Como os presidentes se informam? : a estratégia presidencial de assessoramento no Brasil (1990-2017)

Abstract

The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze what strategies the Brazilian presidents of the period 1990-2017 used to circumvent in informational problems arose in the decision-making process resulting from the cabinet's multiparty composition, party alternation and external shocks. To this end, the analysis focuses on an administrative tool available to the presidents, namely, the centralization of formal advisory structures (EFAPs) in the Presidency aimed at collecting, systematizing and providing advice and information. To analyze the advisory structures, two work fronts are undertaken. First, a descriptive analysis of these structures is carried out based on five dimensions in relation to which they vary: (1) the quantity of EFAPs present in the Presidency, (2) of the political area to which they are directed, (3) the type of policy they are dealing with, (4) institutionalization and (5) composition. Second, an exploratory analysis to verify whether and how the informational problems arising from the cabinet's multiparty composition, party alternation and external shocks are associated with the variation in the annual quantity of EFAPs centralized in the Presidency. To verify the association, bivariate analyzes are performed (Pearson's correlated test, Spearman's and Qui-square of independence). The results of the analyzes indicate that there is, in fact, a positive and significant association between the information problems resulting from the cabinet's multiparty composition and the centralization of new EFAPs. However, they indicate a low association between the other informational problems discussed and the centralization of new EFAPs. Such findings suggest that more definitive conclusions about the relationship between these variables require a multivariate analysis, controlling the interference of other factors.