As ambiguidades interpretativas de Heisenberg acerca das relações de incerteza

Abstract

This dissertation aims to propose a division into phases of Werner Heisenberg’s thought. By carefully analyzing the physicist’s work, we observe philosophical inconsistencies regarding the derivations, causes, and interpretations of his uncertainty relations. At times, Heisenberg presents a derivation through the γ-ray microscope, while at other times, he considers only the direct derivation through the Dirac-Jordan formalism. Regarding the causes, the physicist varies between justifying his relations through the thesis of perturbation or through complementarity. As for interpretations, Heisenberg oscillates between accepting an epistemological interpretation or an ontological interpretation of the uncertainty relations. From the analysis of these inconsistencies, we propose three distinct, internally coherent phases for Heisenberg’s thought, enabling a deeper understanding of his work and a more precise philosophical study of the physicist.