Risco moral, subsídio público e política tarifária: uma análise microeconômica para o transporte público a partir do modelo de Belo Horizonte

Abstract

This work seeks to analyze public authorities' decision-making in the face of regulatory challenges regarding public transport in terms of welfare, quality, and fares, based on the operation of Belo Horizonte's public and conventional transportation system. Using the Principal-Agent methodology for the Moral Hazard scenario, we evaluated how the interaction in a strategic game between public authorities, firms and public transport users can shape the contractual incentives that optimize social welfare. This analysis was conducted considering different levels of knowledge on the part of the Principal (the public authority) regarding the operations of the Agent (the service provider). Based on this conceptual investigation, it was verified under which conditions the Principal should offer wage incentives to the Agent to make efforts to improve the service quality. In addition, public choice and social welfare were assessed in scenarios with different autonomy for the Principal to manage the public transportation ticket price.The results indicate that price management by the public authority is an important tool for optimizing welfare. Further, the modeling suggests that contractual incentives and the bus ticket's price are connected to each other when the Principal optimizes social welfare. Then, there is a specific ticket value for each arrangement of contractual incentives offered by the public authority based on the level of quality desired for the service.