O sucesso político do setor agropecuário no Brasil contemporâneo

Abstract

Although the behavior of interest groups is one of the most traditional research subjects in the Political Science, the Brazilian literature about the topic is still incipient. The size of researches is relatively small and grows slowly at the recent years. The most of it focus on the question of lobbying success and/or influence of interest groups within the Brazilian National Congress, especially on the political action of industrial business. Among the many gaps identified, it assumes salience the absence of researches on the lobbying success and/or influence of agricultural, financial, commercial and service sectors. In this context, the biggest demand of research field still resides on exploration and description on the behavior of interest groups. Aligned to this perspective, the question is: What is the lobbying success of the agricultural sector within the Brazilian National Congress? What are its characteristics? The analysis of political outcomes attained by the agricultural sector assumes prominence not only because there is a gap in the literature, but also by various evidences pointing that such sector is an important political actor. Among them, the considerable participation of agricultural sector on the Brazilian GDP and trade balance; the intense participation of agricultural interest groups on public hearings and seminars promoted by parliamentarian committees of the Brazilian National Congress and substantial financial campaigns contributions to the Brazilian legislative elections of 2014. To measure the political success of the agricultural sector, it was employed the method of preference attainment with categorical measurement scale. First, it was selected an active umbrella organization of agricultural sector from the Brazilian National Congress: the Agricultural Parliamentary Front (Frente Parlamentar da Agropecuária). Next, it was identified a set of legislative propositions of interest for the group between 2011 and 2013. Finally, it was verified the interest group positions and outcomes for each proposition. The results found suggest that agricultural lobbying success is similar to the industry’s success. The success overcomes the failures and is characterized by the defense of the status quo in the face of potentially harmful propositions, in other words, it is a defensive success. Most of the results align with the thesis of the legislative dominance of the Executive Power, except by the offensive success of the sector, due to the propositions authored by the Legislative Power. Surprisingly, none defensive failure of the group was identified, which would imply effective losses for agricultural sector with worsening of the regulatory environment. Within the scope of the thematic categories of the propositions, diversified scenarios were observed. Finally, three influence indications were identified. First, most of the propositions analyzed closed legal procedures aligned with the agricultural sector’s interest. Second, the success and gain rates of the agricultural sector grow over time parallel to the professionalization of the interest group’s lobby activities. Finally, the priority degree and gain and mitigation rate are associated in the expected way, that is, the gain rate grows according with priority degree, while the mitigation rate reduces.