A estabilidade da concepção de justiça e sua relação com as democracias reais no pensamento de John Rawls

Abstract

This work deals with the stability in Rawls's theory of justice, going through, initially, the exposition of the theme that was approached in his two main works: “A Theory of Justice” and “Political Liberalism”. It then deals with an interesting debate between two great Rawls interpreters, Professor George Klosko and Professor Paul Weithman, about the “inherent stability vs. imposed stability” dichotomy and the eventual need to smooth the distinction between the two models, to to consider that real societies, known as “liberal democracies”, can meet the ideal of justice without being labeled as unjust, just because they have the component of coercion in their state structure. At the end, an analysis of the debate is presented with considerations about Rawls' goals and, therefore, a demonstration that Klosko's critique does not consider an end-state theory, despite being useful for an analysis of concrete situations to define the which may be more or less fair, aims to demonstrate that liberal democracies, in an ideal situation, can satisfy certain conditions so that, in Rawls's view, they meet the demands of justice, delimited by the members of a well-ordered society in a situation of full deliberative rationality.