A compatibilidade entre o formalismo da ética discursiva e a crítica habermasiana à eugenia liberal

Abstract

This thesis explores the programmatic challenges facing Jürgen Habermas' discourse ethics with regard to his critique of liberal eugenics, understood as the use of technologies to select or alter the human genome for the purpose of genetic enhancement based on parental values or interests and the market supply of genetic products and services. In criticizing this philosophical position, Habermas uses concepts such as species ethics to defend the normative interdiction of liberal eugenics, which would lead his discourse ethics to rely on substantive concepts that are characteristic of teleological ethics. To investigate the possibility of a “substantive turn,” in the first chapter I analyze the recent debate on the ethical implications of technologies for altering the human genome, the philosophical positions of the advocates of so-called liberal eugenics, and its detractors in the context of Habermas’ theses. The second chapter analyzes the arguments in the book 'The Future of Human Nature' to understand the role of concepts such as human nature and species ethics in its moral philosophy, evaluate the status of the regulatory proposal for the moralization of human nature in relation to ethical formalism, and to question whether this proposal in fact requires that discourse ethics rethink the limits of what the philosopher calls the postmetaphysical moderation of ethical life. In the third chapter, I question whether the relationship between technique, science, and ideology offers additional elements for the Habermasian critique of the implications of liberal eugenics, and the extent to which his theory of society illuminates the complex relationship between the moral sphere, political and legal regulations of human genome modification technologies. From the standpoint of the grounding of discourse ethics, I contend that a return to the substantive moderation of ethical life does not adequately represent an application of the principles of universalization and discourse to the evaluation of candidate norms to regulate the use of technology for the purpose of genetic enhancement, and that Habermas fails to complete a "substantive turn" in its ethics. From the point of view of the articulation of Habermas' moral philosophy with his social theory, his most relevant contribution is the thesis of the colonization of normative spheres of society by steering medium originating from the systemic sphere. This underscores the limited and one-sided nature of the liberal eugenicists' proposal for a regulation of the aforementioned technologies based on the articulation of parental values and market supply and demand laws. Confronting these two evaluations of Habermas' contributions to the debate, I point out the insufficient treatment given to the relationship between ethical values, moral norms, and legal rules in the face of the potential of the discourse theory of morality and law to propose alternative grounds that could guide the application of genetic technologies, taking into account the complexity of the issue.