Dual class shares, board of directors’ effectiveness and firm’s market value: an empirical study

Página do item simplificado
dc.creatorLélis Pedro de Andrade
dc.creatorAureliano Angel Bressan
dc.creatorRobert Aldo Iquiapaza
dc.date.accessioned2023-02-28T13:48:35Z
dc.date.accessioned2025-09-08T23:13:44Z
dc.date.available2023-02-28T13:48:35Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10997-017-9375-7
dc.identifier.issn13853457
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1843/50505
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidade Federal de Minas Gerais
dc.rightsAcesso Aberto
dc.subjectAdministração de empresas
dc.subject.otherVoting power
dc.subject.otherDual class shares
dc.subject.otherOutside directors
dc.subject.otherAgency costs
dc.titleDual class shares, board of directors’ effectiveness and firm’s market value: an empirical study
dc.title.alternativeDual class shares board of directors effectiveness and firm s market value: an empirical study
dc.typeArtigo de periódico
local.citation.epage1092
local.citation.issue4
local.citation.spage1053
local.citation.volume21
local.description.resumoThis study aims to identify whether a relationship exists between the controlling shareholders’ voting power and outside directors’ effectiveness in maximizing firms’ financial performance. We analyze a panel data with 3057 observations for the 2000–2012 period using a random effects model, logit and probit regressions, and the two-stage model of Heckman in the Brazilian stock market. Our findings show that firms whose controlling shareholders use dual class shares to leverage their voting power have less independence from the board and worse financial performance and market value. Further, the percentage of outside directors tends to be ineffective in increasing the firm’s value, and in changing the firm’s chief executive officer (CEO) when (1) the controlling shareholder’s voting power is leveraged, or (2) when the CEO assumes a position on the board of directors simultaneously. We interpreted that these results are in line with the arguments in favor of the existence of a new agency cost, which is related to the undue obedience of board members to authority, such as the largest controlling shareholder or the CEO in Brazilian listed firms.
local.publisher.countryBrasil
local.publisher.departmentFCE - DEPARTAMENTO DE CIÊNCIAS ADMINISTRATIVAS
local.publisher.initialsUFMG

Arquivos

Pacote original

Agora exibindo 1 - 1 de 1
Imagem de Miniatura
Nome:
Dual class shares, board of directors’ effectiveness and firm’s market value an empirical study - s10997-017-9375-7-2.pdf
Tamanho:
619.71 KB
Formato:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Baixar

Licença do pacote

Agora exibindo 1 - 1 de 1
Imagem de Miniatura
Nome:
License.txt
Tamanho:
1.99 KB
Formato:
Plain Text
Descrição:
Baixar

Coleções

Artigo de Periódico

Logo UFMG