Amazon

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dc.creatorLetícia Santos de Lima
dc.creatorFrank Merry
dc.creatorBritaldo Silveira Soares Filho
dc.creatorHermann Oliveira Rodrigues
dc.creatorChristiane Dos Santos Damaceno
dc.creatorMarcos A. Bauch
dc.date.accessioned2023-04-18T21:31:03Z
dc.date.accessioned2025-09-08T23:28:50Z
dc.date.available2023-04-18T21:31:03Z
dc.date.issued2018-12-05
dc.description.sponsorshipCNPq - Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico
dc.format.mimetypepdf
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207855
dc.identifier.issn1932-6203
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1843/52204
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidade Federal de Minas Gerais
dc.relation.ispartofPLoS ONE
dc.rightsAcesso Aberto
dc.subjectEcologia
dc.subjectBiodiversidade - Conservação
dc.subjectBrasil
dc.subjectMadeira - Exploração
dc.subjectIndústria madeireira
dc.subject.otherTimber industry
dc.subject.otherIllegal logging
dc.subject.otherConservation strategies
dc.titleIllegal logging as a disincentive to the establishment of a sustainable forest sector in the Amazon
dc.typeArtigo de periódico
local.citation.epage21
local.citation.issue12
local.citation.spagee0207855
local.citation.volume13
local.description.resumoBrazil recently began granting timber concessions in public forests to promote sustainable forest use. The effectiveness of this strategy hinges on the design and implementation of the concessions themselves as well as their competitive position within the logging sector as a whole. There is, however, a lack of information on the competitive interaction between legal and illegal logging and its effects on concessions profits. We address this knowledge gap by using a spatially explicit simulation model of the Amazon timber industry to examine the potential impact of illegal logging on timber concessions allocation and profits in a 30-year harvest cycle. In a scenario in which illegal logging takes place outside concessions, including private and public “undesignated” lands, concession harvested area would decrease by 59% due to competition with illegal logging. Moreover, 29 out of 39 National Forests (≈74%) would experience a decrease in harvested area. This “leakage” effect could reduce concession net rents by up to USD 1.3 Billion after 30 years. Federal and State “undesignated” lands, if not adequately protected, could have 40% of their total volume illegally harvested in 30 years. Our results reinforce the need to invest in tackling illegal logging, if the government wants the forest concessions program to be successful.
local.identifier.orcidhttp://orcid.org/0000-0002-0268-2055
local.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-7703-946X
local.publisher.countryBrasil
local.publisher.departmentENG - DEPARTAMENTO DE ENGENHARIA HIDRÁULICA
local.publisher.departmentIGC - DEPARTAMENTO DE CARTOGRAFIA
local.publisher.initialsUFMG
local.url.externahttps://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0207855#sec020

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