A disputa sobre ontologia fundamental entre David Lewis e Nancy Cartwright : um estudo sobre os reflexos na física, na economia e no direito

Abstract

This thesis proposes a reinterpretation of Law as a technical instrument of social engineering, grounded in Nancy Cartwright’s notion of nomological machines as developed within the Philosophy of Science. The investigation begins with an analysis of Hume’s ontology of causation, according to which our beliefs about causal connections do not stem from necessary bonds between events, but from habits formed through repeated experience. This conception underpins David Lewis’s formulation of the so-called Humean mosaic, a metaphysical framework in which reality is structured as an arrangement of discrete facts governed by immutable natural laws, the foundation of a deductive and universal science. However, the thesis argues that such a model proves inadequate for understanding social phenomena, which are marked by contingency, complexity, and contextual variation. In contrast, Cartwright rejects universalist ideals and maintains that science operates through the construction of experimental arrangements that explore the intrinsic capacities of elements, allowing for the generation of regularities under specific conditions. On this basis, the dissertation defends the possibility that unobservable entities and natural capacities may be empirically discovered and articulated, offering an alternative epistemological path for the investigation of social phenomena. Economics is thus reinterpreted, drawing on Julian Reiss’s contributions, as an applied science dedicated to building adaptable models capable of producing local predictability by arranging socio-economic facts whose capacities are discernible. In continuity, the same conceptual framework is applied to the legal field, conceiving Law as a normative system designed to modulate behavior effectively and predictably. Departing from moralized or naturalistic conceptions, Law is here understood as a normative mechanism operated by the holder of institutional power, capable of organizing social facts as components of a normative laboratory. The thesis concludes by proposing that Law can be conceived as a nomological machine of social engineering, capable of generating normative and behavioral effects in service of the constituted power.