Corrupção sob medida: detecção, reprovação moral e punição do corrupto como estratégias cooperativas

Abstract

The aim of this doctoral thesis is to investigate the reasons for the multiple meanings of corruption and the different reactions to it in Brazil. The research is interdisciplinary, and begins by pointing out the multiple meanings of ―corruption‖ in official documents, dictionaries, ―interpreters of Brazil‖ and corruption perception indices. It is concluded that there is no single meaning for the term, which is explained by theories of the evolution of human behavior, especially evolutionary moral psychology. The thesis' hypothesis is that the term ―corruption‖ actually encompasses deviations in large-scale cooperation, involving collective resources, for the personal benefit of the deviants. Maintaining cooperation involves at least three strategies: identifying those who do not cooperate, through the cheater detection module; the punishment of deviants, through the tendency to moralistic aggression and consequent punishment at any cost; and controlling others to lessen the chance of cheating through morality. These three mechanisms also explain the multiple meanings and reactions to corruption, as the corrupt is one of the possible cheaters in cooperative games. A model of corruption judgment is proposed, based on the social intuitionist model of moral judgment and on the typologies of perception of corruption proposed by Heidenheimer and by Peter and Welsh. In the model, three types of variables stand out that can lead to different positions on corruption: the subject, the object and the context. With the model, and the cooperation mechanisms, an assessment is made of how the public debate on corruption has affected the country's politicial enviroment and criminal legislation proposals, and the risks of lack of clarity about what people are claiming when talking about the end of corruption, as well as the risks of mixing moral judgments and criminal legislation.